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A firm’s participation in cartel depends upon the potential problems that may arise due to 
price fixing and the incentives provided to the management. The top levels of management 
such as the board of directors and the CEO are responsible for deciding if the firm will 
participate in the cartel and manage the corporate governance activities of collusive price 
fixing agreements.  
 
This study aims to identify which characteristics of the participating firms’ boards of 
directors and CEOs are associated with cartel formation. It analyses the empirical 
investigation of cartel participation of firms, taking into account corporate governance 
characteristics as such as board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, CEO 
characteristics, and CEO compensation scheme. The study is focused on UK cartel firms 
which has the highest representation in the sample. A total number of 150 cartel firms in 52 
cases from all around the world between the years 1990 to 2008 are involved in this study, of 
which 114 are UK firms. Therefore, this study is dominated by UK firms. 
 
The challenge of this study is that the personal attributes of CEOs and boards can make a 
significant contribution to the risk profile of a cartel being formed. This indeed would be to 
‘diagnose’ organisational culture in a quite radical direction. The study suggests and finds 
that some corporate governance attributes are associated with cartel formation. The results 
reveal consistency with prior researches, that cartel firms have different corporate 
governance relative to a control sample in the three years prior to cartel formation.  
 
Specifically, the study concludes that UK-based cartel firms characterised by having larger 
board size compared to non-cartel firms; lower percentage of independent directors (non-
executive); higher average of board remuneration; less likely that cartel is formed by 
family-owned and controlled firm (large shareholders); having older CEOs represented on 
the board; having CEO who served a less number of years as a director; less likely to have 
a female CEO represented; more likely to have CEOs who’s combined CEO-chairman 
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“Effective competition is crucial to an open market economy. It cuts prices, raises quality, 
and expands customer choice. Competition allows technological innovation to flourish”.  
— Directorate General Competition website, June 2005 
 
1.1 Background  
Firms have been carrying out collusive behaviour in terms of price fixing for many years; in 
the 1980s the antitrust authorities around the world started to pay more attention to these 
firms. The penalties enforced on the organisations worldwide exceeded $2 billion per year in 
the early 2000s. More than 40% of these penalties were settled in private suits. The remaining 
60% were fines imposed by the European Union antitrust authorities and the US (Connor and 
Helmers, 2007). A cartel is defined as an association which is formed by independent firms to 
establish objectives in explicit agreements that would help them reap profits by either 
controlling prices or restricting the level of output (Connor and Helmers, 2007).  
 
Not only does price fixing incline firms to join cartel but also management incentives, which 
help them carry out this decision (e.g., Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Spagnolo, 2005). 
Collusive agreements are managed at lower discount factors when managers find that there 
exists a smoother path for profits and that contracts are able to achieve incentive provisions 
such as bonus plans, etc. (Spagnolo, 2005). Since high collusive profits are expected by 
shareholders, shareholders are ready to bear the high costs associated with the plan. It is also 
observed that in a classical model of repeated oligopoly, a positive correlation exists between 
the performance-based incentives of the top hierarchical levels and tacit collusive agreements 
(Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2008). 
 
Two issues have been found requiring attention in a cartel situation: The entry of new firms 
and the cheating possibility (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). The financial statement of the 
organisation consists of all kinds of deviations that the firm may carry out as part of the 
collusive agreement. The partners in the cartel may start a price war if they find exceptional 
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earnings, and this activity may result in lower earnings overall. The antitrust authorities may 
also be alerted and the collusive agreement would be considered weak. Defection from 
collusive behaviour may not be attractive since the future costs are very high. Some of the 
firms may also enter the market and distort the existing collusive equilibrium. Concentrated 
industries are commonly found to have successful cartel that facilitate collusive activities 
(Bolotova, Connor, and Miller, 2008).  
 
The management of the organisation is required to enforce cartel agreements (Spagnolo, 
2005) and the decision to actually form the cartel is taken by the top management 
(Harrington, 2006c). The CEO, Board of directors and top management are all involved in 
the collusive price fixing agreements, which are formed by their firms as part of the corporate 
governance discussions. Hence, it is necessary to understand whether the corporate 
governance within a firm helps determine if a cartel should be formed. Many organisations 
may not want to carry out this hard-core activity and establish collusive agreements. Cartel 
participation increases if the board of directors is weak; if most power is exercised by the top 
management level (concentrated power); and if the incentives provided to the management 
depend on their performance levels (Spagnolo, 2005). The empirical literature has not yet 
established a link between cartel and firms’ corporate governance characteristics.  
 
1.2 Addressing the Problem  
This study’s primary objective is to examine the characteristics of the boards and the CEOs 
of firms involved in cartel formation. It is proposed that significant differences in the 
corporate governance attributes may exist between cartel and non-cartel firms, and that these 
differences might help to explain how corporate governance characteristics are related to 
cartel formation and discovery.  
 
The independent variables reflecting corporate governance attributes are grouped in four 
different types: board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics, 
and CEO compensation scheme. A review of the corporate governance literature reveals 




1. Corporate governance attributes that are proved in the literature to have a link with 
financial fraud. 
2. Corporate governance attributes that are proved in the literature to have a link with 
collusion (Han ( 2010), Spagnolo (2005), Burhop and Lubbers (2008), Gonzalez and 
Schmid (2012)) 
3.  Based on the agency theory perspective that will be illustrated in chapter three. This 
includes the internal monitoring by boards of directors (Fama (1980) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983)), and the use of NEDs (Fama (1980) and Anderson et al., (1993)). 
4. Corporate governance attributes that the review of the prior literature reveals a lack of 
research in them. For example age of the CEO and the board of directors.  
5. Corporate governance attributes that are proved in the literature to have been 
associated with competition. This includes CEO compensation scheme (Spagnolo 
(2000) and Han, (2010)). 
 
These attributes are used in this research to test the link between corporate governance and 
cartel formation. In line with the above illustration, the main research questions are: 
 
 Is there any corporate governance characteristics associated with cartel formation? 
 Can appropriate policies and recommendations regarding a board structure be 
designed to reduce the probability of firms creating cartel? 
 
1.3 Research Approach  
This research aims to find if there is a link between corporate governance characteristics and 
cartel formation in UK-based cartel firms. The cartel data set consists of 150 cartel firms, 
where 114 firms are from the UK. These firms have formed cartel and discovered in 52 cartel 
cases that operated in all around the world, and were found guilty by DoJ, EC, and OFT/CC 
between 1990 and 2008.  
 
Several databases are used in the cartel sample selection and cartel data collection phases of 
this study. The ordered logistic estimation model is used to examine the differences in board 
characteristics, ownership structure, and CEO characteristics among cartel and non-cartel 
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firms, where Binary model is used to examine the differences in CEO compensation among 
cartel and non-cartel firms. 
 
1.4 Contributions of the Study  
This study links two literatures by studying the relationship between corporate governance 
and cartel formation. 
 
Prior studies have examined the economic consequences of cartel formation. Various criteria 
have been applied to evaluate cartel performance (e.g. Levenstein and Valerie, 2006) 
including longevity (e.g. Dick, 1996; Simmerman and Connor, 2005; Levenstein and Suslow, 
2010), stability (e.g. Porter and Zona, 1993; Villar, 1983, 1973 and 1999), social welfare (e.g. 
Bos and Pot 2012; Mott, 2003), and efficiency (e.g. Burhop and Luebbers, 2008; Dick, 1998; 
Günster, Carree and Dijk, 2011). However, only few papers have discussed cartel formation 
in relation to corporate governance. Specifically, previous studies focus on cartel formation in 
connection with compensation, CEO tenure and board characteristics (Han (2010); Spagnolo 
(2005); Burhop and Lubbers (2008); and Gonzalez and Schmid (2012)).  
 
However, this thesis offers contributions to the literature by complement the empirical 
findings of Spagnolo’s (2005) which are connected to this research. As Spagnolo documented 
that collusive agreements are managed at lower discount factors through smoother paths for 
profits. He has specified that price fixing and management incentives encourage firms to join 
cartel, which provide enlightenment to this research as it discusses corporate governance and 
cartel formation. The focus of his study is similar to this current study since both of them 
discuss compensation schemes (remuneration) as one of the characteristics of corporate 
governance. Spagnolo reinforces the influence of corporate governance on cartel formation as 
stated in his paper that to enforce cartel agreements is to require the management of 
organisations. Therefore, the current research is complementing the empirical finding of 
Spagnolo’s (2005) 
 
Furthermore, this thesis offers contributions to the literature by complement the empirical 
findings of Han (2010). Han examines short-term and long-term employment contracts and 
their effects on cartel stability. The study shows that firms are more likely to be involved in 
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cartel agreement when CEO tenure (short-term employment contract) is low or when CEO 
turnover is high. The author also shows that a short-term contract provides stability to a cartel 
formation more than a long-term contract. Therefore, the current research is complementing 
the empirical finding of Han’s (2010).  
 
Moreover, the most closely related study in this literature is perhaps the study by Gonzalez 
and Schmid (2012). Their research was conducted by using a sample of 1,148 observations 
from 1987 to 2009, in 182 various U.S. cartels. Overall, the research studied the link between 
possibility of being part of a cartel and financial controls, product market competition and 
several corporate governance variables. The corporate governance variables that they use in 
their study are; board size, CEO shares, block ownership, % outsiders, combined CEO-
chairman, busy board and finally CEO centrality. The study found that there is direct 
involvement posed by the board of directors and the CEO in the potential collusive price 
fixing agreements of their firms, leading to an assumption of a significant relationship 
between corporate governance and cartel formation. However, in this research the focus on 
different board and CEO characteristics in addition to the one used by Gonzalez and Schmid, 
also this study uses to test the hypothesis dataset contain mainly UK-based cartel firms. 
Therefore, the current research is complementing the empirical finding of Gonzalez and 
Schmid (2012). 
 
In an experiment conducted by Hamaguchi et al. (2009), gender was included as an 
individual or social background variable, in an experiment mostly designed to look for group 
size effects on cartel dissolution, along with leniency programme characteristics. The design 
of the research (which also proceeds by logistic regression), is very much alike the research 
pursued here in this study. There is certainly more attention being given to individual 
characteristics than ever before in the non-econometric analyses. The coefficient for gender 
in the logistic regression was significantly negative in showing that women have a positive 
impact on cartel dissolution (p<0.05), since “fewer men dissolved their cartels than women” 
(Hamaguchi, et al. 2009). Therefore, the current research is complementing the empirical 
finding of Hamaguchi, et al. (2009). 
 
In many ways, this study is also complementing the work of Grillo (2002). Instead of focus 
on competition law and how market strategies are nullified by the “straightforward co-
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ordination on market strategies”, the focus of this research describes how multiple firms 
design and practice an organisational culture in a cartel arrangement, or what Grillo calls “an 
anticompetitive object”. This anti-competitive object can more easily be reproduced amongst 
certain kinds of boards and with certain types of CEO – this is the conclusion of this research. 
Therefore, the current research is complementing the empirical finding Grillo (2002). 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter Two discusses the definition and 
formation of cartel and highlights the four main players in cartel formation. It then discusses 
the theoretical framework on cartel formation. This is followed by a discussion on cartel 
damages and cartel accountability (individual vs. firm). Furthermore, this chapter reviews the 
factors facilitating cartel agreement and the development of policy under the three main 
jurisdictions used in this study: the U.S Department of Justice, the European Commission, 
and the Competition Commission /Office of Fair Trading in the UK. 
 
Chapter Three will first look into the concept of corporate governance and the roles of the 
CEO and board of directors in corporate governance. In addition, it discusses the influences 
of corporate governance on market competition, and cartel formation.  This followed by a 
review from the literature on the relationship between cartel formation and CEOs as well as 
the impact of cartel formation on shareholders. A discussion of agency theory shall be 
presented in tackling the concept of corporate governance and cartel formation. It will then 
identify the independent variables and justifies its utilisation in this research as proxies for 
corporate governance attributes. Finally, an overview of literature on corporate governance 
will be used to justify the inclusion of each independent variable and provide an 
understanding as to why these attributes may be associated with the incidence of cartel 
formation.  
Chapter Four describes the sources of data and method of collection. It discusses how the 
cartel sample was obtained, including the two screening stages used to filter the initial set of 
cartel identified into a usable sample. The resulting cartel data are then compared with the 
initial sample and their characteristics are described in more detail. It discusses how the 





Chapter Five, which deals with methodology and empirical results, provides a presentation 
and discussion of the results using assembled data. It describes six boards, two ownership 
structure and eight CEO variables, as well as models, which depends on three environmental 
factors – the market environment, legal and regulatory environment, and internal control 
environment. Cartel and non-cartel sets are matched, and the analysis of board and CEO 
characteristics are being focused by cross comparison, controlling for other environmental 
factors.  
Chapter Six, on the other hand, provides an analysis of the results reported in Chapter Five in 
an effort to address the research questions. It embodies a discussion of the findings as well as 
how ownership concentration takes place in cartel formation. It also tackles compliance code 
needs in cartel; and corporate anti-cartel compliance programmes. 
Chapter Seven presents a summary of this research and draws conclusions and implications. 
This chapter also highlights the study’s potential limitations and provides recommendations 





















Cartel is a phenomenon, which have been extensively researched upon to understand their 
workings and their effects on society and economy. Many different kinds of theoretical 
models and empirical studies have been brought after extensive economic analysis in relation 
to cartel. It is found that a firm forms a cartel when it intends to purposely raise prices for the 
customers and eventually harm them due to an increasing expense. 
 
Nearly all discovered cartel are operated and formed by managers (CEO/executives) whose 
motivation may not be fully aligned with those of the profit-motivated owners (shareholders). 
Even though participating in cartel may benefit executives and shareholders during their 
period in operation, once caught and sentenced, the effects of such behaviour can result in 
high fines and reputational losses on the part of the firm and its management (Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1990). This thesis contributes to the theoretical basis by shedding some light on 
the characteristics of the boards and executives of firms involved in cartel formation. 
 
This chapter discusses the definition and formation of cartel and highlights the four main 
players in cartel. Moreover, it tackles cartel accountability (individual vs. firm) and reviews 
the factors facilitating cartel agreement. Finally it examines the development of policy under 
the three main jurisdictions used in this study: the U.S Department of Justice, the European 
Commission, and the Competition Commission/Office of Fair Trading in the UK. 
 
2.2 Definition and Forms of Cartel 
Cartel is a formal agreement between competitors that attempt to restrict competition between 
them in order to increase profitability and/or maintain price. They are generally regarded as 
the most serious restrictive practices, especially ‘hard core cartel’ which are generally defined 
as agreements that fix prices, limit supply or output, share markets or rig bids (OECD, 2003). 
Successful price fixing usually requires more than price to be controlled. For example, in the 
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Citric acid cartel which ran from 1991-1995, firms agreed on a standard price and allowed to 
offer discounts to their key clients according to a market sharing agreement (Ellis and 
Wilson, 2003).  
 
In addition, cartel formation can either be on an international level (e.g., the lysine cartel 
case) or on a domestic level (e.g., sugar cartel in the UK). Moreover, cartel can be public 
(e.g., OPEC) which is a legal agreement supported by the government, or private which is an 
illegal act viewed as violating antitrust laws in most jurisdictions. In this research, the focus 
is on the private cartel, in its international and domestic levels. 
 
The four-tier hierarchy models below (Figure 2.1) demonstrate the cartel players: manager 
(CEO, director), owner (shareholders), anti-cartel enforcement, and consumer. 
1. The management of the organisation is required to enforce cartel agreements 
(Spagnolo, 2005). The decision to actually form the cartel is taken by the top 
management (Harrington, 2006c).  
2. Shareholders and/or owners of the firms are assumed to have objectives which are 
different from that of the management (Discussed in Chapter Three). 
3. Anti-cartel enforcement is one of the pressures on the firms and the cartel agreement. 
An anti-cartel enforcement policy is a set of legal instruments to fight cartel and to 
protect fair competition in the market.  
4. Market/consumers may be forced to pay a higher price for goods and services; or they 
might not afford to buy these products at all; and/or they might be forced to buy the 
products from abroad.  











Figure 2.1: Cartel Players     
 
    
  













             Source: Author 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework  
 2.3.1 Oligopoly Theory  
The field of economics state that when there are small numbers of sellers (oligopolists) in the 
market and these sellers are dominant enough to have an effect on the market structure, then 
oligopoly is said to be taking place. The firms and the players have knowledge about each 
other’s actions as well as the ability to affect decisions.  
 
The most well-known and most basic theory of oligopoly behaviour is called the Cournot 
Model. The Cournot Model is established on a very simple assumption that other market 
players will not change their amount of production. When there is oligopoly present in the 
market, there is a possibility of cartel formation. This cartel is an explicit and formal 
agreement amongst the competing firms of the industry regarding the quantity of production 




















due to the small number of firms and due to its being bound by many anti-trust laws (Stigler, 
1968).  
 
Several issues arise due to the small number of players present in the market for a specific 
business situation. The theories and economic models cannot be developed efficiently since 
the actions of these players cannot be judged. These players are always acting at their best to 
carry out activities and strategies against each other in competition. Their activities may be of 
many kinds which involve coming together and performing in a perfectly monopolised 
market, enabling them to act as strong rivals and drive the price of the commodity towards a 
very low level (Stigler, 1968). 
 
To increase power in the market, the oligopolistic firms form a cartel. This helps them work 
together as a group by stating the price that will be charged and the level of output that will 
be produced. Forming such a cartel helps them carry out monopolistic activities. A horizontal 
market price demand curve will be formed for firms that are in an oligopoly and sell an 
undifferentiated product like Lysine. If a cartel is formed by firms and the output and price 
are fixed, then the demand curve would then be downward sloping like that of a monopolist. 
The monopolist and the cartel usually have the same goal of profit maximisation. The output 
level determined by the cartel members is based on the level where the combined marginal 
cost is equal to the combined marginal revenue. The output level defined by the cartel helps 
maintain a market demand curve that identifies the cartel price. The cartel as well as the 
monopolists always chooses to maintain a perfectly competitive market where there is less 
output and high price level. 
 
Forming a cartel presents itself with a certain set of rules that need to be efficiently enforced 
by the members. The members may not want to remain a part of the cartel and pursue their 
own interests since they could increase their levels of output and prices for profit 
maximisation. They could sell at a high monopoly price compared to the rest of the cartel 
members. If a small firm is part of the cartel and is contributing less towards the market 
output, then the price it manages is high and has the ability to provide full capacity 
production for profit maximisation. The cartel may always be at risk, but the firms enjoy the 




The classic framework put forward by Stigler (1968) states that for a cartel agreement to be 
formed and sustained, firms need to recognise their mutual interdependence. Moreover, they 
must see an incentive to cooperate, maintain the agreement, and avoid cheating, e.g., through 
some punishment mechanism. 
 
Due to market conditions, the prices do not fluctuate for a small number of firms and they 
might be inclined to cheat in their cartel agreements. These firms are required to remain 
within the prices that have been set and sell the same product to the buyers.  
 
The distribution of profits is also decided upon by all members which are part of the cartel. 
One method that could be used is to pool in all profits with the cartel managers and then 
receives equal dividends from this pool. Such an activity is usually observed by professional 
sporting leagues since they can share the revenues. The market allocation would be able to 
help decide on the distribution of profits for the cartel members. The members may receive 
shares as the market has been allocated to the cartel members in some specific way 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2006). 
 
 2.3.2 Game Theory 
Game theory tries to predict how people behave in strategic situations. In other words, game 
theory analyses the way that two or more players choose strategies that jointly affect each 
other (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2000).  
 
Dixit and Nalebuff (1993), on “Thinking Strategically:” Game theory means rigorous 
strategic thinking. It’s the art of anticipating your opponent’s next moves, knowing full well 
that your rival is trying to do the same thing to you”. 
 
A basic game theory that shows the problems involved is the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which 
assumes that the prisoner’s dilemma is an imaginary position where two individuals are 
caught and are charged of carrying out a crime. The two prisoners are kept separately, and 
tries are made to encourage each one of them to implicate the other. In the event that neither 
of them does confess, each will be set free. This is called the co-operative strategy, which is 
available for both prisoners. To be able to induce one or both to confess, each one is informed 
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that a confession implication or a small incentive reward may result to her or his discharge. In 
case both admit, both will be jailed. Yet, if one of them implicated the other and not the 
opposite, then the implicated one will get a tougher sentence compared to each one of them 
implicating the other. 
 
Several strategies used in game theory: 
1. Dominant strategy: In considering possible strategies, the simplest case is that of a 
dominant strategy. This situation arises when one player has a single best strategy 
regardless of the strategy the other player follows.  
2. Nash equilibrium (non-cooperative): Each firm considers whether to charge its high 
price or to raise its price toward the monopoly price and try to earn monopoly profit. 
The firms can raise their price in the hopes of earning monopoly profits. It is also 
sometimes called the non-cooperative equilibrium because each party chooses the 
strategy which is best for itself with no collusion or co-operation and without 
considering the welfare of the society or any other party. 
 
2.4 Factors that Facilitate and Limit Collusion  
Two constraints have been defined in theory for a cartel to operate successfully (Mott, 2007).  
First, the firms should be able to fulfil the “participation constraint” requirement. Second, the 
“incentive compatibility constraint” should be satisfied to ensure that the cartel is operating 
successfully. Once the “incentive constraint” is fulfilled, the “participation constraint” is 
fulfilled automatically. Violating the “incentive constraint” leads to the deterrence of the 
cartel, independent of the “participation constraint” (Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2006, 2007). 
Thorough monitoring has been carried out by cartelists to ensure that the firms are not selling 
large quantities at the raised price since this would be unfair. If such behaviour is found, the 
firms would be penalised, and this punishment can aid in managing stability in the collusive 
arrangements. To sustain the formation of a cartel, two constraints need to be satisfied along 
with several factors that may help with its stability (Ellis and Wilson. 2003). Several market 
characteristics that contribute to cartel stability are discussed below: 
 
1. Presence of Entry Barriers: If barriers to entry are kept low, then reaching 
agreements may be difficult for the industry. If any kind of competitive strategy is 
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being set, the low barrier to entry would attract new players to enter with their short 
term hit-and-run strategy. This would highly affect the competitive strategy of the 
players. The collusion sustainability may also be affected since the risk of future entry 
reduces retaliation issues. If entry occurs, the firms may have a less portion of 
profitability to lose. The firms may resort to deviation but the future entry prospects 
may not affect their short-term benefits. However, the costs associated with future 
deviation may be reduced since the profits would also tend to diminish.  
 
If any new entries take place, profits diminish as a result regardless of how much the 
organisations may try to build strategies against them. The retaliation occurring 
against the deviating firm is also less significant if there is entry in the industry. There 
will be undercut of the collusive prices and the collusion process also declines.  
 
An entry barrier has been defined as that aspect which reduces the threat of entry and 
allows the incumbent firms to reap profits above the normal levels (Bain, 1954). 
Large scale economies may be considered a barrier to entry if only the incumbents 
remain at the level of production and the new entrants believe that this level of 
production is efficient and will remain throughout to help maximise profit levels. If 
the incumbents start to believe that maintaining a lower level of production would 
help in increasing profits with a large-scale occurrence of entry, then the future 
entrants would also not keep their previous levels of output.  
 
The opinion brought forward by Bain is rejected by Stigler (1968) since the latter 
believes that scale economies cannot be considered a barrier to entry. The researcher 
clearly stated that the costs which are borne by new players are the basic barriers to 
entry and these costs are not borne by those members which are already present in the 
industry. He states that the new entrants as well as the incumbents have the benefit of 
scale economies if the output is expanded. Hence, his definition does not state that 
scale economies are a barrier to entry and the two researchers have different opinions 
regarding this aspect. The antitrust lawyers and the economists have been posed with 
difficulty due to the conflicting definitions presented by the researchers regarding 




Cigarettes and steel are a part of a collusive oligopolistic industry used by Bain (1949) 
to state his empirical evidence. To maintain short term profits, the price levels of the 
commodities have been kept at lower levels which would act as deterrence for entry 
and a limit price model. This limit price is the highest price which has been set by the 
incumbent firm to make sure that at least one other firm is able to enter the market. 
Before carrying out this activity, the incumbents make sure that they are clear about 
the competition levels that they would face along with the market share, which they 
would lose to the new entrant. The profits that have been estimated beforehand are 
compared to this limit pricing and not compared to the short-run profit maximising 
price, which could be set. The short-run prices which the incumbent firms want to set 
may be low since they want to reap the small profits all for themselves and maximise 
their levels of industry profit to keep the entry barriers high in order to discourage 
entry (Bain, 1949).  
 
The limit pricing would help the firms manage long term profitability by letting go of 
the short term profits and for this purpose, Bain (1950) aimed to search for 
appropriate market conditions. One of the vital elements that were found was freedom 
of entry since if new players were to enter the market conveniently, and then the 
incumbents would not be able to reap short-term benefits easily. Three factors that 
may restrict entry freedom have been identified. First, patents may be used for 
production processes or the required resources be controlled. Second, production costs 
may be low for the incumbents as compared to the new entrants. Lastly, the 
economies of scale and the optimum firm scale may be large as compared to the 
market.  
 
Barrier to entry has been defined as a that aspect which allows present firms to 
establish pricing above marginal costs, having monopoly in the market and making 
the entry of new players unprofitable (Ferguson, 1974). This marginal cost pricing 
does not allow long-term profits for incumbents since they would only be able to 
achieve them if prices were above-average cost, which usually does not happen due to 
competition. At the same time, Fisher (1979) states that if incumbent firm profitability 
is high, then entering the market would be difficult. The potential entrants may weigh 
the benefits of the society and the industry before entering the market. Von 
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Weizsacker (1980) highlights those costs as barriers to entry, which are borne by the 
new player in the market. This may cause a kind of distortion in the resource 
allocation of the society.  
 
Entry barriers are usually formed to avoid new players to enter into the market and 
reduce competition levels (Gruca and Sudharshan, 1995). These barriers may arise 
due to industry characteristics and may require new entrants to bear certain costs in 
the form of expenses to compete efficiently (Kerin et al., 1992). The incumbents are 
found to have many advantages, such as high level profitability (Yip, 1982) as 
compared to the new entrants due to these barriers (Nicholls, 1951; Porter, 1980a). 
With the presence of these barriers, competition is likely to remain away from the 
market (Shepherd, 1979) along with creating a spill-over effect. This effect takes 
place when a firm enters the market without a low price and brand loyalty and the 
incumbent firm reaps the advantages since it already has these aspects (Karakaya and 
Stahl, 2009). 
 
2. Number of firms: Cartel behaviour is more likely to sustain in industries where there 
are a few number of firms. The smaller the number of firms in the industry, the easier 
to manage and detect the behaviour of each other. Firms will get a better share of 
profits in a concentrated market when prices become higher, and the deviator’s short- 
term profit is actually smaller as it started through a larger market share. Hence, the 
more concentrated the market, the larger are the gains from collusion and the smaller 
is the cost of co-operation (Bain, 1951; Stigler, 1964). A study conduct by Tirole 
(1988) finds that the smaller the number of market participants, the more the 
likelihood of collusion.  
 
3. Quality differences/product differentiation: Forming a cartel also depends upon the 
type of products available, which may be homogeneous or differentiated. The 
existence of similar products - in case trust participants report a market share 
reduction - is justified through a quantity rise or a price reduced by firm cheating. 
Empirical studies have provided mixed results on product differentiation. Some 
studies state that in order to promote differentiation in the economy, many 
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organisations find it difficult to engage in collusion (Hay and Kelley 1974; Fraas and 
Greer, 1977); others find the opposite (Dick, 1996). 
 
Raith (1996) finds that corporations at times cannot observe the efficient activities of 
their competitors and in these cases, it is better that they focus on the set of demands 
present in the market and work towards horizontal product differentiation. If the 
product is unique in the market, it is possible that the competition between firms 
become stronger. In this way, the deviations being brought forward may become 
difficult to detect and the deceiving process would be difficult to sustain.  
 
4. Seller concentration: In general, established oligopoly theory is based on static 
equilibrium concepts and expects that a high degree of seller concentration in 
homogeneous product markets lowers the cost of managing common activities and 
therefore favours cartelisation. 
 
Similarly, some find that high seller and capital concentration facilitates collusion, but 
others find little or no impact of these determinants (Dick and Hay, 1996). Critical 
analysis states that there is bias present in the study relating to these aspects and that 
the focus is only on the most elaborate cartel formations. Dick (1996b) finds that in 
comparison with other export-oriented industries, the cartel formed by the American 
Webb-Pomerene kept the low seller concentration target and sold capital-intensive, 
non-durable and standardised products. They required growth in export industries, 
especially where the US industries had large market share. Jacquemin et al. (1981) 
studied 545 Japanese export cartel in forty sectors between 1960 and 1970. The four-
firm concentration average ratio in these industries was 59.5 percent compared to a 
62.7 percent average for all of Japanese manufacturing firms. However, collusion 
occurs in both very concentrated and very un-concentrated industries.  
 
5. Capacity constraint and excess capacity: The part that capacity constraints play on 
sustaining cartel is unclear. On one hand, a capacity-constrained firm has less to 
expand from undercutting its rivals as it is able to accommodate only a fraction of the 
extra-demand this would generate. On the other hand, capacity constraints limit firms’ 
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disciplinary power. This is because the strongest penalty that firms can expect is to 
produce at full. 
 
A study by Brock and Scheinkman (1985) gives a great example of this unclear effect. 
Throughout a symmetric environment in which all of the firms within the market have 
the identical capacity constraint, the authors demonstrate that a non-monotonic 
relationship exists amongst cartel durability as well as the volume of the total capacity 
kept by every firm. Whenever the market capacity is sufficiently small, the actual 
change restraint effect of capacity restrictions controls, indicating that including 
additional capacity can make collusion tougher to continue. When market’s total 
capacity is sufficiently large however, the penalty decreasing the impact of capacity 
constraints controls.  
 
The punishment-reducing effect of the capacity constraint dominates its position when 
the capacity of the industry is large. In order to sustain the collusion, it is essential that 
the firms increase their capacity levels. If a firm has the ability to sell a variety of 
products, then the process of collusion becomes hard. The reason being that the profit 
generated from all these products is high and the market share is also higher than what 
it would be if the firm were in a monopolist position. A variety of products enables 
benefits to be reaped from deviation greater than the opportunity cost of the 
punishment (Symeonidis, 2002). 
 
The cartel’s sustainability has been viewed in terms of the asymmetries which are 
present in capacity and its constraints. The aggregate capacity, along with the 
asymmetry impact, has been viewed as a combined effect. Studies carried out by 
Compte (1998) and Brock and Scheinkman (1985) both indicate that when the 
capacity of production is large, collusion is favoured by the firm and if the production 
levels are low, then the asymmetric capacity hinders collusion. The literature present 
on this aspect is vague; however, many theories promote the use of excess capacity to 
support collusion. 
 
6. Buyer power: An additional essential factor for cartel formation is the number of 
buyers in the market. Whenever firms set a price in secret, changes from cartel pricing 
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are much easier to identify if there are several small buyers compared to only a few 
large buyers:. Increasing the number of consumers increases the possibility that those 
last may communicate price reductions to competitors. Therefore, with a large 
number of customers, it is tougher to do secret price cut.  
 
Snyder (1996) argues that the impact of occurrence of interaction upon the firms’ 
capability to collude may be particularly vital in the presence of large buyers. This is 
because large buyers can strategically concentrate their orders across time in order to 
make firms’ relations less frequent and consequently make collusion harder to sustain. 
 
7. Elasticity of demand: The actual profits from fixing higher prices will certainly 
become higher the greater inelastic the market demand is. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the contraction in output essential to obtain the greater collusive price will be 
less; also the gains accordingly will be higher. Despite the fact that a low market 
elasticity of demand raises the probability of a cartel, it does not mean that a high 
elasticity of market demand indicates that cartelisation will not occur. This market 
elasticity is pre-cartel elasticity, presuming that the firms would not have substantial 
market power. Once elasticity during cartel is used, high elasticity may be consistent 
with the persistence and existence of a cartel since it has managed to increase prices 
closed to the cartel price; that is, high elasticity might be a proof of successful cartel 
(Snyder, 1996).  
 
8. Static or declining demand: A cartel is less likely to form when demand is growing 
considerably because of the problems of disentangling those sales due to greater 
demand from those included by firm undercutting the cartel price. 
 
Game theoretic models challenge the traditional view. When analysing the market, it 
is found that the trend in demand is cyclical and this assumption is considered a more 
realistic model (Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991). When the demand for a product 
is high, it becomes easier for firms to conspire since the cost of punishment is low and 
the short-term gains are at high levels. The demand levels which are persistent and 
stochastic have also been researched. It is believed that collusion takes place if the 
period of boom is to last for a long period (Bagwell and Staiger, 1997). Within a 
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decline phase, if transitory shocks take place, it becomes very difficult to sustain 
collusion. When capacity constraint is present, the collusive prices change according 
to changes in the demand conditions. A collusive agreement may also destabilise if 
there are long periods of low demand (Staiger and Wolak, 1992). 
 
2.5 Effects of Cartel Imposition 
Distribution and supply agreements are part of the vertical agreements which have the ability 
to affect the welfare and competition in a positive manner. Firms form agreements which are 
to fix the prices or raise them to undermine the competition and carve the market or allocate 
market shares. Through this process, the customers are harmed and the firms which are part 
of the cartel have considerable advantage. Hence, the formation of cartel is prohibited in the 
competition law and referred to as hard-core violations. This law believes that such cartel 
reduce the levels of efficiency within firms providing them with an unfair advantage. Any 
negative aspects which are present against the competitors are suppressed within the internal 
workings of the firm. Competition is removed from the market which distorts the entire 
buying and selling process along with attributing pressure on the buying power of the 
consumers. Extra costs are applied, which are borne by the consumers along with the 
suppliers and the non-participating competitors. The fixing of prices at a high level or 
preventing the price erosion process makes the customers of the product suffer in terms of 
purchase prices. The firms which are part of the cartel may carry out the following activities 
which affect the customers. 
 
Customers, suppliers, non-participating competitors and the final consumers are the ones who 
are highly affected by the imposition of cartel. When the purchase is made of the commodity, 
the effect of the cartel is felt by the consumer directly while other effects may be felt at a later 
point in time. Lost profits, interest and actual losses are direct effects caused by cartel. 
Market inefficiencies and several other structural effects may be included in the indirect 







 2.5.1 Direct Effects 
 Actual Loss (Overcharge) 
Several losses are incurred when the competition law is violated and the overcharge concept 
is used to estimate these losses. The customers are affected by several kinds of dimensions 
and this overcharge is only a part of the entire cartel agreement which constitutes the lower 
end of the losses. Overcharge has been regarded as that difference which exists between the 
hypothetical price that would prevail in the market and the actual market price incurred 
during the cartel agreement. The loss incurred by a single firm is referred to as the price 
overcharge and is multiplied by the product quantity purchased during that specific period to 
attain the price effects during the cartel. It has been observed as a fact in the case law that 
overcharge is usually at the expense of the rest of the market participants and arise due to 
hard-core cartel performed by the firms. 
 
 Loss of Profit 
Restricting the output quantity is one of the activities of the firm’s engagement in the cartel, 
which is why purchasers are subjected to additional damages. If competition is high, 
customers would be provided with large supplies of the commodity, which does not happen 
in this situation. Hence, the purchasers’ profit is the amount he would save if the purchase 
was made at a non-cartelised price. The ECJ Manfredi judgment states that the damage head 
that takes into account the total exclusion of the loss of profit consists of the compensation 
which should not be accepted. Within the context of commercial or economic litigation, if the 
EU law is breached, the total exclusion of the loss of profit would not be able to repair the 
damages which have been caused [Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, para 96]. 
 
 Interest (Opportunity Cost) 
The interest that has been accumulated on the value of the loss is able to account for the 
damages that have been cause by cartel formation in the market. This interest may also be 
referred to as the opportunity cost or the chance that is forgone to invest. The ECJ Manfredi 
judgment [Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, para 97] states that the damage caused and the 
compensation of the loss should not leave out factors such as time effluxion since it could 
also reduce the value. The award of interest should be regarded as an essential component of 
compensation according to the national rules that are applicable. With the help of this rule, it 
is possible to provide the sufferers with the real value of the loss. The EU law also requires 
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that the amount of interest should be paid from the time the damage occurred till it was 
actually paid off in full. According to the Marshall case, the amount of interest must be 
adequate in keeping with the loss that has been incurred. If there is any breach in the EU law, 
the payment should be made according to the national rule thus prescribed, which should be 
made in full [Case C 271/91, para 26]. A German Act has also been presented on the 
Restraint of Competition which states that on the day the damage takes place, the infringer is 
required to pay five percent above the base rate per year of the interest as an obligation for 
the damage that has been caused (ACCC Cartels, 2009).  
 
 2.5.2 Indirect Cartel Effects 
 X-Inefficiency 
The difference between the minimum and actual attainable average production costs is a gap 
which is referred to as the ‘X-Inefficiency’. Since there is less competitive pressure, the cartel 
firms maintain high levels of production costs keeping inefficient players in the market. The 
R&D activities are reduced along with the improvement of technology. Hence, product 
diversity and improvement of product quality suffers; however, a high price is still charged in 
the market.  
 
 Long-Term Structural Effects on the Market  
Many competitors are forced to leave the market due to cartel formation since there is 
predatory pricing, common battle funds, increased costs of rivals, and several other damaging 
activities by the members. Common standards that have been set also create a barrier for new 
entrants. Hence, it is found that cartel have a long lasting effect in the form of increased 
prices and profits on the market and competition levels even after termination. The damage is 
also continued after it has been thoroughly analysed and fined for the activities performed.  
 
2.6 Who is Accountable? Individual vs. Firm 
Preferences and incentives are the two things that drive the decisions people make in an 
organisation. When an organisation is found to misbehave, it is usually said that it is not the 
organisation but the people who are part of it who should be held accountable. The people 
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who are part of the organisation have formed a relationship with the firm, which is based on 
contractual arrangements (Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2007).  
 
Individual accountability is an important concept to be introduced to apply social control in a 
society. Individual accountability is described as “each individual is held responsibility for 
his/her own behaviours and actions” (Wells et al., 2011). They are required to provide an 
account of the behaviour or conduct that has been carried out and receive sanctions for this 
behaviour in order to progress further (Gereffi, 2011). This kind of accountability may be 
expected from either an individual or a corporation. It is not only limited to the actions of 
individuals. Corporations may be responsible for a criminal activity which requires policy 
regulations; it is also necessary to understand that not only may the corporations be held 
accountable for their actions but also individuals working within these corporations. 
 
According to Wells et al. (2011), the corporations are usually subjected to antitrust 
prosecution, since it is believed that they have the ability to pay the fines. On one hand, these 
penalties and fines are intended to motivate organisations to control the behaviour of 
management. An organisation is vast with large numbers of personnel, so it can be difficult to 
find which individual should be held responsible for the inappropriate action (Becker, 1968; 
Elzinga and Breit, 1986; Posner, 1976; Landes, 1983; Posner, 1980). On the other hand, 
several arguments state that the punishment for individuals is easier to implement and owing 
to their knowledge of this, they are inclined to act correctly. If an individual in an 
organisation is being punished, it harms the reputation of the corporation since the incident 
would be publicly highlighted and the employee may also engage in whistle-blowing. If an 
individual is held responsible for his actions in an organisation, he would be inclined to 
discourage activities like price-fixing since it could harm his reputation and job security 
(Calkins, 1997; Evans and Hughes, 2003). The individual could also be subjected to penalties 
alone and held responsible for this action. Any third party involved would also be subject - 
whether an individual or a corporation - to penalties or fines.  
 
Several cases have been observed where the corporation cannot be separated from the actions 
of the individual. In one hand, if an individual is being punished, he is found to protect his 
assets by combining them with the corporation. On the other hand, if the corporation is being 
punished, the individuals would want to save themselves by withdrawing their assets from the 
34 
 
organisation. If both the parties are being punished, it is possible that inefficient transfer of 
assets would take place. Hence, the two parties are more inclined to carry out behaviour that 
is consistent with the antitrust laws present in society (Calkins, 1997; Stephan, 2008b). 
 
A research study by the Centre for Competition Policy is also presented, where it states that 
there are several reasons why corporate fines alone are not able to provide efficient 
deterrence of such activity. At first, fines are limited and they cannot be applied in a 
disproportionate manner. Secondly, it is the individuals who carry out such decisions in the 
organisation. Lastly, it is not the organisation that makes the individual to carry out such 
activities as price-fixing (Stephan, 2008a).  
 
Furthermore, since individuals work as agents on behalf of the firm, it will make sense to 
prevent these individuals directly by frightening them through sanctions, also to enforce this 
kind of sanctions once they violate the law. Due to the fact that corporate fines rarely achieve 
a level that would likely increase their deterrent effects, they do not give enough incentives 
for the firm to effectively control and monitor its agents to prevent them from engaging in 
illegal activities and from placing the firm at the risk of getting fined for engaging in an illicit 
cartel. Besides, it is doubtful if a firm would at all times have the means to control and 
monitor its agents and prevent them from illegal behaviour (OECD, 2004). 
 
If an individual believes that the organisation will be held responsible and be punished for 
their actions, this does not ensure that he or she would avoid such activities. The Competition 
Authority goes through a long process of imposing fines on organisations and during this 
time, the responsible individuals may have switched jobs or even retired. The stockholders 
who may have profited considerably from the cartel formation would also have sold their 
shares before being subjected to fines. When corporate fines are finally imposed on the 
organisation, it is the current employees and stakeholders that will suffer, not the ones who 





2.7 Anti-Cartel Enforcement Policies  
The presence or absence of antitrust policy and the efficiency of their enforcement in a 
country impact the decisions of firms to collude or not. It also influences the level to which 
the market price can be increased if firms decide to form a cartel. Scholars have undertaken 
empirical studies of antitrust enforcement in the United States, United Kingdom and other 
countries around the world. Several measures of enforcement effort and performance 
provided by the Divisions have been applied. The literature review identified five key 
elements of an effective legal regime (OFT, 2009):  
 
1. Fines (against firms)  
2. Penalties (administrative and criminal) against individuals  
3. Amnesty/leniency  
4. Settlement 
5. Private damages actions 
 
This section discusses the anti-cartel policy development in the three main jurisdictions used 
in this research: the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), the European Commission (EC), and 
Competition Commission/Office of Fair Trading in the UK (CC/OFT). 
 
 2.7.1 The U.S approach (Department of Justice) 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Gallo, et al., 1994), which was the beginning of the U.S 
legislation to manage cartel, was the pioneer in recognising price-fixing contracts as criminal 
actions which were liable to economic as well as disciplinary sanctions. It officially declared 
the conspiratorial contracts shaped by rivals to restrict competition as illegal, stating that:  
 
‘[E]ach contract arrangement in the shape of conviction or else scheming, in limitation of 
business and trade...is to be illegal’. 
 
Subsequently, the Clayton Act of 1914 stretched the US anti-cartel policy and identified the 
different types of behaviour to be regarded as illegal restraints of trade, including the most 
harmful type of cartel behaviour (Harding and Joshua, 2003).  
§ 4 of the U.S Clayton Act, 1914: 
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‘[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws […] shall recover threefold the damage by him sustained, and 
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.'’ 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was set up under the Clayton Act and its Bureau of 
Competition became the main federal body investigating and initiating proceedings against 
firms involved in unfair parasites. Eventually, the FTC began to share enforcement of 
antitrust laws with the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DoJ). The DoJ is 
empowered to file criminal cases against cartelists and from the late 1970s; it gradually 
adopted an increasingly tough policy toward cartel.  
 
 Firm sanctions 
Heavier sentencing was encouraged by the publication of sentencing guidelines in 1977 and 
revised guidelines in 2004 and 2007. Maximum corporate fines have been increased several 
times since 1974.
 
Recognising the rising threat to U.S. businesses and consumers caused by 
cartel, in June 2004, Congress significantly raised the maximum punishment for criminal 
Sherman Act infringement increasing the statutory maximum corporate fine to $100 million 
(Hammond, 20005a).  
 
Gallo and Goshal (1996) show in their study that every time the statutory limit was raised in 
the years 1974, 1985, and 1990, real average corporate fines afterwards increased many 
times. The statutory maximum corporate fine was raised from $1 million to $10 million in 
1990 and to $100 million in 2004 (Connor, 2008).  
 
 Individual sanctions 
The legislative maximum prison time was unaffected for three decades, but individual fine 
levels were increased several times between 1974 and 2004. The maximum individual fine 
for illicit Sherman Act violations was increased to $250,000 in 1984, through a combination 
of the Omnibus Crime Control of 1984 and the Criminal Fines Enforcement Act of 1984.  
 
In 1990, the Sherman Act was modified to raise the individual fine to $350,000, and in 2004 
increased the statutory maximum individual fine again to $1 million, and the maximum jail 




 Amnesty programme 
In 1978, the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division set up an amnesty programme 
according to which corporations or individuals could confess their involvement in illegal acts 
and could aid the department in investigation of those acts. This programme was quite lenient 
in its operations and led to the reporting of one case per year. This was amended in 1993 and 
is currently in action and doing quite well in enforcing actions against major cartel. 
According to this programme, a corporation could confess its part in illegal activities and 
could cooperate with the Antitrust Division in carrying out investigations of such cases. This 
amendment has led to an increase in the number of applications to 20 per year and the 
conviction of 30 defendants with the collection of over $1 billion in fines within the last two 
years. It was found that more than 90% of the convictions in antitrust cases resulted from 
plea-bargaining. The structure of the programme made amnesty automatic if no ongoing 
investigation was made before the application.  
 
There is also a possibility of amnesty for those individuals who assisted the department in 
carrying out the investigation even if they came forward after the start of enquiries. Further, 
there is a possibility of a negotiated settlement at any stage of the investigation. In 1994, the 
programme was again amended to provoke individuals involved in antitrust violations to 
report to the Antitrust Division. Noteworthy immunity affects the data collected on sentences 




Settlement and plea bargaining are methods used to help enforcement and reduce costs. 
Under the US regime, 90% of the antitrust cases are settled. A study by Lande and Davis 
(2007) reports that private cartel settlements is $8.2 to 9.6 billion since 1990 for both 
domestic and international hard-core cartel in the U.S.  
 
 
 Private damages 
For nearly a century, private enforcement of the antitrust laws through damages actions has 
played a key part in the development of US antitrust law. Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 
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15 USC. § 5, injured partied can bring lawsuits against infringers and receive three times the 
amount of damage actually caused as a result of the anticompetitive behaviour. 
 
 Literature on penalty regime of the Department of Justice 
Next section discusses a number of studies to show the changes in the sanctions level over the 
years for both corporate and individual under the US Department of Justice (DoJ). 
 
A study by Connor (2008) evaluates the effectiveness of the antitrust law of the U.S. to detect 
and deter cartel during the period 1990 to 2007. Connor shows that the number of cartel cases 
filed by the antitrust fell by 49%. The number of firms charged annually decreased 
continuously during 1995 to 2007. Yet, the penalties imposed by the Division on convicted 
firms have increased. The total amount of cartel fines imposed is $4.2 billion. At the same 
time, the amount imposed for private damages is roughly four times as large. In addition, it 
shows that the Division places great attention on the prevention of cartel by imposing high 
prison sentence for convicted cartel managers.   
 
Table 2.1 below demonstrate the average fine from 1990 to 2007. There is a solid rising trend 
in corporate penalties, which in the early 1990s was an average of $28 million per year . 
From 1993 onwards the mean of the annual penalties has surpassed $300 million. Corporate 
penalties have averaged $560 million per annum in the period 2005-2007 - and between 1990 
and 2007; corporate penalties per enterprise have also risen. It can be calculated that during 
the 1990s, the mean corporate penalties were increased 26 times, then experienced a decrease 
during George W. Bush’s first term and finally, continued on its path of escalation during the 
four years of Bush’s second term. This is supported by data that provide statistical evidence 
for the four sub-periods throughout which the mean corporate fine grew from $0.5 to $12.9, 
$10.2, and $36.8 million accordingly, and the average mean corporate fine from 1990 to 2007 
is $7.5 (Connor, 2010).  
 
Table 2.1 illustrates that the number of persons indicted for breach of the policy was at its 
highest, 59, in the first half of the 1990s and in the succeeding years 1995-2006, it averaged 
39 per annum. In the first 64 years of the Sherman Act, only 21 individuals were incarcerated 
for price-fixing (Posner 1970: 389-391). This movement can be partly attributed to the 
change in the Division prosecutions from the secretive contracts of schemes, which included 
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a greater number of firms and managers in comparison to the typical price-controlling cartel, 
which has a relatively lower number. The sample shows that for the duration of 1995-2006, 
the number of cartel executives’ indicted rose; for instance in 2005-2007, the yearly figure 
for charged cartel executives was 22% greater than in 1995-1999. This can be explained, 
since being charged with a federal offence should have a greater deterrent effect; additionally 
the actual penalties could have undesirable implications for future employment (Connor, 
2008).  
 
The number of individuals fined for criminal price-fixing violations averaged 26.6 per year 
during 1990–2006 (Table 2.1). Just like the number of firms, the number of individuals fined 
peaked at 34 per year in 1990-–1994 and has been much lower (averaging 23.5 per year) 
since then. Furthermore, there is a strong downward trend in the yearly number of fined 
individuals during 1995–2006. Roughly 61% of all individuals charged with criminal price 
fixing were subsequently fined. This percentage was highest (79%) in the early 1990s and has 
dropped down in each subsequent sub-period since then. In 2005–2007, only 41% of those 
charged were fined. This decline in the occurrence of punishing individuals is explained in 
part by an increasing share of charges being levelled at foreign residents, many of whom 
became fugitives (Connor, 2008). 
 
Table 2.1 Annual Averages Cartel Fine for Corporations and Individuals 
under US DoJ From 1990 to 2007 
U.S. DoJ 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Number of Cartel Cases 72 55 35 25 
Corporate sanctions:         
Number corps. Fined 59 27 17 16 
Fines/corps. ($mil). 0.5 12.9 10.2 36.8 
Avg. corps. fines ($mil/yr) 28 317 174 560 
Individual sanctions:         
Person charged 59 36 40 44 
Avg. person fined 34.4 27.8 33.6 18 
Total fine ($ mil.) 1.62 4.39 3.4 7.75 
Fines/person 47 135 150 475 
No. imprisoned 14.6 11.4 16.6 23.7 
Source: Connor, 2008 
  
The Workload Statistics developed by the Antitrust Division state that the percentage of 
offenders confined behind bars for the period of 1990–2006 has averaged 37% and has 
consequently grown in every sub-period: 25% in 1990–1994, 31% in 1995–1999, 46% in 
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2000–2004, and 54% in 2005–2007. This pattern shows progress regarding cartel deterrence 
since the figures demonstrate that this proportion jumped from 37% in the 1990s to 52% in 
2000–2004, and hit a peak of 74% during 2005–2007 (Hammond 2007). 
 
Denvil (2011) examines the increase of individual sensation by DoJ. His research involved 
individuals who were sentenced to prison or fined for their acts in cartel cases which took 
place during the period between 1990 and 2008. In his research, 152 were the known 
individuals who suffered from such penalties and 151 were those who held prominent 
positions during the time of the cartel. These individuals are shown in Table 2.2 below 
(Connor and Lande, 2011). 
 
Table 2.2: Breakdown of Individual Defendants Involved in Cartel 
Cases by Position in the Firm (from 1990 to 2008) 
Position Number of individual   
Heads of the firm 40   
Corporate position 24   
Mid-level employees 77   
Co-owner 3   
Stamp dealers 3   
Consultants 4   
Total 151   
Source: Connor and Lande, 2011   
 
Another study carried out by Gallo et al. (2000) provides results in relation to sanctions 
forced in antitrust cases. Table 2.3 reports the number of firms and individuals fined and the 
average real fine per ﬁrm and per individual for completed cases initiated in each year since 
1990. The study shows 200 firms and 150 individuals were fined during 1990–1997. The real 
fines were $8367.47 per ﬁrm and $358.93 per individual. Table 2.3 also indicates the number 
of individuals jailed, the total duration of term served, and the average term served per case 
and per individual. From 1990 to 1997, 41 individuals have been imprisoned for breaching 
the antitrust laws. The total number of months served is 294 or 7.49 per case and 6.30 per 
individual (Gallo et al., 2000). Original study examines the period from 1955 to 1997; 




































1990 35 319.583 11 61.143 13 99 9 7.62 
1991 50 324.521 26 50.085 15 108 9.82 7.2 
1992 32 522.55 12 35.932 4 34 8.5 8.5 
1993 24 642.361 16 29.877 3 17 5.67 5.67 
1994 13 1424.373 7 60.517 2 7 3.5 3.5 
1995 19 1345.821 72 67.84 1 3 3 3 
1996 27 3788.262 6 53.537 3 26 13 8.67 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Gallo et al. (2000: Table XIX, XX) 
 
Additionally, Gallo et al. (2000) shows that during 1955-1997, an average of the entire price 
fixing cases had 81% firms as defendants; and 10% as individual defendants. An exciting 
result is that 60% of the individuals found guilty during 1955-1997 were directors, proprietor, 
or other executives. Knowing the large size of most corporate cartel affiliates, their 
executives are likely to be reasonably wealthy persons, the majority with compensation in the 
$500,000 to $1,000,000 range. Gallo et al. (2000) also illustrate that the percentage of 
international cases prosecuted generally ranged from 2% to 5% in 1955-1979, which fell to 
0.2% in 1980-1994, and then increased to 12% in 1995-1997.  
 
 2.7.2 The European Approach (European Commission) 
Cartel decisions have always been an important part of European competition law 
enforcement. EU Competition law started in the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) agreement amongst France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Germany, 
in 1951 after the Second World War. The agreement intended to prevent Germany from re-
establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as it was felt that this dominance 
had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 and later Art 66 of the agreement 
prohibited cartel and the abuse of a central position by firms (Papadopoulos and Anestis, 
2010).  
 
In 1957, the real history of competition law and policy in Europe began; the policy was 
included in the Treaty of Rome, which was also known as EC Treaty. The Treaty of Rome 
started the enactment of competition law amongst the primary goals for the EEC (European 
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Economic Community) throughout "Organization of a system insuring that market 
competition is not altered”.  
 
The Treaty of Rome, which was signed in 1957, contained Articles 81 and 82 in which 
antitrust provisions were highlighted. The treaty empowered the Commission to implement 
the regulations passed by the council within the first three years. Article 81 enabled the 
European Commission to act according to the principle empowering it to intervene in any 
wrongdoings by those in authority, who interfered with fair competition and trading practices 
(Buch-Hansen, 2008).  
 
In Article 81(3): 
"EC- prohibits agreements and concerted practices which prevent, restrict or distort 
competition, insofar as they may affect trade between Member States, unless justified by 
improvements in production or distribution in accordance with Article 81(3) “. 
 
Regulation 17/62 was introduced in a pre Van Gend en Loos period in EC legitimate 
development, when the supremacy of the EC law was still not completely established. To 
prevent various interpretations of EC Competition Law, which might differ from a national 
court to another, the Commission has been made to anticipate the role of central enforcement 
authority. 
 
Regulation 17/62 Article 101(1) states:  
“All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market.” 
 
However, after the Regulation 17/62 which was passed in February 1962, the desire to 
enforce antitrust regulations was boosted, and it enabled the Commission to take actions like 
breaking up price cartel and punishing some other anti-competitive acts, which demonstrated 
the Commission’s success and was appreciated by the competitor firms (European 
Commission, 2009). This regulation had given the Commission a relatively stronger position 
with the authority of investigating firms’ acts, making decisions and providing exemptions to 
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agreements. It led to the transformation of the Directorate General (DG) into a union wide 
antitrust agency (McGowan and Wilks, 1995; Wilks, 2005; Lehmkuhl, 2008). In that period, 
any group of firms was liable to get approval before finalising an agreement between them, 
and they had to get that approval from Directorate General IV which is now known as the 
Directorate General Competition (DGC). In fact, Regulation 17/1962 had empowered the 
European Commission in taking decisions regarding the conformity of cartel with the Rome 
Treaties. There could be no agreements between the firms unless they were authorised by the 
European Commission. This outcome reflects the success of the Commission and the 
working mechanism of the Competition Policy in the Treaty of Rome. 
 
The Commission also shows its authority in altering the structures of practices carried out by 
corporations, in particular the ones that are opposing to EU competition law. This authority 
was widely used by the Commission especially in the 1990s and in those cases where it was 
observed that acts were going against the preferences set by the member states. However, the 
Commission introduced the term “modernization Regulation” which currently employed in 
EC law circles to refer to changes in the enforcement of Art 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and 
in particular Regulation 17/62. A reform which came into effect on May 1/2004 (Council 
Regulation 1/2003) displayed the demands of the member states for increased powers for 
national competition authorities which may be seen in the authoritative structure of these 
member states. The fundamental method of the new regulatory structure is that the 
Commission and National Competition Authorities (NCAs) now share responsibility for 
public enforcement of Art 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (European Communities, 2004).  
 
EU Council Regulation 1/2003 puts the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and 
Member State national courts in the centre of the enforcement of Arts (101 and 102). 
Decentralised enforcement has been the usual way for other EC rules; Regulation 1/2003 
finally extended this to Competition Law as well (McGowan, 2005; Budzinski and 
Christiansen 2005). The Commission still held an important position in the enforcement 
system, since the co-ordinating induce in the newly created European Competition Network 
(ECN). This Network, made up of the national bodies plus the Commission, manages the 
flow of information between NCAs and maintains the coherence and integrity of the system. 
During this time, Competition Commissioner Mario Monti hailed this regulation as one that 
will modernise the enforcement of Arts 101 and 102. Since May 2004, all NCAs and national 
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courts are empowered to completely employ the Competition terms of the EC Treaty. In its 
2005 survey, the OECD lauded the modernisation effort as promising, and mentioned that 
decentralisation aids to redirect sources so the DG Competition could focus on complicated 
investigations.  
 
 Firm sanctions 
Within the EU competition law, fines only imposed on firms involved in anti-cartel acts, 
though there are some national laws in some states of Europe which impose fines on the 
managers of those firms. According to Regulation 1/2003, the fines to be imposed will be up 
to 10% of the firm’s total earnings; although the fines are rarely that high, the amount needs 
to be related to the timescale and type of act committed (Motta, 2007). During January 1998, 
the European Commission put forth a set of regulations according to which the conditions of 
imposing fines were made clear and later on, it published new guidelines to reform its fining 
policy in September 2006 (European Communities, 1998). Corresponding with the new 
regulations, the Commission will employ a two-step system to set the fine. 
  
 Individual sanctions 
The EC has no powers to impose fines on individual (OFT, 2009). The attempt to enforce 
individual sanctions against cartel activities at EU level faced some serious difficulties. The 
efforts to inflict individual legislation against cartelist by the commission, even if it presented 
Member State support, seemed to be met by systematic resistance, especially following the 
Judgment of the German Constitutional Court. It is important to note, however, that the use of 
individual criminal penalties for such violation at a national level (Germany, Netherlands, 
etc.) was explicitly authorised by the Council of Ministers (Morgan, 2010). 
 
 Amnesty Programme 
In 1996, a leniency policy was established in Europe in the hope of reducing acts involving 
violation of cartel law by firms, but this did not give the European Commission the expected 
results. According to this leniency policy, a firm could have a 75% to 100% reduction in fines 
by the Commission if the firm reported its acts to the commission before the start of the 
investigation and was not found to be leading other firms in committing the same crime. They 
were able to get a 50% to 75% reduction if the firm cooperated with the Commission during 
the investigation process. In both the cases, the firm needed to be the first one to let the 
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investigation begin and inform the Commission of its acts. If these two conditions could not 
be met even then the firm could have a reduction of between 10% and 50% if it cooperated 
with the Commission in carrying out the investigation. The flaws which led to the failure of 
this policy included the lack of transparency in the imposition of fines over the firms by the 
European Commission as the firms did not know the amount which they were to be charged 
until the final decision was published. The fine reduction policy was not as clear as that 
practised in the US. Another factor was the absence of immunity provided to firms after the 
beginning of the investigation process.  
 
However, in February 2002, amendments were made in the structure of the policy making the 
level of fine clear to the firms even during the investigation process and the provision of 
immunity to the cooperating firms was also made automatic just like in the US (Official 
Journal of the European Communities, 2002). In fact, every firm was provided with immunity 
from fines if it helped supply evidence to the investigators during the inspection phase 
provided that these firms were not the instigators of the cartel. Though the policy was 
reviewed again in 2006 no further prominent changes were made (Motta, 2007). 
 
The European Commission proposed a public consultation in October 2007 which provided 
individuals involved in acts of cartel space to acknowledge their law violating acts and made 
the procedure of investigation faster. This practice allowed the Commission to deal with the 
maximum number of cases in a short time. The proposal is consistent with the revised version 
of the leniency notice and the revised guidelines of imposing fines. These acts were not in 
accordance with US policies which for the past 20 years have dealt with almost 90% of cartel 
cases with plea agreements. However, the practices of the Commission were not in favour of 
dealing with cartel cases through face to face talks with the firms. Leniency is only provided 
in cases of cooperation from the firms going through the investigation phase (GCR, 2013). To 
reach the decisions earlier, the Commission spends the same amount of time as the US 









A policy laid out in the Commission notice on the Conduct of Settlement Procedures in 2008 
states that firms that acknowledge their liability can be rewarded with lower fines for 
reducing the burden on the EC’s resources. The EC retains full discretion about which firms 
can benefit from settlement and the terms of the settlement (OFT, 2009). 
 
 Private damages 
The European Union, private enforcement actions are rare and take smaller part than public 
enforcement in the fight against antitrust behaviour. Several complication delay actions for 
damages in member state national courts, including a limited access to evidence, the 
unavailability of class actions and the potential that the applicant may have to pay the 
defendants’ costs if the applicant loses the case. To concentrate on these complications and 
the large range of damages actions amongst the member states, the European Commission 
lately published a green paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules. The 
green paper looked at those aspects of EU litigation practice that have led to a pronounced 
underdevelopment of private damages actions in the EU. Since its publication in December 
2005, the green paper has sparked significant debate within the international antitrust 
community about the role of private enforcement of EC Treaty competition law and about 
damages actions in particular. The general expectation is that private damages actions will 
emerge in the European Union (SEC, 2005).  
 
 Literature on the penalty regime of European Commission 
In early decades, the fines that were given for infringements by the European enforcement 
usually concerned cases that resulted from a Commission’s own initiative or a complaint. 
However, since 1970 the Commission has produced roughly 5 cartel infringement decisions 
per year on average. In recent years, Europe has seen a lot of cartel activity revealed by the 
enforcement efforts. The Commission followed the U.S in the mid-1990s in the enforcement 
prohibition of concerted practices with the object or effect to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition in the common market. During the terms of Commissioners van Miert and 
Monti, the EC undertook a major transformation of the competition rules. It stepped up its 




The fines imposed by the European Commission between 1990 and 2009 had constantly 
increased and are shown in the table displayed below. Prior to 1990, the EC had levied fines 
of about 60 million on 23 petrochemical producers for their fixing prices in the plastics 
industry (European Commission, 1988). Table 2.4 below displays the fine imposed on firms’ 
shows that since 2006, the EC has fined cartel over €1 billion annually, with €3 billion in 
2007, indeed in the first quarter of 2007 over €1.6 billion was imposed as the result of only 
two such law violating acts. In December 2008, the EC imposed fines of over €1.3 billion on 
four car glass manufacturers for their cartel act, which was the largest fine ever imposed by 
the EC (European Commission, 2008). 
 
Table 2.4: The Estimated Cartel Cases Decided by the European Commission from 1990 to 2009 
Year  Corporate fine €/m 
Cases decided Number of firms 
fined 
1990 – 1994  344.282.550 11 138 
1995 – 1999  292.838.000 10 56 
2000 – 2004  3.697.516.100 30 24 
2005 – 2009  9.643.606.100 33 112 
Total  13.978.242.750 85 330 
    Source: European Commission, 2008 
 
A research conduct by Veljanovski (2007) examines the EC law fines on price fixing. Table 
2.5 below shows the amounts charged by the EC from firms involved in cartel conduct, the 
duration of such conduct, the gains of firms and consumer loss. The table shows that the 
highest fine imposed by the Commission was on Plasterboard case. The maximum harm on 















Table 2.5: Estimates of Consumer Losses and Optimal Fines 
Cartel Years Fine € m Sale € m Consumer Loss € m Harm 
Lysine 4 110 164 181 61% 
Vitamin A 9 132 150 413 32% 
Vitamin E 9 203 250 688 29% 
Vitamin B2 4 70 34 38 186% 
Vitamin B5 8 106 34 96 110% 
Vitamin C 5 114 120 168 68% 
Vitamin D3 4 41 20 22 184% 
Beta Carotene  6 64 76 131 49% 
Carotenoids 6 62 50 86 72% 
Carbonless Paper  4 314 1079 1198 26% 
Graphite Electrodes  6 219 420 722 30% 
Methylglucamine 9 3 3 9 33% 
Citric Acid 4 135 320 353 38% 
Plasterboard 7 478 1210 2478 19% 
Methionine 13 127 260 1122 11% 
Speciality Graphite 5 42 84 118 36% 
Extruded Speciality Graphite  4 9 42 46 19% 
Food Flour Enhancers 9 21 12 33 62% 
Carbon &Graphite Products 10 101 290 905 11% 
Organic Peroxides  25 70 250 2649 3% 
Choline Chloride  6 66 122 210 32% 
Copper Plumbing Tubes 13 222 1151 4967 4% 
MCCA Chemicals  15 217 125 651 33% 
Rubber Chemicals  5 76 200 282 27% 
* Note: annual sale in the preceding year as reported by the European Commission. 
Source: Veljanovski, 2011 
 
Another study by Motta (2007) examines the cartel deterrence and fines in the EU. Table 2.6 
below shows the number of firms that have been fined for violation of cartel laws since 1990. 
The figure clearly shows that there is a large increase in the number of firms committing 
cartel. The figures highlight the increases since the 1990s, specifically those after the 1998 
introduction of new guidelines in the imposition of fines. The given statistical data illustrate 
the firms involved in cartel cases and the sort of fines levied on them by the European 
Commission. The average number of cartel cases revealed by the Commission from 1990 to 
1999 is 2.9 cases; at the same time, the average number of cartel cases revealed by the 











Table 2.6: Cartel Decisions Made by European Commission 
From 1990 to 2007 
year Number of cases Number of firms Fine /€ m 
1990 2 4 18 
1991 0 0 0 
1992 4 48 44.76 
1993 0 0 0 
1994 15 86 399.106 
1995 1 2 11.8 
1996 1 5 0.65 
1997 0 0 0 
1998 5 41 451.89 
1999 1 8 99 
2000 1 5 112.9 
2001 9 59 1780.29 
2002 9 47 944.87 
2003 5 28 404.78 
2004 5 33 354.2 
2005 5 41 682.32 
2006 5 56 1833.11 
2007 3 19 2014.81 
Source: Motta, 2007  
 
 
  2.7.3 The UK approach (Competition Commission/ Office of Fair Trading) 
The UK’s approach against cartel has altered significantly in the last decade. Prior to the 
Competition Act 1998, the policy was based on the 1976 Restrictive Trade Practices Act. 
This restrictive practice regime emphasised the form of the agreement (Morgan, 2009). UK 
law considered the formal terms of agreements and sought to confirm whether they were 
phrased in restrictive form against competition law. The 1976 Act could have been applied 
with complete thoroughness but have little influence on competition (Morgan, 2009). 
 
Though the UK government felt the need for reforms, action was not taken instantly although 
in 1978 and 1979; two Green Papers were issued on the subject. The Competition Act 1980 
did not change the monopolistic controls or restrictive practices but instead added a third 
component to the British antitrust policy. After a decade of struggle, the Conservative 
Government issued another Green Paper (DTI, 1988). This document acknowledged the need 
for fundamental changes in the law of restrictive practices and suggested the harmonisation 
of the UK control of anti-competitive agreements with EC competition laws. Hence, the 
50 
 
White Paper released the next year agreed to the required changes and also offered an 
abstract of the weaknesses of the existing act (DTI, 1989). The UK government accepted the 
fact that ‘our existing system is rigid and time-consuming, repeatedly dealing with cases that 
are ineffective and not thoroughly associated with anti-competitive agreements’ (DTI, 1989). 
Along with other recommendations, it suggested dissolving the registration system under the 
1976 Act and replacing it with a clause 81(1) EC pattern general injunction, to establish a 
strong competition authority to acquire the power of the Director General (DG) and to apply 
a system of individual and block exclusion based on Article 81 (3) EC. All these 
recommendations were initially expected to be implemented by 1991 (DTI, 1989).  
 
Later, in 1992, another Green Paper outlined an alternative sequence of possible reforms 
(DTI, 1992). In this paper, the central point was to accept the reform on the abuse of 
monopoly. Therefore, choices considered were a general ban on abuse of influential position 
considering Article 82 EC, following the dual system which maintained the Fair Trading Act 
1973; and avoiding differences and inconsistency in interpretation to make the existing 
structure stronger. The Green Paper also supported the government intention to establish new 
authorities as soon as possible, but little consideration was given to these proposals. Rather, 
the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 limited the authority of the United Kingdom 
law regardless of aligning it with the Treaty of Rome (Pratt, 1994). 
 
The Competition Act 1998 became operational in 2000 based on Article 81 (OFT, 1999). 
This Act was allied to national competition law and EC law as closely as possible (Articles 
81 and 82 EC) for minimising the regulatory liability on firms. To achieve this goal, the 
government had to add two chapters - Chapter I, restrictions on anticompetitive agreements 
and Chapter II, abuse of a dominant position. Firms that agreed or plotted to fix prices, 
limiting production, rigging bids or share markets would be breaching section 2(1) of the 
Competition Act 1998 covered in Chapter I and the prohibition affecting the trade through 
attitude and behaviour between Member States, Article 81(1) of the EC treaty.  
 
 Firm sanctions 
For the first time, the Competition Act 1998 introduced fines for firms found acting against 
fair competition. Later, the amount of maximum fine was fixed at 10% of a firm’s per annum 
worldwide turnover, as at EC level (OFT, 2004a). This corporate penalty alone was not 
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enough to discourage firms from forming a league of their own to control the market. 
Moreover, suggestions for individual criminal sanctions were mentioned in the joint 
Treasury/Department of Trade and Industry report on productivity issued in June 2001 (DTI, 
2001).  
 
 Individual sanctions 
The Enterprise Act of 2002 introduced the cartel crime as a criminal offence for individuals 
dishonestly participating in cartel agreements. This criminal offence operates together with 
the Competition Act 1998 regime, which provides civil sanctions for any ‘undertaking’ that 
breach the law (OFT, 2003a). Anyone involved in criminal cartel wrongdoing under the 
Enterprise Act 2002 - such as price-fixing - might face the prospect of going to prison for a 
period of five years, and/or an unspecified level of fines.  
 
Previously, the penalty was only a regulatory slap on the wrist, but after the Competition Act 
1998, there was a significant prescription for such unhealthy competition in the UK market. 
Extreme cartel violations are directed to the Community level by the European Commission 
Directorate General Competition, when Article 81 EC is breached. There is a legislative 10% 
limit of an enterprise’s worldwide turnover, which is intended to protect enterprises from the 
unfavourable effects of huge fines; this is the only sanction that is available as an 
administrative fine for corporations under Regulation 1/2003 (preceded by Regulation 
17/1962). At the time the Enterprise Act 2002 was introduced, it made remarkable changes to 
UK’s competition law. The act was executed during 2003 with several important clauses 
coming into effect from 20 June 2003. The White Paper that was published before the 
introduction of the Enterprise Bill argued that the probability of getting detected might avert 
the need for agreeing what a satisfactory level of fines to discourage cartel breaches would be 
(DTI, 2001). The criminal offence ensuring to compensate for this drawback in anticipation is 
aligned with cartel application on both the Community and UK levels (Sealy and Milman, 
2012). 
 
The Enterprise Act introduced a new clause that had the power to execute disqualification 
orders on directors of enterprises. Under the Competition Disqualification Order, the court 
can disqualify an individual from being a director of a firm with violations of Competition 
Act (Articles 81, and 82 of the EC Treaty and Chapters I and II prohibitions). This 
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disqualification order can prevent a person from being a director for a period of 15 years. The 
first sentences resulting from guilty pleas after a US plea bargain agreement were handed 
down five years after the offence came into force in the UK (OFT Press Release, 2008). 
Clearly elected consumer bodies will be allowed to apply for rights to address damage claims 
on behalf of a named individual consumer. An extra restriction imposed by the UK 
government is an individual sanction, which can include an unlimited fine on conviction for 
the cartel offence or imprisonment of up to five years. Moreover, the Commission initiated 
actions for damages for anti-competitive behaviour, looking after details and proceedings in 
the normal courts for damages faced as a result of a violation that may be taken up in the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal.  
 
 Amnesty programme 
The OFT leniency programmes are based on the experience of the US leniency programmes, 
and all their clauses are related to the US DOJ corporate amnesty policy. On the contrary to 
the EU, the OFT implemented the “leniency policy plus” alike to the one in the US, which 
gives the opportunity to corporations that is under investigation in one case to reveal 
information and evidence about another case. By doing this, they will obtain an additional 
reduction in fines (Morgan, 2010). The US experience proved that in order for the leniency 
policies to work well with both individual and corporate levels, there is a need to be 
predictable and clear (Barker, 2009)  
 
The leniency programme was considered by UK Office of Fair Trading for the establishment 
of suitable punishments under the new Competition Act. A modified version of this 
recommended guidance was approved in 2000. Individuals who provide information have 
immunity from prosecution and can save themselves from getting disqualified from being a 
director. Recently, the information from whistle-blowers became the way in which cartel 
behaviour was discovered. Moreover, the evidence collected was used in the investigation by 
OFT (Grout and Sonderegger, 2005).  
 
 Settlement 
Although OFT programmes have not mentioned the conditions of all the settlements that 
have been agreed upon till now, the OFT may utilise any settlement discount given for 
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cooperation in its clemency programme. This programme took an important role in detecting 
cartel and helped in investigating cases effectively (Aubert et al., 2004).  
 
 Private damages 
A private action is a fundamental principle of the Community law in Europe (Art 81 and 82). 
The White paper introduced a number of provisions that aimed at facilitating private actions. 
However, private actions have not played the part being predicted.  
 
 Literature on the penalty regime of Competition Commission and Office of Fair 
Trading 
In 2008, David Brammer, Peter Whittle and Bryan Allison were sent to jail for 30 months and 
three years for participating in a worldwide cartel in the supply of flexible Marine Hoses 
case. After attending a cartel meeting, the three individuals were arrested by the US antitrust 
authorities in 2007. The DoJ caught and imprisoned a BA executive Keith Packer, for an 
equivalent crime relating to air cargo fuel surcharges in October 2008 (DoJ Press Release, 
2008). However, the first real test of the new anti-cartel laws at a tribunal was brought by the 
Serious Fraud Office (Prosecutions of the cartel offence in England and Wales, and in 
Northern Ireland are generally undertaken by the SFO. Prosecutions in Scotland are brought 
by the Lord Advocate). Those found guilty had accepted the charges levelled against them 
and were found guilty in the US under a plea bargain. These individuals will also appear in 
court to make sure that they were not deported to the US. The US Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division (DoJ) permitted them to return to the UK on the condition that they will 
plead guilty to the UK cartel offence and will be sent to the US if their UK punishments were 
less than those accepted under the plea agreement. The other conviction of four British 
Airways Executives involved in the price-fixing of fuel surcharges cases will appear again in 
court to argue against deportation to the US. 
 
Table 2.7 below illustrates the value of fines imposed by the OFT from 2001 to 2006. In 
2003, following successful prosecutions regarding price-fixing of ‘Hasbro Toys’ and ‘Replica 
Football Kits’, and the ‘Genzyme Limited’ exclusionary practice case, the OFT collected 
approximately £48 million (€54.59m) in antitrust fines, which adds up to more than a half of 
the total amounts collected as fines from 2001 to 2006. The OFT levied £63.1 million (€71.6 






Table 2.7: Fines Imposed by the OFT From 2001 to 2006 







     Source: OFT, 2009 
 
Table (2.8) below provides a comparison between the three jurisdictions discussed.
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Table 2.8: Legal Enforcement against Cartel: Comparison Between U.S, EU and UK  
Jurisdiction 
 Max Individual 
fine  
Max prison  
term 









Not applicable  10% of total worldwide turnover. 
Full 1, 2 
  
Policy laid out in the Commission 
Notice on the Conduct of Settlement 
Procedures (2008). Firms that 
acknowledge their liability can be 
rewarded with lower fines for 
reducing the burden on the EC’s 
resources. The EC retains full 
discretion about which firms can 
benefit from settlement and the terms 














10% of total worldwide turnover Full 2 
No formal policy. Lower fines have 
been imposed on firms  
that do not contest OFT findings and 
do not appeal a decision  







twice the  
gain/harm 
10 years  Not applicable  
• USD $ 100 million (~ €76 million) 
under the Sherman Act, or  
• An alternative sentencing statute allows 
for fines up to twice the gain derived 
from the criminal conduct or twice the 
loss suffered by the victims. 
Full 1 
  
Negotiated settlements are possible 
at any stage of the investigation. 
More than 90% of convictions in 
antitrust cases are a result of ‘plea-
bargaining’.  
Yes 
        Sources: Gallo et al. (2000), and OFT (2008) 
 Notes: immunity is available for both firms and individuals. 1) Not available if the applicant was the ringleader in the infringement. 2) Not available if the applicant coerced other parties to 
participate in the infringement. 
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2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the definition and forms of cartel; the theoretical framework where the 
oligopoly theory and the game theory for cartel existence are explained; the direct and indirect effects 
of cartel imposition; and the anti-cartel enforcement policies by the United States (DoJ), Europe 
(European Commission), and the UK (Competition Commission/Office of Fair Trading).  
 
This chapter tackles the purpose of cartel formation in today’s competitive environment and how 
cartel players undertake their roles through anti-trust enforcement. The participation constraint 
requirement and the incentive compatibility constraint aid in successful cartel operation. Market 
characteristics contributing to cartel stability include the presence of entry barriers, the number of 
firms, the quality differences/product differentiation, seller concentration, capacity constraint and 
excess capacity, buyer power, demand elasticity, and static or declining demand. The essence of 
cartel formation is the establishment of agreements amongst firms on fixing or raising prices to 
undermine the competition, carve the market, or allocate market shares. Cartel imposition directly 
affects customers, suppliers, non-participating competitors, and the final consumers. These direct 
effects are in the forms of actual loss (overcharge), profit loss, and interest (opportunity cost). 
Indirect effects, on the other hand, include X-inefficiency and long-term structural effects on the 
market. Individual and firm accountability is discussed to show who is accountable for cartel 
formation. Whether the firm decides to collude or not is influenced by the presence or absence of 
antitrust policy and how such policy is enforced. The US approach, European approach, and UK 
approach to jurisdiction provide an elaboration of fine sanctions, individual sanctions, amnesty 
programme, settlement, and private damages to deal with cartel commission.  
 
The next chapter shall examine the concept of corporate governance, its link to market competition 
and cartel formation. It also discusses theoretical background and literature review, thereby offering 









Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
3.1 Introduction     
This chapter looks first at the concept of corporate governance and the roles of the CEO and board of 
directors in corporate governance. In addition, it discusses the influences of corporate governance on 
market competition, and cartel formation.  This followed by a discussion from the literature on the 
relationship between cartel formation and CEOs as well as the impact of cartel formation on 
shareholders. 
A discussion of agency theory shall be presented in tackling the concept of corporate governance and 
cartel formation. It will then identify the independent variables and justifies its utilisation in this 
research as proxies for corporate governance attributes. Finally, an overview of literature on 
corporate governance will be used to justify the inclusion of each independent variable and provide 
an understanding as to why these attributes may be associated with the incidence of cartel formation.  
The independent variables reflecting corporate governance attributes are grouped in four different 
types which consist of board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics 
and CEO compensation packages. Once support for the component of each variable is provided, a 
number of individual propositions will be posed. The results of testing the propositions will be 
furnished in Chapter Five. 
 
3.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
The development of the concept of corporate governance started taking place in developed market 
economies over the past decades where the manner of managing the firm was said to determine the 
economy and the firm’s efficiency and competitiveness. However, corporate governance is 
questionably more significant in transition economies taking on marketisation and reforms in 
wholesale property rights (Lin, 2001). These economies feature a kind of privatisation with no 
associated efforts to tackle issues on corporate governance, which led to ownership patterns and 
insider control that are unfavourable to restructuring and output recovery. Today, there is wide 
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recognition in the corporate governance development as an essential trajectory for an efficient market 
system to successfully go through transition (Lin, 2001).  
 
Corporate governance has been defined as a framework provided for the management of resources in 
an efficient manner and for the application of these resources in society. These activities are to 
clearly exhibit the interests of the individuals, corporations, and society as a whole. Cadbury (1992) 
provides this concept of corporate governance in his speech at the Global Corporate Governance 
Forum. The concept focuses on firms and their shareholders, as well as the firms’ accountability to 
several groups of people, or ‘stakeholders’ (Solomon, 2010).  
 
Charreaux and Desbrieres (2001) believe that corporate governance is anything that governs the 
actions and activities of the management and the reason why such actions are carried out in the first 
place. Corporate governance also provides an assurance to the investors of the organisation that they 
would be provided a return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) Persons (2006) states 
that if an organisation takes on negative actions, it is possible that it may not be able to generate high 
returns after a certain period.  
 
It must be noted that any negative activity carried out by the management has the ability to reduce 
shareholder wealth. This is why the concept of corporate governance is introduced to protect the 
wealth and well-being of the shareholders in the long run. These shareholders are the ones who 
actually provide the capital to run the organisation and it would be an extensive task to individually 
monitor all activities. For this reason, a corporate governance structure is presented which has the 
ability to analyse that all fiduciary duties have been carried out accordingly.  
 
A study was conducted by Hermanson et al., (2006) in which ten fundamental conclusions is 
presented relating to the concept of corporate governance. The basic concept behind all these 
conclusions is that in order to gain the confidence of the investors in the financial markets, it is 
essential to carry out corporate governance practices. Hence, all the different kinds of literature 
present the same aspects of corporate governance. They all believe that corporate governance is a 
framework or structure being followed by the management to keep them in control. These activities 
are monitored at all times so that they may be stopped before any kind of fraudulent action could  




To help align the diverse interests of directors/managers and shareholders, market competition plays 
as an external mechanism to discipline management as well as the internal mechanisms of corporate 
control can be employed (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Next section briefly discusses corporate 
governance in relation to board of director, CEO and ownership structure.   
 3.2.1The Board of Directors Roles in Corporate Governance 
The board of directors is considered the most important element in the internal framework of 
corporate governance (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board’s composition serves as the 
basis for establishing the board with effective management monitoring. The agency theory views that 
an independent board is a vigilant element of agency problem since it involves a considerable number 
of non-executive directors tasked to monitor the performance and behaviour of management 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Bainbridge, 1993).  
 
The principal-agent theory of financial economics leads to the dominant views on the role and 
significance of corporate boards of directors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Daily et al., 2003; Lynall 
et al., 2003). The seminal work of Berle and Mean (1932) was the basis of the principle-agent theory 
and underlined the newly formed distinctions between the firm ownership and operational control 
and the benefits that were achieved through having specialized managerial staff that had relevant 
expertise and knowledge (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 
However, the dispersed share ownership and the development of qualified management that was 
specialized would lead to a possibility of conflicting interests, as Berle and Means (1932) pointed 
out. According to the principal-agent theory, the ‘principals’ who are the owners of the firm i.e. the 
shareholders are usually distinct from the ‘agents’ who are the managers of the firm, and this 
distinction leads to the agents having an advantage over the principals with respect to availability of 
information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
The agency theory assumes that the managers keep their own interests in mind when making 
decisions and these interests may not necessarily be the same as that of the principals. The 
shareholders benefits are of secondary importance to self-serving managers looking to maximize 
their personal utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this regard, the ‘model of man’ that the 
principal agent model represents believes that the management acts in “a homo 
economicus…individualistic, self-serving and opportunistic manner” (Davis et al., 1997). Managerial 
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decisions that are not satisfactory for the principals come about when the utility of the manager is 
derived from rewards that are financial or status based instead of inner satisfaction regarding the 
firm’s success. Management may get involved in activities that seek to build an empire, reduce risk 
by diversifying the firm and corporate philanthropy activities that look for prestige, activities that do 
not necessarily increase the shareholder value (Ong and Lee, 2001; Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
 
Various functions are intended to be carried out by the board of directors, when considered from the 
perspective of agency theory, to ensure that the costs pertinent to separation of ownership and control 
are minimized (Daily et al., 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003). This model specifically implies the 
key role of board of directors to employ an effective method of supervising and reporting so that the 
degree of unequal distribution of information between the principals and agents is reduced. To make 
sure that this supervision function is carried out effectively, it is vital that the board of directors is 
independent of operational management to some degree at the least (Davis et al., 1997). It is due to 
this viewpoint that many discussions are taking place with respect to the significance of having non-
executive directors who may be from outside the organization.  
 
The chairman of the board also needs to be separated from the operational activities so that a board 
that is independent enough to be able to meet its supervisory responsibilities effectively is formed 
(Davis et al., 1997; Boyd, 1995; Green, 2004). Board of directors that are from outside the 
organization put forward opinions that are independent of executive management. They consider the 
maximum benefits for the shareholder when evaluating the strategy of the firm and are expected to 
study the proposals of the executive management with objective reasoning. This creates a pressure on 
the executive management to avoid taking actions based on personal motives seeking to maximize 
their utility.  
 
The issue of agency problem can also be resolved through the employment of external board of 
directors who also help to integrate the interests of the shareholders and managers which eventually 
leads to a better financial performance (Daily et al.., 2003; Peng, 2004). The independence of the 
board is also improved when the roles of the CEO and Chairman of the board are separated which 
leads to an independent evaluation of the executive manager’s suggestions and also lessens the power 
held by the CEO. According to the agency view, this would lead to an improved financial 
performance through more firm decision making at the board level (Boyd, 1995; Beatty and Zajac, 




The incentives of the agents need to be parallel to those of the principals so that the former are 
inclined to proceed according to the interests of the latter.  This is the second vital responsibility of 
the board directors. The right remuneration policies need to be formed and executed so that the 
incentives of the managers and owners become parallel (Daily et al., 2003; Conyon, 2006). Schemes 
like rewarding senior managers with shares or giving them the option to buy shares at subsidized 
prices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or compensating the executives and awarding bonuses by 
ascertaining the levels of returns that the shareholders receive (Buck et al., 2003) need to be 
implemented as part of systems that are formed to bring the interests of principals and managers in 
line with each other.  
 
Resource dependence theory is the third important perspective on the function of board of directors 
and it presents the view that the corporate board of directors is an important aspect of the firms’ 
attempts to exercise control over their external environment (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
 
The impacts of economics, science, politics and sociology are conceptualized into a multifaceted 
approach called the institutional theory, which is the fourth theory that needs to be implemented in 
corporate boards. Studies on corporate boards manifest a particular aspect of institutional theory the 
most which is the idea of isomorphism and legitimacy (Parker et al., 2007; Peng, 2004; Li and 
Harrison, 2008; Young et al., 2000; Myllys, 1999; Chizema, 2008). 
 
The conflicting interests of the ones who make the decisions and the ones who bear the risks is 
brought into alignment through the board of directors influence to appoint, dismiss and give benefits 
to senior management teams. Thus, large business organizations consider them to be an integral part 
of their governance structure as the recent developments in economic theory implies (Williamson, 
1983, 1984; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
 
The responsibility of managing decisions is handed over to the CEO while the board assumes control 
of the decisions, which makes it easier for the corporations to take care of the possibility of agency 
problems. This means that the strategic decisions are initiated and executed through the CEO while 
the board endorses and monitors those decisions. The primary task of the board is to align the 
conflicting interests of the shareholder and top management by serving as a system of internal control 
(Mizruchi, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
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 3.2.2 The CEO Roles in Corporate Governance  
 
Because CEOs are the key decision makers in firms; there is interest in the role that CEO play in 
explaining the difference in corporate decision across firms.  
 
According to Hazarika et al. (2012), the imposition of costs on shareholders can be undertaken by 
CEOs who manage earnings, but an important issue is whether boards take a proactive or reactive 
action to discipline these managers, and whether they do act only when external consequences have 
taken place out of manipulation. The authors use a sample of forced and voluntary turnovers within 
the period of 1992 to 2004 and find a positive relationship between earnings management and the 
likelihood of forced turnover. A negative relationship is found between a CEO’s job tenure and the 
extent to which earnings are actively managed during his term of office. These results are consistent 
in tests that take account of the potential changes in CEO turnover and earnings management, as well 
as external consequences. Firms performing either good or bad can involve the occurrence of the 
relation between forced turnover and earnings management, as well as the inflating or deflating of 
reported earnings through accrual work. These results suggest that proactive action is undertaken by 
at least some boards in disciplining managers with aggressive earnings management prior to costly 
external consequences caused by such manipulations. This idea is congruent with the notion that 
internal governance addresses managerial agency problems (Hazarika et al., 2012).  
 
Hazarika and colleagues’ study finds usefulness in this research as it contributes to explain the 
behaviour of the firm in chastising managers that practise earnings management aggressively as well 
as the CEO’s job tenure and their corresponding degree of active management of earnings. This in 
turn contributes to addressing the hypotheses as it provides enlightenment on these areas, which are 
essentially tackled in this research.  
 
Only when executives have gained influence on crucial decisions can they impact firm outcomes. It 
is through the basis of this idea that Adams, and Ferreira (2003) design and test a hypothesis stating 
that firms with CEOs that have more decision-making power should have performance variability. 
The focus of the study is directed to the CEO’s power over the board and other top executives. The 
authors find out that more variable stock returns are indicated for firms managed by powerful CEOs 
and that firm performance generates important consequences as a result of the interaction between 
organisational variables and the characteristics of executives (Adams et al., 2005). This article is 
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useful to the topic being investigated as it focuses on the influential role of CEOs on firm 
performance, and the relationship between powerful CEOs and firm outcomes, which is indicative of 
corporate governance.  
 
Corporate governance saw its greater importance in the Enron failure and the collapse of high-profile 
corporations. Debates relating to corporate governance efficiency have emerged along with this, 
including controversies on director and CEO remunerations, greater stakeholder approach to 
governance, and the like. This led to debates in current corporate governance, which consider the role 
and structure of boards from a number of theoretical perspectives. It is worth noting that these 
theoretical perspectives commonly aim to posit a link between corporate governance and board 
characteristics. Agency theory involves the alignment of the interests of managers and owners and 
assumes that an inherent conflict exists between the management and the owners of the firm 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2003).  
 
Whilst there are studies support the assertions of both agency theory and stewardship theory, it is 
found out through a recent meta-analysis that substantive relationships do not exist between firm 
performance and board composition. In another meta-analysis study, it is concluded that a slight 
positive relationship exists between the two. Overall, consistent evidence of any significant 
relationship between them is generally lacking (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). The study infers that 
larger firms are characterised by larger and more interlocked boards, increased proportion of external 
directors, and increased likelihood to separate the chairman and CEO roles. These firms view greater 
number of directors as necessary in the outsiders’ increased proportion and the separated roles of the 
CEO and the chairman so that the firm may be efficiently monitored and controlled (Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2003).  
 
Since these firms need to seek greater links with other firms, the corresponding impact would be 
appointment of more directors and search for more interlocks, which are linked to firm size and board 
size. It must be noted, however, that no relationship exists between the amount of interlocks and CEO 
concentration power. Whilst there is evidence in the notion that boards will aim to connect with the 
external environment, there is no presence of any link between this pursuit and firm performance 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). This study by Nicholson and Kiel is useful to this research report as it 
tackles the interplays between several variables of corporate governance, i.e., firm performance, firm 
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size, CEO concentration power, number of interlocks, etc., which provide evidence to the role of 
CEOs in corporate governance.  
 
Ferris et al. (2003) found in their study that directors nearing retirement age might consider multiple 
directorships. Age is said to serve as a proxy for the director’s experience and the energy needed for 
the demands of board service. The study found that the regression for the number of directorships 
vis-à-vis age involves a significant positive co-efficiency. It also suggests that older directors with 
greater experience of directorships are no longer interested in additional directorships or might pose 
as less attractive candidates. The average age of directors is also older in boards with multiple 
directors. In a particular corporation, arbitrary terms are not held by the board as a limitation that may 
be imposed on directors’ service. The board does not also maintain a position that directors must be 
remunerated annually until upon reaching the mandatory retirement age (Clayman et al., 2012). 
 
 3.2.3 Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance  
A theoretical model is developed by Desender (2009) purporting to better understand of how 
ownership structure influences the priorities of the board of directors, and how firm performance is 
affected by this. Despite the discussions of several researches on the universal link between corporate 
governance practices and performance outcomes, there is neglect in the firm’s specific context, 
however. Moreover, diverse environments result in disparities in the effectiveness of various 
government practices.  
Desender (2009) posits that the board’s priorities are influenced by ownership structure, and that 
these priorities ascertain the board’s optimal composition. In the case of a board that sets priorities on 
monitoring, such board views the importance of directors with concentration power and financial 
experience. In the case of a board that sets its priorities on the provision of resources, such board 
benefits from directors of diverse characteristics, the CEO’s presence on the board, and a larger board 
size. Greater sensitivity is required in understanding how the board influences firm performance, and 
such sensitivity must be focused on the impact of corporate governance on the various areas of 
effectiveness for a range of stakeholders.  
The insights that may be derived on the link between board composition and ownership structure can 
bring about new realisations on the conflicting empirical results of past research that attempted to 
provide direct association between board composition and ownership structure. In view of perceived 
benefits from reengineering governance systems, discussions have emerged in terms of the suitability 
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of executing recommendations for corporate governance characterised by dispersed ownership 
(Desender, 2009). 
Desender (2009) points out that ownership structure is a key dimension to corporate governance and 
is also largely seen as having been determined by corporate governance characteristics of other 
countries, such as the nature of state regulation and stock market development. It is found that 
shareholder structures are fairly varied across countries, where frequency of dispersed ownership is 
seen in listed firms of US and UK. Moreover, rich economies often have typically concentrated 
ownership of large firms, whose control is often carried out through pyramidal groups. Albeit large 
shareholders dominate the control of some large firms in the U.S (e.g. Microsoft and Ford), these 
firms are however few and have not drawn much attention to the corporate governance debate.  
Accordingly, there are two apparent consequences in the differences in ownership structure for 
corporate governance: (1) dominant shareholders are empowered and incentivised to discipline 
management, and (2) a new problem can be created by concentrated ownership because of the lack 
alignment between the interests of controlling shareholders and those of minority shareholders. 
Whilst maximisation of returns at reasonable risk is the primary concern of shareholders, preferring 
growth to profits may be the concern of managers. Considering the fact that ownership and control 
can be potentially separated, the interests of principals and agents must be aligned through various 
mechanisms. Due to the problems faced by shareholders in their monitoring of the management, a 
corresponding increase in agency costs had taken place. These problems include the existence of 
imperfect information experienced by these shareholders in relation to making qualified decisions. 
Reducing these costs requires designing a range of contractual mechanisms, such as corporate boards, 
which in turn lead to aligned interest between the management and those of the stockholders. 
Therefore, taking an agency perspective, the board’s main focus is to monitor the actions of 
management (Desender, 2009).  
The board of directors is said to perform two functions: To monitor and provide resources. Agency 
theory provides the theoretical underpinning of this monitoring function, describing the likely 
conflicts of interest caused by the separation of control and ownership in organisations. The board’s 
primary function is to monitor the actions of managers (agents) so that the interests of owners 
(principals) may be protected (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976 cited in Desender, 
2009). The board’s monitoring task is important since potential costs are earned as management 
carries out its own interests to the detriment of shareholders’ interests. Agency costs, which are 
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intrinsic in the separation of control and ownership, are reduced through the monitoring stance of 
board of directors (Fama, 1980; Zahra and Pearce, 1989 cited in Desender, 2009).  
Researchers argue that boards comprising mainly insiders or even outsiders who do not enjoy 
independence from the firm or the current management are less incentivised to monitor management 
due to their dependence on the CEO or the organisation. Boards subject to outside, non-affiliated 
directors are perceived to monitor better because of lack of this deterrent to monitor.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, cited in Laiho, 2011), the ownership structure is important 
not only in terms of how much the firm insiders own, but also in terms of the extent of concentration 
held by the holdings of the outside shareholders. It is argued that large shareholders are better able to 
monitor the management compared to small shareholders. This is because large shareholders 
internalise larger aspects of the monitoring costs and possess sufficient voting power in corporate 
decisions. Small shareholders, on the other hand, are only able to influence corporate decision 
making at a minimum basis. Because small shareholders have little influence on decision making, the 
managers then hold the control of the firm, who possess both the opportunities and incentive of 
misusing their position. It is therefore concluded that corporate performance would be adversely 
affected by the ownership-control separation (Laiho, 2011; Hamdani and Yafeh, 2010; Leech, 2001).  
Laiho (2011) states that a more effective monitoring takes place through a more concentrated 
ownership in the form of large shareholders. Effective monitoring has two significant obstacles that 
may be solved by large shareholders: staying informed to enable reaping sufficient benefits towards 
exceeding the costs of obtaining the needed information; and possessing an adequately large share of 
the votes in order to influence corporate outcomes (even in circumstances of minority holding). Small 
shareholders, on the other hand, have difficulty carrying this out collectively as they are only able to 
internalise a small aspect of the potential gains and endure free-rider problems. An agency problem 
identified here is therefore the incentive of large shareholders to gain private benefits at the detriment 
of the small shareholders (Laiho, 2011; Kaisanlahti, 2002; Bebchuck, 1999).  
 
Moreover, control by a large minority shareholder takes place if wide distribution of the remaining 
shares is carried out amongst a mass of small shareholders where the outcome of a vote is likely 
determined. Generally, it is likely that the small shareholders’ votes are cancelled out, to which the 
power of decision is given to the large blockholder (Leech, 2002; Means, 2008).  
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It must be noted that the idea concerning the impact of ownership structure on firm performance is a 
question that relates to managerial incentives as well as to those of the owners’ and the ability of both 
of them to control the decision-making stances of the firm. Control in the form of voting rights, 
which is linked to ownership; naturally take place as a factor because it ascertains whether the firm 
can be coerced by shareholders to do their bidding (Laiho, 2011).  
 
A position of fundamental authority is enjoyed by shareholders as owners of the firm, paving the way 
to certain rights in relation to their assets. These rights include decision-making through voting at 
firm meetings and the right to income from firm assets, amongst others; giving rise to maintaining 
relationships with the firm. According to Leech (2001), the costs relating to an individual shareholder 
will be outweighed by the private benefit that accrues to this shareholder, which in fact is caused by 
correcting management failure subsequent to shareholder action. This assumption can be made of 
large shareholders but may be considered questionable when applied to small shareholders whose 
role is very small; however, such assumption may be made as a formality covering both small and 
large shareholders (Leech, 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, shareholders are collectively composed of a voting body that undertakes collective 
decision making where each member holds a different number of votes based on his/her holding. 
This comprises the analysis of formal voting power accrued to shareholders, alongside firm control. 
Shareholder power in this occasion may be defined according to the result of a hypothetical division 
as the member’s ability to sway any alliance of players. Shareholder power may therefore be 
considered important to corporate governance even in the absence of large concentrations of share 
ownership since dispersed power is not necessarily the implied outcome of dispersed ownership 
(Leech, 2001). 
 
The study of Hamdani and Yafeh (2010) looks into the role of corporate governance in the market 
with prevalent concentrated ownership. When controlling shareholders exist in a firm, only a limited 
role can be played by minority shareholders in corporate governance. It is suggested that the absence 
of conflict of interest rather than minority shareholders’ legal power for institutions to be able to 
undertake their corporate governance role. The idea whether firm performance makes a difference to 
ownership structure is put forward by Laiho (2011). The agency theory serves as the starting point of 
the analysis where it is predicted that firm performance improves with higher levels of managerial 
ownership structure, and this is caused by incentive effect. It is also suggested that dominant owners 
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might extract the firm’s resources at the expense of other shareholders due to high ownership 
concentration. Laiho (2011) also infers that the role of ownership structure may also be analysed 
besides agency costs that managers generate. It is assumed that there is a propensity for high-
ownership owners to use their position to obtain private benefits. These benefits include takeover 
defence for insiders and consumption of the firm’s goods. If adverse effects are generated by these 
benefits on firm performance, there is a possibility for ownership concentration to hurt performance. 
It boils down to the idea that not only does agency problem exist between owners and managers 
because the same terms can govern the relationship between large and small shareholders. It must be 
noted that the idea concerning the impact of ownership structure on firm performance is a question 
that relates to managerial incentives as well as to those of the owners’ and the ability of both of them 
to control the decision-making stances of the firm. Control in the form of voting rights, which is 
linked to ownership; naturally take place as a factor because it ascertains whether the firm can be 
coerced by shareholders to do their bidding (Laiho, 2011).  
 
In the work of Bebchuck (1999, cited in Laiho, 2011), a theory of ownership concentration is 
designed based on the controlling owner’s potential private benefit extraction, demonstrating that this 
decision is dependent to the size of the private benefits of control. In cases of large potential private 
benefits, the initial owner holds an incentive to capture the benefits and bar potential outsider 
takeovers. Bebchuck’s model suggests that ownership concentration tends to be higher in countries 
with large private control benefits and likewise explains the reason why low ownership concentration 
occurs in some countries. Moreover, Laiho notes that small shareholders are less likely to monitor the 
management than do large shareholders as the latter is able to internalise a larger part of the 
monitoring costs and also possesses adequate voting power in influencing corporate decisions.  
 
It is also significant to consider that the rights of minority shareholders, according to recent research 
on law and finance, are broadly impacted by the legal tradition, creating an economic impact on the 
ability of the firm to increase outsiders’ equity capital (Kaisanlahti, 2002).  
 
The vulnerability of minority shareholders is emphasised in some research, whereby little regard for 
incorporation’s ex-ante motivations is looked into. It is said that majority of shareholders are placed 
on enhanced fiduciary tasks expected of partners, acting towards the close corporation as a 
partnership garbed in corporate shape. This approach omits the differences between partnerships and 
corporations, whereby uncertainty is created in terms of whether the corporate shape will be 
69 
 
honoured or whether the corporation is to be served by the majority so that the interest of the 
minority may be addressed (Means, 2008).  
 
3.3 Corporate Governance and Market Competition  
There is scarce evidence on the interaction between corporate governance and product market 
competition (Keasey et al., 2005; Allen and Gale, 2000). The evidence states that firm performance is 
enhanced by the level of corporate governance and product market competition. In a particular study, 
the degree of market competition is said to be linked to high productivity growth. In addition, it is 
concluded that competition may be seen as a substitute mechanism to internal control (Keasey et al., 
2005).  
 
The study of Nickell (1996) illustrates the improvements in productivity development through 
product market competition, whereas Robinson and Hou (2006) give evidence for the higher returns 
of competitive industries as compared to concentrated industries. The shareholder rights are 
distributed in a different proportion in each industry with some industries having greater rights than 
others, as Johnson et al. (2009) has stated. Once the industry effects are controlled, those firms that 
have stronger rights of shareholders gain no abnormal benefits than those that have weaker rights. 
The measurement of quality of corporate governance through the entrenchment index of Bebchuk et 
al. (2009) gives consistent results. Hence, quality of governance is affected by the characteristics of 
the industry. Those corporations that belong to competitive industries possess better structures of 
corporate governance according to Karuna (2007) who measures industry level competition. He 
states that managers in competitive industries need to be monitored closely as they have the 
discretionary power to come up with competitive strategies for their firm. 
 
Nevertheless, it has been found by Cremers et al. (2008) that shareholder rights are weak in 
competitive industries, and that it is the long-term relationship with customers that creates the 
industry effect on corporate governance. Customers face problems when they have to change their 
service providers in case service providers are taken over by some other organization. This is 
especially true for the firms of competitive industries as they have long-term associations with their 
customers. Hence, the customers concern of survival is lessened by the firms through shareholder 




Guadalupe and Pérez González (2010) have carried out a fairly similar study which shows indirect 
support for the impact of industry features on the quality of corporate governance. Their study used 
publicly traded data of 19 countries and revealed that low private benefits of control come about 
through high competition. The executives and owners in a domestic industry attain fewer benefits for 
themselves being in charge of their corporations when the global market poses strong competition. 
The evidence from literature indicates that corporate governance is improved through competition 
and hence decreased benefits are considered to be a sign of efficient governance structures.  
 
Better transparency of information for firms in the same industry and the top management’s fear of 
bankruptcy create the impact of competition on corporate governance as Guadalupe and Pérez-
González have concluded. Past literature offers these two major theories with respect to the influence 
of product market competition on corporate governance. However, there has been no study so far 
which gives concrete evidence that explains the effect of competition on management in the most 
accurate manner. 
 
Hopt et al., (1998) state that one may see that market competition can be substituted by tight 
corporate governance. A well-functioning corporate governance system would be expected in an 
economy with little market competition since overcoming the lack of market competition necessitates 
tighter discipline. In contrast, it is also reasonable to assume a complementary status between 
corporate governance and market competition, which has been described also by Keasey et al., 
(2005). 
 
Van Frederikslust et al., (2008), alternatively, point out that intensive competition in product markets 
leads to a possibility of the mode of corporate governance becoming less important. Competition 
compels firms to adopt efficient governance structures apart from cost minimising methods of 
production. Slack firms will be driven away from the market by more efficient firms who will steal 
business from them. In the long run at least, upon entry facilitation, inefficient structures are 
eliminated by this selection effect of competition, where effective governance is eliminated. 
Eventually, the forces of competitive markets may simultaneously determine the mode of corporate 
governance (Van Frederikslust et al., 2008). It must be noted that the proper functioning of a market 
economy may require the presence of an effective corporate governance system within each 




Moreover, it is important that a framework be adopted in order to understand how economic 
performance and firm behaviour are affected by corporate governance. A principal-agent relationship 
in corporate governance takes place when a person owning a firm is different from the one who 
controls or manages it; hence, a separation between ownership and control exists. However, firms 
must be provided with incentives by product market competition in order to employ the most 
efficient mechanisms of corporate governance. Market participants are needed to address the 
continuous occurrence of slack firms being replaced by more efficient firms rather than justifying 
public intervention. Hence, market responses to institutional inadequacies are through recent 
managerial labour market developments, such as corporate control market (McCahery, 2002).  
 
Alternatively, the market failures taking place from asymmetric information within the realm of 
corporate governance cannot be solved by competition alone. It is important to note that several 
factors may influence the effectiveness and form of various systems of corporate governance, and 
product market competition is one of these (McCahery, 2002).  
 
In a study of Januszweski, et al., (2002), they find out that firms tend to experience higher 
productivity growth when they operate in markets with intense competition. Moreover, higher 
productivity growth is indicated for firms controlled by a strong ultimate owner, but this is not the 
case however if the ultimate owner is a financial institution. The authors also suggest that tight 
control and competition are complementary, which has been mentioned also earlier by Keasey et al., 
(2005) and Hopt et al., (1998), which means that a strong ultimate owner enhances the positive effect 
of competition.  
 
According to Kole and Lehn (1997), firms surviving in the competition are assumed to have optimal 
governance structures. Those who are not able to adapt their governance structures to changes in the 
business environment are likely to lead to demise, resulting in a “natural selection of efficient 
organisational forms” (p. 421). There is little research about how governance structures evolve – 
whether they are stable or change over time; whether they adapt to sudden changes in the business 
environment and how quickly if so. There is limited understanding of these issues at present (Kole 
and Lehn, 1997).  
 
In their study, Giroud and Mueller (2011) indicate that firms with weak governance in non-
competitive industries tend to have lower firm value and equity returns. The causes of the efficiency 
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are examined, and the authors find lower labour productivity and higher input costs taking place 
amongst firms with weak governance, but this occurs in non-competitive industries only. It is also 
found out that activist hedge funds are more likely to target firms with weak governance in non-
competitive industries, indicating that investors work on mitigating the inefficiency.  Next section 
will shed some lights from the literature on the possible relationship between corporate governance 
and cartel formation. 
 
3.4 Corporate Governance and Cartel Formation 
There are different types of illegal activities such as collusion between agents and supervisors (e.g. 
between auditors and management or regulators and regulated firms), large scale frauds (including 
financial ones), illegal trade such as of arms, people trafficking and drugs, where at least a buyer and 
a seller frequently interact, and long term corruption (where at least two parties are continually 
involved, a bribery and a bribe). All these illegal activities lead to tremendously high social costs to 
the society (Spagnolo, 2004). Cartel would also be considered an illegal activity involving many 
agents thereby describing it as a type of organised crime, but not the most detrimental. The incentive 
structure of all these activities that is made for all the agents who are part of it is similar to that of 
cartel (Gonzalez and Schmid, 2012). 
 
It is the main aim of managers to make profits and they are accountable to shareholders for their 
performance. There would be increased profits if cartel participation is successful. This is because the 
firm would be able to raise the price at more than competitive levels of pricing. The profit is 
increased because the margin between price and marginal cost is increased. Since there is low 
visibility in the actions of managers from shareholders, the managers have the most advantage in this 
classic cartel formation. Both shareholders and managers get the advantage of being part of a cartel 
as share value of the firm rises through increase in earnings of the firm. As per the remuneration 
system of the firm, the managers also receive part of the increase in earnings. Moral hazards could be 
a reason for formation of cartel; this is because incentives might not be aligned since between the 
agent and the principal, the costs and benefits are not allocated equally. (Spagnolo, 2005 and 2007) 
 
According to Gonzalez and Schmid (2012), the board of directors and the CEO have direct 
involvement in their firms’ potential collusive price fixing agreements. Hence, it is pondered whether 
a significant relationship exists between corporate governance and the probability for a firm to 
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participate in a cartel. In particular, collusive agreements and hard-core cartel membership may be 
facilitated or prevented by certain corporate governance structures, which is seen in such examples as 
weak board of directors, strong performance-based incentives received by top managers, and top-
level high concentration of power.  
 
Gonzalez and Schmid (2012), infer based on theoretical research that a firm’s decision to participate 
in a cartel is influenced by potential profits from price fixing as well as problems on management 
incentives. Using samples of U.S cartelist firms within a period of 1986 to 2010, the study made an 
empirical investigation of the relation between the probability of cartel participation on one hand, and 
a range of corporate governance and other firm and market characteristics, on the other. The results 
indicate that it is likely for large and mature firms in concentrated industries to engage in cartel 
participation. There are however no findings between cartelistic behaviour and corporate governance 
despite the significant relationship between a few corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, top 
executives tend to carry out a significantly higher portion of their exercisable options during 
collusive behaviour than what CEO and executives of benchmark firms exercise (Gonzalez and 
Schmid, 2012). Gonzalez and Schmid offer a discussion that provides an important insight on firm’s 
participation in a cartel, which is contributory to this research.  
 
In the study of Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), it is pointed out that factors of corporate governance 
play a critical role in ascertaining a firm’s behaviour towards competition as well as in identifying the 
key players in its judgement to take on an anti-competitive behaviour. The focus of their study is to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and how cartel are formed, as well as the 
manner in which factors of corporate governance impinge on the optimal implementation of antitrust 
law against cartel (Abreu et al., 1985). 
 
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) define corporate governance as institutional arrangements intended 
to keep under control the agency problems of a firm and to lead managers to prioritise the pursuit of 
shareholders’ interests rather than their own. They infer that competition acts as the main force 
disciplining firms by maintaining their responsiveness to the markets, encouraging them to employ 
competent practices and to maximise efficiency. Amongst the means through which corporate 
governance and performance may be improved by product market competition are firm selection, 
efficient firm management, relative performance evaluation, and rents reduction. The authors suggest 
that managers are forced by effective competition to take on efficient firm management to ensure that 
74 
 
the firm survives in the competition and hence avoid the possible loss of their jobs. This point 
provides an insight that there is a direct relationship between management performance and firm 
survival (Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2007).  
 
Further Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) state, that important strategic impacts are placed by contracts 
with third parties. These contracts refer to corporate governance variables, such as financial 
arrangements and incentive systems for managers. Accordingly, research indicates that decisions for 
cartel formation typically begin at the highest level of the firm hierarchy, which are then 
implemented through issuance of instructions to lower level management hiding the collusive 
arrangement.  
 
According to Lin (2001), corporate governance is said to comprise market competitiveness as an 
external mechanism. Full nationwide competition might be obstructed by several administrative 
barriers which in turn constrain product market competition. The dominance of state-owned firms 
taking over a particular market mirrors an oligarchic structure. Massive market power is enjoyed by 
these large conglomerates, which can possibly lead to cartel operation (Lin, 2001). 
 
In contrast, Larcker et al., (2007) deal with the fact that no consistent set of results had been 
produced for the empirical research studying the link between measures of corporate governance and 
a range of economic and accounting outcomes. They believe that this is in part attributed to the 
difficulty in generating reliable measures for corporate governance. The authors find out through an 
exploratory principal component analysis that corporate governance has 14 dimensions and that these 
indices are associated with abnormal accruals. Moreover, the findings indicate slight relation to 
accounting restatements but can explain future operating performance (Larcker et al., 2007). This 
research is useful to the topic under study since it provides insights on the internal organisation of the 
firm, specifically economic and accounting areas, which are attributes of corporate governance. The 
importance of these outcomes is seen in the firm’s ultimate decision to enter into a cartel. 
 
Moreover, there is evidence showing the influence of corporate governance and firm-level 
competitive behaviour. First of this is the fact that a substantive role is often assumed by the board of 
directors in the strategic decision-making process of the firm, as shown by management research 
literature (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Second is the fact that a firm’s competitive behaviour is 
influenced by two ultimate drivers (Chen, 2008; Chen et al., 2005): The motivation of the firm to 
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involve itself in competitive pursuits, and its capacity to do so. Subsequent to this logic, corporate 
governance mechanisms have a range of elements affecting a firm’s motivation and capability to 
pursue competitive actions.  
 
Agency theory states that managers possess a certain degree of economic self-interest that may not be 
consistent with those of the owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This would lead the firm to take sub-
optimal strategic actions since the managers’ personal motivations are misaligned with the 
shareholders’ economic interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
On one hand, it is a reasonable stance to anticipate that effective corporate governance, which in 
significant aspects serves as an agency remedy, should offer assistance to the firm to undertake 
optimal strategic actions to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. On the other hand, the board 
of directors serves as a corporate governance mechanism that plays a unique role. The board’s 
advisory and service functions indicate that the board of directors can function as an important 
organisational resource, which can affect directly the firm’s capability to carry out competitive 
actions (Chatterjee and Harrison, 2001; Mace, 1986).  
 
If board of directors and other mechanisms of corporate governance have the ability to influence the 
way in which firms compete, there are certainly various aspects of corporate governance influencing 
the competitive behaviour of the firm. Consequently, if agency remedies perform effectively, optimal 
competitive actions undertaken by effective managers must be expected, considering the presence of 
favourable strategic opportunities (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). In addition, the board of directors can 
function as supplementary means to enhance the firm’s capability since directors have valuable social 
and human capital that is deployable by the firm in its quest to engage in competitive actions 
(Hutchinson and Gul, 2004).  
 
The insufficiency of explaining the occurrence of collusion cannot be addressed by limiting 
competition since collusion is more difficult than what can be assumed. Cartel is by nature 
changeable because they constructed the incentive to cheat. In terms of increased market power, 
cartel might be surpassed by long-range contracts with tacit oligopolistic collusion if these cartels 




Fear (2007) has presented a discussion on cartel and its nature, and the corresponding corporate 
governance embodying it, making the study relevant to this research. Fear’s stated that the cartel 
issue had always involved certain assumptions about business behaviour, trust, and reputation, 
amongst others. These assumptions finally led to economists wrestling with industries’ implications 
that are beset by fixed costs and competitive behaviour. The way economists wrestle with these 
implications is by debating trust and cartel formation as they raised issues about corporate 
governance; such as the issue on the social impact of big businesses and the issue of ownership-
control separation. 
 
 3.4.1 The CEO and Cartel Formation  
The management of the organisation is required to enforce cartel agreements (Spagnolo, 2005) and 
the decision to actually form the cartel is taken by the top management (Harrington, 2006c). The 
CEO, Board of directors and top management are all involved in the collusive price fixing 
agreements, which are formed by their firms as part of the corporate governance discussions. Hence, 
it is necessary to understand whether the corporate governance within a firm helps determine if a 
cartel should be formed. Many organisations may not want to carry out this hard-core activity and 
establish collusive agreements. Cartel participation increases if the board of directors is weak; if most 
power is exercised by the top management level; and if the incentives provided to the management 
depend on their performance levels (Spagnolo, 2005). 
 
When cartel is formed, senior managers benefit from it through bonuses and stock options. These are 
both kinds of financial benefits which in turn assist in collusive activities and its maintenance 
(Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2007). Thus, according to studies conducted recently, it is through senior 
management that the decision of being part of a cartel is made (Harrington, 2008). 
 
Thépot (2011) stated that when there is more effort required from an agent, there is more motivation 
to find an alternative in its place and that would be forming cartel. So if shareholders want to reduce 
the motivation of managers to be part of cartel, they would have to decrease those benefits that lead 
to the alternation of efforts through collusion. This method affects those issues that are related to 
certain remuneration packages such as allocation of stock options. Also it affects the welfare that is 
not considered when the whole system does not consider agency relations and the factors causing 
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collusion. Thus opportunism occurs due to the fact that a manager has natural incentives to alternate 
illegal market conduct for effort (Ibid, p 5).  
 
According to Gonzalez and Schmid (2012), the board of directors and the CEO have direct 
involvement in their firms’ potential collusive price fixing agreements. Hence, it is pondered whether 
a significant relationship exists between corporate governance and the probability for a firm to 
participate in a cartel. In particular, collusive agreements and hard-core cartel membership may be 
facilitated or prevented by certain corporate governance structures, which is seen in such examples as 
weak board of directors, strong performance-based incentives received by top managers, and top-
level high concentration of power.  
 
It is worthy to note that a more competitive attitude is induced amongst managers by stock-based 
incentives because these incentives link the present compensation of managers to the expectations of 
stock markets on the future profitability of the firm. When there is breaking of a tacit collusive 
agreement and competitors happen to detect it, the negative effect of the breach is anticipated by the 
stock market, specifically the effect on the future profitability of the firm, which is linked to the 
impending price-war period. The result is that the negative effect is right away discounted on the 
stock price, leading to managers’ reduced short-run gains from deviation. It is important to note that 
cartel may be strongly destabilised by stock-related compensation, leading managers to provide 
extensive emphasis on short-range results. It may be expected that this would result in destabilising 
cartel through increased valuation of short-term gains by managers from their unilateral defection. 
Such defection is from collusive strategies associated with prospective long-term losses. Note that 
these losses are caused by the price wars set off by defections once found out by members of the 
partner cartel (Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2007). 
 
Buccirossi and Spagnolo surmise that considering a firm’s financial performance, a period of five 
years may be viewed as short-term, but for cartel having five years average estimated duration, a 
five-year period is considered long. Hence, the stock-based compensation tends not to be deterred by 
short-termism, which means that the firm managers’ short-term objectives are adequately long-term 
when cartel’ average life span is considered. A high discount rate on future costs are even taken by 
managers as these costs are indicative of defecting from the cartel scheme and may be too large to 
become significant in present value. This would mean discouraging defections despite the short term. 
Ironically, large stock-related incentives cannot guarantee competitive behaviour and may in truth 
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likely to smooth the progress of collusive behaviour by enabling stability amongst cartel (Buccirossi 
and Spagnolo, 2007). This assertion only supports the common knowledge that the manner in which 
firms must organise their relationships with each other is not at all based on pure competition but by 
cartel formation and promotion (Hopner and Krempel, 2004). Buccirossi and Spagnolo have 
provided a useful and insightful discussion on the relationship between corporate governance and 
cartel formation, which is relevant to the topic being studied.  
 
The study of Aubert (2007) harmonises with that of Buccirossi and Spagnolo as both have focused on 
managerial effort incentives as well as their relation with cartel formation. Aubert examines how 
managers’ incentives to collude interact with their incentives. The firm’s competitive strategy is 
privately chosen by a manager along with exerting efforts to enhance productivity; and his pursuit to 
increase profits may lead him to replace effort with collusion. The idea is that it would be more 
attractive to participate in a cartel through high profit targets such as in the form of strong effort 
incentives. The study point out that to neglect the issues on internal incentives is to underestimate 
welfare losses due to cartelisation. Even in the absence of collusion, the new cost of potential 
collision (internal inefficiencies in firms that collude and compete) involves fostering internal 
efficiency by benefiting from antitrust intervention (Aubert, 2007).  
 
Aubert’s findings indicate that managers can be prevented from colluding by providing them with 
weak incentives so that they may exert effort, when antitrust sanctions cannot be expected to deter 
sufficiently. This suggests that collusion enables saving on effort, which is considered more preferred 
for high-effort levels, considering the marginal cost of effort in its increasing stance. Owners 
decrease the gain obtainable by managers through collusion by decreasing the target profits or the 
demanded level of effort. In an attempt to avoid cartelisation, sacrificing internal efficiency can thus 
be resorted to by owners. It means that social losses may be generated from the potential of collusion 
by managers, which is caused by inefficient levels of effort despite the firms’ non-collusion in reality. 
In contrast, firms in favour of cartel formation needs to also request low effort levels that are 
considered inefficient so that deviations from cartel agreement may be deterred. It is worthy of 
mention here that when it becomes attractive to collude, so is it to deviate, since deviating would 
allow the firm to have more savings especially on the cost of effort, i.e. during high profit targets. 
Hence, albeit colluding to save on effort is the natural incentive of managers, it would be difficult for 
colluding firms to induce effort once they have considered all incentive issues. Inefficiently low or 
high levels of effort are in fact always requested by colluding firms; whilst this is not the case for 
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competing firms who may take on efficiently full operations as long as there are high enough 
individual sanctions. Apart from effort distortions, an information rent must be paid by colluding 
firms to managers, which may also be done by competing firms in the presence of very low expected 
individual sanctions (Aubert, 2007). Aubert’s study is related to this research report as it tackles 
collusion, managerial effort incentives, and cartelisation and can thus contribute to addressing the 
identified set of hypotheses.  
 
Burhop and Lubbers (2008) conduct an analysis on how productive efficiency is impacted by 
cartelisation and managerial incentive schemes, with particular focus on coal mining corporations in 
Ruhr district, Germany. It is found out that product efficiency is not affected at all by cartelisation. 
The authors claim that only when corporate governance variables (e.g. the quality of corporate 
governance; proxies for product market competition) are taken into account can the impacts of cartel 
formation of productivity be fully justified. This is seen in the idea that managers must be motivated 
if there is asymmetric information between managers and shareholders. Product market competition 
is influential to how these managerial incentives must be optimally designed; the underlying idea is 
that designing incentives optimally becomes difficult if managers view monopoly profits as those that 
result from their own efforts, which would lead to a more diffused signal received by the principal 
(owner of the firm). Further, firms’ bankruptcy risks are reduced by low market competition, which 
hence leads to the likewise reduction of managers’ lay-off risk, and which might lead to reduced 
managerial effort and firm efficiency. However, managers still exert effort on the firm if they receive 
a share of the profit. Since low market competition involves higher marginal return of managerial 
effort, managers would resultantly increase their effort, which would essentially lead to a 
corresponding increase in the efficiency of the firm. Similarly, the principals can enable 
counteracting the negative correlation between market power and bankruptcy risk through the 
selection of the firm’s financial structure. Moreover, the debt-equity ratio increases vis-a-vis 
bankruptcy risk; hence, increasing debt in relation to equity can be carried out to counteract the 
effects of market power on the managerial effort. Therefore, it is when variables of corporate 
governance are considered can the impacts of cartel formation on productive efficiency be fully 
explained (Burhop and Lubbers, 2008). 
 
Burhop and Lubbers state that if managers prefer a quiet life than the difficult profit-maximising life 
offered to them, lower productive efficiency would be demonstrated by cartelised firms in which they 
are connected. This hypothesis is tested by the authors by using data from coal mining corporations 
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covering a period of 32 years through a stochastic frontier model. The findings suggest that cartel 
membership does not have a significant effect on the productive efficiency of these corporations. 
Productive efficiency is not also affected by a high-debt equity ratio; instead, it demonstrates higher 
rates in firms’ offering of large bonuses to their board members. This only suggests that it is more 
important to uphold compensation schemes than consider competitive pressures from product 
markets when productive efficiency is taken into account; neither is the higher bankruptcy risk of 
high-leverage firms more important than compensation schemes when considering such efficiency. 
When corporate governance variables are controlled, it is found out that significant correlation exists 
between stronger managerial incentives and product efficiency (Burhop and Lubbers, 2008). Burhop 
and Lubbers’ study provides substantial insights relevant to this research and likewise enlightens the 
reader on several relationships governing corporate governance. 
 
A study by Han (2010) examines short-term and long-term employment contracts and their effects on 
cartel stability. The study shows that firms are more likely to be involved in cartel agreement when 
CEO tenure (short-term employment contract) is low or when CEO turnover is high. Han shows that 
a short-term contract provides stability to a cartel formation more than a long-term contract. If a 
certain profit margin is achieved, only then is the short-term contract renewed. With the help of this 
activity, firm performance is enhanced and defection from the collusion has taken place, which 
diminishes the chances of being laid off. Firm performance may be hindered due to any kind of 
future punishment potentials which is why the chance of being laid off increases. The stability of 
cartel is influenced by these re-employment trade-offs which are tangled with the monetary trade-
offs. A long-term contract does not affect stability when the fixed salary components are applied. The 
fixed components affect the short-term contract to an extent. Cyclical collusive pricing also takes 
place due to the short-term renewable contracts that may be extended after a certain period of time. It 
is also observed that equity-financed firms are not able to provide as much stability to cartels as much 
as debt financed firms.  
 3.4.2 The Shareholders and Cartel Formation 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, when cartel is formed the senior manager benefit from it through 
bonuses and stock options (Spagnolo, 2005). The agency theory perspective holds that corporate 
governance has a clear implication of establishing adequate control or monitoring in order to protect 
shareholders from the conflict of interest occurring in the management. Eisenhardt (1989) clearly 
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states that the conflict occurs when the goals of principal (owners) and the agents (managers) are 
different and it becomes costly for the principal to actually verify the activities of the agent.  
 
However, being part of cartel is sometimes an advantage to the whole firm which includes 
shareholder regardless to the consequences of forming cartel and discovering it by the legal authority, 
this lead us to the question “what are the conditions under which cartel formation might be in the 
interests of shareholders ” ?  
 
According to Thépot (2011) there are two reasons for the interest of the owner in being part of 
collusive activity. One reason is that shareholders might be encouraged to give an agent benefits to be 
part of such activity due to certain corporate governance issues. Another reason is that collusive 
activity is an advantage to the whole firm as it increases earnings. It has been mentioned earlier as 
well that being part of cartel is an advantage to the whole firm and is therefore of interest to the 
owners. However, at times, managers might not benefit from cartel formation, which is why such 
illegal activity could be due to the owners’ own motivations (Mullin and Snyder, 2005). 
 
Through these illegal activities, the aim of increasing expected return can increase the shareholders’ 
wealth.  This is through the way that due to decrease in firms’ risk and/or rise in expected return, the 
value of the firm’s shares increases. Thus, there are two ways through which shareholders receive 
advantage from such unfair activities, expected-return increases and reduction of risk (Cloninger, 
1985). 
 
In a study of McAfee, Vincent, Williams, et al. (1993), it is found out that the collusive agreements 
of hostile takeover bidders had no significant effect on the target’s price. A welfare analysis suggests 
that social benefits can be accrued to a positive probability of cartel formation; however, the same 
may or may not be beneficial to the target’s shareholders. This provides useful insights on the 
prevailing policy debate relating to collusive agreement regulations. However, Davis and Thompson 
(1994) identify the conditions where shareholders’ interest is considered in cartel formation: 
engagement in shareholder rights, CEO selection, determination of executive remuneration, and 
decision-making processes. According to them, activist shareholders expand their demand from 
merely engaging in shareholder rights, to such concerns as choosing CEOs as well as determining 




Geradin (2004) offers another set of conditions where shareholder interest might be considered in 
cartel formation. He points out that these conditions are: the position to claim for compensation in 
such event that a cartel is successful in excluding a firm, and to oversee a proceeding to correct the 
wrong, which is an exclusive interest of shareholders. He states that in cases that a cartel aims at a 
new market entrant and has been successful in excluding a firm, claiming for compensations will not 
be a position of anyone in the absence of shareholders. Bringing proceedings to correct the wrong 
may only be an interest exclusive to shareholders. This is aligned to the idea that shareholders are in 
effect active owners of the firm whereby they take part in its top decision making (Leech, 2001). 
 
3.5 Theoretical Background 
The empirical investigation in this research builds explicitly upon agency theory in order to 
understand the empirical relationship between corporate governance structure and cartel formation. 
 3.5.1 Agency Theory  
The Agency Theory is based on the modern corporations and how the principles or owners of the 
corporations are separated from the agents who are the managers. In the modern organisation, 
management is not carried out by the shareholders but is diversified to other agents. These agents are 
responsible for the daily operations of the organisation. It is due to this separation of ownership and 
control that several issues may arise within the organisation. Resolving these issues may prove to be 
costly for the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 Eisenhardt, 1988). The basic problem 
associated with agency theory is that the management who is responsible for control is involved in 
pursuing self-interest. The manager is only motivated to provide extra ordinary efficiency levels 
when he is provided with some kind of personal gain. They pursue their personal interests and not the 
interests of the organisation or the shareholders. For instance, they may be attracted towards the 
purchase of comfortable and expensive office equipment only because the cost is borne by the 
owners and they would reap the benefits (Eisenhardt, 1988).  
 
The agency theory perspective holds that corporate governance has a clear implication of establishing 
adequate control or monitoring in order to protect shareholders from the conflict of interest occurring 
in the management. Normative recommendations are directed to the concept that different persons 
should occupy the positions of independent directors and of the chairman and CEO. The agency 
theory is in contrast with the stewardship theory, which views that managers are essentially 
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trustworthy and manage efficiently the resources that the firm has entrusted to them (Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2003).  
 
Hence, it is the basic concern of the shareholders that the management is motivated enough to not 
only pursue their own interests but also increase shareholder wealth. Eisenhardt (1989) clearly states 
that the conflict occurs when the goals of principal (owners) and the agents (managers) are different 
and it becomes costly for the principal to actually verify the activities of the agent These principals 
do not have the ability to efficiently monitor the activities of the agents (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
When the management is engaged in pursuing self-interest, the costs of the organisation increase 
since the decisions are not efficient and the formation of contracts is not relevant to shareholder 
wealth. Hence, the earnings of the organisation are highly affected by this problem (Leuz et al., 
2003). 
 
A proposal has been brought forward by Fama and Jensen (1983) to resolve the issue of agency costs 
due to the separation of ownership and control. They believe that by introducing two separate 
programmes of decision management and decision control, it would be possible to resolve the 
problems. The opportunistic behaviour that is carried out by the management can be contained by 
introducing the corporate governance mechanism (Fama, (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Williamson (1988) and Shilefer and Vishny (1997).  
 
This mechanism should be based on internal and external controls to have a reduced effect on agency 
costs (McKnight and Weir, 2009). With the help of these internal and external mechanisms the 
principal and agent goals can be aligned along with reducing the costs and increasing shareholder 
wealth (Weir et al., 2002; Roberts, 1985; Davis et al., 1997). Many authors, including Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), believe that corporate governance not only aims to improve the performance of the 
organisation but also monitors the management behaviour and enhances the efficiency of the 
financial reporting process. This concept has the ability to mitigate the costs associated with 
management self-interest and align the managers’ interests with the shareholders’. 
 
Thepot (2011) examined the relationship between leniency policy and individual liability - two 
instruments on competition policy enforcement. Such examination is done by analysing the interplays 
amongst the cartel members and the interplays within each firm. A two-dimensional system serves as 
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the transformation of these instruments; namely, the horizontal dimension, which the cartel members 
themselves have formed; and the vertical dimension, which the interaction of cartel members has 
constructed. The basis of analysis is the theory of the firm, where their ownership-control separation 
is upheld, as well as the agency theory, which is based on the assumption of the inevitable problem of 
moral hazard between the owner and the manager. The argument is pursued along the literature on 
collusive agreements, individual liability, and leniency policy. Insights on corporate governance vis-
a-vis cartel are also carried out by the economic literature using game theoretical approaches. 
Theoretical insights will aid in understanding the link between cartel activity on one hand, and 
agency and governance issues on the other (Thepot, 2011). Thepot has provided a useful discussion 
for this study as he links the interaction between cartel and corporate governance, making it relevant 
to the topic being investigated. 
 
Many authors have also suggested that corporate governance is not as effective and that alternate 
strategies of control such as performance evaluations, audits, etc., should be introduced. This would 
not only monitor the activities of the organisation but will also reduce agency costs associated with it 
(e.g., Davis et al., 1997). However, to implement efficient governance practices, it is essential that 
the board members are independent in making their decisions and have no personal contact with the 
management. The board should consist of non-executive directors (NEDs) to handle all management 
issues. A separate officer should be assigned for this purpose of aligning the interests of the 
management and the shareholders’ (Donaldson, 1990; Dalton et al., 1998; Coles and Hesterly, 2000; 
Daily and Dalton, 1997). 
 
Many of the researches that have been found highlighted the importance of agency theory in the 
study of corporate governance. The earnings management practices of the firm and the role of the 
board of directors are very much related to governance mechanisms (Xie et al., 2003; Kao and Chen, 
2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Benkel et al., 2006 and Goodwin et al., 2009).  
 
To carry out an effective decision control system, establishing an audit committee is important. This 
would help in the internal monitoring system of the organisation (Fama, 1980 Fama and Jensen, 
1983). It is not only the internal monitoring that is important but also the external auditing process 
that requires a committee (Bradbury et al., 2006) and integration of NEDs (Fama, 1980; Anderson et 
al., 1992). The governance mechanisms have been found to be much more efficient and cost effective 
than the process of takeovers (Fama, 1980). The management interests should be pursued along with 
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the interests of the shareholders to make sure that the organisation prospers (Davis et al., 1997; Tosi, 
et al., 2003).  
 
The external audit members are to be independent from the firm so that he may reduce the problem 
of information asymmetry in financial reporting. This would then reduce the agency costs associated 
with the monitoring process (Poit, 2001). Hence, with the help of monitoring and good governance 
practices it is possible to reduce any kind of fraudulent behaviour that may take place in the 
organisation. Agency theory and external auditing are two of the most important mechanisms of 
corporate governance practices. Both have the ability to reduce the agency costs and any kind of 
opportunistic behaviour that may arise from within the management (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
The monitoring activities are in behalf of the shareholders and the independent auditors ensure that 
neither the management nor the owners pursue only their self-interests. 
 
Taking agency theory into consideration, the cartel may be indicative of an agency problem. As a 
consequence, enhancing corporate governance should result reduced practice of the cartel formation. 
Given these agency assumptions, independent variables will be identified with the aim of detecting 
associations between corporate governance attributes and cartel formation. 
 
3.6 Hypothesis Development 
The above literature review shows that there is a potential relationship between cartel formation and 
corporate governance attributes (Spagnolo, (2005); Han (2010); Aubert, (2007); Gonzalez and 
Schmid (2012); Harrington, (2008)).Therefore, a broad range of literature that has been conducted 
over the past decades on a variety of corporate governance topics is reviewed in order to draw a clear 
picture of what board and CEO characteristics could be associated with cartel formation. However, 
there is certainly no clear negative or positive relationship between what is regarded as good 
corporate governance in the literature and the likelihood of firm engaging in cartel agreement. 
 
This section reviews the empirical literature related to board characteristics, ownership structure of 
the board, CEOs characteristics, and CEO compensation scheme. The focus will be on the following 
characteristics: Board size, directors’ age, directors’ gender, board duration, independent directors 
(non-executive directors) and board compensation. The ownership structure: common stock owned 
by an outside director and family ownership. The CEO characteristics are; CEO age, CEO gender, 
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CEO tenure, multiple directorships, and CEO concentration power. This section also reviews the 
literature on CEO compensation schemes (share, bounces, etc.) Although this list is comprehensive 
enough to capture the most important board and CEOs characteristics identified by the literature; it is 
by no means exhaustive (for recent studies of other board characteristics see for example Bebchuk 
and Cohen (2005)).  
 
3.6.1 Does Board of Director Characteristics Matter?  
 Board Size 
The importance of limiting the board size is a global consideration and this is due to the workloads 
being required; however, only slight empirical evidence is available to support this view. Rather, a 
strong tradition persists in terms of supporting many directorships as a firm’s tool to appoint external 
resources (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006). The findings undertaken by Kiel and Nicholson in their study 
suggest a low incidence of several directorships. They indicate that the reasons of many examples of 
several directorships relate to entities, the nature of these entities, and lower workload requirements 
as outcome of such nature. In addition, the findings suggest a lack of apparent relationship between 
the financial performance of the firm and implementation of several directorships. Finally, the 
authors tackle the implications for boards and the importance of ensuring governance 
recommendations and guidelines.  
 
Moreover, managing a large board of directors in an organisation can prove to be costly (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Due to the fact that the members are in large number, it is possible to 
have disagreements and difficulty in performing efficient roles. As the number of board members 
increases, the internal conflict problem increases along with the agency issues, and the 
communication and coordination activities amongst the board members become weak (Eisenberg et 
al., 1998). Eisenberg and colleagues indicate that such number must be as small as not to allow 
conflicts to thrive as well as not to weaken communication and coordination activities amongst board 
members. 
 
The Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (ECFA) provides a mandate that the number of 
directors must be at least five and that the board must determine the optimal board size based on the 
needs of the organisation. The Standards for Excellence Institute also mandates a minimum of five 
directors, but they consider it preferable to have seven or eight directors. At least five directors are 
also proposed by the Committee for Purchase and the Panel of the Independent Sector. The Internal 
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Revenue System (IRS) holds that very small or very large boards may be problematic since small 
boards might fail to represent public interest whilst large boards might fail to do their duties and 
responsibilities (Hopkins and Gross, 2009). 
 
According to the OFT 2011, directors in small firms might have more hands on involvement with 
day-to-day business practises of their firm, and therefore they might be more knowledgeable of any 
actual or potential breach of competition law. In contrast, directors in large firms might not be as 
involved as the directors in smaller firms.  
 
In a similar manner to this study Gonzalez and Schmid (2012), using a sample of 1,148 firms on 182 
different U.S cartels from 1987 to 2009, empirically tested the relationship between the probability of 
firm involving in cartel and several corporate governance attributes. The results show that mature and 
large low growth firms are most likely to participate in cartel. Also, large-sized board significantly 
related to the probability of firm participating in cartel. Gonzalez and Schmid indicate that large 
boards are capable of such formation.  
 
A research carried out on a large number of U.S. publicly traded firms from Forbes 500 states that 
there exists an inverse relationship between the number of directors and Tobin’s Q. In this research 
all other attributes like firm size, ownership structure, etc., have all been controlled (Yermack, 1996). 
Another research carried out on 879 middle-sized and small Finnish firms states the same results. It is 
also believed that a smaller number of board of directors leads to lower expenses in the funding 
organisations (Yermack, 1996; Tufano and Sevick, 1997;  Dann, et al., 2003).  
 
If the board is very large, problems like low levels of motivation or coalitions may occur. The issue 
of responsibility diffusion also arises when there are large numbers of people to handle similar 
activities. Hence, it is found that a large board size may negatively affect the coordination activities 
and group dynamics which are to be extracted for the purpose of organisation development. This has 
been pointed out earlier by Eisenberg et al. (1998). Any decision-making activity may also be 
hindered due to the fact that a consensus from all members of the board may not be easily met (Judge 
and Zeithaml, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Golden and Zajac, 2001). Hence, large boards may prove to be much less efficient and hinder the 




A continued debate goes on in terms of the role of board size according to various perspectives 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Hemalin and Weisbach, 2003). Board size has been examined by a range of 
literature from the strategic perspective. Large boards encounter coordination and communication 
difficulties which hence serve as a hindrance for the board’s capacity to advise and be involved in 
strategic planning (Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Also, larger boards tend to be less 
productive and less powerful in monitoring (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 
1996) 
 
On the contrary, an agency perspective holds that there is a likelihood for larger boards to become 
aware of any agency problems since a significant number of experienced directors can be deployed to 
review the actions of the management. Moreover, the agency theory views that effective monitoring 
is supported by larger boards through the reduced dominance of CEO within the board, which in turn 
protects the interest of shareholders (Singh et al., 2001).  
 
The bargaining position of the board is enhanced through larger boards, especially in relation to the 
CEO, which leads to the conclusion that it is more effective to monitor management when larger 
boards are utilised to do so. Therefore, board size proves to be an essential aspect of boards’ ability 
towards effective management monitoring (Persons, 2006).  
 
Board size indicates its advisory and monitoring responsibilities, which can contribute to 
management behaviour. Increased expertise and diversity are likely to be exhibited by larger boards 
alongside increased monitoring capacity of the board (John and Senbet, 1998). In addition, more 
independent directors tend to be included in larger boards, which results in the capacity of these 
directors to delegate more responsibilities to delegate more tasks to board committees than smaller 
boards, which can result in limiting managerial opportunistic behaviour (Xie et al., 2003).    
 
However, the fact that a large size of board members may hinder the growth of the organisation has 
been proved in literature but it is also essential to understand that a minimum number of board 
members are required to make sure there is diversity and countervailing power in the organisation. It 
is necessary to have board members who can deliver balanced representations along with expertise at 




In addition, it is found out that the audit committee independence is in fact drawn from the board’s 
size because of increased pronouncement of the probability of having a totally independent audit 
committee in firms with larger boards (Ebrahim, 2007). It is argued that small board size tends to 
limit the available independent directors serving the audit committee, alongside the evidence that 
board size increases, vis-à-vis the independence of the audit committee (Klein, 2002).  
 
There are some who argue that reporting quality is enhanced by larger boards (Chtourou et al., 2001; 
Xie et al., 2003) whilst there are also those who claim that such is enhanced by smaller boards 
(Yermack, 1996; Alonso et al., 2000). Some of the shortcomings that may be encountered with large 
and small-sized boards are increased likelihood for management or outsider dominance. Bureaucracy 
might also serve as a hindrance for larger boards to discharge their monitoring duties.  
 
The study of Sanchez (2009) aims to determine the extent of effectiveness of corporate governance 
by analysing how board structure impacts on the technical efficiency of the firm. The study evaluates 
firm performance by using Data Envelopment Analysis using resembling methods and bootstrapping 
strategy. It utilises truncated regressions to find out the effects of board characteristics on efficiency. 
These characteristics are the board’s size, reputation, independence, diversity, and activity. The result 
suggests that the technical efficiency of business tends to increase with a heterogeneous board that 
involves a limited number of directorships as well as a limited activity stipulated in annual board 
meetings in decreased number alongside increased number of specialised committees (Sanchez, 
2009). This study is relevant to the research as it provides clarification on the impact of board 
structure on the firm’s technical efficiency.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) suggest that there is no relation between board composition and 
corporate performance. However, negative relationship exists between board size and corporate 
performance. The board’s decision to replace CEO has a corresponding correlation with board size 
and composition. The same correlation exists between board size and composition on one hand, and 
acquisitions and executive compensation on the other.  
 
Following Gonzalez and Schmid (2012) study that large-sized board significantly related to the 
probability of firm participating in cartel, also Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 
1996, who have argued that the larger the size of the board the weaker corporate control over firm 
and CEO, therefore, this study examines the relationship between board size and the probability of 
cartel formation. If cartel agreement can be considered a failure of corporate control, i.e. a failure of 
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the board to control individuals (e.g., CEO, individual directors), then it should be the case that the 
propensity to get in the cartel agreement is positively related with the size of the board. To examine 
this effect, several studies measure board size as the total number of the firm’s directors (e.g., 
Beasley, 1996; Yermach, 1996; Vafeas, 2003; and Coles et al., 2008). This study uses the total 
number of members on the board as a measure of board size (SIZEBA). Controlling for poor firm 
financial performance, firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index, this 
study tests for the proposition below; a positive and significant coefficient is expected 
 
P1: The size of board of directors is larger for firms committing cartel than for a matched 
sample of non-cartel firms  
 
 
 Board Independence (Non-Executive Directors) 
There are two kinds of independent board members thus identified. The first kind is the one who is 
actually affiliated with the firm and is an employee and the second kind is the one who is not 
affiliated with the organisation at all and only provides services like consultation etc. (NACD, 1996). 
These independent directors do not have any kind of financial ties which could hinder their 
performance in the firm. Much confusion exists about how many independent board of directors 
should exists since there are many costs involved with it.  
 
In the literature there are two kinds of views present about independent directors. In one hand, some 
state that the market perceives these directors as more efficient in making corporate decisions which 
is why they are promoted (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Brickley, et al., 1994; Cotter, et al.,(1997); 
Dann, Del Guercio and Partch (2003); Anderson, et al.,, 2004).  
 
On the other hand some state that they may not be able to provide such high value (Bahgat and 
Black, 1999). It also presented by Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003) that there needs to be a mix of 
outside and inside directors and that the inside directors should be provided with incentives. With the 
help of these incentives it would be possible to bring about truthfulness and integrity within the 
decision making processes without having to use the concept of veto power. A study has also been 
conducted which states that the large number of independent directors are able to manage the 




The literature also has not been able to clearly state if the inside or outside directors have the ability 
to influence the kind of conflicts that take place in an organisation (Mace, 1986; Patton and Baker, 
1987; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 1991; Lee, et al., 1992; Shivdasani, 1993; Vicknair, et al., 
1993). Within the category of outside directors there are two kinds, the grey (non-independent 
directors/ non-executive directors) and the independent directors. In this case, an independent 
director is one who is only affiliated with the firm as being a board of director lest he has no kind of 
affiliation. For the purpose of this research as well the outside non-executive directors would be 
taken into account.  
 
Many researchers have observed the effect of outside directors on the board and found that it is not 
only the compensation that can be held responsible for the monitoring constraints of the organisation 
(Fizel et al., 1990). A labour contract is established with the CEO when he is hired and within this 
contract exist all constraints for the CEO activities. Some of the findings suggest that the time period 
of the CEO has no link with the fraction of outsiders on the board. It is found that a monotonic 
decrease takes place in the time period when the outsiders’ percentage of the board is increased.  
 
Moreover, board of directors is considered the most important element in the internal framework of 
corporate governance (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board’s composition serves as the 
basis for establishing the board with effective management monitoring. The agency theory views that 
an independent board is a vigilant element of agency problem since it involves a considerable number 
of non-executive directors tasked to monitor the performance and behaviour of management 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Bainbridge, 1993).  
 
It is posited that boards with dominance of insider directors tend to have self-monitoring problems as 
well as weak monitoring stances by executive directors (Fama, 1980). Lawler et al. (2002), through 
their empirical study on the subject, support the view that board independence leads to capacity to 
improve the board’s monitoring function. Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) posit that aside from 
the direct impact of board independence on the performance of the firm, it also impacts on financial 
disclosure since management can be forced by outside directors to enhance firm disclosure quality.  
 
In the UK, the Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 2002) emphasises the significance of independent boards, 
alongside its recommendation of a minimum of three independent directors on the board to ensure a 
substantial contribution of independent directors in executing the board’s duties. The Higgs Report 
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on the Corporate Governance Combined Code 2003 which consists of the regulation to include in the 
annual report the independent non-executive directors. The board has a duty to ascertain board 
independence in terms of judgment and character, including the circumstances or relationships that 
tend to create an impact on the director’s judgment. Nonetheless, the issue of independence here does 
not rest on relying totally on the items that firms disclose in their annual reports but that of the 
directors’ independence. The work identifies the application of independence criteria to each non-
executive director. Each non-executive director is therefore examined whether each independence 
criterion is applied to them to find out their independence. Moreover, the director is disqualified from 
divergence from any of the independence criteria of the UK Corporate Governance Combined Code 
2003.  
 
In the appointment of new directors it is more likely for cartel to choose busy outsider directors, and 
this is congruent with a conjecture that management tends to nominate new board members who are 
not likely to do aggressive monitoring. This results in models that have controls for board size 
(Gonzalez, Schmid, and Yermack, 2013). 
 
In a study of Kang, et al., (2007), it is revealed that director independence is demonstrated in 83 
firms from the total ones involved in the study. This is consistent with the finding of another study 
showing 73 firms with independent chairpersons. These findings are congruent with the 
recommendations made by ASX Corporate Governance Council in 2003. The level of board 
independence is found to have been significantly influenced by shareholder concentration and 
industry type as implied by the findings (Kang et al., 2007). 
 
Another research study states that there may be a relationship between the CEO turnover levels and 
outsider representation (Weisbach, 1988). There is a strong relationship between firm performance 
and the presence of inside or outside board of directors. Borokhovich et al. (1996) found out that 
outsider board members are supportive of other outsider board members in the activities carried out 
within the firm and that they are most likely to become the CEO of the organisation depending on 
their percentage. The market also has confidence in these outsider boards of directors that they would 
provide benefits as a whole. These outside boards of directors may quit from their position if the firm 
is not performing well in the organisation which is why the CEO close to his retirement is inclined to 
hire inside board of directors so that they may be permanent and available to become the next CEO 




To form an effective and competent board it is necessary to have a number of independent directors 
(Fama1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) use the 
terminologies “outside directors” rather than “independent directors”. However, their general notion 
of outside directors is similar to independent directors. According to them, the management of the 
firm should be comfortable enough to bring their issues to the board without worrying of being 
questioned or punished (Fama, 1980). Hence, independent directors are helpful in increasing the 
performance of the firm since the management feels comfortable in applying their expertise.  
 
Some of the research studies also state that internal mechanisms are not required and that the market 
is able to provide a solution to the agency problem and the board of directors are unnecessary (e.g., 
Hart, 1983). The market is very much interested in the appointment of outside directors as they 
believe that these directors would act in the interest of the market (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990).  
 
Prior studies indicate that there is a positive impact that independent board members can pose on the 
governance of a firm, specifically in terms of fraud (Beasley, 1996; Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 
2000a; Peasnell et al., 2005; Jaggi et al., 2009; Klein, 2002b; Chtourou et al., 2001; Bradbury, 2006; 
and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010).  
 
As mentioned above, board independence is regarded as a very important element in an organisation 
due to the fact that non-executive directors (outside directors) are considered as the control and 
monitor mechanism in the firm, who can also enhance firm performance (Duchin et al., 2010; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Weishbach, 1988). Being financially independent from the management, and from 
possibly conflicting situations, non-executive directors (outside directors) have the ability to 
minimise agency problems and control managerial self-interests (Rhodes et al., 2000). They are able 
to protect the shareholder interest, as well as supervise and manage performance in a much better 
way to align firm strategies for greater performance. Therefore, if cartel agreement can be considered 
as a failure of corporate control and monitor, i.e. a failure of the board to control and monitor 
individuals (e.g., CEO, individual directors). Hence, it should be the case that the propensity to get 
into the cartel agreement is negatively related to the percentage of independent board members on the 
board. Consistent with most prior studies, board independence (NED) is calculated in this study as 
the percentage of independent NEDs to the total number of board members. Consequently, this study 
empirically tests the proposition below by controlling for poor firm financial performance, firm 
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ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index. Negative and significant coefficient 
is expected: 
 
P2: The percentage of independent (non-executive) members on the board of director is lower 
for firms committed cartel crime than for non-cartel firms. 
 
 
 Age of the Board of Directors 
Several views have been stated by researchers regarding the age of the board of directors. On one 
hand, some of them state that as the board members grow older, their productivity levels decline. On 
the other hand, the older board members are found to have much more experience and a well-
integrated social network to enhance the performance of the organisation. According to the National 
Association of Corporate Directors the age of 70 these board members should be removed so that the 
productivity levels may be maintained. The compensation paid to these managers is higher than their 
levels of productivity which is why it is essential to retire them (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 
1999). 
 
Even though this criticism is considered valid, older board members may also prove to be productive. 
For instance, those directors who have retired can now provide more time and efficiency towards the 
corporation. If there are younger directors present it is possible that the risk taking may increase and 
a strategic change may take place (Child, 1974; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). On the other hand a 
researcher states that when older directors are present, the processes become more conservative. 
These managers are more independent than the younger managers who actually carry out risks based 
on the expense of the shareholders (Stevens et al., 1978). Hence, it is believed that directors who are 
older in age are able to provide better performance than the ones who are younger.  
 
In a study of Vell (2010) involving the age distribution of board members, they find out that 56 is the 
average age whilst 58 is the median age of these board members. Age diversity is present as shown 
by three board members who are aged 71 and some others who are aged 33. In a board index by 
Silicon Valley in 2008, it was found out that boards tend to trend a little older. Outside directors had 
an average age 59, compared with 57 in 2007. Alternatively, Lacker and Tayan (2011) stated that 
firms establishing an age limit to serve on a board have about 72 years as the average mandatory 
retirement age. Loos (2010) claims that there are typically no age restrictions imposed on directors of 
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boards of US corporations. Age requirements can however be set by charter documents as a matter of 
corporate governance policy. 
 
According to Kang and Shivdasani (1995), the generalisability of findings related to age of directors 
is bounded by different regulatory environments, cultural diversity, size of capital markets, and 
governance mechanism effectiveness. Hence, the value of governance structures including the age of 
directors, as well as the influential factors, must be investigated separately in each country.  
 
Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2002) found in their study that directors nearing retirement age 
might consider multiple directorships. Age is said to serve as a proxy for the director’s experience 
and the energy needed for the demands of board service. The study finds that the regression for the 
number of directorships vis-à-vis age involves a significant positive co-efficiency. It also suggests 
that older directors with greater experience of directorships are no longer interested in additional 
directorships or might pose as less attractive candidates. The average age of directors is also older in 
boards with multiple directors. In a particular corporation, arbitrary terms are not held by the board as 
a limitation that may be imposed on directors’ service. The board does not also maintain a position 
that directors must be remunerated annually until upon reaching the mandatory retirement age 
(Clayman, Fridson, and Troughton, 2012).  
 
In a study by Kang et al. (2007), it is found out that the age of directors tend to become a sensitive 
area as shown by 70 firms in the sample disclosing this information. There is evidence showing 
preference by firms for directors in the older age groups, whereby those within the age range of 50 
and above comprise 80% of the total sample. There is also a significant and positive link between age 
diversity and board size, as there is generally a positive link between age diversity and the type of 
industry in which these directors belong. Moreover, it is found out that a more diverse age range is 
demonstrated by directors in consumer sectors and product industry sector.  
 
There has not been much a focus on individual differences in risk taking, which also includes its 
association with age. According to Wiersema and Bantel (1992), when firms bring about various 
changes in their corporate strategy, it is usually seen that the top management of the firm has a lower 
average age, which could mean that as age increases risk aversion increases. A negative association 
between age and risk taking and the importance of risk has been seen through a short version of 
Kogan and Wallach’s choice-dilemma test. This test was conducted by Vroom and Pahl (1971) to 
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observe 1,484 managers from over 200 firms. When individual marks are correlated with age, the 
association is small in size, but it increases significantly when mean marks are used. Moreover, the 
associations across items and across firms are relatively balanced. The developmental and socio 
cultural mechanisms that could cause these outcomes are discussed. 
 
Campbell (2001) in terms of investment behaviour, reports a negative age impact on engaging in 
equity investments. Analyzing risk perceptions of households, Bucciol and Miniaci (forthcoming) 
found that risk tolerance is reduced in age and a review study by Sahm (2007) and Grable, McGill, 
and Britt (2009) suggests that older individuals are less risk tolerant. Grable, et al., (2009) attribute 
this result to improve in attained knowledge of risk and risky situations comparable to younger 
people.  
 
Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009) harmonize with this literature by examining lifecycle 
patterns in financial decisions connected to credit behaviour. They document that younger individuals 
make more mistakes than older people, e.g., they are less capable to value properties and they spend 
too much high fees. Overconfidence additionally performs a part. Gervais and Odean (2001) suggest 
inexperience in younger individuals leads to misattribution of success causing in upward revisions of 
the capability to manage risk. Eventually, individuals better assess their knowledge and risk tolerance 
reduces. 
 
The investors’ portfolio choices have been utilised in various researches to assess willingness of 
investors to take risk. Personal risk taking in general and more particularly corporate risk taking has 
been seen to be effected due to age. According to Samanez-Larkin et al. (2010), exceptional effects 
of age on risk taking in financial decision making have been observed. As per the work of Ackert et 
al. (2002), it has been found that investors of an older age keep a smaller percentage of their risky 
assets in equities as compared to bonds, showing risk aversion increases with age. Even according to 
Bodie and Crane (1997) and Morin and Suarez (1983), there is a significantly negatively relation 
between age and percentage of risky assets held in equity. 
 
According to Mason and Hambrick (1984), younger executives take on riskier strategies referring to 
the ‘follies of youth’. This was supported by Markóczy (1997) whose study revealed the greater 
inclination of young directors to take risks, while it was asserted by Brouthers et al. (2000) that 
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managers in their young age are more ‘strategically aggressive’ than those who are in their old age 
and this is especially true during times of instability. 
 
Younger directors are however more likely to face pressures from the society and corporation, as was 
revealed in a study of white collar crime by Price and Norris (2009). In contrast older directors are 
protected from these pressures due to their age (Price and Norris, 2009), and they also have a less 
tendency to give in to these industrial and organization forces (Daboub et al., 1995). Older executives 
are considered to be more conventional which is probably due to their ability of being able to judge 
risks and negative outcomes. They also have a lesser tendency to challenge the corporation’s policies 
(Child, 1974). Higher degree of moral development creates maturity, and older directors are more 
capable of adequately comprehending the ethical standards of conduct of the firm (Serwinek, 1992).  
 
The effect of board age on risk-taking is not attributable to changes in risk-taking to board age, but to 
ownership structure (Berger, et al., 2012). A research contacted by Elsaid (2012), where he studied 
679 CEO successions in 650 small, medium and large-cap North American firms, between 1992 and 
2005. Elsaid found that corporate risk-taking is influenced by board age, in which a link is indicated 
between older boards and less firm risk-taking.  
In summary, it can be argued that if the board consists of younger directors, it is possible that risk 
taking may increase and more risky strategies may take place (Wiersema and Bantel (1992), Ackert 
et al. (2002), Bodie and Crane (1997), Morin and Suarez (1983) and Elsaid (2012)). Following 
Anderson et al. (2004) this study measures board age as the sum of all the ages of directors divided 
by the number of directors. The proposition below is tested by controlling for poor firm financial 
performance, firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index. Negative and 
significant coefficient (AGEBA): 
 
P3: The average age of board directors for cartel firms is lower than non-cartel firms. 
 
 
 Gender Diversity of the Board  
The corporate board of directors also requires paying attention to gender diversity amongst members. 
Depending on the kind of society the organisation is associated with, there is usually a homogenous 
board of directors. This aspect is considered poor implementation of the corporate governance 
structure since both genders should be provided with equal opportunities (Bilimoria and Piderit, 
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1994; Burke and Mattis, 2000; Carter et al., 2003; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Daily and Dalton, 1992; 
Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Singh et al., 2001; Thomas, 2001). 
 
According to Hampel (1998), agency theory supports board gender diversity with the theory’s 
emphasis on board balance. Hence, a more balanced board takes place through representation from 
diverse groups especially those boards tending to prevent small groups from imposing dominance on 
decision-making processes. 
 
According to Weber and Zulehner (2010), there are more chances of survival of new start-ups that 
employ female first. As per Adams and Ferreira (2009), when the board of directors is more gender-
diverse, it can be seen that CEO turnover is associated increasingly with poor performance. There 
was increased acquisitions and decline in performance in Norwegian publicly-traded firms when 
board member gender quotas were made obligatory (Ahern and Dittmar 2012). All these studies 
show that gender diversity affects corporate decisions or outcomes. 
 
Shrader et al. (1997) suggest that there was no significant link between percentage of women in top 
management and firm performance, whilst a negative effect on performance of the firm was seen 
with the inclusion of women as board members. These outcomes were found through a study of 
Shrader et al. (1997), using a sample of 200 large US firms. However, there was a quite a significant 
relation found between women friendliness and profitability of the firm, by the study of Alder (2001).  
 
Firm performance is positively affected when it has women employees, as has been ascertained 
through many studies (Hillman et al., 1998; Adler, 2001; Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003; 
Catalyst, 2007). Firms achieve greater shareholder returns when their boards consist of a greater 
number of women and minorities as Hillman et al. (1998) stated that an increased diversity in the 
board greatly benefits the shareholders. A similar study by Adler (2001) found that the firm 
profitability had a strong relationship with the extent of employment of women at senior executive 
level in the firms of Fortune 500. 
 
Managerial risk-taking may be explained by agency theory, which considers risk preferences in 
stable mode. It is also supported by behavioural approaches which assume that risk perceptions, and 
thus risk-taking, are importantly linked and dependent to context. It must be noted however that 
despite research prevalence of agency theory, there remains an unclear domain on the exact link 
99 
 
between government structure and choice for agent risk (Finkelstein, et al., 2009). The study of 
Berger, Kick, and Shaeck (2012) suggest that higher proportion of female executives leads to board 
changes. This in turn is related to increased risk taking by younger executives, which also results in 
board changes. On the contrary, increased executive representation holding PhD degrees as an 
outcome of board changes leads to decline in risk taking. Berger and colleagues further that an 
executive board’s socio-economic composition has high relevance to socio-economic policy, which 
is seen in gender quotas that are often used to support career outcomes for females.  
 
However, it is noted that there is little evidence found in the impact of having more females in the 
board on firm outcomes and whether female board members indeed put forward a less risky posture 
to conduct business. It is indicated that whilst quotas on an executive’s gender have direct impact on 
the representation of various groups on executive boards, a knock-on effect takes place on corporate 
outcomes. In the study of Barsky and colleagues (1997 cited in Berger et al., 2012) and Jianakoplos 
and Bernasek (1998 cited in Berger et al., 2012), it is inferred that female executives tend to be more 
risk averse in decision making relating to financial concerns.  
 
In a separate study within the context of corporate governance arrangements, it is found out that there 
is an inverse relationship between female board members and firm risk, whereby it is revealed that it 
is more likely for female board members to take risks than men (Berger et al., 2012). The analysis 
points out to the notion that excessive monitoring is taken by female directors, which thereby leads to 
decreased shareholder value, and that they undertake such poorer investment decisions because of the 
bigger obstacles they face than men who are able to acquire information on investment projects 
(Bharat et al., 2009 cited in Berger et al., 2012). 
 
However, Hillman, et al. (2002) documented otherwise in the propensity for women to occupy board 
seats. The authors undertake a study to determine any difference between female directors of racial 
minority and white males where they use a sample from Fortune 1000 boards. The findings indicate 
differences in education, occupational backgrounds, and board affiliation patterns, whereby female 
directors and those with African-American descent tend to come from non-business backgrounds and 
likewise tend to become more involved in multiple boards faster than their male benchmarks. The 
issue is the ability of these females to take risk in occupying multiple boards at a faster rate.  
Two-hundred large organisations were researched upon and the conclusion showed that women in the 
higher levels of management hierarchy were irrelevant for firm performance (Shrader et al., 1997). 
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There were many instances indicating a negative impact of women being on the board. These 
conclusions were drawn using the measurements of return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), 
and return on assets (ROA).  
 
Moreover, Nguyen, et al. (2007) examines the relationship between the firm’s market value and 
gender diversity of board of directors. The results indicate that shareholders’ value tend to be 
promoted by gender diversity, as there is a significant economic relationship between woman director 
variables and the firm’s higher market value. Similarly, there are significant relationships evidenced 
from board diversity studies between women proportion on the board and the firm’s average value. It 
must be noted that there tends to be an association between participative boards with equal power 
distribution between the CEO and the board, and increased proportion of female board members 
(Pearce and Zahra, 1992).  
Research made by Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) nevertheless indicates fewer women compared to 
men occupying board directorship in UK firms. This is demonstrated by only 64% female directors 
for the top 100 firms in 1999, which went down to 61% in 2002. It is said that social exclusion may 
prove as a dominant factor to this occurrence. 
 
In their study of women on corporate board of directors, Dang and Vo (2012) indicate that a glacially 
slow progress in gaining seats on boards of directors is experienced by female candidates. This is 
explained by the barriers hindering women’s progress and issues relating to the influence of women 
directors on firm performance.  
 
Another study also shows a positive relationship between firm value and gender or minority diversity 
amongst the board of directors (Carter et al. 2003). Using Tobin’s Q proxies, it is possible to believe 
that women and minorities on the board can help increase the value of the firm. This aspect was 
suggested after conducting an experiment on a sample of 638 Fortune 1000 organisations. The same 
research study indicated that the proportion of women on the board is higher than that of the 
minorities present. However, it was not able to define the effect of women participation on firm 
performance.  
 
Jamali et al. (2007) claim that female board member’s gain from the firms’ governance by means of 
a range of skills and perspectives and by bringing new dynamics to board deliberations. Background 
and qualification diversity may enable women to take on unique and rare perspectives during board 
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meetings and thus contribute to the dynamics of board deliberations. This complements the skills 
held by male directors who tend to specialise in operations, and other functional areas (Zelechowski 
and Bilimoria, 2004). Women, on the other hand, are said to possess a range of experiences that are 
good for governance (Huse and Solberg, 2006). They also tend to query conventional wisdom and 
lead open discussions, which hence improve boardroom effectiveness and financial reporting quality 
(Mattis, 2000).  
Several previous researches report a positive effect of the role of women on boards and find that 
women improve the quality of decision making (Smith  et al., 2006; Huse & Solberg, 2006), that 
gender is a factor in ethical decision making (Ford and Richardson, 1994); and that women are 
generally more risk averse than men (Watson and McNaughton, 2007). 
 
Thus, a number of studies related to gender diversity led to the fact that gender does greatly impact 
the risk-taking behaviour of people. Many other studies conducted using different factors like 
experience, attitude etc. prove that women are less corrupt than men (e.g. Cheung and Hernandez-
Julian, 2006; Swamy, Azfar, Knack et al., 1999). They are likely to be much less selfish and are 
worried about the risks associated with corruption.  Barsky and colleagues (1997 cited in Berger et 
al., 2012) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998 cited in Berger et al., 2012), documented  that female 
executives tend to be more risk averse in decision making relating to financial concerns. Therefore, in 
this study we expected to see less female directors serving on the board of cartel firms than non-cartel 
firms. Following Tacheva and Huse (2006) this study measures gender diversity (GENBA %) by the 
percentage of female directors on the board of directors. Controlling for firm ownership status, 
current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index, a negative and significant coefficient is expected 
(GENBA %). 
 
P4: There are less female directors on the board of cartel firms than the non-cartel firms. 
 
 Duration of the Board of Directors  
The behaviour of a director based on his tenure in the organisation is confusing to define. Many 
directors have been found to have high levels of commitment, skills, knowledge, and expertise due to 
their experience in the business environment for many years. The organisation is highly influenced 
by executive and outside directors depending on their time duration within the organisation. These 
managers are highly associated with the firm’s resources and have the ability to decide which 
102 
 
decision would help enhance the performance of the organisation. Familiarity with the organisation 
can itself provide many benefits (French and Raven, 1959; Zald, 1969).  
 
Hence, it is believed that the tenure of these members would highly influence the organisation as a 
whole. Many other researchers also indicate that when the length of service of the participant 
increases, a cohort group is established with the rest of the members, where mutual decision-making 
processes are carried out in the organisation. They may also carry out activities like competition or 
rivalry to grow faster (Pfeffer, 1982). These cohorts have the ability to reflect power distribution and 
influence within the firm. Socialisation levels are very high for members who are of long duration 
within the firm.  
 
Alderfer (2004) conducted a study that thoroughly analysed the decision making processes of the 
board members in an organisation. He stated that when these members are of long tenure, they form a 
special group with comfortable understanding of each other and operate the organisation efficiently. 
When new board members are introduced, these new members are required to study the practices of 
the organisation in order to carry out effective decisions and this may take a few years.  
 
In shared firms, the duration of the board of directors may not exceed four years and may be re-
elected according to the constitutive documents (Sitaru, 2011). Usually, the general meeting of 
shareholders appoint the directors of the board for a four-year term, which is also subject to 
renewability.  
 
The board’s duration of office must be defined in order for all directors not to rotate off the board at 
the same period. This is done by appointing one-third of the new board members for a term of two 
years; another one-third for a term of three years and yet another for a term of four years. This must 
take place until the natural rotation of the board is established, and hence preserve its stability (Tagg, 
2013).  
Garoyan and Mohn (1985), state that the long duration of the board is beneficial. Proprietary 
corporations usually elect directors to a one-year unrestricted succession of terms. Directors must be 
permitted to have duration of enough consecutive terms so that they may acquire a thorough 
understanding of operations; thus, the authors suggest three three-year terms for the board’s duration. 
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A study by Buchanan (1974) suggests that the commitment and motivation of a firm to strive harder 
to achieve its goals increases when the tenure of directors is extended. This is supported by Salancik 
(1977) who asserts that experienced employees have gained sufficient confidence and expertise in 
carrying out their tasks and also have an additional stake in the organization (like the ownership of 
firm stock) which is why tenure directly affects organizational commitment.  
 
Vance (1983) suggests that the talent and expertise of directors is wasted when they are forced to 
retire. Hence, when there is an efficient market for directors, shareholder interests are best secured 
through the long term survival of directors.  
 
Katz (1982) obtains contrasting results which state that intra-group communication decreases when 
tenure is increased and also leads to the isolation of groups from important sources of information. 
There is a non-linear relationship between group performance and tenure as ascertained in his study, 
with performance increasing initially due to learning effect, and falling subsequently. The lengthy 
presence of the directors on the corporate boards has led to the business community’s apprehensions 
regarding its unfavourable effect on shareholders.  
 
Replacing directors is considered to be a key challenge, however alterations to the composition of the 
board is necessary due to changing business climate, as has been underlined by NACD (1996). The 
board directors are allowed to provide their service for a maximum of 10 to 15 years according to the 
Commission so that the creative ideas and analytical thinking of new directors can be utilized by the 
board. There might be an attempt by the influential directors to take over some of the responsibilities 
of the CEO with time, which is why Lipton and Lorsch (1992) have proposed having limits on the 
director’s term.  
 
The quality of longer board duration has been discussed in the previous literature (Buchanan (1974); 
Garoyan and Mohn (1985); Alderfer (2004); and Pfeffer (1982)). Vance’s (1983) claim that boards of 
longer duration are generally interested in achieving the goals of the organisation. However, none of 
the previous research has examined the relationship between board duration and infringement 
behaviours particularly in relation to cartel formation. Therefore, this study assumes that the quality 
of the longer board duration exist in non-cartel firms, thus will empirically examine the relationship 
between board duration and cartel formation (DURBA) by controlling for firm poor financial 
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performance, firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index. A negative and 
significant coefficient is expected. 
 
P5: The average duration of the cartel board is less than non-cartel firms 
 
 
 Remuneration  
Many researches are found on organisational performance and board composition but there is only 
limited research available on corporate fraud and board compensation. The Agency Problem has been 
defined as a modern issue which is associated with managerial power and discretion since these 
managers may use the discretion for personal gain (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). These managers may not consider that the organisation is not performing well and still 
distribute the excess cash that is available (Jensen, 1974; Williamson, 1964; Jensen, 1986). They may 
also stabilise themselves in such positions that it becomes difficult for the organisation to remove 
them when the time comes (Shleifer and Vishny; 1989).  
 
By adjusting the pay of these directors it is believed that the agency problem may be avoided 
temporarily. The compensation scheme needs to be strong so that the board is motivated to achieve 
the goals of the organisation as well as pursue their own interests. To understand which kind of 
compensation package is best suited in an organisation many financial economists have conducted 
thorough research. To achieve an optimal contracting model, Murphy (1986) as well as Core, et al., 
(2001) has made several efforts. The only limitation that lies in the study in the package deals with  
political aspects which are associated with deciding on the most suitable compensation package for 
the directors (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
 
A study has been conducted to find out whether the compensation provided to the board of directors 
in the form of cash is able to enhance the performance of the organisation and is negatively 
associated with the performance of the peer groups present in the same industry (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1990). Using the data from 1974 to 1986 on 1,049 US firms, it was found that cash 
compensation is able to decrease the market average stock return but is able to increase the firm’s 
stock returns. When peer groups were considered, there was a significant and positive relationship 




Firms have acknowledged the idea of managerial discretion as an important determinant of CEO 
compensation; however, there is no existing test thus conducted to formally examine the discretion 
hypothesis despite considerable work that indirectly invoked certain ideas relating to the sources of 
possible managerial contribution (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). The performance consequences of 
CEO remuneration had been tested only by little attention. Finkelstein and Boyd make use of samples 
from Fortune 1,000 firms where they find evidence for a principal impact of managerial discretion on 
CEO remuneration as well as a contingency effect that shows higher firm performance with aligned 
discretion and remuneration than when such alignment is absent.  
 
The shareholders are unable to monitor the activities of the executives entirely which is why they 
develop compensation contracts to motivate them to perform well. In some cases it is found that these 
executives may resort to corruption practices in the financial statements to help receive their 
compensations. They are only interested in achieving the goals set for the organisation for personal 
gain. Researchers like Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003a, 2003b), Goldman and Slezak (2003), Robison 
and Santore (2006), and Chesney and Gibson-Asner (2004) have worked towards the development of 
models for efficient incentives which do not create corruption practices since financial incentives 
have the best ability to develop corruption in the organisation (Becker, 1968).  
 
Consequently, this study empirically tests the proposition below by controlling for poor firm 
financial performance, firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index. Similar 
to findings by Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003a, 2003b), Goldman and Slezak (2003), Robison and 
Santore (2004), and Chesney and Gibson-Asner (2004), this study expects to see a positive and 
significant coefficient between board remuneration and cartel formation. 
  
P6: The board remuneration for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms. 
 
 3.6.2 Does Ownership Structure Matter?  
 
 Outside Directors’ Stock Ownership  
The ownership structure of the board of directors has the ability to influence the corruption practices 
taking place in the organisation. This effect has been thoroughly analysed by authors - Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) - who believe that there is a strong relationship 
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between the ownership structure and corruption practices. Several researchers have also examined the 
institutional and insider ownership within an organisation by taking into account long term returns 
and applying regression analysis. This research states that as ownership increases the stock levels 
also increase (Han and Suk, 1998). It is also found out that insider ownership may negatively affect 
the performance of the organisation since there is a possibility of management entrenchment.  
 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) indicate in their study that a considerable amount of CEO 
compensation’s cross-sectional discrepancy may be explained by board measures and ownership 
structures. In addition, the study suggests that CEOs receive bigger compensation when they are 
within less effective governance structures. Overall, the authors’ results indicate that greater agency 
problems are encountered by firms that have weaker governance structures and that these firms 
perform worse. They also find out that CEOs of these firms receive greater compensation.  
Peng (2004), points out whether outside corporate board directors have an effect on firm performance 
during institutional change. The authors use resource dependence and institutional theories in 
addressing this concern. Their findings demonstrate that there is indeed a difference made by outside 
directors on firm performance, specifically when sales growth is used as a measure for such 
performance. A bandwagon effect is also exhibited by the results and such effect relates to the 
practice of outside director appointment to corporate boards. The study highlights the policy 
implications of the trend towards appointing more outside directors in corporate boards. According to 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), changes in ownership structure, along with CEO turnover, is an 
important factor affecting changes in boards.  
The US public corporations data which bear Federal crimes taking place in 1984-1990 are also 
analysed by Alexander and Cohen (1999). With the help of these data, it is possible to provide fresh 
Federal guidelines for the sentencing of the organisation. The analysis of the data shows that when 
there is a large ownership stake, corruption practices are at low levels in the organisation.  
 
There are circumstances that it is not possible to change the board size by changing the ownership 
structure (Chen and Yao, 2006). Moreover, it is very rare that a firm separates ownership and control 
in its structure since it is a frequent occurrence that controllers possess some degree of ownership of 
the firms’ equity. Corporate governance holds that ownership structure is a potentially important 
element. Keasey, Thompson, and Wright (2005) hold that reduced conflicts of interest and higher 
firm value must be the result of great overlap between ownership and control. They further that 
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alignment of managers’ interests with those of the firm’s shareholders is the result of ownership by 
management.  
 
In a study involving CEOs, ownership structure and the relationship between CEO and the board are 
explored in relation to their impact on pay and performance. For ownership structure, the result is 
that institutional investors have limits on paying CEO with unearned compensation. Evidence shows 
that more benefits can be obtained by boards by acquiring impartial outside directors than by 
increasing the number of outside directors (Mangel and Singh, 1993).  
It is predicted that the greater the stock ownership of outside directors, the smaller the incentive to 
indulge in managing fraud and hence, the smaller the possibility of cartel formation. Thus, the 
proposition below is empirically tested (OUTOWN %), representing the percentage of common stock 
owned by outside directors. Controlling for poor firm financial performance, firm ownership status, 
current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index, a negative and significant coefficient is expected. 
 
P7: The percentage of outside directors’ stock ownership is lower for cartel firms than for 
non- cartel firms 
 
 Family-Owned and Controlled Firms 
 
The notion behind family-controlled firms will be discussed under this segment. As Astrachan and 
Shanker (2003) define, family-controlled firms are organizations which are formed either under close 
associations or within the related members of the family each contributing as an investor which 
grants them the voting right to make key decisions for the firm. Such family firms provide benefit in 
terms of alleviating the Type I agency problem, phenomena commonly experienced under the 
conventional owner-manager setup which occur due to conflicting interests (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Anderson and Reeb, 2003, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Hence, we can simply say that 
firms which are founded and run by family members come under the domain of family firms.  
 
There are several reasons as to how such family-controlled firms actually decrease the probability of 
agency conflict.  Ali et al., (2007) ascertain that firstly, because the individual capital share of each 
family member is involved in the business, it is ensured that the business activities of the manager are 
thoroughly scrutinised. In contrast, individual shareholders in a firm find it difficult to monitor 
managerial activities because of their diversified portfolios. Secondly, family members have a good 
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background of their business and are genuinely concerned about it giving them a better chance to 
keep a check on managers. Thirdly, all family firms are ready to provide for investment even in the 
long run as compared to shareholders. This automatically makes them wary of any prejudiced 
decisions made by managers.   
 
The above mentioned characteristics can, on one hand, prove to be advantageous for managers as 
they allow them with considerable authority to engage in either managerial entrenchment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) or other related- party transactions  (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) by diverting 
private benefits at the cost of shareholders. However, on the other hand, such characteristics make it 
very difficult for them to perform earnings management to hide any opportunistic behaviour which 
can harm other shareholders.   
 
The structure of family firms comprises of a larger shareholder who can either be an individual or an 
institution like for example, financial intermediaries, investment fund or a corporation. This structure 
will define the type of agency problem which might originate. The inducement for expropriation and 
monitoring increases, if the larger shareholder is either a family or an individual, thus leading to 
agency problem II. In such a case, the family will utilize its power to gain private benefits at the cost 
of other minority shareholders. However, if the larger shareholder is an institution, then the authority 
to control is spread amongst various shareholders where each of them has lesser advantage to 
expropriate smaller shareholder. But at the same time, it commands greater check on the manager 
leading to agency problem I.  
 
Prior researches state that at times, decisions favouring the majority shareholders are made in family 
firms which might actually differ from the interest of the smaller shareholder (Morck and Yeung, 
(2003); and Bertrand and Schoar, (2006)). As Perez-Gonzalez (2006) state that in case the larger 
shareholder is the family, members attach significance to control and will try to be part of the 
management even though it may cause weak firm operations.   
 
Making a distinct comparison between family and non family firms, it is observed that non family 
firms typically face Type I agency problems. To tackle with them, managers in non family firms are 
compensated on observable performance measures. Conversely, managers in family firms are not 
often compensated under observable performance measures. This is because the founders have a 
direct control and will keep a check on the management; hence compensate the manager on the basis 
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of his actual efforts which are visible under the controlling process.  Chen (2005) provides reasoning 
on compensation of CEO which is related to the fact that the issues arising from separation of 
management and ownership are quite narrow in family firms. He states that a CEO’s earning based 
pay for family firm is quite less in terms of total and also as a percentage of total compensation. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) and Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) report less probability of earnings to be 
manoeuvred in family firms as management compensation is not linked with earnings.  
 
Members of family have a clear understanding on the operations of the business which is why the 
manager will have a minimalistic chance to engage in any behaviour which can impact the firm’s 
profitability. Ali et al., (2007) quote an instance whereby direct control by the family over the 
manager and their long term association with suppliers and customers will allow them to identify if 
sales revenue is overstated due to early procurement of goods or unfounded reduction has been made 
to allow for flexible payments.  
 
It is hence established that due to Type I agency problems, quality of reported income for family 
firms is much greater than those of non family ones. Nevertheless, aspects of reputation concern in 
the labour market and legal liabilities can assist in alleviating if not completely eradicating these 
discrepancies between non family and family firms. Ali et al., (2007) hence imply that in comparison 
to non family firms, family firms will deliver better quality of reported earnings.  
 
Type II agency problems have their share of differences and can cause a differential effect on the 
quality of reported earnings amongst both family and non family firms. Such problems may direct 
family firms towards manoeuvring of accounting earnings for various reasons such as to conceal the 
unfavourable impact of a related party transaction or to assist family members in gaining 
management positions. Because the owners in family firms have the adequate authority and control, 
they are definitely capable of manoeuvring the earnings. Such private seeking behaviour on the cost 
of minority shareholders can cause legal liabilities and a decrease in stock price of the firm, which 
help to lessen the difference in Type II agency problems amongst non- family and family firms. As 
the case with Type I, these aspects will only alleviate the difference in Type II agency Problems 
between family and no-family firms but not eradicate then completely. The quality of earnings in 
family firms is therefore expected to deteriorate as Ali et al., (2007) state keeping in view their 




The influence of family control and institutional investors on the remuneration received by CEO has 
been studied by Ettore, et al., (2012). To analyse the effect, 754 listed firms with 3731 firm-year 
observations across 14 different countries from Continental Europe were studied from year 2001 to 
2008. It was found that in family business, adequate control will help to curtail the amount of both 
total cash and part of equity based remuneration for the CEOs. However, any influential impact of 
family control on surplus total and cash compensation was found to be missing. Also, the relationship 
between family control firms and cartels resulting in collusive behaviours has not been established 
under empirical evidence.  
 
Researchers have argued on the best possible structure for organizations. While McConnaughy, et al., 
(1998); Palia and Ravid (2002); Anderson and Reeb (2003); Adams et al., (2004); Fahlenbrach 
(2005); Villalonga and Amit (2006) suggest founder CEOs to produce constructive results on firm’s 
performance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) state that in the USA, the most successful organizational 
structure work under family ownership. Specifically if the decision making at the top is under 
ancestors, control under family firms will be prone to particular limitations (Villalonga and Amit, 
2004).  
 
To establish a link between the ownership structure and firm’s performance, 675 listed firms across 
11 countries of Continental Europe were studied by Barontini and Caprio (2006). The result of the 
study actually went against the hypothesis of family control hindering the performance of the firm. It 
reported that family firms will depict better operational performance and valuation if the descendants 
serve as non-executive directors in the Board. Furthermore, with respect to valuation and 
performance, such family firms are statistically not discernible from non family firms, if the 
successor becomes the CEO. In fact family firms are capable to display greater separation between 
control and rights to cash flow.  
 
Geographically, family firms are expected to perform efficiently in markets which are well regulated 
and transparent as quoted by Anderson and Reeb (2003) which is why such structure will for 
example not work in Asian markets and is best suited for large family firms in the US.  Their result is 
based on a study which considers a sample of big US family owned firms whereby it was established 




To summarize, in family-owned and controlled firms, agency problems I become less relevant, while 
Type II agency problems appear. Given the fact that the two effects move in opposite directions, the 
relationship, in terms of cartel formation, is not certain (i.e., it may increase or decrease). However, 
the focal interest of this part of the study is on the Type II agency problems which demonstrate the 
conflict between family-controlled firms (large shareholders) and minority shareholder. The 
definition used in this study of a family ﬁrm is very close to the one used by Amit and Villalonga 
(2006). A ﬁrm is reported as a family ﬁrm when the founder or a member of the founder’s family is a 
blockholder of the firm. Following Ali, et al., (2007); Morck and Yeung, (2003); and Bertrand and 
Schoar, (2006), who documented that large shareholders (family firms), might use their controlling 
position in the firm to obtain private gain which might actually differ from the interest of the smaller 
shareholder. Therefore, the proposition below is tested by controlling for poor firm financial 
performance, firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index, to test if cartel is 
more likely to be formed by family firms (large shareholders). Positive coefficient is expected: 
 
P8: Cartel likely to be formed by family-owned and controlled firms (large shareholders). 
 
 3.6.3 Does CEO Characteristics Matter? 
Anti-cartel enforcement has always been the main concern of the Antitrust Division. The Antitrust 
Division has always supported the idea of rigorous imprisonment to avoid price fixing, bid rigging, 
and allocation agreements, which are considered extreme cartel activities. Imprisonment is very 
necessary in anti-cartel enforcement. Cartel offences are commonly carried out through single 
employees. Large amount of fines are preferred to be paid by executives to reduce their time in jail 
rather than being in jail to reduce their fines (U.S Department of Justice, 1993).  
 
As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, the new movement toward punishing individuals (CEOs) who 
participate in cartel formation means that they are a very important part of the cartel agreement. 
Therefore, this study examines the link between cartel formation and individuals who are selected as 
CEOs or executive. Given that a CEO’s background experiences will likely impact organisational 
outcomes, pre-succession experience should be an important differentiating factor in CEO selection. 
We define ‘experience’ to include life experience (age) and firm experience (tenure). These 
managerial characteristics represent individual background factors proposed by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) as having important implications for leadership decision making and behaviour.  
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 CEO age  
Numerous researches suggest that risk taking reduces with an individual’s age. Prendergast and Stole 
(1996) and Graham (1999) propose theories focused on career considerations. These theories 
recommend that reputational considerations increase in age. 
 
The managerial signalling model was formed by Prendergast and Stole (1996), the likelihood that 
younger CEOs make increased and more risky investments than their older CEOs is developed 
through this model. Younger CEOs go for a more aggressive investment style as compared to older 
CEOs. According to Prendergast and Stole (1996), younger CEOs try to give implications to the 
market that they have greater capabilities and so they go for more aggressive investment style. 
Another point is that to avoid any such indication that their investments made earlier on were not 
right, older CEOs avoid making any new investment changes. There is a horizon problem in which 
older CEOs will avoid any new long-term investment projects that could be beneficial to the firm for 
short-term projects, which may give temporary increase in firm performance. Older CEOs take this 
step when they are close to their retirement. This horizon problem is linked to the likelihood made by 
managerial signalling models (e.g. Smith and Watts (1982); Dechow and Sloan (1991); Cheng 
(2004); Antia, Pantzalis, and Park (2010). However, horizon problem does not explain if this 
difference in level of riskiness of investments is between older and younger CEOs; it only relates to 
the issue that older CEOs reduce their investment when they are close to retirement.  
 
Moreover, younger directors and CEOs tend to be less averse and may lack adequate experience, 
which might impact negatively on the monitoring and control of the firm. Age diversity can build a 
well-balanced functioning of the board, although more focus must be given to their qualifications, 
experience, knowledge, and effectiveness (Rezaee, 2007).  
 
In addition, there are entrenched CEOs who invest less and even make less aggressive investment 
decisions, as found in previous studies. They prefer a quiet life (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Older 
CEOs could go for lesser investment levels in comparison to younger CEOS if they have more 
influence in the firm. Another study is that younger managers have more confidence about the 
decisions they make and are thus more willing to take risks. Roberts et al (2005) as well as Taylor 
(1975) voice their concerns on reduced energy levels in the elderly. There was also a study showing 
the causes of how the age of CEO could influence investment behaviour, such as that of Levi, Li, and 
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Zhang (2010). Levi and colleagues’ study shows that in terms of mergers and acquisitions, younger 
CEOs tend to be more aggressive than older CEOs. Thus, these current studies show that besides 
risk-aversion, there are other characteristics of CEOs that cause reduced investment in relation to 
their age. 
 
In the research of Li, Low, and Makhija (2011), the variations in the investment behaviour amongst 
younger and older CEOs have been investigated. When compared to younger CEOs, older CEOs 
have a lesser aggressive style of investment. This result was found through the assessment of plant-
level investment decisions. A study conducted by Yim (2010) indicates that it is more possible that 
younger CEOS would go for acquisitions quite early in their careers since there increased 
remunerations for CEOs take place after an acquisition. Both Li et al. and Yim have apparently 
focused on investigating the link between firm level investment and CEO age.  
 
In contrast, Holmstrom (1999) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990) formed market learning models 
which provide the likelihood that younger CEOs invest less aggressively than older CEOs since they 
are more risk averse. According to these researches, younger CEOs are able to face increased 
inspection from the labour market because they do not have any previous records of investment 
achievements. This is why younger CEOs are not too keen to go for an aggressive investment 
strategy because they could face increased inspection from the market if they make any bad 
investment and that could decrease their future career opportunities. Both these researches have 
opposing views about the effect on investment decision through the age of executives.  
 
In addition, it has been suggested that the age of the CEO plays a vital role in generating income, but 
not much has been shown for the link between CEO age and corporate fraud. Studies by Barro and 
Barro (1990) show how CEO age may result in generation of income by keeping the retirement age at 
52 years. The retirement practices are higher when the age is above 52 years and lower when less 
than 52. Hence, after the retirement age, an individual has little prospects of continuing his position 
as CEO. However, in cases where CEOs execute extraordinary work, they are less likely to retire 
during their age of retirement.  
 
Kensinger stated that to consider the merits of the CEOs’ stock ownership against option-like 
compensation needs to take into account their age and decision-making since they respond in a 
different way based on their life stages (Kensinger, 2012).  In the work of Sharma (2011), it was 
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found that younger CEOs tend to undertake riskier strategies than their older counterparts. Kensinger 
stated that age plays an important function in the optimal level of employee ownership. Since the 
time horizon of older CEOs is shorter than that of younger CEOs and since the former cannot rely on 
legislation to iron their investment performance over time, they are more risk averse compared to 
younger CEOs. Hence, older CEOs can be described as less fearful and less acquisitive than younger 
CEOs, which then allow them to respond differently to incentives. This might explain the reason why 
it is often that boards of directors tend to appoint a younger CEO to lead the functional areas of the 
firms. This way, the firm benefits from age and experience as well as from enhanced effectiveness of 
incentives of younger CEOs (Kensinger, 2012).  
 
In a study of MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990), it was emphasised that the more successful a CEO 
is, the more likely it is for him to take risks, and the more mature he is, the more he intends to avoid 
risks. Relating this to the assertion of Kensinger (2012) where the author found that younger CEOs 
are given the tasks to lead the functional areas of the firm, such position would likely allow CEOs to 
become successful, or is in fact the basis for their being foreseen to succeed, which is the reason for 
their appointment in the first place, and which hence relates to MacCrimmon and Wehrung’s findings 
towards being successful. Moreover, as it is a general knowledge that maturity comes with age, this 
therefore suggests risk aversion amongst older CEOs.  
 
This propensity of younger CEOs towards risk-taking than older ones is supported by the work of 
Jones (2009). Younger CEOs are more willing to undertake greater strategic change and are more 
prone to risk-taking. Apart from this, their skill set is more updated due to their acquisition of recent 
technical knowledge than their older counterparts.  
 
The risk-taking propensity of CEOs based on age is also highlighted in the work of Berger, Kick, and 
Shaeck (2012) where the authors claimed that the risk-taking stances of financial institutions are 
influenced by age, education, and gender composition of executive teams. They found out that 
younger CEO teams tend to have increased risk-taking, as do board changes, leading to a higher 
proportion of female executives. The authors’ initial enquiry was how risk-taking affects the age 
composition of the CEO board. Empirical evidence demonstrates that risk-taking tends to decrease 
with CEO’s age. It was also found out that risk tolerance is likely to decline with age; hence, older 
executives are less risk- tolerant than their younger counterparts. Grable et al. (2009, cited in Berger 
et al., 2012) attributed this finding to older CEO’s growth in attained knowledge of risk and risky 
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situations associated with young people. It was also pointed out that younger individual inexperience 
leads to misattribution of success that hence results in upward revisions of one’s ability to control 
risk. Over time, however, people are more able to assess their abilities, leading to reduction in their 
risk tolerance. In addition, research suggests that mature CEOs take lesser risk than non-mature ones 
(Berger et al., 2012).  
 
Consistent with the findings of earlier authors cited in this review, Serfling (2012) found that risk-
taking behaviours tends to decrease as the CEO becomes older, and such reduction of firm risk is 
usually demonstrated by carrying out less risky investment policies. In particular, older CEOs are less 
likely to invest in research and development compared to their young counterparts. They also found 
out that when the CEO and the next dominant executive are older, the riskiness of corporate policies 
tends to be at their lowest. This is contrary to the situation with younger CEO and the next dominant 
executive, where the riskiness of corporate policies tends to be at their highest. Lastly, the authors 
determined that less risky firms tend to purposely employ older CEOs, and more risky ones employ 
younger CEOs to bring into line CEOs’ propensity for risk and the risk preferences of the firm 
(Serfling, 2012).  
 
However, younger CEOs have more to lose in case of dismissal due to poor performance, and they 
are also more likely to be dismissed by the board than their older counterparts (Kensinger, 2012). 
Rezaee (2007) also pointed out that younger CEOs may not possess the adequate experience and 
reputation enjoyed by older CEOs, which might impact negatively on the firm’s monitoring and 
control mechanisms. In the departing directors of S&P 500 firms in 2005, 90 percent of the firms 
cited retirement as the reason for CEO departures, suggesting that these CEOs have reached their 
retirement ages when they left their positions. It was pointed out that the general consensus amongst 
firms in terms of age of the CEO and directors is that firms must establish mandatory retirement ages 
and term limits for their position.  
 
It was also emphasised in one study that 91 percent of audit committee members, who were 
independent directors, were 50 years old and older (Baker and Anderson, 2010). This majority 




Moreover, experience is correlated with age, and firms tend to look at young executives as having not 
established adequate experience and equipped decision-making capability as do older ones (Hart, 
1995).  
 
The prevalence of older CEOs in firms is exemplified by the findings of Young and Buchholtz 
(2002). The authors indicated that the average CEO age in their sample was 58, with the youngest 
CEO aged only 28. This reveals that since 58 years old is the average age of the CEOs in these firms, 
it therefore implies that firms generally employ more CEOs who are older than younger ones. Having 
established this, the risk-taking factor of younger CEOs, although significant, cannot therefore be 
taken as sole determinant for firms to altogether discount the experience and knowledge of older 
CEOs.  
 
The age of the CEO has not been linked to the probability of impaired judgement in any of the 
studies found. However, there exists a strong correlation between wisdom and age with that of 
making decisions in personal or professional life. This fact has been highlighted by cognitive and 
development psychologists who studied the relationship of age and competency levels. 
 
Older CEOs are likely to be more conservative and this has a positive impact on firm performance, 
but also less likelihood of fraud (and increased CEO tenure means less fraud) (Stevens et al., 1978). 
However, fraud happens amongst single firms – it is a singular activity by one firm, where cartel 
formation on the other hand has different and more social dynamics. Older CEOs may have strong 
established social networks that enable the communication necessary to cartel formation compare to 
younger CEOs. Older CEOs may have worked for many organisations and established a number of 
strong networks. As a result, engaging in collusion with other firms will be less difficult (Beasley, 
1996). Older CEOs established in certain industries can also understand how those market structures 
perhaps make the formation of a cartel agreement a ‘rational decision’. Therefore, the proposition 
below is tested by controlling for poor firm financial performance, firm ownership status, current 
ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index. Positive coefficient is expected: 
P9: The age of CEO for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms 
 
 CEO Tenure  
Using the tenure of a manager to monitor the activities of the firm can prove to be efficient as stated 
in the literature (Weisbach, 1988). This literature states that organisational performance and 
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managerial turnover have a negative relationship and that the resignation of a CEO also affected the 
accounting performance and stock returns negatively (Weisbach, 1988). A study states that there is a 
negative and significant effect of abnormal returns on the change of CEO. This result has been 
provided by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) who analysed the fluctuation effect in abnormal stock 
returns on the probability of the change of CEO.  
 
In a particular study by Barro and Barro (1990), top management levels such as the CEO and the 
head or chairman of the board were linked to the stock returns of the organisation (Warner, Watts, 
and Wruck, 1998). The results demonstrate a positive relationship between two aspects; however this 
is only significant when there is a really good or a really bad performance. CEO pay and turnover 
have also been analysed by Barro and Barro (1990) by taking into account CEOs in commercial 
banks from 1982 to 1987. The relationship between firm performance and CEO departure has been 
analysed using logit regressions. Results show a negative relationship, alongside a significant and 
improved performance that can reduce turnover levels.  
 
One single individual has been held responsible for the operating and financial decisions being 
carried out in corruption practices. This is found by analysing fraud cases, where 75% of the cases 
provide similar results (Loebbecke et al., 1989). With this condition, the management conducts 
corruption activities but with the help of two variables CEOTENURE and BOSS it would be possible 
to carry out the monitoring processes. The established CEO has the highest power to monitor the 
corruption practices being carried out by any of the board of directors (Mace, 1986; Patton and 
Baker, 1987; Vancil, 1987; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). 
 
Rajagopalan and Datta (1996) examine the link between the characteristics of CEO and 
comprehensive industry conditions using data from manufacturing firms in the United States. The 
results indicate that a limited role is played by industry conditions in tackling differences in CEO 
tenure, educational background, and functional heterogeneity. Regression analysis results suggest 
that there are generally small differences between the two groups’ industry coefficients albeit 
alignment is shown between high performers and CEO characteristics.  
Besides, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, short-term contracts with fixed salary mechanisms 
weakly enhance the cartel stability. Gillian, et al., (2009) found that the median and mean duration in 
a sample of 184 S&P 500 CEO contracts is 3.4 and 3.0 years, respectively. Likewise, as a result of 
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375 CEO employment contracts of large public corporations, Schwab and Thomas (2006) found that 
81% specify duration of 5 years or less, with a mean of 3.6 years.  
Furthermore, a study by Jenter and Lewellen (2010) shows that CEO turnover decisions are 
extremely sensitive to stock price performance. Using a sample of 2,569 publicly traded U.S. ﬁrms 
from 1992 to 2005, the authors found that 44% of CEOs left the ﬁrm within 4 years as a consequence 
of bad ﬁrm performance. These empirical results illustrate that executives usually have a short-term 
renewable employment contract, that is, a contract for a fixed period of time which is renewed if and 
only if the ﬁrm performs adequately well. 
Moreover, a study by Han (2010) examines short-term and long-term employment contracts and their 
effects on cartel stability. The study shows that firms are more likely to be involved in cartel 
agreement when CEO tenure (short-term employment contract) is low or when CEO turnover is high. 
Han shows that a short-term contract provides stability to a cartel formation more than a long-term 
contract. If a certain profit margin is achieved, only then is the short-term contract renewed. With the 
help of this activity, firm performance is enhanced and defection from the collusion has taken place, 
which diminishes the chances of being laid off. Firm performance may be hindered due to any kind 
of future punishment potentials which is why the chance of being laid off increases. The stability of 
cartel is influenced by these re-employment trade-offs which are tangled with the monetary trade-
offs. A long-term contract does not affect stability when the fixed salary components are applied. The 
fixed components affect the short-term contract to an extent. Cyclical collusive pricing also takes 
place due to the short-term renewable contracts that may be extended after a certain period of time. It 
is also observed that equity-financed firms are not able to provide as much stability to cartels as much 
as debt financed firms.  
 
CEO turnover was the emphasis of the study of Kaplan and Minton (2008) for large U.S firms, 
serving as samples from 1992 to 2005. Their initial finding was that CEO tenure declined, indicating 
the precariousness of the job compared to the past years. When the authors included the external 
takeovers, a decline in the average CEO tenure was found, that was less than six years for the period 
of 1998 to 2005. Compared to those reported in previous research, substantially shorter tenures have 
been reported recently. For individual CEOs, some of the benefits of increased pay over this period 
were likely offset by the shorter expected tenure. It was also found out that it is possible for CEOs 
with shorter tenure to pursue manipulation in the form of earnings management with the situation that 
provides greater stock performance sensitivity and higher compensation. Sharma (2011) noted that 
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long CEO tenure is linked to performance conformity whilst short tenure is associated with the 
propensity to make strategic change. He also found out that CEO age is positively related to the 
CEO’s tenure with the firm. 
 
Compensation is said to be affected by CEO tenure since there is a tendency for CEOs with longer 
tenure to earn more than those with shorter tenure. Additionally, older CEOs tend to earn more than 
their young counterparts. It is also more likely for those with stock ownership to make more than 
those without. Beasley (2012) found out that the more increased connection the CEO has with the 
firm’s directors; the weaker the governance structure tends to become (Beasley, 2012). Executive 
compensation can therefore be described as a complex system because of its link to risk-taking and 
corporate governance (Beasley, 2012).   
 
Beasley, (1996) conducted another logit analysis between fraud and non-fraud firms, using CEO 
tenure as an independent variable (Beasley, 1996). The basis of Beasley’s study is much closer to the 
study conducted here, and in fact Beasley’s study used similar variables CEO tenure and overlap of 
the CEO and board chair roles (BOSS) in the logit analysis. The variable BOSS was also found to be 
positively correlated with the likelihood of financial fraud misstatements. The finding also agrees 
with how long-tenured CEOs are less likely to have appropriate strategies (Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992). This is of interest if cartel activity is accepted as a measure of a lack of strategic change 
ability, i.e. opting for the status quo amongst cartel firms. 
 
According to Miller (1991), long-tenured CEOs are less likely to achieve the match between an 
organisation’s strategy and structure on one hand, and the challenges set by its environment, on the 
other, than their short-tenured counterparts. In a more particular manner, an inverse relationship 
exists between CEO tenure and the prescribed match between organisation and environment, 
especially in indeterminate settings and with ownership concentration. A positive relationship 
prevails in the match between environment and strategy on one hand, and financial performance, on 
the other.  
 
In the study of Lausten (2002), it was emphasised that inverse relationship prevails between CEO 
tenure and firm performance, with evidence showing a range of measures for corporate governance 
and corporate performance. The threat of turnover serves as an ensuring factor that CEOs act 
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according to the interest of shareholders. Additionally, the ownership of the firm reinforces the 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance.  
 
Therefore, it can be argued following to Han (2010), Beasley, (1996) and Kaplan and Minton (2008) 
that CEOs in cartel firms have a shorter tenure than CEOs in non-cartel firms. Therefore, the 
empirical proposition below is examined to test for the relationship between the length of the CEO’s 
service on the board and cartel formation, the CEO tenure (CEOTEN) was included in the model. 
Similar to Chaganti et al., (1985) and Shivdasani (1993) the CEO tenure was calculated as 
uninterrupted years on the board. Controlling for poor firm financial performance, firm ownership 
status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index, a negative coefficient is expected: 
 
P10: The number of years a CEO had served as a director for a cartel firm is less than that 
for non-cartel firms. 
 
 CEO Gender 
Oppression of women has always been present in the workplace, especially amongst the higher 
management. In today’s world of corporate finance the CEO is responsible for the operations of the 
firm hence his/her decisions are given priority accordingly. Several scholars discussed gender issues 
with regards to different areas for instance, firms’ performance, market reaction, and risk taking 
behaviours, etc.  
 
According to Brennan and McCafferty (1997), there have been recommendations that there are two 
benefits of keeping women on board. One benefit is that women may know more about needs of 
customers, have more knowledge of consumer behaviour and chances for firms of meeting needs of 
customers. Another benefit is that women are more independent since they are not part of the “old 
boys” network. These are some evidences that state that a firm’s value can increase when there are 
women on the board. There could be competitive advantage attained by a firm by keeping women on 
the board as it would first lead to improved corporate governance (Bernardi et al., 2002). 
 
Evidence from the U.S market about the effects of gender on the reaction of the stock market 
subsequent to a CEO appointment is indicated in the study of Triki, Sami, and Ureche-Rangan 
(2012). The study likewise makes an assessment of the impact of the characteristics of female 
candidates on observed returns. The findings suggest that a significant difference does not exist in the 
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stock market reaction subsequent to a CEO appointment. However, a negative effect on observed 
returns is indicated by nomination of insider female candidates. Moreover, the sector of activity 
where the firm operates affects the market reaction.  
 
Another study conducted by Burke and Mattis (2000) shows that response towards women CEOs of a 
firm by the overall markets is unappreciative. According to Hallock (2002), the inequality of salary 
between male and female CEOs is due to the characteristics of the job and the workers. Mohan and 
Chen’s (2004) study shows that the IPO pricing is irrelevant towards male or female CEOs. Recent 
studies show that women in higher management levels tend to produce better financial results 
(Welbourne, 1999; Catalyst, 2004). According to Wolfers (2006), firms with women leaders are 
capable of making mistakes on a large scale. This kind of bias is mostly found amongst male 
analysts. 
 
A study carried out by the US non-profit organisation for women’s advancement. This study showed 
that in Fortune 500 firms characterised by higher proportion of women in top level management, 
there was 34% increased total return to shareholders and 35% higher return on equity. Hence, firms 
with most proportion of women in top level management performed considerably better than those 
with the lowest proportion of women (Catalyst, 2004).  
 
Cheung and Hernandez-Julian (2006) as well as Swamy et al. (1999) exhibit in their studies that men 
have more ability to be corrupt than women. Factors such as experience and work attitude between 
men and women have shown that women have less chances of being corrupt as compared to men. 
 
According to Sundén and Surette (1998) and Bernasek and Shwiff (2001), when it comes to the 
provision of wealth in pensions, women are considerably more risk averse. In a study on betting 
behaviour of men and women by Bruce and Johnson (1994) and Johnson and Powell (1994), it was 
observed that women show a lesser inclination towards risk-taking than men. Variations in risk-
taking in both genders are also present in a military framework (Hudgens and Fatkin, 1985). 
 
The following different works depict that female fund managers are generally more risk averse than 
men or at the least, both are equally risk-averse. Thus, differences in both genders are mainly in 
terms of risk-aversion. Through the research of Niessen and Ruenzi (2007), it can be stated that 
female fund managers are more risk-averse that male fund managers; they follow less risky 
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investment patterns that are also temporally steady than those of male fund managers, and do not 
diverge too much from benchmarks. When Atkinson, Baird and Frye (2003) compared the 
investment behaviour and performance of both genders fixed-income mutual fund managers, it was 
found that funds managed by each gender are not very different from each other. This could be said 
in relation to risk, performance, and other related features. Moreover, male fund managers trade more 
than female fund managers. Thus, when the various risk-adjusted performance measures were used, 
there was no considerable difference in the average performance of male and female managed funds. 
 
Additionally, the Meta-analysis is an example of a study on the presence of gender differences in the 
tendency to take risks. Its results stated that it is quite apparent that “male participants are more likely 
to take risks than female participants” (p. 377). This study was conducted by Byrnes, Miller, and 
Schafer (1999) who studied more than 150 papers on gender differences in risk perception. 
 
Considering the existing research, there had been other important researches that include five various 
content domains to evaluate the risk that can be observed in the behaviour of men and women. These 
domains are health/safety, ethical, social financial and recreational decisions. It was observed that 
men are less risk averse and have greater tendency to work with risky behaviours. Four out of five 
domains depicted gender differences, social decision making being the exclusion. This study was 
conducted by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002). Even in a big German sample conducted by Johnson, 
Wilke, and Weber, 2004, using these domains, similar gender differences were observed. These 
above mentioned researches were carried out to evaluate in depth the generality and cognitive 
foundations of these differences (Slovic, 1997). 
 
In relation to gender differences in risk attitudes, a research was conducted, which showed that 
context is quite important (Schubert et al., 1999). Women and men’s risk attitudes were checked in 
this test in terms of their similarities or differences in relation to whether they have to decide on 
certain investment or insurance problems (no differences exist) or an abstract gamble (differences 
exist). The outcome of the study was that there were no noticeable gender differences when it comes 
to real-life contexts such as financial decisions. This could lead to the thought that noticeable gender 
differences may be present in terms of differences in opportunity sets. There are even more 
researches showing that women might be more risk-averse (Hershey and Schoemaker, (1980)). 
Lately, newer surveys observed that whilst having equal economic status, portfolios of single men are 




Compared to men, women are more in favour of using financial advisers; they have lesser risk 
preferences and a greater amount of anxiety when it comes to financial decision-making (Stinerock et 
al., 1991).The effect of gender on asset allocation in retirement pension accounts was evaluated by 
Powell and Ansi c (1997). According to the authors, the allocation of investments in retirement plans 
is affected by gender differences. The final outcome of the study was that when it comes to selection 
of allocation of funds in their retirement savings account, women tend to show increased risk 
aversion. Another study examined the association between gender and the investment plan of a 
person who has the opportunity to select his own retirement plan. This was conducted by Sundén and 
Surrette in (1998). According to the study, asset allocation decisions were not affected by age and 
education; however, marital status and gender do influence the decision of individuals in the 
allocation selection of assets in the pension account.  
 
Research usually examines the results of decisions made by men and women instead of the whole 
decision-making process, which makes it hard to understand the element of gender differences. 
Gender differences could also be due to gender discrimination and different choices made by 
individuals (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996). There have been studies stating that in a number of 
activities comprising financial decision-making, women show increased risk aversion than men 
(Hintz, et al., (1997); Jianakoplos and Bernasek, (1998); Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, (1996)). However, 
there are also those showing completely different results, which state that in relation to premium 
pension portfolios, married women are willing to take more risk than unmarried women (Sundén, 
2004). Another contrasting study is that women, under controlled economic conditions, generally do 
not make less risky financial decisions. This study is in contrast with the studies mentioned earlier in 
terms of variations in how male and female opportunity sets are framed (Schubert, et al., (1999)).  
 
Byrnes et al., (1999), in a Meta study of 150 previous studies, compared the risk-taking inclinations 
of male and female participants in different risky activities. They stated that men are willing to take 
more risk than women and as age increases, this gender difference in risk taking tends to decrease. 
Gender difference existed differently amongst many activities and decision contexts. In another 
study, it was observed that women are more risk averse than men. It was stated that female fund 
managers “take less risk and follow a less extreme investment style” (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2006). 
However, the authors also stated that there has been no indication of difference in fund performance 
even with the presence of risk-related behavioural differences between female and male fund 
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managers. Thus, with the risk-averse investment approach of women, similar results were drawn. 
According to Barber and Odean (2001), men trade 45% more than women. This was found through 
an analysis of the common stock investment behaviour of men and women from February 1991 to 
January 1997 in the USA. According to the authors, since men are more confident, they tend to trade 
more frequently than women. There was an observation, after seeing outcomes from controlled 
experiments, that women seem to be more risk averse than men and that they invest less (Charness 
and Gneezy, 2004).  
 
It is stated that when seen in the context of corporate decision making, gender differences may not 
exist. This is because either the women would try to outdo men when it comes to taking risk or since 
the decision would be made together by men and women, there could not really be gender differences 
in the decision made. Women could also be following the pattern of men in relation to risk taking 
behaviour, thereby removing any gender differences. When the stock-selling behaviour of male and 
female executives is observed in relation to stock option rewards, it can be indicated that since male 
executives are more into diversification-related stock sales than female executives, male executives 
are more risk-averse (Zahid, et al., 2006). Hence, when discussions on whether female executives or 
male executives are more risk averse, the outcomes are quite varied. Women are inclined to take less 
risk and follow a less extreme investment strategy when they play the role of an individual or 
institutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2001; Charness and Gneezy, 2004; Niessen and Ruenzi, 
2006). However, men are more risk averse than women executives when they are corporate 
executives (Zahid et al., 2006). 
 
Moreover, an analysis of 150 studies ranging from 1967 to 1997 was made by Byrnes, et al., (1999). 
In their study, a comparison was made on male and female risk-taking inclinations in a number of 
different settings. It was observed that in 14 out of 16 different activities, men were more willing to 
take risk than women. In a survey of economic literature conducted by Eeckle and Grossman (2003), 
drawing outcomes from field studies, abstract gambles and contextual experiments were analysed and 
compared. The results from laboratory experiments were less certain but field studies led to the 
decision that women are more risk-averse than men. 
 
Consistent with the previous studies this study expects to find a similar result to Cheung and 
Hernandez Julian (2006); Swamy, et al. (1999); Zahid et al., (2006); Eeckle and Grossman (2003); 
and Byrnes, et al., (1999) that women (CEOs/executive) are less likely to participate in risky 
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activities of corruption and they are risk-averse. The proposition below is empirically tested by 
controlling for firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index. Negative and 
significant coefficient is expected.  
 
P11: Female CEOs are less represented in cartel firms than in non-cartel firms. 
 
 Multi-directorship (Busy Directors) 
Busy directors, as defined by the National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) are those who 
have more than three directorships and six for directors who are retired. A CEO is said to be busy 
according to the number of directorships he/she holds. Shivdasani (1993), in his research, shows that 
the efficiency of a director holding a number of directorships has no harmful connection with the 
problems faced by the agency.  
 
Ferris et al (2003) found in their study that directors nearing retirement age might consider multiple 
directorships. Age is said to serve as a proxy for the director’s experience and the energy needed for 
the demands of board service. The study found that the regression for the number of directorships 
vis-à-vis age involves a significant positive co-efficiency. It also suggests that older directors with 
greater experience of directorships are no longer interested in additional directorships or might pose 
as less attractive candidates. The average age of directors is also older in boards with multiple 
directors. In a particular corporation, arbitrary terms are not held by the board as a limitation that may 
be imposed on directors’ service. The board does not also maintain a position that directors must be 
remunerated annually until upon reaching the mandatory retirement age (Clayman, Fridson, and 
Troughton, 2012). It must be noted that Ferris et al. (2003) have not seen any association between 
multiple directorships and increased likelihood of fraud litigation. The evidence they gathered 
demonstrated that calls to limit directorships were not supported.  
 
Studies by Fama and Jensen (1983) show that those directors with numerous of directorships, are 
more likely to be hired by firms. Good governance practices are found in those directors who are part 
of more than one board and carry out multi-directorship.  According to Gilson (1990), Kaplan (1994), 
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999), Shivdasani (1993) and Ferris et al. (2003), efficient work is related 
to the number of directorships a director holds. The results of these authors show that boards of 
directors of firms committing fraud are less likely to have directors who work on other boards, 




In the contrary, Roe (1994) and Jensen (1993), argues that directors holding multiple directorships 
may not be able to make effective decisions. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) study shows that busy 
directors have a high likelihood to be chosen as directors by the firm managers. Some believe that 
numerous number of directorships do not affect the goals of a firm. An Act passed in the United 
States known as the Clayton Act considers it as illegal if a director holds directorships of rival firms 
in the U.S and if joint as a sole firm there would be a serious violation of the antitrust laws. However, 
two out of eight rival firms is combined together as a single corporation in the U.S. (Roe, 1994) 
 
Firms have been generally criticised by shareholder activists and institutional investors for having 
appointed directors with multiple directorships in different firms, maintaining that these directors are 
not capable of effectively monitoring the management of several firms. Mainstream critics such as 
Chancellor William Allen (1992) argued that time and resources must be committed to effective 
monitoring. It has been claimed by the Council of Institutional Investors (1998) that if there are no 
atypical and highly specific circumstances prevailing in the firm, full-time directors must not occupy 
more than two other boards. By contrast, the Business Roundtable (1997) advised that firms must be 
required to limit the number of directorships.  
Directors themselves were not in favour of the exercise of multiple directorships due to insufficiency 
of time for discharging their professional responsibilities, which is the most common reason for such 
refusal (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Moreover, it was revealed in a survey of directors of Fortune 500 
firms that a director experienced too much burden with too many board appointments. About 56 
percent of outside directors have also reported having refused an invitation for additional board 
assignments due to lack of time.  It is apparent that these directors perceived that excessive board 
assignments might dispel their time and attention and might also cause them to undermine their 
ability to monitor management. The same study also discovered that majority of directors held that 
limitation must be placed on the number of boards in which CEOs and other inside directors were 
appointed. However, directors were evenly divided in terms of whether outside directors must indeed 
be given limitation in their management of the firm. Therefore, it has been a controversial topic to 
whether an individual director’s capacity to monitor management is impaired by his exercise of 
multiple directorships. Despite such controversy, only little research was carried out involving the 
impact of multiple directorships on corporate performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
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It was also reported that positive relationship exists between one’s potential to commit accounting 
fraud and an outside director’s average number of directorships (Beasley, 1996). Similarly, busy 
directors tend to set CEO compensation at excessively high levels, which in turn results in poor firm 
financial performance.  
However, other evidence indicates that multiple directorship is positively related to firm success, as 
shown by the results involving Japan’s cotton spinning industry during the 20th century, where 
directors held multiple directorships (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2000). It was also reported that larger 
premiums in tender offers were received by shareholders when multiple directors were included by 
the board (Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997). In addition, superior acquisition-related returns 
were enjoyed by firms when their directors held multiple directorships. These studies indicate that 
multiple directorships are parallel with shareholder interest. The specialised settings and 
circumstances of these results however place the generalisability of these results to becoming open to 
question.   
Moreover, Pfeffer and Salansik (1978) posit that firms can benefit from the boards through these 
boards’ stance to act as channels to communicate information between the firm and external 
organisations. This way, organisations are able to reduce uncertainty related to strategic decision 
making. Other firms are also able to observe other firms by means of their board interlocks and hence 
facilitate inter-firm learning and dispersion of ideas, strategies, practices, and behaviours (Strang and 
Soule, 1998).  
Therefore, this study follows Gilson (1990), Kaplan (1994), Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999), 
Shivdasani (1993) and Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003), who have argued that boards of 
directors of firms committing fraud are less likely to have directors who work on other boards, 
compared with boards of directors amongst non-fraud firms. In similar vein to the previous studies by 
controlling for poor firm financial performance, firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and 
Herfindahl index, this study empirically tests the proposition below; negative coefficient expected:  
 
P12: Boards of directors of a firm committing cartel crime are less likely to have directors 





 CEO/Chairman Concentration Power 
According to the Cadbury Committee Report (1992) CEO concentration power should be 
disapproved. This came about through the belief that when an individual holds two titles, corporate 
governance may suffer due to the ensuing conflicting interests.  
 
Mixed results are once again achieved when the CEO’s role is differentiated from that of the 
chairman of the board (Zahra and Pearce 1989; Dalton et al., 1998). The impact of this disintegration 
on board performance is likely to be favourable, as the principle-agent view suggests, because the 
power of the CEO is distinguished from that of the Board Chairman (ibid).  
 
The dual nature of the leadership of the board was examined by Berg and Smith (1978) using four 
performance measures. Only one measure, total return to investors, showed that when the roles of 
CEO and Chairman were combined, the performance was negatively affected. Mixed results were 
attained by Boyd (1995), showing the positive impact of concentration power of leadership in some 
cases and the opposite in others. However, he stressed that the corporate governance movement of 
separating the role of CEO and chairman was not supported in his studies.  
 
Firm bankruptcy did not come about through the integration of the Chairman’s and CEO’s role, 
according to Changanti, et al., (1985). Alternatively, Rechner and Dalton (1989) ascertained that 
financial performance was not enhanced when these roles were dissociated. Evidence was found in a 
following study by Rechner and Dalton (1991) regarding the better performance of those firms that 
had an independent board rather than those who had a combined role of CEO and Chairman of the 
Board. The meta-analysis of Dalton, et al., (1998) conversely determined the lack of relationship 
between financial performance and board leadership.  
 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) report that CEO/Chairman concentration power is linked to 
higher CEO compensation, and Goyal and Park (2002) show that CEO concentration power reduces 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance 
 
Combining the positions of the CEO and the chairperson is often done by firms, thereby allowing the 
CEO to carry out managerial and oversight functions – two important functions of corporate 
governance. The CEO therefore oversees the direction of the firm and at the same time, manages its 
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operations. The CEO in a concentration power must have vision, strategy, problem-solving skills, and 
motivation (Rezaee, 2009). 
 
It is said that 75% of fraudulent cases of financial statements studied by Loebbecke et al. (1989) 
show that only one individual is responsible for operating finances and making financial decisions, 
thus giving a chance to defraud easily. As Jensen (1993) argues, besides his/her own interest, a CEO 
is not authorised to take charge over the chairperson’s monitoring job of financial statements. 
 
The CEO is the most authoritative and dominant person of the firm. The Chairperson of the board has 
the responsibility to employ, evaluate, compensate and dismiss the CEO of the firm. Meetings of the 
board of directors are conducted by the chairperson as well. To create an efficient monitoring system 
by the board it is necessary to make the chairperson and the CEO of the firm into separate entities 
(Mintzberg, 1983).  
There are many different views on the CEO concentration power and firm performance levels; 
however, Dalton (1992) states that there exists no relationship whatsoever. Coles et al. (1997) also 
find that there is no negative relationship between the two. A sample of fortune 500 firms is taken 
into account by Rechner and Dalton (1991) which shows that the concentration power of the CEO 
provides a positive effect on the performance of the firms. If there is no concept of CEO 
concentration power in the firm, it is therefore very much sensitive to the CEO turnover and firm 
performance levels (Goyal and Park, 2002). Many of the agencies present in the U.S. have 
established regulations against CEO concentration power due to the insider activities taking place; for 
instance, the recent division of the roles of Chairman and the CEO of the NYSE.  
 
There is an impediment to the ability of the board to supervise managerial activities due to CEO 
concentration power, as Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) put forward, leading to a rise in 
the cost of agency. Firm performance is consequently going to be enhanced when the roles of 
Chairman and CEO are separated.  
 
CEO concentration power, however leads to an improved performance of the firm by providing a 
definite leadership that takes care of strategy development and implementation, as the arguments of 




When there are separate roles of the CEO and chairman, the issues of cost of sharing information, 
disputes between the two parties and inefficiency may arise. Communicating information pertinent to 
the organization in a timely manner may be costly; it would be difficult to find out who is responsible 
for the poor performance of the firm and the process of making and implementing decisions may not 
be as efficient when there are two leaders instead of one.  
 
Accounting performance measures of the banking industry and CEO concentration power are 
negatively related as has been determined by Pi and Timme (1993). When there was a change in the 
status of concentration power, there was no subsequent change in performance according to Baliga, 
Moyer, and R. Rao (1996). No substantial difference is found by Daily and Dalton (1997) with 
respect to performances with dual CEO or non-dual CEO organizations.  
 
A positive relationship has been provided by Dahya and Travlos (2000) with respect to CEO 
concentration power and firm’s success. The separation of the roles CEO and Chairman of the Board 
in the UK firms does not show an improvement in the performance of these firms (Dahya, 2005). 
According to Faleye (2007), organizational intricacy, managerial ownership and CEO reputation 
have a positive relationship with CEO concentration power, suggesting that the costs and benefits of 
having an alternate leadership are not considered by the firm.  
 
The CEO attains a huge base of power and locus of control when he also holds the title of the 
Chairman (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Patton and Baker, 1987; Harrison et al., 1988), which 
weakens the control of the board on decisions (Morck et al., 1989). Achieving the CEO’s agenda, 
which might be significantly different from the goals of the shareholder, becomes easier when there 
is a weakening of board control (Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Thus, when the titles of CEO and 
Chairman are combined, there would be a deteriorating control on the board, resulting in poor 
performance of the firm as the agency theory suggests.  
 
Following Fama and Jensen (1983) and Morck et al., (1989) who have documented that CEO 
concentration power could hinder board’s capability to monitor management and thus raise the 
agency cost. Therefore, to test for the CEO’s ability to affect the board monitoring, this study 
includes (BOSS) variable for situations where the CEO and chairperson positions are combined using 
a measure consistent with that used in Shivdasani (1993), and Beasley (1996). Controlling for poor 
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firm financial performance, firm ownership status, current ratio, firm sale, and Herfindahl index, a 
positive and significant coefficient is expected;  
P13: Firms that commit cartel are more likely to have CEOs serving as board chairs 
compared to non-cartel firms. 
 
 3.6.4 Does CEO Compensation Scheme Matter? 
Top management levels are responsible for deciding on forming cartel and imposing this decision 
upon the management who strives to hide any kind of collusive agreement (Harrington, 2006a). 
Many compensation schemes are provided to top managers and it is necessary to understand if these 
schemes may help in stopping the managers from forming collusive agreements.  
 
In the 1990s, managerial compensation and empirical literature relating to this was much more 
popular than the 1980s (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Along with dynamic competition in the market, 
several incentive schemes have been developed, including bonus contracts by contractors to 
thoroughly understand the competitive behaviour. Collusive agreements are managed efficiently by 
those managers who have limited incentives and bonus plans (Spagnolo, 2005).  
 
The incentives provided to a manager decline as the period increases. He also receives less marginal 
utility from higher profitability. They start to believe that a price war would help them reap more 
benefits in the form of profits rather than carrying out the collusively agreed strategies. To avoid this 
issue it has been recommended that bonuses and compensation caps must be provided to the 
managers in the form of schemes (Healy 1985; Gaver et al., 1995). These bonuses would be provided 
if firm profitability is up to a certain level. As profits increase, bonuses also increase. However, it is 
always found in firms that an upper bound is set on the bonus above which the profits are not 
provided (Murphy, 1999). 
 
Moreover, stock-based compensation plans have been introduced in the business world to build a 
positive attitude within the managers and reduce the tacit collusion and social welfare activities. A 
period of four years is usually observed where the liquid plans awarding stock based bonuses are 
provided, after which, a new plan is formed after the period expires (Kole, 1997). A classical model 
of repeated oligopoly can also incorporate this plan to manage the collusive behaviour. In a perfect 
potential stock market, the dividends are justly distributed and the incentives may be deferred, 
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causing compensation packages to enhance the collusion (Spagnolo, 2000). With the help of the 
stock-related incentives, the management of the organisation is linked strongly to the profitability of 
the organisation. 
 
The collusion stability may be improved with the help of stock related compensation since the stock 
market foresight may be perfectly informed about the collusive agreements. The punishments that 
have been decided may be discounted in the current stock prices which would reduce the levels of 
gain from defection (Spagnolo, 2000).  Managers prefer a smoother stream of profits where they 
carry out collusion activities, which can create stability (Spagnolo, 1998). If they do not have this 
stream then they become highly dissatisfied with the incentive, which leads to low punishment profits 
for the future. If the selected bonus is efficient then the defection gain will be limited and the 
collusion would show stability (Spagnolo, 1998). 
 
Executive compensation is used by shareholders as a way of lining up managerial interest with their 
own since CEOs/executives are the agents of shareholders, irrespective of the gender. Although since 
women executives have been found to be risk averse or have a risk seeking behaviour, as mentioned 
previously in the thesis, their reaction to risk incentives as part of the executive compensation might 
be different. To be protected from a downside risk is the mostly thought of reason for stock option 
compensation. This is because a stock option, also being a call option on the firm’s shares is only 
linearly linked to the stock price when the stock price goes beyond the exercise price of the option 
(Feltham and Wu, 2001). Another reason is that as the firm’s stock return is volatile, the value of the 
stock option rises. This is because of the convexity of payoff i.e. tremendously high stock option 
value at high stock values. Therefore, through stock option compensation, risk-averse managers are 
encouraged to be involved in risky investment projects including risky acquisitions and managerial 
risk aversion is also offset (Guay, 1999; Datta et al., 2001 Coles et al., 2005). 
 
There is another way through which an incentive is given to managers to increase the performance of 
the firm. This is restricted stock, which is a type of equity based compensation, and is linearly linked 
to the stock price. However, this method, leads to too much risk of the managers’ wealth and even 
increases managers’ risk aversion since the linear payoff does not reduce the down-side risk (Bryan 
et al., 2000; Ryan and Wiggins, 2002). Male and female CEOs and executives may react in different 
ways to the pay-for-performance incentives which however do not restrict downside risk. This is 
because there are gender differences in risk taking. There has been experimental study which 
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compared both compensations, showing that option-based compensation leads to increase in risk-
averse managers to go for risky but value-increasing investment projects, than is done by stock-based 
compensation (Bryan et al., 2000). 
 
Therefore, following Spagnolo (1998, 2000 and 2005), this study empirically tests the following 
propositions; positive and significant coefficient is expected from all. 
 
P14: The average CEO bonus for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms. 
P15: The average CEO share for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms. 


























Table 3.1: List of Propositions  
Board Characteristics: 
P1: 
The size of board directors is larger for firms committing cartel than for a matched sample of 
non-cartel firms 
P2: 
The percentage of independent (non-executive) members on the board of director is lower for 
firms committed cartel crime than for non-cartel firms. 
P3:  The average age of board directors for cartel firms is lower than non-cartel firms. 
P4:  There are less female directors on the board of cartel firms than the non-cartel firms. 
P5:  The average duration of the cartel board is less than the non-cartel firms 
P6:  Board remuneration for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms. 
Ownership Structure  
P7:  
The percentage of outside directors’ stock ownership is lower for cartel firms than for non-
cartel firms 
P8: Cartel likely to be formed by family-owned and controlled firms (large shareholders).  
CEO Characteristics 
P9:  The age of the CEO for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms 
P10:  
The number of years a CEO had served as a director for a cartel firm is less than that for non-
cartel firms 
P11:  Female CEOs are less represented in cartel firms than in non-cartel firms. 
P12:  
Boards of directors of a firm committing cartel crime are less likely to have directors who 
work on other boards, compared with boards of directors of non-cartel firms. 
P13:  
Firms that commit cartel are more likely to have CEOs serving as board chairs compared to 
non-cartel firms. 
CEO Compensation Scheme 
P14:   The average CEO bonus for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms 
P15:   The average CEO share for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms 










3.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter provides a discussion of the literature review and hypothesis development for the study. 
It begins with clarifying the concept of corporate governance and the theoretical background 
underlying the formation of cartel. The literature review elucidates the CEO role in corporate 
governance and in forming cartels. It also tackles how shareholders act in cartel formation. The 
hypothesis development, on the other hand, is focused on the characteristics of the board and whether 
the CEO characteristics and compensation scheme matter. The empirical investigation embodying the 
theoretical background is built upon agency theory, aiming to clarify the empirical relationship 
between corporate governance structure and cartel formation. Analysing the corporate governance 
structure necessitates investigating the structure of the board of directors and the manner in which 
their activities impact the performance of the organisation. The list of propositions provides a 
summary of the hypotheses relating to board characteristics, CEO characteristics, and CEO 
compensation scheme to determine how corporate governance structure impacts the propensity of 
cartel formation. 
The next chapter provides a discussion of data description and data collection, thereby clarifying how 

















Data Description  
 
This chapter describes the sources of data and method of data collection. It discusses how the sample 
of cartel was obtained, including the two screening stages used to examine the initial set of cartel 
identified into a usable sample. The resulting cartel data are then compared with the initial sample 
and their characteristics are described in more detail. Besides these, this chapter discusses how the 
benchmark set of firms that have no known cartel participation is obtained, and their characteristics. 
 
4.1 Cartel Data  
 4.1.1. Sources 
The initial aim is to create a data set of firms that have been found to be involved in cartel formation. 
The starting point is to identify all cartel firms that participated in cartel and are sentenced by the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), and/ or by the European Commission (EC), and/ or by the 
Competition Commission (CC) / Office of Fair Trading (OFT) for the whole period over which 
information on cartel cases is available.  
 
Several databases are used in the cartel sample selection and cartel data collection phases of this 
study. The first set of sources are the DoJ, the EC and CC/OFT. The second is the LexisNexis 
database. The third set includes the academic working papers by Levenstein and Suslow (2006 and 
2002), Levenstein, Suslow, and Oswald (2003) and Connor and Helmers (2006). The forth source 
includes data obtained from Prof. John Connor of Purdue University. 
 
 4.1.2. Data Collection Methods 
Finding relevant information on cartel and firms involved is a considerable task. It is not easy to 
obtain the needed data from the EU, UK, and US authorities. This is because the DoJ, for example, 
does not provide detailed information about all cartel cases being sentenced and the detailed 
information about firms involved. The DoJ is also less transparent about its cases than EC and 
CC/OFT where cases are discussed in more detailed. In fact, the DoJ’s website does not contain 
comprehensive information about cases and their outcomes; and in multiple cases, there is no 
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information about firms that have been sentenced. For example, it is quite common for the DoJ to 
report that there was a cartel case involving several firms but does not however provide any 
information about which firms are involved, and the resulting outcomes, as well as the penalties 
imposed. It means that after several months spent on building a suitable cartel database (24 cases 
from DoJ, 76 cases from EC and 52 cases from CC/OFT), a total of 152 cases were collected. 
 
Several attempts were made to contact the DoJ to ask for an access to the information about their 
cartel cases that were not publicly available, but they have refused to provide any information. 
However, it was helpful to have acquired the data from a professor of Purdue University, who has 
written extensively on international cartel from an economic perspective. His sample of 314 cases 
was used in his ‘Statistics on Modern Private International Cartel’ (Connor and Helmers, 2006). The 
data gathered by Connor and Helmers were collected from several sources, such as antitrust 
authorities (e.g., DoJ, Canadian Competition Bureau (2002), and EC); newspapers and magazines 
(e.g. Chemical Market Reporter, Oil and Gas Journal, etc. - Factiva, LexisNexis); academic working 
papers (e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2003 and 2006); Evenett et al., 2001); Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2002) and its annual competition-law reports by 
members.  
 
Even though obtaining John sample was useful, there were some problems with his data, such as 
incomplete information on some cartel cases and several missing data. Furthermore, as the purpose of 
this research is to find out which characteristics of the participating firms’ boards of directors are 
associated with cartel formation; this research only intends to study those firms that have been found 
to be operating cartel. Therefore, having assembled the initial sample, it was necessary to screen the 
cases to ensure that all were suitable for the study. Cases were excluded on three grounds: 
 
1. If the case was still under investigation. Eight cartel cases were excluded, as a decision 
was not yet reached at the time of the sample collection. 
2. If no sentence date/year had been reported. There were 75 cases in this category.  
3. Some cases do not identify the firms participating in the cartel, which makes it 
impossible to get information about them. A further 58 cases were excluded on this 
basis.  
Altogether, 141 out of the 314 cases from Connor’s database were excluded as a result of the 
screening process. Additionally, combining the set of data that was collected from DoJ, EC archive, 
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and CC/OFT (152 cases) with Connors’ data (173 remaining cases), a full list of 325 cases and 1,901 
firms were obtained.  
 
The sample of 1,901 firms contains those located across multiple countries. It means that this study 
would need to collect information about corporate structure and financial data from different 
countries around the world and to collect a matched set of data for the benchmark study. As the 
University of Bath does not have the sources to cover all of these countries therefore, a further round 
of screening to obtain the eventual sample used in the study then followed the initial screening (the 
full set is available on request). The following additional criteria were used in the second screening to 
select the final cartel sample: 
 
4. Cartel cases were chosen based on at least one firm of UK origin amongst cartel 
members. As a result, the number of cartel cases was reduced to 93 cases whilst the 
number of firms was reduced to 681.  
5. Only cartel cases operating between 1990 and 2008 were included to allow three years of 
information to be collected before the cartel started. This additional step reduced the 
number of cartel cases to 60 and the number of firms to 457 firms. 
6. Cartel firms identified in steps 1 and 2 were included in the final sample if governance 
data and financial statement data were available for the time period. Since there were no 
sources at the University of Bath to collect the governance data for some countries (e.g., 
Brazil, Mexico, etc.), the sample was reduced again; hence, the total sample size was 150 
firms in 52 cases. The final cartel sample selection is summarised in Table 4.1 below: 
 






Number of firms 
remaining 
All identified cartel firms before screening 3200 
 
  
  Less:   
 
  
1. Firms under investigation    37 3163 
2. Cases without date/year   518 2645 
3. Anonymous firms   744 1901 
    
 
  
Cartel firms identified after first screening   1299 1901 
  Less:   
 
  
4. Firms in cartel without at least one UK firms    1220 681 
5. Firms in cartel active outside 1990-2008 period   457 224 
            6.  Firms without suitable financial and governance data    74 150 
Final sample of cartel firms   150 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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As a result of the two screenings, the total number of cartel firms used in this research is 150; 
however, the cartel firms are divided into two types of cartel abusers:  
 Single abuser: firms that committed cartel and were sentenced once and appeared once in 
the sample.  
 Multiple abusers (Recidivism)1: firms that have committed cartel more than once and 
appeared in the initial sample and the study sample more than once in different cases. 
 
Therefore, the 150 cartel firms of which 114 are UK firms consist of 102 single cartel firm abusers 
and 19 multiple cartel abusers (counting multiple abusers and cartel firms once only). It means that 
the total number of firms when the multiple cartel firms are counted only once is 121. Table 4.2 
below shows the firms’ distribution for both single cartel firms and multiple cartel firms: 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution for Both Single-Cartel Firms and Multiple-Cartel Firms’ Abusers 
Country Number of Firms Single abusers  Multiple abusers 
Australia 1 1 0 
Canada 2 0 1 
France 8 1 3 
Germany 5 1 1 
Ireland 2 2 0 
Italy 1 1 0 
Japan 3 1 0 
Netherlands 2 2 0 
New Zealand  1 1 0 
Singapore 1 1 1 
Spain 1 1 0 
UK 114 83 12 
US 9 7 1 
Total 150 102 19 
Source: Author’s own calculation from main data set 
UK firms, having significantly generated the most number amongst the included countries of origin, 
are the focus of cartel formation and discovery.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Recidivism is: one of the most fundamental concepts in criminal justice. It refers to a person's relapse into criminal behaviour, often 
after receiving sanctions or undergoing intervention for a previous crime (Maxfield and Babbie, 2012) . 
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4.2 Data Description 
The sample used to test the hypotheses in this research consists of 150 cartel firms in 52 cartel cases, 
taken out of the initial sample of 1,901 firms and 325 cartel cases. In order to describe the sample and 
compare it with the original, the data are categorised at two levels: first, at a cartel level; and second, 
at a firm level.  Figure 4.1 below contains the classifications used in each case: 
 




















1. Countries where cartel 
operated 
2. Industry where cartel operated 
3. Cartel duration  
 
 Classified by: 
1. Country of origin  
2. Firms’ industries 





4.2.1 Description of Cartel Cases  
1. By countries where cartel operated 
The geographical location of where cartel cases operated are divided into three groups; EU, global 
and domestic cartel: 
 International: cartel fixed or attempted to fix prices on at least two countries. 
 Domestic (National): cartel limited their operations to one country.  
 
Therefore, the initial 325 cartel cases are divided in 262 international cases, and 63 domestic cartel 
cases (23 cases in the U.S and 40 cases in the UK).  
 
Out of 52 cartel cases used in this research, 35 are international cases and 17 cartel cases operate 
domestically (5 cases operate in the U.S and 12 cases operate in the UK). Table 4.3 below shows the 
number of initial and cartel sample cases in their geographical location:  
 
Table 4.3: Geographical Location of Cartel Cases’ Operations 
Location Initial cartel cases Cartel cases  
International  262 35 
National  63 17 
Total 325 52 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
2. By industry in which the cartel operated 
The cartel operated in a variety of industries, including chemicals, metals, paper products, 
transportation, and services; their members included some of the largest corporations in the world. 
Selecting the three-digit SIC industry code for each cartel case, which were obtained from UK Firms 
House, and Fame and DataStream, depending on the availability of the data for each firm
 
, the initial 
cartel cases were a result of 46 industries for all 325-cartel cases. This figures show the major 
industries that cartel were operating in for the last 25 years. The largely affected industries are the 
chemical industry with 54 cartel cases, manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products with 25 cases, 
and sale of motor vehicles and wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco with 18 cases each. More 




Similarly, the cartel cases examined in this study have 23 industries. The largely affected industries 
in this sample are the chemical industry (10 cases) followed by finishing of textiles industry with 6 
cases. Table 4.4 below illustrates the cartel cases classification by industry for both the initial sample 










021 Forestry and logging 1 0 
110 Manufacture of beverages 10 0 
120 Manufacture of tobacco  2 0 
133 Finishing of textiles 6 6 
162  Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials  1 0 
171 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 8 0 
182  Reproduction of recorded media  3 2 
192  Manufacture of refined petroleum products 18 3 
201 
Manufacture of basic chemicals; fertilisers and nitrogen compounds; plastics and 
synthetic rubber in primary forms  
54 10 
211  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 25 1 
231 Manufacture of glass and glass products 2 0 
235  Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster  8 0 
236 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster  13 2 
241 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of Ferro-alloys 6 2 
244 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals  8 2 
261 Manufacture of electronic components and boards  3 0 
262 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment  1 0 
275 Manufacture of domestic appliances 9 0 
279 Manufacture of other electrical equipment  1 1 
282 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery  11 0 
309 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c.  1 0 
321 Manufacture of jewelleries, bijouterie and related articles  3 0 
324 Manufacture of games and toys 3 1 
325 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies  7 2 
351 Electric power generation, transmission and distribution 6 0 
352 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains  12 3 
360 Water collection, treatment and supply 2 0 
421 Construction of roads and railways  3 0 
432 Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation activities  4 1 
451 Sale of motor vehicles 7 2 
463 Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco  18 2 
464 Wholesale of household goods  2 1 
466 Wholesale of other machinery, equipment and supplies  2 0 
471 Retail sale in non-specialised stores 7 0 
477 Retail sale of other goods in specialised stores  4 1 
493 Other passenger land transport  1 1 
502 Sea and coastal freight water transport  12 0 
511 Passenger air transport  8 2 
551 Hotels and similar accommodation  1 1 
612 Wireless telecommunications activities 14 4 
641 Monetary intermediation 9 0 
651 Insurance  4 1 
692 Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy  1 1 
731 Advertising  1 0 
742 Photographic activities 2 0 
782 Temporary employment agency activities 1 0 
  Total 325 52 
Source: UK firms House 
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3. By Cartel duration  
Table 4.5 below shows the average duration of cartel cases used in this research from 1990 to 2008. 
The average duration in the 1990s sample of DoJ, EC, and CC/OFT cases was four years. The 
average duration rose dramatically in 2002 and dropped down in 2007. Fourteen of these 52 cartel 
lasted for an average of four years - certainly long enough to have had a significant impact on 
consumers and economies. 
 
Table 4.5: Average Duration of Cartel Cases 
Year cartel started Avg. Cartel Duration  Number of cases 
1990 1.0 1 
1991 7.6  10 
1992 6.6 2 
1993 3.3  3 
1994 3.5  3 
1995 8.2  2 
1996 4.6  2 
1997 6.2 2 
1998 2.0  6 
1999 4.3 3 
2000 4.5 4 
2001 4.0 4 
2002 1.0 2 
2003 2.3 4 
2004 3.4 3 
2006 1.0 1 
Total  4.0 52 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
4.2.2 Description of Cartel Firms 
1. By country of origin 
The initial data set contain 1901 cartel firms from all over the world. The highest representation is 
from UK firms, followed by EU firms. This supports our choice of choosing the UK firms as it 
has higher representation than other countries. 
 
Moreover, the sample used in this study contains 150 cartel firms from all over the world, where 114 
cartel firms are from the UK. And the lowest numbers of firms are from Australia, Italy, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Spain. Table 4.6 below shows the distribution of cartel firms according to 




Table 4.6: Initial Sample and Cartel Sample Firms’ Country of Origin 
Country Initial sample Cartel sample  
Australia 0 1 
Canada 0 2 
France 0 8 
Germany 0 5 
Ireland 0 2 
Italy 67 1 
Japan 325 3 
Netherlands 197 2 
New Zealand  0 1 
Singapore 0 1 
Spain 0 1 
UK 725 114 
US 213 9 
Other  374 0 
Total 1901 150 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
2. By Industry 
The preliminary data set classified the firms’ industry by identifying the three-digit SIC industry 
code for each cartel firm. The 1901 cartel firms were spread across 46 industries. The most number 
of firms are found in the chemical industry (364 firms), manufacture of basic pharmaceutical (127 
firms) and those in the wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco (116 firms).  
Using the same classification used in the preliminary data, the study sample resulted in 25 
industries. The figure shows the major industries from which cartel firms have originated. The firms 
with the most number are from the chemical industry (24 firms), followed by firms that sell motor 
vehicles (14 firms). Table 4.7 shows the cartel firms’ classification by industry for both the initial 
















021 Forestry and logging 3 0 
110 Manufacture of beverages 32 0 
120 Manufacture of tobacco  6 0 
133 Finishing of textiles 33 13 
162  Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials  6 0 
171 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 63 0 
182  Reproduction of recorded media  20 4 
192  Manufacture of refined petroleum products 69 4 
201 
Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and 
synthetic rubber in primary forms                                              346 24 
211  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 127 6 
231 Manufacture of glass and glass products 8 0 
235  Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster  38 0 
236 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster  78 5 
241 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of Ferro-alloys 62 4 
244 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals  47 6 
261 Manufacture of electronic components and boards  10 0 
262 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment  10 0 
275 Manufacture of domestic appliances 37 0 
279 Manufacture of other electrical equipment  6 1 
282 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery  62 0 
309 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c.  5 0 
321 Manufacture of jewelleries, bijouterie and related articles  6 0 
324 Manufacture of games and toys 13 3 
325 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies  31 2 
351 Electric power generation, transmission and distribution 52 0 
352 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains  72 13 
360 Water collection, treatment and supply 12 0 
421 Construction of roads and railways  23 0 
432 Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation activities  29 3 
451 Sale of motor vehicles 49 14 
463 Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco  116 13 
464 Wholesale of household goods  9 4 
466 Wholesale of other machinery, equipment and supplies  6 0 
471 Retail sale in non-specialised stores 54 0 
477 Retail sale of other goods in specialised stores  20 1 
493 Other passenger land transport  3 1 
502 Sea and coastal freight water transport  110 0 
511 Passenger air transport  55 10 
551 Hotels and similar accommodation  6 1 
612 Wireless telecommunications activities 47 11 
641 Monetary intermediation 44 0 
651 Insurance  35 3 
692 Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy  4 4 
731 Advertising  11 0 
742 Photographic activities 22 0 
782 Temporary employment agency activities 4 0 
  Total 1901 150 




3. By type of ownership 
The preliminary data set involves considerably more owned cartel firms than publicly quoted firms 
(66% versus 34%). 
 
Nevertheless, the study sample has slightly more public than private cartel firms (58% versus 42%). 
The Table below illustrates the type of ownership in the sample used in this study alongside their 
country of origins. As mentioned earlier, the higher distribution of the firms amongst the sample is 
from the UK; thus the most number of both public and private firms is from the UK - by 44 private 
vs. 70 public firms, followed by Germany (5 privately-owned firms), and France (5 publicly-quoted 
firms). The table below shows cartel firms’ ownership type across countries: 
 
Table 4.8: Cartel Firms’ Ownership Type across Countries 
Countries Private Public 
Australia 1 0 
Canada 0 2 
France 3 5 
Germany 5 0 
Ireland 2 0 
Italy 1 0 
Japan 0 3 
Netherlands 0 2 
New Zealand  1 0 
Singapore 1 1 
Spain 0 1 
UK 44 70 
US 4 4 
Total 62 88 









4.3 Benchmark (Non-Cartel Firms)  
This study utilises a matched sample approach to create a comparison group. This non-probability 
approach limits variations that might cause bias to the study (Macnee and McCabe, 2008). The use of 
matched sampling implies that the samples are in some way related (or correlated). A significant 
relationship exists between the matching variable and the dependent variable (Leong and Austin, 
2006). The purpose of a matched sample design is therefore to ascertain that some characteristics are 
identical (Wood and Ross-Kerr, 2011).  
 
To create a comparison group, matching firms are selected which have not been discovered/detected 
as operating cartel and referred to here as "non-cartel firms", this means the firm has not formed any 
cartel, nor had been discovered for any cartel activity. However, it must be noted that some non-
cartel firms might also be in cartel but have not been discovered/detected, which cannot qualify them 
to be called "cartel firms" in this study. 
 
Cartel firms are matched to non-cartel firms via a specific matching process. This process includes 
matching a cartel firm with a non-cartel firm’s benchmark within the same industry, based on a 
three-digit SIC code, and takes into account the timing of the starting year of the cartel cases to 
ensure that the data for each pair came from the same period. This is an example of twinning or 
ensuring the identical characteristics of the samples being matched (Leong and Austin, 2006; Wood 
and Ross-Kerr, 2011). Firm size based on net sales is also taken into consideration along with their 
position in the stock exchange. The firms with similar size and position in the stock exchange are 
matched together.  It is proposed that matching via this comprehensive set of criteria would improve 
the quality of matched pairs and hence the quality and precision of test results.  
 
For the purposes of this matching process, the industry selection is based on a three-digit Standard 
Industry Code (SIC) assigned to each firm based on the industry they operate in. This code could be 
sourced from FAME database, DataStream, and firms’ databases depending on the availability of 
data for each firm. The matching process has utilised these databases to search for appropriate 
matches based on the criterion data (i.e. SIC code, time and size) of each cartel firm. This variable is 
also used as a control variable in the regression model to control for firm’s the industry.   
 
 Moreover, one year prior to the year when the cartel case started to be used for matching purposes 
ensures the financial data and governance data for both the cartel firms and benchmark groups from 
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the same time period. This additionally enables the actual performance of cartel firms - prior to cartel 
formation - to be used to match the pairs. Exact matches of the time criterion are sought, while 
acceptable limits established within which the SIC coding and size criterions are permitted to deviate. 
These limits are set to emulate earlier studies, such as that of Beasley (1996), which permitted 
industry matches to two digits SIC code and a ±25 % margin of fraud firms for matching by size.  
 
The size criterion is determined by the net sales specified in the annual financial report issued on the 
fiscal year preceding the cartel incident. Matching the pair on a size criterion is deemed important to 
ensure that both cartel firms and non-cartel firms share relatively similar availability of resources and 
are therefore capable of implementing comparable corporate governance structures. Therefore, non-
cartel firms are considered similar in size to cartel firms if the net sales are within ±25% of the cartel 
firms’ sales for the year before the cartel cases started. Possible matches for cartel firms are identified 
through customised search. Excel spreadsheets are used to collate the data furnished from each 
search, which are then sorted and assessed to identify the closest possible matches. This variable is 
also used as a control variable in the regression model to control for firm profitability.   
 
However, the classification of non-cartel firms will result in some misclassifications if a firm 
classified as non-cartel had an incidence of collusion or financial fraud. To reduce this possibility, the 
annual reports for the selected firms are reviewed, as well as data from Department of Justice, 
European Commission and Competition Commission (three years pre-cartel detection); to verify that 
there are no documented reports of cartel for any non-cartel firms. The financial statements filed with 
the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are also reviewed to identify whether the firms 
committed any financial fraud during the same window period for each cartel case. In the case that 
fraud was committed; the matched firm is excluded from the sample. From this step most excluded 
firms were identified in the 1901 initial cartel firms sample; in other words, they have been in a cartel 
before. 
 
Finally, after firms had been identified and checked; each cartel firm is matched with one or more 
non-cartel firms depending on the availability of data. There are three scenarios:  
 
 One cartel firm is matched with one non-cartel firm. This is the case if only one firm 
matched the requirements. In this case, there are 130 non-cartel firms. For example, the cartel 
firm Alliance Boots LTD is matched with non-cartel firm AAH Pharmaceuticals LTD.  
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 One cartel firm is matched with more than one (two or more) non-cartel firms. This is 
the case if the cartel firm has more than one match: In this case, all possible matches are 
included. There are a total of 30 non-cartel firms in this category. For example, the cartel firm 
Prosper de Mulder LTD is matched with non-cartel firms Butcher’s Pet Care Limited and 
Crown Pets’ Foods LTD.  
 More than one cartel firms are matched with the same non-cartel firm. In this case, there 
are 18 non-cartel firms that are matched with 50 cartel firms. For example, Morrison Foods 
and Waitrose are matched with non-cartel firm Marks and Spencer.  
 
The total benchmark after the matching process completed is 178 non-cartel firms, taking into 
account all possible matches for each cartel firm
 
(The table for matching cartel firms with non-cartel 
firms can be found in Appendix A3).  
 
4.4 Benchmark Descriptive Analysis 
As discussed earlier, the total number of non-cartel firms identified is 178. The sample contains data 
collected for firms located across multiple countries. The descriptive analysis for non-cartel firms is 
categorised as follows: 
 
 4.4.1 Country of Origin 
Table 4.9 below represents the number of non-cartel firms according to their country of origin. The 














Table 4.9: Number of Non- Cartel Firms According to Their Country of Origin 
Country Cartel firms Non- cartel firms 
Australia 1 4 
Canada 2 0 
China  0 4 
France 8 3 
Germany 5 0 
Ireland 2 13 
Italy 1 5 
Japan 1 1 
Netherlands 2 2 
New Zealand  1 0 
Singapore 3 0 
Spain 1 0 
UK 114 138 
US 9 8 
Total 150 178 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
4.4.2 Industry 
The table below shows the matched industries of non-cartel firms with cartel firms. The industries 
of non-cartel firms are classified using the same three-digit SIC industry code for each cartel firm 
for 24 industries. The table below shows the major industries of cartel firms and non-cartel firms. 
Those firms with the most number are from the chemical industry (36 firms), followed by those that 

























133 Finishing of textiles 12 13 
182  Reproduction of recorded media  4 4 
192  Manufacture of refined petroleum products 7 4 
201 
Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics 
and synthetic rubber in primary forms  36 24 
211  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 6 6 
236 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster  5 5 
241 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of Ferro-alloys 4 4 
244 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals  6 6 
279 Manufacture of other electrical equipment  2 1 
324 Manufacture of games and toys 3 3 
325 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies  4 2 
352 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains  13 13 
432 Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation activities  3 3 
451 Sale of motor vehicles 15 14 
463 Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco  16 13 
464 Wholesale of household goods  4 4 
477 Retail sale of other goods in specialised stores  1 1 
493 Other passenger land transport  5 1 
511 Passenger air transport  13 10 
551 Hotels and similar accommodation  1 1 
612 Wireless telecommunications activities 11 11 
651 Insurance  3 3 
692 Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy  4 4 
  Total 178 150 
Source: Firms House 
 
4.4.3 Ownership Type 
There are more private firms than public firms in the sample (66% private vs. 34% public non-cartel 
firms). Table 4.11 below shows the type of ownership across cartel firms and non-cartel firms 
alongside their country of origin. The highest distributed firms (both public and private) in the 
sample are from the UK (103 private firms vs. 35 public firms) followed by Ireland (11 privately-











Table 4.11: Non-Cartel Firm Ownership Type against Their Countries of Origin 
  Non-cartel firms Cartel firms 
Countries Private Public Private Public 
Australia 3 1 1 0 
Canada 0 0 0 2 
China 0 3 0 0 
France 0 2 3 5 
Germany 0 0 5 0 
Ireland 11 5 2 0 
Italy 0 7 1 0 
Japan 0 1 0 3 
Netherlands 1 1 0 2 
New Zealand  0 0 1 0 
Singapore 0 0 1 1 
Spain 0 0 0 1 
UK 103 35 44 70 
US 3 2 4 4 
Total 121 57 62 88 



















4.5 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provides a description of data sources and data collection method for this study. The 
data sources involve a set of firms that have been detected for cartel activities, including those found 
to have participated in cartels and sentenced by the U.S. Department of Justice, the EC, and CC/OFT. 
Certain difficulties pertaining to lack of availability of data due to lack of transparency of cases were 
encountered for data collection. A screening process was conducted, which eventually led to the 
acquisition of a full list of 150 cartel firms, which are divided into single abusers and multiple 
abusers (Recidivism). When counting the multiple cartel firms, this number became 121 only. The 
total number of non-cartel firms, on the other hand, is 178.  
The UK cartel firms are the focus of this study since these firms have the most significant number of 
cartel firms amongst the included countries of origin.  
Cartel cases are described according to the country of origin, industry, and cartel duration. Cartel 
firms, on the other hand, are described according to the country of origin, industry, and type of 
ownership. A matched sample (non-probability) approach is utilised to create a comparison group, 
aiming to limit variations that might potentially cause bias and determine that some characteristics 
are identical. A three-digit Standard Industry Code (SIC) is used for the industry selection for the 
matching process. The size criterion is utilised to ensure that both cartel firms and non-cartel firms 
are similarly related in terms of availability of resources and are thus capable of enforcing 
comparable corporate governance structures. Financial statements filed with the U.S. SEC are 
reviewed to ascertain any financial fraud committed by the firms during the same window period for 
each cartel case. This chapter describes specific scenarios in its pursuit to match each cartel firm with 
one or more non-cartel firms based on data availability.  
The next chapter ushers the reader to the methodology and empirical results, which is a continuance 
from this chapter, whereby outlined propositions are described, alongside measurement of the 










Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
This chapter aims to provide an empirical answer to the primary research question:  
 
Is there any relationship between corporate governance attributes and the incidence of cartel 
formation? 
The chapter presents and discusses the results from the research using the assembled data. It opens 
with the methodology for selecting and measuring the independent variables, which are described in 
more detail. These independent variables are constructed from board characteristics, ownership 
structure and CEO characteristics (outlined in Chapter three) most likely relevant to cartel formation 
and discovery. Six board, two ownership and eight CEO variables are described. Since collusion 
depends on three environmental factors, the market environment, legal and regulatory environment, 
and then the internal control environment, these must also be modelled (Bolotova et al., 2005).  
 
In this study, the internal control environment is focussed on board characteristics and not board 
decisions or activities. The model is a static model of board and CEO characteristics. Therefore, 
market and legal indices are used as control factors shared between cartel and non-cartel firms. Since 
the firms in the cartel and non-cartel sets have been matched, then cross-comparison between them 
controlling for other environmental factors shall concentrate the focus of the analysis on board and 
CEO characteristics. 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are followed by the presentation of the results of the 
tested models and the inferences drawn from tests of the propositions. Findings are compared with 








5.1 Outline of Propositions 
 5.1.1 Measurement of the Dependent Variable 
Using data records from the period 1990 to 2008 of cartel activity and sanctions on firms from 
European Commission (EC), the UK Competition Commission (CC) / Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
and U.S Department of Justice (DoJ) two variables were created to measure cartel formation and 
discovery: 
1. The discrete variable Convictions (CONV) are created to imply the formation and discovery 
of cartel. Hence, the dependent variable separates those firms that formed cartels that were 
detected from all other firms some of which were not in cartels and other which were in cartel 
but were not discovered.  The dependent variable Conviction (CONV) counts the number 
of episodes of sanctions in connection with proven cartel activity. CONV takes a value of 1 if 
the firm has been sanctioned in connection with cartel formation and discovery on a single 
occasion, 2 if the firm was involved in cartel activity on two occasions (multiple abusers), etc. 
The value of 0 is assigned to CONV for the benchmark comparison with firms without any 
involvement in cartel activity, referred to here as "non-cartel firms", which means that the 
firm has not formed any cartel, nor had been discovered for any cartel activity. However, it 
must be noted that some non-cartel firms might also be in cartel but have not been discovered, 
which cannot qualify them to be called "cartel firms" in this study.  
 
The definition of CONV in the ordinal logistic model is that of an event with a certain 
probability, and this will be described in more detail further on in this chapter. 
 
2. The dependent variable Cartel is a dummy variable of whether a firm participates in cartel 
agreement or not, which took a value of 1 if the firm participated and discovered in cartel 
agreement and 0 otherwise.  
 
 5.1.2 Measurement of the Independent Variables 
The governance data and the financial data originated from proxy statements with filing dates three 
years prior to the start of the cartel agreements. The sources used to collect the data also include 
Fame, DataStream, UK Firms House, Annual Reports by respective firms, BoardsEx, and 
ExecuComp. In order to test whether certain characteristics of the boards and CEOs are associated 
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with cartel formation, the following variables are constructed to test the propositions made in chapter 
three: 
 
 Board Characteristics 
1. Sizeba, the size of the board pre-cartel formation. This variable is calculated as the average 
total number of executive and non-executive directors for three years before the cartel started 
for cartel firms. In the case of non-cartel firms, the average size is taken over the three-year 
period corresponding in time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm 
is matched.  
 
2. NED (%), the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. This 
variable is computed for cartel firms as the percentage of the total number of board members 
who are considered to be an independent director for the three-year period before the cartel 
started. In the case of non-cartel firms, the average is taken over the three-year period 
corresponding in time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is 
matched.  
 
3. Ageba, the age of the board pre- cartel formation. This variable is calculated as the average 
age of the board for three years before the cartel started for cartel firms. In the case of non-
cartel firms, the average age is taken over the three-year period corresponding in time to the 
window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched.  
 
4. GENBA (%), the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. This variable is 
computed for cartel firms as the ratio of the number of female directors on the board to the 
total number of male directors for the three-year period before the cartel started. In the case 
of non-cartel firms, the average gender is taken over the three-year period corresponding in 
time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched.   
 
5. Durba, the duration of the board pre-cartel formation. This variable is computed for cartel 
firms as the average duration of the board for three years before the cartel started. In the case 
of non-cartel firms, the average duration is taken over the three-year period corresponding in 




6. Remun, the board remuneration pre- cartel formation. This variable is computed for cartel 
firms as the average board compensation for the three-year period before the cartel started. In 
the case of non-cartel firms, the average is taken over the three-year period corresponding in 
time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched.  
 
 Ownership Structure  
 
1. OUTOWN (%), the common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel 
formation. This variable is calculated for cartel firms as the percentage of the common stock 
owned by outside directors for the three years before the cartel started. In the case of non-
cartel firms, the average is taken over the three-year period corresponding in time to the 
window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched.  
 
2. FAMCON, following Lin and Liu (2009) FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if 
the firm is family-owned and controlled, 0 otherwise. 
 
 CEO characteristics  
1. CEOAGE, CEO age. This variable is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of 
the cartel formation. In the case of non-cartel firms, the CEO age is taken over the period 
corresponding in time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is 
matched.  
 
2. CEOTEN, CEO tenure. This variable is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of 
directors up to the year when the cartel started. In the case of non-cartel firms, the CEO 
tenure is taken over the three-year period corresponding in time to the window on the cartel 
firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched.  
 
3. CEOGEN, CEO gender. This variable is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-
cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO was female and 0 if otherwise. In the case of non-cartel 
firms, the CEO gender dummy is taken over the three-year period corresponding in time to 




4. BOSS, power concentration.  This variable is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a 
value of 1 if the chair of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if 
otherwise. In the case of non-cartel firms we take the BOSS dummy is taken over the three 
year period corresponding in time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel 
firm is matched.   
 
5. Multidir, multiple-directorships. This variable is calculated as the total number of 
directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. In the case of non-cartel firms, the total 
number of multiple directorships is taken over the three-year period corresponding in time to 
the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched.  
 
 CEO Compensation 
1. Bonus. This variable is calculated as the average three-year CEO bonus. In the case of non-
cartel firms, we take the average CEO bonus over the same time window which corresponds 
in time with the window of the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched. 
 
2. Shares. This variable is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. In the 
case of non-cartel firms, we take the average CEO shares over the three-year period 
corresponding in time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is 
matched.  
 
3. Tcomp. Is the total compensation. This variable is calculated as the total average three years 
CEO compensation in the firm. In the case of non-cartel firms, the average CEO total 
compensation is taken over the three-year period corresponding in time to the window on the 
cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched. 
 
 5.1.3 Measurement of Control Variables 
In the empirical analysis of price fluctuations, Connor et al., (2008) suggest that the success of 
collusion depends on three key factors: market environment, legal environment, and internal 
enforcement. Since this study examines the governance structure of firms involved in cartel, this 
study will examine independent governance variables (CEO and board characteristics) in respect to 
cartel formation and discovery (CONV scores), and therefore, following Connor et al. (2008) will 
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establish some measures for control factors that describe the market and legal environments of cartel 
and non-cartel firms, as well as the firm control variables. 
 
 The Market Environment 
HHI, i.e., the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, commonly accepted measure of the market 
concentration is used in this study. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm 
competing in the market and then summing up the resulting numbers.  
 
 
Where si is the market share of the firm; i is the market, and N is the number of firms. In a market 
with two firms each with 50 percent market share, the HHI equals 0.50^2 + 0.50^2 = 1/2. Markets 
in which the HHI is between 0.15 and 0.25 point are considered moderately concentrated by the U.S 
DoJ, whilst those in which the HHI is in excess of 0.25 are considered to be concentrated. 
Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 0.1 in already concentrated markets will 
automatically attract antitrust concerns under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued by the U.S 
DoJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (See Merger Guidelines (1.5)). In the case of non-
cartel firms, we take the HHI over the same time window, which corresponds in time with the 
window of the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched.  
 
 The Legal Environment 
This variable describes the jurisdictional zone where the conviction case was set. The variable is 
broken out into an array of four jurisdictions, covering the U.S Department of Justice (DoJ), the 
Competition Commission/ Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the European Commission (EC), and all 
other territories. A value of 1 is assigned when the firm is found to have committed a cartel criminal 
infringement in the jurisdiction, and 0 if otherwise. However, as these variables are highly 
correlated with one another only the DoJ variable is used in the regression since it is the oldest 
jurisdiction between all and it is not highly correlated with the other variables. 
 
 Firm Control Variables 
1. Saleb, i.e., the average sales pre-cartel formation; this variable is calculated for cartel firms as 
the average size of the board for three years before the cartel agreement started. In the case of 
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non-cartel firms, we take the average sales over the three -year period corresponding in time 
to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is matched. It must be noted 
that the firms, having the most number of firms amongst the sample firms, are highlighted in 
the sample.  
 
2. CurrRatioB, i.e., the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. This variable is calculated 
as the average of current asset divided by current liabilities for three years before the cartel 
started. In the case of non-cartel firms, the average current ratio is taken over the three-year 
period corresponding in time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm 
is matched.  
 
3. PPER, i.e., the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. Bell, Szykowny, and 
Willingham (1993) noted that poor financial performance increases the likelihood of general 
financial fraud. Therefore, the variable PPER (poor performance) is included as a metric to 
control for differences in financial performance between cartel and non-cartel firms. The 
metric is measured in a manner similar to that of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994), and Beasley (1996). However, the studies above 
have used a poor performance measure as a dummy variable, whereas here, the actual value 
of ‘poor performance’ is used to indicate the firms’ actual financial performance. The 
variable is calculated for cartel firms as the average profit and loss for three years before the 
cartel started. In the case of non-cartel firms, the average is taken over the three-year period 
corresponding in time to the window on the cartel firm with which the non-cartel firm is 
matched.  
 
4. COSTA, i.e., the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. This 
variable takes the value of 1 if the firm is public and 0 if the firm is private.  
5. Industry, i.e. the industry in which each firm operates (three-digit SIC code); 
6. Year, i.e. the starting year of the cartel formation agreement. 







Table: 5.1 Variables and their Measurements 
Dependent variable Symbol Description of the Variables 




Ordered variable equal to the prior incidence of cartel formation and 
discovery. Thus, the value is 0 if the firm had never been convicted of a 
cartel crime, 1 if it was a first-time conviction, 2 if it represented the 
second conviction, and so on. 
Cartel formation Cartel 
Dummy variable which equal 1 if the firm participated and discovered in 
cartel agreement and 0 otherwise.  
Independent Variables   
Board Characteristics    
Size of the Board  
 SizeBA Average size of the board of directors for the period pre-cartel, for both 
cartel and non-cartel firms. 
Age of the Board  
 AgeBA Average age of the board of directors for the period pre-cartel, for both 
cartel and non-cartel firms. 
Gender of the Board  
 GENBA % The average gender ratio of the board of directors for the period pre-
cartel, for both cartel and non-cartel firms. 
Duration of the Board  
 DurBA Average duration (years) of board members’ tenure for the period pre-
cartel, for both cartel and non-cartel firms. 
Non-Executive Directors 
NED % Percentage of outsider (non executive) directors on the board for the 
period pre-cartel.  
Board compensation Remun Average of three years board compensation 
Ownership Structure    
Common stock own by 
outside directors 
OUTOWN % Proportion of common stock owned by outside directors. 
Family-owned and  
controlled  
FAMCON Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is family -owned and 
controlled, 0 otherwise. 
CEO Characteristics    
CEO Gender   CEOGen Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the CEO was female, 0 otherwise.  
CEO Age CEOAge  Age of the CEO at the starting year of the cartel. 
CEO Tenure  CEOTen  Years of tenure for the CEO on the board. 
Concentration Power 
BOSS Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the chair of the board also held the 
concentration power of CEO or president for the period pre-cartel. 
Multi-directorship  Multidir The total numbers of directorship the CEO serving on. 
CEO Compensation   
Bonus Bonus Average 3 year CEO bonus for the period pre-cartel 
Share Shares Average 3 year CEO share for the period pre-cartel 
Total Compensation  Tcomp Average 3 years total CEO compensation for the period pre-cartel 
Control Variables   
Sale Pre-cartel Saleb Average 3 years sales for the period pre-cartel. 
Current Ratio Pre-cartel  
Currratio Average 3 years current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) for the 
period pre-cartel. 
Herfindahl Index HHI The size and distribution of the firms in a market pre-cartel 
Poor Financial Performance  PPER Average of three annual net losses in period preceding the cartel.  
Firm ownership 
Costa Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm is a public firm and 0 if the 
firm is private. 
Members Joined  Join  Number of members appointed during the CEO regime. 
Department of Justice  
DoJ A dummy variable with value of 1 is assigned when the firm is found to 
have committed a cartel criminal infringement in the US, otherwise 0.  
CEO Case 
CEOCASE Dummy variable shows the total number of cartel cases the CEO was 
involved in before a-particular cartel case. 
CEO number CEONUM Total number of cartel cases the CEO is involved in.  
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5.2 Empirical Methodology  
Bolotova, Connor, and Miller (2005) conducted an empirical study that used extensions of traditional 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models and generalised ARCH (GARCH) 
models. ARCH models take a time series of events and assume that the variance in the current error 
term is a function of previous error terms and often the sum of squares of previous terms. The 
empirical method used consistently measures price variation changes (the second order derivative) 
from cartel activity. The model could be used by antitrust authorities for the purpose of screening any 
illegal firm conduct that is alleged by other parties, and to prove additional information to summarise 
the fact of injury in any legal proceedings over price-fixing.  
 
However, the model used here could complement other empirical (price or econometric) techniques, 
if it is established that board and CEO characteristics are significantly associated with cartel 
formation and discovery, once other environmental variables are controlled. The fact of the analysis 
being conducted before the formation, duration and discovery of a cartel could usefully use the same 
time period and empirical techniques to add further complexity and accuracy to establishing the 
likelihood of collusion. The possibility of adding scores in a logistic regression model is a great 
advantage of the model used in this study (see below). 
 
To test for characteristics of the cartel firms, the ordered logit estimation analysis is used to examine 
differences in board and CEO characteristics between cartel and non- cartel firms. The ordered logit 
model is an estimation model that is employed for dependent variables that are measured using the 
ordinal scale rather than a nominal scale.  
 
Ordered logistical regression is an extension of regression techniques that ordinarily use continuous 
variables. In logistical estimation, the response values can be discrete, and often are binary or called 
dichotomous variables (Stone and Rasp 1991). These types of analyses are suited to binary answers 
to questions; with 1 and 0 often substituting YES and NO categorical variables, or where the data 
should be normalised. If p is the probability of a 1, then the analysis relates p to the values of the 
explanatory variables; in this case board and CEO characteristics, which can be labelled x0, x1, x2. 
However, writing p = β x0 + β1 x1 + β2 x2 is not correct since the right hand side is not constrained to 
lie in the interval [0, 1], as it should if p is to represent some probability. The solution is to use the 





And this produces the equations: 
     (Equation 2) 
And  
 (Equation 3) 
 
For the respective odds p/ (1 − p) and probability p. The right-hand side of the equation for p will 
now always lie in the interval [0, 1]. The left hand side of equation 1 is referred to as the ‘logit’, and 
equation 1 is the main object of interest in logistic regression. 
 
Logistic regression is based on an ordinary regression relation, but not between continuous variables 
and explanatory variables. Instead, logistic regression relates the log of the odd p of the event 
occurring at a particular setting of the explanatory variables, and the values of the explanatory 
variables x1. . . xk . The quantity log (p/ (1 − p)) is also referred to as ‘log odds’. 
The procedure for estimating the coefficients β0, β1,..., βk using this relation and carrying out tests of 
significance on these values is known as logistic regression.  
 
The definition of CONV in the ordinal logistic model is that of an event with a certain probability. In 
ordinal logistic regression, the particular event of interest is observing a particular score or less, in an 
ordered set of responses. For the example of convictions, the model would exercise the following 
patterns: 
 
θ1 = prob (CONV = 1) / prob (CONV greater than 1) 
θ2 = prob (CONV of 1 or 2) / prob (CONV greater than 2) 
θ3 = prob (CONV of 1, 2, or 3) / prob (CONV greater than 3) 
 
The series of probabilities goes up until the last category (θj), which does not or cannot have an 
indeterminate odds associated, since at this point the probability of CONV reaching up to and 
including the last CONV score is a probability of 1. 
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All of the probabilities or log odds are of the form: 
θj = prob ( CONV ≤ j ) / prob (CONV > j)  
Or else, the equation can be re-written as  
θj =prob (CONV ≤j) / (1–prob (CONV ≤j)). 
 
Compare this to the left-hand side of equation 1. The probability of a firm with a CONV greater than 
j, is 1 – probability of a firm with CONV less than or equal to j.  
 
The odds that an event occurs (in our case it will be the number of convictions – cartel formation 
and discovery – denoted by CONV) is the ratio of the number of firms who are found participating 
in a cartel, and are convicted, on a precise number of occasions, compared to the number of firms 
who do participate in a lesser number of cartel and are convicted. Hence CONV=2 is the logit 
divides the probability p that cartel participation occurs by the probability that cartel participation 
occurs at a lesser frequency. As both probabilities possess the same denominator and this cancels, the 
logit produces the number of cartel firms (with a certain number of discovery specified by CONV), 
divided by the number of non-cartel or cartel firms of lesser convictions (those firms with less than 
that number of convictions). Therefore, each CONV is a monotonic (probability) function rising in 
the interval [0, 1]. 
 
The coefficients in the logistic regression model used in this study yield how much the logit will 
change given certain values of the predictor variables. Therefore, the coefficients in the logistic 
regression model yield how much the ratio of cartel participation to non-cartel participation change, 
dependent on the characteristics of the CEO and board. 
 
In ordinary logistic regression, the values of CONV would be dichotomous, or either 0 or 1. In 
ordered logistic regression, an order set of discrete variable can be assembled and the same 
regression procedure extended. 
 
The fitted model includes a logit function for the number of response categories minus one (the 
reference event is number of cartel formation and discovery). For example, if the response has 4 
levels, the model calculates 3 logit equations.  
 
The ordinal logistic model in the simplest case, of a single independent variable, is then:  
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Log (θj) = αj –βX 
 
Where j spans 1 to the number of categories, minus 1. 
 
It is crucial to note that there may be a negative sign in front of coefficients for the predictor variables 
(board and CEO characteristics) instead of the usual positive signs in ordinary regression analyses. 
That is correct because in this model (versus ordinary regression models where the coefficient is 
reciprocal to the score or influence of a characteristic, and the right hand side of the regression model 
is not constrained to [0,1]), larger coefficients then indicate an association with larger scores or large 
influence.  
 
This is easy to see since in the case that the numerator (probability p in the left hand side of equation 
1) is less of a value than the denominator (probability of not-p, or 1-p in the left hand side of equation 
1), the value of the log function will be negative since the log of a number less than 1 is always 
negative. The less likely p is compared to non-p or 1-p, the greater the negative value of the log and 
the more a larger negative co-efficient of a certain characteristic is required, or else many negative 
characteristics are required.  
 
A large positive coefficient for a dichotomous variable model (for instance if cartel formation and 
discovery (CONV), are either zero or one), would suggest that higher scores are more likely for the 
first category, i.e. the event that there are many more zero convictions, CONV=0, and thus a higher 
score for no conviction, meaning in our case that the non-cartel firms dominate the population of 
firms for that particular combination of CEO and board characteristics.  
 
A negative coefficient indicates that lower scores are more likely. For a continuous variable, a 
positive coefficient tells you that as the values of the variable increase, the likelihood of larger scores 
increases. An association with higher scores (such as CONV=4) means smaller cumulative 
probabilities for lower scores, since they are less likely to occur. 
 
Each logit has its own αj term, but possesses the same coefficient β. This means that the effect of the 
independent variable (CEO or board characteristic) is the same for different logit functions (which 
are calculating the relative probabilities of a certain number of convictions, and less than that number 
of convictions). Hence ordered logit regression models can be called the proportional odds model. 
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The αj terms are labelled threshold values and do not concern us here – they resemble the intercept of 
ordinary linear regression models – except that in ordered logistic regression, each logit has its own 
αj term. Therefore, αj is important for calculating the overall ordered regression solution, but each αj 
has no dependence on each of the independent variables, meaning board and CEO characteristics. 
The values of αj would be important for calculating predicted values, and if the model for instance 
was used in a machine learning environment, with the data such as here used as a training set, and 
then the model used on new data entirely (the test set) to predict the CONV rate that might be 
expected from amongst the mixed set of firms in the test set. The test set would thus be divided into 
cartel and non-cartel firms, and a value of CONV attached to each. 
 
Each equation will possess a unique constant and a unique parameter for each predictor, meaning for 
each of the board and CEO characteristics. While nominal logistic regression assumes that the effect 
of the predictor characteristic differs for each response value in CONV, in ordinal logistic regression 
the effect is assumed to be constant (to repeat, a constant coefficient β in each logit function). Each 
logit function evaluates how the covariates affect the likelihood of observing the reference level of 
the response, versus observing another level of the response. The slope for each covariate describes 
how the likelihood is affected. This means that all of the values of the coefficients of characteristics 
in Table 5.2 (below) are correct for all of the values of CONV. If a multinomial logit regression were 
used, there would be many more tables of coefficients, up to the value of j-1, in the description 
above. 
 
Three other attractive features of ordered logistic modelling are noticeable. First, there is how 
combining scores into a single category does not affect results in other groups not involved in the 
merge. The linear quality of the model is thus quite intuitive even to non-experts. This is very 
desirable for allowing a business people and other non-mathematicians to appreciate the results.  
At the same time, and secondly, the ordinary logistic regression model does not assume any 
particular probability distribution around the distribution of the independent variables. This also is 
crucial for describing the ‘real’ distribution of characteristics in a human population i.e. board 
members and CEOs, whose age, gender, and other features is not easy to ascribe an analytic 
probability distribution. For instance, most board members are male and between the ages of 40-70, 
with highly skewed populations of men and older men. The probability distribution does not have to 
be normal, linear or of equal variance amongst the sets of independent variables. All of this 
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permissible variation makes the model capable of being applied to the particular population and other 
characteristics of corporate firms. 
 
Third, a Maddala (1991) show that the logit model analysis is the appropriate procedure where 
disproportionate sampling from two populations (i.e., the cartel and non-cartel firm populations) 
occurs. Maddala notes that, the “coefficients of the explanatory variables are not affected by the 
unequal sampling rates from the two groups. It is only the constant term that is affected.” Therefore 
only the values of αj are affected. Two comments can be made here. In the sample in this study, 
because of the very careful matching process done between cartel and non-cartel firms, and the 
selection of roughly equal numbers of cartel versus non-cartel firms, the distribution of convictions 
(cartel formation and discovery) and non-convictions in terms of sample records would already be 
approximately 1 (given a dichotomous CONV = 0 or 1). However, the allowable range of CONV is 
much higher in the ordered logistic regression, and so this still does not affect the model.  
 
Moreover, if the sample of firms had been highly biased towards non-cartel firms (as in real life, 
when cartel firms are in a minority), and then this is of little consequence. It might appear that a 
sample of 1500 non-cartel firms versus 150 cartel firms would bias the model towards non-cartel 
firms, or negative values in the logit function, since the population of the event in the denominator is 
much larger than the population in the numerator. The latter possibility seems easy to appreciate, 
since in the case that the numerator (probability p in the left hand side of equation 1) is less of a value 
than the denominator (probability of non-p, or 1-p in the left hand side of equation 1), the value of the 
log function will be negative since the log of a number less than 1 is always negative. The less likely 
p is compared to non-p or 1-p, the greater the negative value of the log and the more a larger negative 
co-efficient of a certain characteristic is required, or else many negative characteristics are required. 
However, logit function works by probabilities and is not dependent on the sample size of either p or 
non-p, meaning cartel or non-cartel firms. 
 
This is another benefit of the model, its extensibility to unequal populations of cartel and non-cartel 
firms. Therefore, the logistic regression model described here, if used elsewhere on a ‘real’ 
population, is still valid and should have predictive power. The single matter then in empirical terms 
would be to adjust the values of αj, as Maddala (1991) makes note. Correcting for any bias appearing 
in the constant term αj, is only important if the logit analysis is being used to obtain parameter 
estimates for purposes of developing a predictive model (Palepu 1986). It is not the purpose of this 
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research to develop a predictive model of cartel formation related to CEO and board characteristics. 
The model could be only be used accurately to predict cartel and non-cartel firms amongst a 
population that was already known to contain, like this sample, an overall roughly equal sampling of 
cartel and non-cartel firms. Therefore, the model has limited predictive capacity in a real world 
scenario where the population of non-cartel firms is likely to be much higher, and then values of αj 
will be much different from the matched data used here. The values of αj are not necessary for this 
study, and so are not discussed. 
 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
This section is divided in to three parts; the first part analyses the descriptive statistics for the entire 
150 cartel firms and 178 non-cartel firms which are represented in table (5.2). The second part 
analyses the descriptive statistics for only the 114 UK- based cartel firms and 138 UK non-cartel 
firms which are represented in table (5.3). The last part in this section will analyses the descriptive 
statistics for the 56 UK cartel firms at home and 58 UK cartel firms abroad which are represented in 
table (5.4). 
 
 5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis for all Cartel and Non-Cartel Firms 
It is essential to perform the univariate tests since many of the variables of interest were not normally 
distributed. Table 5.2 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of cartel and non-cartel firms in 
respect of the board characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics and CEO compensation 
package. The table shows the number of observations (Obs), the means, the standard deviation 
(STDV), and finally the p-value from paired t-tests between the means. All univariate test results are 
reported as two-tailed. The results presented in Table 5.2 below are ordered by the three categories of 
corporate governance used in this study and reported as significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% p-levels 











Table 5.2: Statistical Description of Board and CEO Characteristics: Cartel Firms vs. Non-Cartel 
Firms, 1990-2008 
The table reports a descriptive statistics of 150 cartel firms and 178 non-cartel firms. For every cartel firm, a control 
group of non-cartel firms was created, which share the first three digits of the SIC code and similar firm size based on net 
sale within ±25% of the cartel firm’s sales at the end of the year before the collusive agreement started. Firm-years, in 
which cartel firms, i.e., firms that at one point in time during our sample period are part of a cartel agreement, are not 
participating in a cartel, are excluded from this analysis. Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel formation. NED% is the 
percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the board pre-cartel formation. 
GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the board pre-cartel 
formation. Remun is the average board remuneration pre-cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the common stock owned by 
outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is family owned 
and controlled. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of the cartel formation. CEOTEN is 
computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy 
variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO was female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a 
dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the board held concentration power of CEO or 
president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of directorship assigned to the CEO on other 
boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO bonus. Share is calculated as the average three-year CEO 
shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average three years CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. DoJ is a dummy variable with value of 1 is assigned when the firm is found to have 
committed a cartel criminal infringement in the jurisdiction. Saleb is the average sales pre-cartel formation. CurrRatioB is 
the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. 
COSTA is the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. UK is a dummy variable took value of 
1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. JOIN is the number of member joined the board during that period. The 
variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the 
cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested using a standard t-test and the equality of medians using a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Category 
Cartel-Firms Non-Cartel-Firms   
Obs Mean STDV Obs Mean STDV t-test (p-value) 
Independent Variable                
Boards Characteristics 
       Sizeba 150 7.02 4.49 178 4.9 3.96 0.39 
Durba 150 2.26 1.27 178 2.31 1.60 0.76 
Ageba 150 44.5 8.81 178 44.9 12.1 0.80 
GENBA (%) 150 0.05 0.14 178 0.11 0.20 0.00** 
Ned (%) 150 0.05 0.15 178 0.08 0.14 0.09** 
Remun 123 1.93 13.17 127 0.62 4.11 0.28 
Ownership Structure 
       Outown (%) 150 0.74 0.40 178 0.67 0.44 0.13
FAMCON 149 0.01 0.11 178 0.07 0.26 0.01** 
CEO Characteristics  
       CEO tenure 150 9.18 4.47 178 10.9 4.90 0.00**
CEO age 150 50.9 8.9 178 44.3 9.90 0.00** 
CEO gender 150 0.01 0.08 178 0.19 0.39 0.00** 
BOSS 150 0.47 0.50 178 0.20 0.40 0.00** 
Multidirectorship 150 1.80 2.50 178 2.80 2.91 0.00** 
CEO Compensation  
       Bonus 46  22.0 44.62  46 6.10 10.3 0.02**
Share 46  9.39 19.05  46 0.40 1.21 0.00** 
Tcomp 46 82.93 224.4 46 15.75 21.2 0.04** 
Control Variables               
COSTA 150 0.59 0.49 178 0.32 0.46 0.00** 
Saleba 148 0.48 4.79 173 0.14 0.44 0.35 
PPER 139 -0.38 2.10 156 0.81 2.98 0.00** 
CURRRATIOB  144 1.45 1.01 170 1.50 1.20 0.66 
HHI 150 0.24 0.21 178 0.16 0.15 0.00** 
UK 150 0.76 0.42 178 0.77 0.41 0.74 
Join 150 5.48 5.92 177 5.80 5.40 0.58 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Mean and pairwise comparisons (cartel vs. non-cartel firms) for various characteristics of the board 
of directors and CEOs are in the table above. The matched pairs of the pairwise comparison varied 
from 46 to 178 depending on the availability of data.  
 
The table 5.2 provides a statistical description of board and CEO characteristics: cartel firms vs. non-
cartel firms, from the period 1990 to 2008. The average board size of cartel firms had 7 directors of 
whom 5% are non-executive directors and 5% were female directors. In comparison the average 
board size of non-cartel firms had 5 directors of whom 8% were non-executive and 11% female 
directors.   
 
In one hand, the pairwise differences in board characteristics show that difference in average board 
size (Sizeba), average board duration (Durba), average board age, and average board remuneration 
(Remun) are not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, the percentage of female 
directors on the board (GENBA %) is statistically significantly higher for non-cartel firms than 
cartel firms. Hence, this result supports the proposition P4; the number of women directors on the 
board is negatively related to cartel formation and discovery. This has been emphasised in the study 
of Cheung et al. (2006) and Swamy et al. (1999) on the propensity of female directors to be less 
corrupt than men, which therefore led to an expectation to see less female serving on the board of 
cartel firms compare to non-cartel firms. This result also consistent with the study of Ford and 
Richardson, 1994; Watson and McNaughton, 2007 and Smith  et al., 2006; Huse and Solberg, 2006 
who reports a positive effect of the role of women on boards and find that women improve the 
quality of decision making, and that women are generally more risk averse than men.  
 
On average, cartel firms have lower percentage of non-executive (NED%) than non-cartel firms and 
the result support proposition P2; the percentage of independent (non-executive) members on the 
board of director is lower for firms committed cartel crime than for non-cartel firms. This is 
consistent with the findings of Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Duchin et al., 2010, that a 
higher percentage of independent directors (non-executive) increase the board effectiveness as a 
monitor management. 
 
The pairwise differences in ownership structure shows that there are more family-owned and 
controlled firms between non-cartel firms than cartel firms (FAMCON). This result is contradictory 
to our proposition P8, that cartel likely to be formed by family-owned and controlled firms. 
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However, the result is consistent with Laiho (2011) who argued that a more effective monitoring 
takes place through a more concentrated ownership in the form of large shareholders. 
The pairwise differences in CEO characteristics shows that cartel firms had significantly lower CEO 
tenure (CEOten)which support proposition P10, that the number of years a CEO had served as a 
director for a UK cartel firm is less than that for non-cartel firms. This result consistent with Han, 
(2010) results which shows that firms are more likely to be involved in cartel agreement when CEO 
tenure (short-term employment contract) is low or when CEO turnover (compensation) is high. Also 
this results support the finding by Kaplan and Minton (2008) who have argued that it is possible for 
CEOs with shorter tenure to pursue manipulation in the form of earnings management with the 
situation that provides greater stock performance sensitivity and higher compensation. 
 
Moreover, the statistical comparison shows that CEO age (CEOage) for cartel firms is higher 
compared to non-cartel firms, and this finding supports our proposition P9: That the age of the CEO 
for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms (p=0.00 <0.05). This results consistent with Kensinger, 
(2012); Rezaee, (2007); Young and Buchholtz, (2002) and Hart, (1995) that experience is correlated 
with age and some firms tend to employ older CEOs for their experience, social network and 
knowledge in an industry. These qualities of older CEOs could facilitate the formation of cartel. In 
addition, CEO closer to retirement age might feel he has less to lose in reputation damage if caught 
committing cartel, and hence be more likely to perform cartel. 
 
The t-test validity depends on the distributions of the means in the cartel and non-cartel firms being 
approximately normal. The approximate normal distribution condition was generally true, as noted in 
the first set of descriptive statistics above, except for the characteristic CEO gender (CEOgen) 
amongst cartel firms, which had a skewness of 12.25 and kurtosis of 150. However, given the fact 
that only one of 150 cartel firms and 35 of 178 non-cartel firms had a female CEO, the test for the 
difference in means would still be expected to yield a significant, statistical difference. The female 
CEO on cartel firms’ boards is lower than for non-cartel firms; this also supports our proposition of 
P11: Less female CEOs represented in cartel firms compared to non-cartel firms (p=0.00 <0.05). 
This findings also support that of Bharat et al. (2009 cited in Berger et al., 2012), where the author 
posited that due to being more risk averse, female CEOs tend to make poorer investment decisions 
and financial risks than male CEOs; hence, are likely to be less represented in cartel firms than in 




In addition, lower number of multiple-directorships (MULTIDIR) appears in cartel boards compared 
to non-cartel boards. This result supports our proposition P12 that boards of directors of a firm 
committing cartel are less likely to have directors who work on other boards than boards of directors 
of non-cartel firms (p=0.01 <0.05), with similar result in 1% and 10%. This is consistent with the 
work of Fama and Jensen (1983) that good governance practices are found in those directors who 
carry out multiple directorships and are part of more than one board; hence, better governance is 
associated with having directors who serve in more than one board, and this is contrary to cartel 
firms. 
 
The statistics result also shows that there are more CEOs’ role as president (BOSS) in cartel firms’ 
boards than non-cartel firms, which supports our proposition P13 that firms committing cartel crimes 
are more likely to have CEOs serving as board chairs compared to non-cartel firms (p=0.00 <0.05). 
This is consistent with the findings made by Goyal and Park (2002) that CEO concentration power is 
not encouraged and is even prohibited due to the likelihood of insider activities, e.g. cartel formation.  
 
Table 5.2 present compensation incentive measures for the CEOs at each firm. Due to the availability 
of the data, the observation number shrunk to 92 firms (cartel and non-cartel). The results show that 
CEOs in cartel firms have higher average bonuses, higher percentage of shares and higher total 
compensation than non-cartel firms. In addition, the statistics also shows a significant p-value for the 
CEOs bonuses, share, and total compensations in cartel firms. This result supports our propositions 
P14 (The average CEO bonus for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms), P15 (The average 
CEO share for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms), and P16 (Total CEO Compensation for 
cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms). The results consistent with Spagnolo, (2000) that 
compensation packages enhance collusion. 
  
A number of control variables were subject to univariate t-tests to determine whether additional firm 
and market characteristics not related to variations in corporate governance attributes were present 
between the sample of matched cartel and non-cartel firms. In one hand, the two-tailed comparison 
tests for three of the control variables - SALE, CURRRATIOB, and JOIN did not identify any 




On the other hand, the firm ownership variable (COSTA) shows a significant difference between 
cartel firms and non-cartel firms at a 5% p-value. This result confirms that public firms are more 
likely to engage in cartel agreement than private firms. Additionally, the poor performance (PPER) 
variable and the Herfindahl index (HHI) variable both demonstrate a significant difference between 
cartel firms and non-cartel firms at 5% p-value. Interestingly, the average poor financial performance 
for cartel firms is (-38.4) and the average for the non-cartel firm is (81.1). 
 
Overall, the pairwise comparisons suggest that systematic differences between cartel firms and non-
cartel matching firms are apparent in certain characteristics of the boards of directors and CEO 
characteristics. However, these univariate comparisons should be viewed with caution when making 
inferences about the connection between governance attributes and cartel formation. The pairwise 
tests implicitly assume that other potentially relevant firm characteristics are fixed, which may not be 
the case. Therefore, the ordered logit model was used to test the propositions in multivariate 
framework. 
 
 5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of UK Cartel Firms and UK Non-Cartel firms 
As discussed earlier in Chapter Four, the sample used in this study involved 150 cartel firms and 178 
non-cartel firms from all around the world, of which 114 cartel firms and 138 non-cartel firms are 
from the UK. Therefore, since this study dominated by UK firms it is important to compare the 
behaviour of UK cartel firms and UK non-cartel firms. This comparison will provide a more broad 
inference on the characteristics of UK cartel and non-cartel firms within UK and outside.  
 
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of UK cartel firms and UK non-cartel firms 
in respect of the board characteristics, CEO characteristics and CEO compensation package. The 
table shows the number of observations (Obs), the means, the standard deviation (STDV), and finally 
the p-value from paired t-tests between the means. All univariate test results are reported as two-
tailed. The results presented in Table 5.3 below are ordered by the three categories of corporate 
governance used in this study and reported as significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% p-levels (denoted as 






Table 5.3 - Comparison between the Characteristics of UK Cartel Firms and UK Non-Cartel 
Firms 
The table reports descriptive statistics comparison between 114 UK cartel firms and 138 UK non-cartel firms. Sizeba is 
the size of the board pre- cartel formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel 
formation. Ageba is the age of the board before the cartel formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board 
pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the board remuneration pre- cartel 
formation. OUTOWN % is the common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a 
dichotomous variable, which equals 1 if the firm is family owned and controlled 0 otherwise. CEOAGE is computed as the 
age of the CEO at the starting year of the cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of 
directors up to the year when the cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms 
with value of 1 if CEO was female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 
1 if the chair of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the 
total number of directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO 
bonus. Share is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average three 
years CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. DoJ is a dummy variable with value of 1 is 
assigned when the firm is found to have committed a cartel criminal infringement in the jurisdiction. Saleb is the average 
sales pre-cartel formation. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor 
financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public 
firms. UK is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. JOIN is the number of member 
joined the board during that period. The variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements 
with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested using a standard t-test 
and the equality of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level.  
 
  UK Cartel Firms UK Non-Cartel Firms   
Category Obs Mean STDV Obs Mean STDV t-test (p-value) 
Independent Variable                
Boards Characteristics 
Sizeba 114 5.61 3.68 135 5.09 3.51 0.26 
Durba 114 2.09 1.07 134 2.44 1.51 0.04** 
Ageba 114 44.72 8.09 134 47.23 8.74 0.02** 
GENBA (%) 114 0.04 0.11 138 0.11 0.19 0.00** 
Ned (%) 114 0.05 0.16 138 0.98 0.15 0.05** 
Remun 92 0.31 1.55 92 0.12 0.17 0.25 
Ownership Structure 
 Outown (%) 114 0.76 0.40 138 0.67 0.44 0.08** 
FAMCON 113 0.00 0.09 138 0.94 0.29 0.00** 
CEO Characteristics  
CEO tenure 114 8.9 0.16 138 10.4 4.81 0.01** 
CEO age 114 51.2 8.19 138 44.26 9.56 0.00** 
CEO gender 114 0 0 138 0.16 0.37 0.00** 
BOSS 114 0.43 0.49 138 0.26 0.44 0.00** 
Multidirectorship 114 1.69 2.48 138 2.84 2.97 0.00** 
CEO Compensation                
Bonus 38 14.8 17.2 33 7.41 1.19 0.03** 
Share 38 7.64 14.8 33 6.42 13.9 0.00** 
Tcomp 38 64.03 52.2 33 28.4 36.3 0.00** 
Control Variables 
COSTA 114 0.61 0.48 138 0.25 0.43 0.00** 
Saleba 112 6.23 55.15 135 1.05 2.00 0.27 
PPER 104 -1.74 15.8 123 9.15 33.01 0.00** 
CURRRATIOB  110 1.41 1.07 132 1.5 1.24 0.61 
HHI                               114 0.25 0.21 138 0.17 0.16 0.00** 
 




Mean and pairwise comparisons (UK cartel vs. UK non-cartel firms) for various characteristics of the 
board of directors and CEOs are in the table above. The matched pairs of the pairwise comparison 
varied from 38 to 138 depending on the availability of data.  
 
In one hand, the pairwise differences in board characteristics show that difference in average board 
size, average board remuneration are not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, the 
average board duration (Durba) is statistically significantly longer for UK non-cartel firms than for 
UK cartel firms. This result suggest that the longer the duration of the board, the lower is the number 
of cartel formation, and thus the lower are the incentives to engage in cartel crime.  
 
Besides, the average board age (AGEBA) is statistically significantly lower for UK cartel firms than 
for UK non-cartel firms. This result suggests that the lower the average age of the board the more 
likely that the firm will form a cartel.  
 
Similar to the previous result gender diversity of the board (GENBA (%)), Family-owned and 
controlled firm (FAMCON) and non-executive directors (NED (%)) is statistically significantly 
higher for UK non-cartel firms than UK cartel firms. In addition, the percentage of common stock 
own by outside directors (Outown (%)) is statistically significantly higher for UK cartel firms than 
UK non-cartel firms.  
 
Moreover, CEO characteristics; CEO tenure (CEOten) and CEO age (CEOage) demonstrate a 
significant difference, whilst the mean and standard deviation of 0 for CEO gender (CEOgen) for 
UK cartel firms indicates that there are no CEO female on UK cartel firms’ boards. The pairwise 
difference shows that UK cartel firms had a significantly lower CEO tenure than non-cartel UK 
firms.  
 
The CEO compensation package results show that CEOs in UK cartel firms have higher average 
bonuses, higher percentage of shares and higher total compensation than UK non-cartel firms. In 
addition, the statistics also shows a significant p-value for the CEOs bonuses, share, and total 
compensations in UK cartel firms.  
 
The firm ownership (COSTA) variable shows a significant difference between UK cartel firms and 
UK non-cartel firms at a 5% p-value. This result confirms that UK public firms are more likely to 
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engage in cartel agreement than UK private firms. Additionally, the poor performance (PPER) 
variable and the Herfindahl index (HHI) variable both demonstrate a significant difference between 
UK cartel firms and UK non-cartel firms at 5% p-value. Interestingly, the average poor financial 
performance for UK cartel firms is (-1.74) and the average for the UK non-cartel firm is (9.15). 
 
Overall, the pairwise comparison between UK cartel firms and UK non-cartel firms shows very 
similar results to the comparison between cartel firms and non-cartel firms from the previous section. 
 
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics of UK Cartel Firms at Home and Abroad 
As discussed earlier, the sample involved 114 UK cartel firms, of which 56 UK cartel firms found 
operating cartel in the UK (Home/Domestic) and 58 UK cartel firms found operating cartel abroad. 
Therefore, since this study dominated by UK firms it is important to compare the behaviour of UK 
cartel firms at home and abroad. This comparison will provide a more broad inference on the 
characteristics of UK cartel firms within UK and outside.  
 
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of UK cartel firms at home and UK cartel 
firms abroad in respect of the board characteristics, CEO characteristics and CEO compensation 
package. The table shows the number of observations (Obs), the means, the standard deviation 
(STDV), and finally the p-value from paired t-tests between the means. All univariate test results are 
reported as two-tailed. The results presented in Table 5.4 below are ordered by the three categories of 
corporate governance used in this study and reported as significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% p-levels 













Table 5.4 - Comparison between the Characteristics of UK Cartel Firms at Home and Abroad 
The table reports descriptive statistics comparison between 56 UK cartel firms based at home and 58 UK cartel firms 
based abroad. The table reports descriptive statistics comparison between 56 UK cartel firms based at home and 58 UK 
cartel firms based abroad. Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors 
on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the board before the cartel formation. GENBA % is the average gender 
ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the board remuneration 
pre- cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON 
is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is family-owned and controlled 0 otherwise. CEOAGE is computed as the age of 
the CEO at the starting year of the cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to 
the year when the cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO 
was female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the board held 
concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of directorship assigned 
to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO bonus. Share is calculated as the average three-
year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average three years CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. DoJ is a dummy variable with value of 1 is assigned when the firm is found to have committed a 
cartel criminal infringement in the jurisdiction. Saleb is the average sales pre-cartel formation. CurrRatioB is the average of 
current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s 
ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. UK is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the 
UK, 0 otherwise. JOIN is the number of member joined the board during that period. The variables on board and CEO 
characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. 
The equality of means is tested using a standard t-test and the equality of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, 







Abroad   
Category Obs Mean STDV   Obs Mean STDV t-test (p-value) 
Independent Variable                
Boards Characteristics               
Sizeba 56 6.43 3.68   58 4.78 3.52 0.01** 
Durba 56 2.44 1.08   58 1.76 0.96 0.00** 
Ageba 56 43.8 7.09   58 45.5 8.92 0.24 
GENBA (%) 56 0.05 0.10   58 0.04 0.12 0.69 
NED (%) 56 0.29 0.10   58 0.08 0.19 0.05** 
Remun 45 0.13 0.24   47 0.47 2.15 0.29 
Ownership structure  
       
Outown (%) 56 0.81 0.37        58 0.72  0.42 0.32 
FAMCON 11 0.00 0.00 22   0.04 0.21 0.48 
CEO Characteristics                
CEOten 56 10.03 4.02   58 7.86 4.49 0.00** 
CEOage 56 49.6 7.11   58 52.8 8.91 0.03** 
CEOgen 56 0.00 0.00   58 0.00 0.00 0.00** 
BOSS 56 0.44 0.51   58 0.43 0.49 0.87 
Multidirectorship 56 1.94 2.96   58 1.44 1.90 0.29 
CEO Compensation                
Bonus 13 19.9 21.9   25 12.2 13.9 0.19 
Share 13 44.9 11.7   25 92.8 16.3 0.35 
Tcomp 13 0.72 0.64   25 0.59 0.45 0.48 
Control Variables             
COSTA 56 0.53 0.51   58 0.68 0.46 0.09** 
saleba 55 11.8 78.6   57 8.38 20.3 0.29 
PPER 50 -38.8 14.1   54 2.42 17.2 0.19 
CURRRATIOB  54 1.44 1.03   56 1.39 1.11 0.81 
HHI                                                                            58 0.28  0.22 56 0.23 0.19 0.17 




The table above shows the mean and pairwise comparisons between UK cartel firms at home vs. UK 
cartel firms abroad for various board and CEOs characteristics. The matched pairs of the pairwise 
comparison varied from 13 to 58 depending on the availability of data.  
 
In one hand, the pairwise differences in board characteristics shows that difference in average board 
age, gender diversity on the board, the percentage of outside directors’ stock ownership, and average 
board remuneration are not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, the average board size 
(Sizeba) is statistically significantly larger for UK cartel firms at home than for UK cartel firms 
abroad. In addition, UK cartel firms at home have longer board duration (Durba) than the UK cartel 
firms abroad. 
 
Furthermore, non-executive directors (NED (%)) have a significant difference between UK cartel 
firms at home and UK cartel firms abroad in terms of board characteristics. Hence, this suggests that 
those UK firms at home have higher percentage of non-executive director than UK firms abroad.  
 
Moreover, board age (AGEBA), gender of the board (GENBA (%)), outside director ownership 
(OUTOWN (%)) and family-owned and controlled (FAMCON) have no significant difference 
based on p-value of 0.05. These results indicate that these variables do not suggest corresponding 
impact with one another in terms of cartel formation and discovery.  
 
Additionally, CEO characteristics; CEO tenure (CEOten) and CEO age (CEOage) demonstrate a 
significant difference, whilst the mean and standard deviation of 0 for CEO gender (CEOgen) 
indicates that the two groups consider the same distribution or characteristics. Moreover, the CEO 
compensation package did not identify any statistically significant difference between the UK cartel 
firms at home and abroad.  
 
The firm ownership (COSTA) variable shows a significant difference between UK cartel firms at 
home and UK cartel firms abroad at a 5% p-value. This result indicates that more UK cartel firms 
abroad are public firms. For the other control variables, the difference is not significant.  
 
In summary the comparison between UK cartels firms at home and abroad doesn’t show a significant 
difference in between them. 
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5.4 Correlation Analysis  
As a number of explanatory variables are to be used in the regression equation, it becomes important 
to make sure unique coefficients can be obtained for every independent variable without a 
relationship (correlation) between them invalidating the results of the regression. “Multicollinearity 
exists when there is a strong correlation between two or more predictors in a regression model” 
(Field, 2005: 174). The correlation test performance determines if multicollinearity is likely to be a 
matter of concern and if so, verifies the steps that need to be taken to resolve problems before the 
regression analysis stage.  
 
Since the data set examined by this study does not conform to parametric assumptions, given that the 
data is not all normally distributed (although much of the data were approximately normally 
distributed), it is recommended to use Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation to determine if 
multicollinearity exists amongst variables. The Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient 
measures the strength of association between two ranked variables.  
 
Table 5.5 below illustrates the results of the Spearman’s correlation coefficient matrixes. Only few 
variables in the matrix exhibit evidence of multicollinearity. The most severe cases of correlation 
arose between Total compensation and Bonus, with a correlation of 0.92. Another significant and 
rather high correlation (80%) is between the CEO dummy variable, CEOCase which shows that if 
the CEO is involved in another cartel, this is highly correlated with the number of cartel cases 
attached to the CEO’s history (CEONUM), with a correlation of 0.84.  
 
Similarly, (CEONUM) and (CEOCase) are correlated with CEO tenure (CEOTEN), poor 
performance pre-cartel (PPER) and Total compensation. We believe that these correlations are 
harmless, especially between the CEOTEN, CEOCase and CEOnum. Anderson, Tatham and Black 
(1995) and Gujarati (2003) have suggested 0.80 as the threshold at which multicollinearity concern 









Table 5.5 – Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation Matrix  
The table presents the pairwise correlations between the variables used in the regression analysis. The sample period is from 
1990 to 2008. CONV is a dummy variable equal to the prior incidence of cartel formation and discovery. Thus, the value of 
0 is assigned for the benchmark comparison with firms without any involvement in cartel activity, referred to here as non-
cartel firms. It means that the firm has not formed any cartel, nor had been discovered for any cartel activity, 1 if it was a 
first-time conviction, 2 if it represented the second conviction, and so on. Cartel is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the firm participated and discovered in cartel agreement and 0 otherwise. Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel 
formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the board 
before the cartel formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the 
board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the board remuneration pre-cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the common stock owned by 
outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is family owned 
and controlled; 0 otherwise. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of the cartel formation. CEOTEN 
is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy 
variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO was female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy 
variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if 
otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as 
the average three-year CEO bonus. Share is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as 
the total average three years CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. DoJ is a dummy variable 
with value of 1 is assigned when the firm is found to have committed a cartel criminal infringement in the jurisdiction. Saleb is 
the average sales pre-cartel formation. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor 
financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. 
UK is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. JOIN is the number of member joined the 
board during that period. CEONUM is the total number of cartel cases the CEO is involved in. CEOCASE dummy variable 
shows the total number of cartel cases the CEO was involved in before a-particular cartel case. The variables on board and 
CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 5%. 
Varibles CONV Cartel Sizeba Durba Ageba Genba NED Remun CEOten CEOage CEOgen Multidir
CONV 1.00
Cartel 0.90* 1.00
Sizeba -0.02 -0.04 1.00
Durba -0.11 -0.05 0.55* 1.00
Ageba 0.17 0.28* 0.41* 0.34* 1.00
Genba 0.02 0.09 0.33* 0.13 0.10 1.00
NED -0.09 -0.04 0.00 -0.21 0.03 0.12 1.00
Remun -0.21 -0.21 0.09 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 0.13 1.00
CEOten -0.45* -0.38* 0.16 0.35* -0.16 0.22 0.02 0.21 1.00
CEOage 0.57* 0.61* 0.16 0.06 0.30* 0.02 0.08 0.09 -0.28* 1.00
CEOgen -0.23 -0.25* 0.22 0.16 0.24* 0.24* 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.28* 1.00
Multidir 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.09 -0.17 -0.17 0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.17 1.00
BOSS 0.15 0.15 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.17 -0.06 -0.24* -0.41* 0.25* -0.14 0.01
Bonus 0.50* 0.45* -0.32* -0.23 -0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.27* 0.19 -0.23 -0.06
Share 0.40* 0.38* -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 0.10 -0.21 -0.25* 0.32* -0.16 0.03
Tcomp 0.58* 0.56* -0.32* -0.18 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.23* -0.40* 0.24* -0.27* -0.04
Outown -0.12 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.14 -0.03 0.16 -0.09 -0.41* -0.06
FAMCON 0.20 0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.15 -0.03 -0.02
COSTA -0.08 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 -0.32* -0.02 0.21 0.25* 0.28* -0.04 -0.12 -0.03
PPER -0.49* -0.55* -0.06 0.12 -0.08 -0.12 -0.17 0.20 0.19 -0.30* 0.22 0.14
Saleb 0.19 0.18 -0.12 -0.07 0.06 0.08 0.37* 0.16 -0.13 0.21 -0.13 0.14
HHI 0.24* 0.20 -0.10 -0.14 -0.28* -0.17 -0.18 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.18 0.02
DoJ 0.24* 0.29* -0.04 -0.01 0.18 0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 0.16 -0.08 -0.13
UK 0.19 0.15 0.32* -0.13 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.34* -0.29* 0.13 0.12 0.13
Join -0.42* -0.48* 0.07 -0.05 -0.33* 0.08 0.07 0.54* 0.49* -0.35* -0.06 0.33*
CEOcase 0.73* 0.57* -0.18 -0.22 0.15 -0.18 -0.11 -0.18 -0.52* 0.32* -0.15 0.09
CEOnum 0.88* 0.83* -0.18 -0.19 0.20 -0.13 -0.11 -0.25* -0.58* 0.49* -0.22 0.03  
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Table 5.5- (Continued) 



















Shares 0.28* 0.25* 1.00
Tcomp 0.17 0.92* 0.39* 1.00
Outown 0.05 -0.08 0.26* -0.05 1.00
FAMCON -0.08 -0.19 -0.09 -0.12 -0.24* 1.00
COSTA -0.18 -0.14 0.20 -0.21 0.23 0.05 1.00
PPER -0.12 -0.43* -0.38* -0.41* -0.23 0.19 -0.16 1.00
Saleb -0.04 0.44* 0.12 0.40* 0.11 -0.16 0.29* -0.05 1.00
HHI 0.05 0.18 0.28* 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.18 -0.19 -0.15 1.00
DoJ 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.23 -0.12 0.33* -0.23* -0.10 -0.19 0.08 1.00
UK 0.08 -0.13 0.12 -0.15 -0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.15 0.04 0.30* -0.11 1.00
Join -0.34* -0.12 -0.42* -0.31* -0.05 -0.02 0.28* 0.20 0.07 -0.04 -0.21 0.08 1.00
CEOcase 0.14 0.55* 0.31* 0.57* -0.15 0.10 -0.18 -0.44* 0.07 0.20 0.12 0.12 -0.26* 1.00
CEOnum 0.23 0.49* 0.35* 0.58* -0.13 0.16 -0.15 -0.56* 0.08 0.25* 0.25* 0.17 -0.49* 0.84* 1.00
 Source: Author’s own calculation 







5.5 Test of Hypotheses (Multivariate Analyses) 
The propositions made earlier from a discussion of the literature predicted that prior to the 
formation of a cartel, various board and CEO characteristics (size, duration, age, gender, and 
non-executive, outside ownership, family-controlled, remuneration, CEO age, CEO gender, 
CEO tenure multiple directorships, and concentration power), as well as CEO compensation, 
may significantly differ between UK-based cartel firms and non-cartel firms.  
 
The regression analysis shows the likely incidence of cartel convictions (CONV), which in this 
report refers to cartel formation and discovery, as the dependent variable, and CEO and board 
characteristics serving as predictors. The dependent variable is ordinal in nature with multiple 
categories between 0 and 22. As noted, logistic regression is an iterative procedure that uses the 
maximum likelihood methodology to accumulate the likelihood of an event below an ordinal 
threshold. The first iteration (iteration 0) is the log likelihood of the “null” or “empty” model, or 
a model with no predictors. With the next iteration, predictor(s) are included until the log 
likelihood increases. The goal is to maximise the log likelihood.  
 
This research utilises ten models to test the research propositions. There are several reasons that 
support the division of the models. First, the correlation coefficient associated with the 
independent variables, which indicates that multicollinearity can be a problem if all variables are 
included in the same model. This multicollinearity problem is common in this type of research 
and several studies control it using the means. For instance, the studies that find a high 
correlation between the corporate governance variables are Ramsay et al. (2006), Benkel et al. 
(2006) and Klein (1998). As suggested by Baum (2006), one way to resolve this issue is to omit 
the collinear variables from the regression. Therefore, several models are formulated to ensure 
increased accuracy of the results and to avoid any multicollinearity. Second, by separating this 
study into several models, it is possible to investigate the effects of the board characteristics on 
cartel formation and discovery separately from the effects of ownership structure, CEO 
characteristics and CEO compensation package. Therefore, the empirical models with the main 
variables of this study’s tests are formed and explained in the next section. Finally, some 
variables such as the CEO gender (CEOgen) involved (32 female in 328 Obs). This variable 
suffers from Sparse-data propensity. This type of data can cause misleading and unreliable 
inferences about confounding, effect modification, dose response, and induction periods, and 
may also have an interaction along with some other biases. Therefore, great care must be 
exercised when adding them to the regression. 
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5.5.1 Model Descriptions  
Models 1–10 set out below are each developed to avoid multicollinearity (avoiding collinear 
overlaps between variables). They check the comparative influence of the independent variable 
versus cartel formation and discovery, given the control variables used for all the models.  
 
 Board Characteristics and Ownership structure 
This section provides evidence on whether there is any relationship between board 
characteristics and cartel formation and discovery.  
 
MODEL 1 
Model 1 tests the link between the board characteristics and cartel formation and discovery 
(CONV). The predictor variables are: board size (SIZEBA), board duration (DURBA), board 
age (AGEBA), gender diversity on the board (GENBA %), non-executive directors (NED %), 
Remuneration (Remun), and members joined (JOIN) were used as explanatory variables. In 
addition, firm ownership status (COSTA), poor financial performance pre-cartel sample (PPER), 
SALE, current ratio (CURRRATIOB), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Department of 
Justice (DoJ), country dummy (UK), and fixed effects (year and industry dummy) were used as 





















 Ownership Structure 
 
Model 2 tests the link between ownership structure and cartel formation (CONV). The predictor 
variables are: Average board size (SIZEBA), outside ownership (OUTOWN %), family-owned 
and controlled (FAMCON), non-executive directors (NED %) and CEO concentration power 
(BOSS). In addition, firm ownership status (COSTA), poor financial performance pre-cartel 
formation sample (PPER), SALE, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), country dummy (UK), 

















 CEO Characteristics 
This partition presents evidence on whether or not there is any relation between CEO attributes 
and cartel formation and discovery (CONV).  
 
MODEL 3 
CEO tenure (CEOTEN), CEO age (CEOAGE), multiple directorship (MULTIDIR) and 
concentration power BOSS were used as explanatory variables. Also firm ownership (COSTA), 
poor financial performance (PPER), sale, current ratio (CURRRATIOB), Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), Department of Justice (DoJ), and fixed effects (year and industry dummy) were 














All variables included in the second model are retained, except PPER (poor financial 















As the data has revealed that some of the CEOs were convicted more than once, it is relevant to 
control for the number of cartel cases the CEO was involved in before-the cartel sample. Model 
5, all variables included in the third model are retained and a new variable CEOCASE (Dummy 
variable shows the total number of cartel cases the CEO was involved in before a-particular 















In this model, we control for the total number of cartel cases the CEO was involved in. Model 6, 
all variables included in the previous model were retained, except CEOCASE (The number of 
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cartel cases the CEO was involved in before-a particular cartel case), which was replaced by a 













 Board and CEO Characteristics 
 
MODEL 7 
In Model 7, the CEO and board characteristics are the following (which are also used as 
explanatory variables): CEO tenure (CEOTEN), CEO age (CEOAGE), multiple directorship 
(MULTIDIR), concentration power (BOSS), board size (SIZEBA), board duration (DURBA), 
average age of the board (AGEBA), % gender on the board (GENBA %), outside ownership 
(OUTOWN %), (FAMCON) family-owned and controlled, non-executive directors ( NED%), 
members joined (JOIN). The control variables are Firm ownership (COSTA), Poor financial 
performance (PPER), sale, current ratio (CURRRATIOB), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 






























 CEO Compensation Package  
As results from previous models demonstrate a very significant link between CEO 
characteristics and cartel formation, we conduct a second test to provide more evidence for the 
validity of our interpretation on the observed relation between the CEO characteristics and the 
cartel formation and discovery. Specially, a regression between cartel formation (the dependent 







CEO tenure (CEOTEN), CEO age (CEOAGE), multiple-directorship (MULTIDIR), 
concentration power (BOSS), and BONUS are used as explanatory variables. Also firm 
ownership (COSTA), poor financial performance (PPER), sale, current ratio (CURRRATIOB), 
















All variables in Model 8 are retained except the variable SHARE, which is replaced by the 















In model 10, all variables are retained except for the variable SHARE, which is replaced by the 


























5.6 Empirical results  
The results are obtained by estimating the relationship between the number of cartel formation 
and discovery and corporate governance characteristics once a cartel crime has been committed. 
The pairwise comparisons in Table 5.2 have already shown systematic and statistically 
significant differences between UK-based cartel firms  and non-cartel firms (CEO age, CEO 
gender, multiple directorships, and the concentration power of the CEO). The ordered logit 
models also found strong associations between cartel formation and discovery (CONV) and 
board characteristics, as well as CEO characteristics, with the likelihood of cartel formation 
raised or decreased by certain predictors. 
 
5.6.1 Board Characteristics Estimation Results  
The main objective of this model is to determine whether or not board characteristics affect 























Table 5.6- Board Characteristics- Ordered Logit Estimation Results 
The table reports the results of ordered logit regressions of a dummy variable equal to the prior incidence of cartel 
formation and discovery (CONV). Thus, the value of 0 is assigned for the benchmark comparison with firms without 
any involvement in cartel activity, referred to here as non-cartel firms. It means that the firm has not formed any 
cartel, nor had been discovered for any cartel activity, 1 if it was a first-time conviction, 2 if it represented the 
second conviction, and so on, in this cartel formation and discovery as dependent variable on a number of financial 
and corporate governance variables for the sample of mainly UK-based cartel firms and matched non-cartel firms. 
For every cartel firm, a control group of non-cartel firms was created, which share the first three digits of the SIC 
code and similar firm size based on net sale within ±25% of the cartel firm’s sales at the end of the year before the 
collusive agreement started. Firm-years, in which cartel firms, i.e., firms that at one point in time during our sample 
period are part of a cartel agreement, are not participating in a cartel, are excluded from this analysis. Sizeba is the 
size of the board pre-cartel formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. 
Ageba is the age of the board before the cartel formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel 
formation. Durba is the duration of the board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the board remuneration pre- cartel formation. 
Saleb is the average sales pre-cartel formation. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is 
the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s ownership status to control for private 
firms and public firms. UK is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. JOIN is the 
number of member joined the board during that period. The variables on board characteristics were obtained from 
proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested 
using a standard t-test and the equality of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
Dependent variable: Conviction (Formation and discovery)  Model 1 
Independent Variables Expected Sign Coeff. Z 
Sizeba (+) 0.12 2.45** 
AGEBA (-) -0.01 -0.34 
GENBA (%) (-) -0.93 -0.71 
DURBA (-) -0.20 -1.17 
NED (%) (-) -3.44 -3.40** 





COSTA   1.08 3.44** 
PPER   -0.30 -2.50** 
Saleb   0.04 3.05** 
CurrRatioB   -0.14 -1.09 
HHI   1.57 2.02** 
DoJ   1.77 3.08** 
UK   -0.17 -0.53 
Industry effect   Yes 
Year effect   Yes 
Number of Obs 215 
Pseudo R2 0.18 
Source: Author’s own calculation
 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
Board Size   
The size of the board has been shown to have an impact on the quality of corporate governance. 
The concept that large boards can be dysfunctional is confirmed in two broad statistical studies 




Assessing cartel formation as evidence of a ‘dysfunctional’ board, the results are consistent with 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg (1998). The result shows that the propensity to get in cartel 
agreement is positively related to the size of the board, and this effect is examined by measuring 
board size as the total number of the firm’s directors (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Yermach, 1996; Abbot 
et al., 2004; Vafeas, 2000; and Coles et al., 2008).  
 
It is also costly to manage a large board of directors in an organisation (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993). Large boards also tend to have disagreements and difficulty in performing 
efficient roles. Gonzales and Schmid (2012) have documented that mature and large low-growth 
firms tend to participate in cartel. The coefficient for SizeBA was been found to be positive and 
statistically significant (β=0.12, z=2.45, p<0.05), with differences in the average size of the 
board (SizeBA) between UK –based cartel firms and non-cartel firms. Therefore, P1 is accepted, 
that the average size of boards is larger for cartel firms than amongst a matched sample of non-
cartel firms.  
 
Board Independency (Non-executive directors) 
Board independence is regarded as a very important element in an organisation due to the fact 
that outside directors are considered the control and monitor mechanism in the firm, who can 
also enhance firm performance (Duchin, et al., 2010; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weishbach, 1988). 
Being financially independent from the management, and from possibly conflicting situations, 
outside directors have the ability to minimise agency problems and control managerial self-
interests (Rhodes, et al., 2000). They are able to protect the shareholder interest, as well as 
supervise and manage performance in a much better way to align firm strategies for greater 
performance. A large board is likely to be made up of executive directors who are not 
independent (NED %). These directors are more concerned with maximising their personal 
wealth rather than working for the best interest of the firm. Consequently, they become more 
inclined to engaging in cartel activity that would facilitate growth in earnings and thus maximise 
their personal wealth. 
 
In addition, engaging in cartel activity can enable these NEDs to conceal some information from 
shareholders, thereby increasing the probability of increasing their personal gains. For example, 
cartel activity can enable directors to hide some related party transactions which may not be at 
arm’s length. Consistent with the proposition that the percentage of outside (non-executive) 
members on the board of directors is lower for cartel firms than for non-cartel firms P2, the 
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table shows that the coefficient for NED% is negative and statistically significant (β=-3.44, z=-
3.40, p<0.05). These results indicate that the boards of non-cartel firms have higher percentage 
of non-executive directors than do the boards of UK-based cartel firms. This finding is 
consistent with Fama (1980) and with Fama and Jensen (1983), who argued that higher 
percentage of outsider increases the effectiveness of board oversight and monitor.  
 
Age of the Board 
Several views have been stated by researchers regarding the age of the board of directors. On 
one hand, some of them state that as the board members grow older, their productivity levels 
decline. On the other hand, the older board members are found to have much more experience 
and a well-integrated social network to enhance the performance of the organisation. 
Corporate risk-taking is influenced by board age, in which a link is indicated between older 
boards and less firm risk-taking (Elsaid (2012)). The result shows that the average age of the 
director on the board (AGEBA) in relation to cartel formation and discovery is negative, but 
statistically not significant. Therefore, we cannot proposition P3 that the average age of board 
directors for cartel firms is lower than non-cartel firms.  
 
However, this result consistent with Wiersema and Bantel (1992), who argued that when firms 
bring about various changes in their corporate strategy, it is usually seen that the top 
management of the firm has a lower average age, which could mean that as age increases risk 
aversion increases. Also Campbell (2001) reports a negative age impact on engaging in equity 
investments. Analyzing risk perceptions of households, Bucciol and Miniaci (forthcoming) 
found that risk tolerance is reduced in age and a review study by Sahm (2007) and Grable, 
McGill, and Britt (2009) suggests that older individuals are less risk tolerant.  
 
Gender Diversity of the Board 
The percentage of gender diversity of the board (GENBA %) variable is negative but 
statistically not significant. Therefore, we cannot accept proposition P4: That there are less 
female directors on the board of cartel firms than the non-cartel firms. Yet, this result may not 
be surprising, that statistical significance was lacking, given the sparse distribution of females on 




The result consistent with many studies conducted using different factors like experience, 
attitude etc. which prove that women are less corrupt than men (e.g. Cheung and Hernandez-
Julian, 2006; Swamy, Azfar, Knack et al., 1999).  
 
Barsky and colleagues (1997 cited in Berger et al., 2012) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998 
cited in Berger et al., 2012), documented  that female executives tend to be more risk averse in 
decision making relating to financial concerns, which support this study findings. 
 
Board Duration 
The duration of the board (DURBA) is statistically negative but insignificant. However, the 
results suggest that the longer the duration of the board, the lower is the number of cartel 
formation in UK-based firms, and thus the lower are the incentives to engage in cartel formation. 
Therefore, we cannot accept proposition P5, that the average duration of the cartel board is less 
than the non-cartel firms. 
 
The number of board members appointed during the CEO’s regime preceding the cartel 
formation, JOIN, is negative and statistically significant (β=-0.20, z=-1.17, p<0.10). The more 
directors who join a board, the less likelihood that cartel formation will arise. This is consistent 
with the finding that board duration, DURBA, is also negatively linked to cartel formation. This 
is consistent with Vance’s (1983) claim that boards of long duration are generally interested in 
achieving the goals of the organisation.  
 
Board Remuneration 
Moreover, the proposition that the board remuneration for cartel firms is higher than in non-
cartel firms - addressed in proposition P6 is confirmed in the results. The coefficient for variable 
remuneration (Remun) is positive and statistically significant (β=0.03, z=3.55, p<0.05). These 
results indicate that the board of UK-based firms who are convicted in cartel formation have 
higher board compensation levels than non-cartel firms. This finding is consistent with research 
developing different theoretical models all linking incentives and fraud, which find positive 
relations between board compensation and fraud (Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003a and 2003b; 






 Control Variables 
 
Firm Ownership Status  
The current status of the firm (COSTA) has a positive impact on the number of incidences of 
cartel formation and discovery (β=1.08, z=3.44, p<0.05). Recall that this variable takes on the 
value of 1 if the firm is publicly-traded and the value of 0 if it is privately-owned and controlled. 
The positive coefficient suggests that UK-based public firms are more likely to form cartel than 
UK-based private firms. The results also show that the impact of the firm ownership (COSTA) 
is quite definite as one can fully reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Firm Sale 
The average sale for the 3-year period pre-cartel formation (SALEBA) has a positive and 
significant coefficient (β=0.04, z=3.05, p<0.05). This suggests that UK-based firms with higher 
average sale are more likely to engage in cartel formation. This result is support the earlier 
finding that UK-based public firms are more likely to form cartel (COSTA), since public firms 
are larger thus their sales is expected to be higher. This result indicates that the higher the 
previous three years average sale, the more likely that the firm will involve in cartel formation.  
 
Poor Financial Performance  
The poor performance of a firm (PPER) has also a negative and significant coefficient (β=-0.30, 
z=-2.50, p<0.05). This result is in contrast with that of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) 
DeAngelo et al. (1994), and Beasley and Hermanson et al. (2006). Their results suggest a 
positive and significant relationship between poor performance and firm fraud, but since firms 
collude together not only to maximise profits but also to maintain their price, this result suggests 
that the UK-based cartel firms are more likely to have a good financial performance, which also 




The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) has a significant and positive coefficient (β=1.77, z= 
2.02, p<0.05). This result indicates that the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not 
significantly different from 0 can be rejected. This finding is unsurprising since high market 
concentrations, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, indicate an industry that is 
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dominated by few, oligopolistic firms. Such firms can more easily engage in cartel activity such 
as price fixing, and create artificial supply shortages, since problems of cartel co-ordination are 
much reduced.  
 
Current Ratio 
The average current ratio (CURRRATIOB) has a negative coefficient but statistically not 
significant. This finding shows that as the current ratio increases, the incentive to form a cartel 
reduces, and vice versa. The results are consistent with how financially constrained or distressed 
firms (with higher debt ratios) are more likely to engage in cartel activity so as to stabilise or 
even improve their performance.  
 
Legal Environment 
Chapter two discussed previously that the U.S Department of Justice (DoJ) is the first to impose 
fines and prison sentences on individuals involved in cartel agreements. Therefore, in order to 
control for the legal environment, we added the variable (DoJ). This variable describes the 
jurisdictional zone where the conviction case was set (cartel formation and discovery). The 
variable took a value of 1 when the firm is found to have committed a cartel criminal 
infringement by the DoJ, and 0 if otherwise. The commission of a cartel criminal infringement is 
essentially cartel formation and discovery, which is the dependent variable. As can be observed 
there is a strong positive relationship between the number of incidences of cartel formation and 
discovery (CONV) and the number of UK-based firms convicted by the DoJ. This implies that 
the higher the number of UK-based cartel firms, the higher the number of cartel convictions by 
the DoJ, and vice versa.  
  
5.6.2 Ownership Structure Estimation Results 
The main objective of this model is to determine whether or not ownership structure of the firms 
influences cartel formation. The identity of the large shareholders (family firms in this section) 
determines the kind of ownership concentration within a firm. The large shareholders also 
establish the relationship between the performance of the firm and the type of ownership. The 
concentration of ownership in this thesis is divided into two owner groups to allow for its 
evaluation: the stock owns by outside directors and family-owned and controlled firms. Table 




Table 5.7- Ownership Structure- Ordered Logistic Estimation Results 
The table reports the results of ordered logit regressions of a dummy variable equal to the prior incidence of cartel 
formation and discovery (CONV). Thus, the value of 0 is assigned for the benchmark comparison with firms without 
any involvement in cartel activity, referred to here as non-cartel firms. It means that the firm has not formed any 
cartel, nor had been discovered for any cartel activity, 1 if it was a first-time conviction, 2 if it represented the 
second conviction, and so on, in this cartel formation and discovery as dependent variable on a number of financial 
and corporate governance variables for the sample of mainly UK-based cartel firms and matched non-cartel firms. 
For every cartel firm, a control group of non-cartel firms was created, which share the first three digits of the SIC 
code and similar firm size based on net sale within ±25% of the cartel firm’s sales at the end of the year before the 
collusive agreement started. Firm-years, in which cartel firms, i.e., firms that at one point in time during our sample 
period are part of a cartel agreement, are not participating in a cartel, are excluded from this analysis. OUTOWN % 
is the common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if the firm is family owned and controlled; 0 otherwise. .Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel 
formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of 
the board before the cartel formation. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the 
chair of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. UK is a dummy variable 
took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. The variables on ownership structure were obtained from 
proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested 
using a standard t-test and the equality of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Dependent Variable: Cartel formation and Discovery (Conv) Model 2 
Independent Variables  Expected Sign Coeff. z 
OUTOWN (%) (-) 0.06 0.17 
FAMCON (+) -2.65 -2.34** 
SIZEBA (+) 0.04 0.82 
NED (%) (-) -1.97 -1.76 
BOSS (+) 1.20 4.76** 
Control Variables 
   
COSTA   1.34 5.48** 
PPER   0.00 -2.60** 
SALEB   0.00 1.18 
HHI   1.72 2.86** 
UK   -0.34 -0.97 
Industry dummy   Yes 
Year dummy   Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.17 
Obs   285 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Outside Directors’ Stock Ownership 
The coefficient for the variable outside ownership (OUTOWN %) is positive but statistically 
not significant. However, this result suggests that the percentage of outside directors’ stock 
ownership is relatively higher for UK-based cartel firms than for a matched sample of non-cartel 
firms. This result is contradictory to our expectation, therefore we cannot accept proposition P7: 
that the percentage of outside directors’ stock ownership is lower for cartel firms than for a 




Family-Owned and Controlled Firms 
The formation of a cartel is significantly and negatively influenced by the family as the results 
given in Table 5.7 signify. The claim that family owners create enhanced governance and 
supervisory systems has been affirmed through this result. The agency problem between 
managers and owners can be lessened through family control which is why significant and 
negative effects of family shareholdings are obtained (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The large 
shareholders are better able to monitor the management compared to small shareholders. This is 
because large shareholders internalise larger aspects of the monitoring costs and possess 
sufficient voting power in corporate decisions. Small shareholders, on the other hand, are only 
able to influence corporate decision making at a minimum basis. Because small shareholders 
have little influence on decision making, the managers then hold the control of the firm, who 
possess both the opportunities and incentive of misusing their position. It is therefore concluded 
that corporate performance would be adversely affected by the ownership-control separation 
(Laiho, 2011; Hamdani and Yafeh, 2010; Leech, 2001).  
 
In addition Laiho (2011) states that a more effective monitoring takes place through a more 
concentrated ownership in the form of large shareholders. Effective monitoring has two 
significant obstacles that may be solved by large shareholders: staying informed to enable 
reaping sufficient benefits towards exceeding the costs of obtaining the needed information; and 
possessing an adequately large share of the votes in order to influence corporate outcomes (even 
in circumstances of minority holding). Small shareholders, on the other hand, have difficulty 
carrying this out collectively as they are only able to internalise a small aspect of the potential 
gains and endure free-rider problems. An agency problem identified here is therefore the 
incentive of large shareholders to gain private benefits at the detriment of the small shareholders 
(Laiho, 2011; Kaisanlahti, 2002; Bebchuck, 1999).  
 
Therefore, we cannot accept the proposition P8: that cartel likely to be formed by family-owned 








CEO Concentration Power  
The coefficient for the concentration power variable (BOSS) was found to be positive and 
statistically different from zero in estimating its influence on cartel formation (CONV).This 
positive figure shows that concentration power increases incentives to form cartel. Therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level of significance. This is consistent with prior studies, which discuss the case of fraud in 
general (Loebbecke et al., 1989; Jensen, 1993). Hence P13: is accepted, that firms committing 
cartel are more likely to have CEOs who also have a dual role serving as board chairs. 
 
5.6.3 CEO Characteristics Estimation Results  
The main objective of this model is to determine whether or not CEO characteristics affect cartel 




Table 5.8- CEO Characteristics- Ordered Logistic Estimation Results 
The table reports the results of ordered logit regressions of a dummy variable equal to the prior incidence of cartel formation and discovery (CONV). Thus, the value of 0 is assigned for the 
benchmark comparison with firms without any involvement in cartel activity, referred to here as non-cartel firms. It means that the firm has not formed any cartel, nor had been discovered for 
any cartel activity, 1 if it was a first-time conviction, 2 if it represented the second conviction, and so on, in this cartel formation and discovery (CONV) as dependent variable on a number of 
financial and corporate governance variables for the sample of cartel firms and matched non-cartel firms. For every cartel firm, a control group of non-cartel firms was created, which share 
the first three digits of the SIC code and similar firm size based on net sale within ±25% of the cartel firm’s sales at the end of the year before the collusive agreement started. Firm-years, in 
which cartel firms, i.e., firms that at one point in time during our sample period are part of a cartel agreement, are not participating in a cartel, are excluded from this analysis. CEOAGE is 
computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of the cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the cartel started. 
CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO was female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value 
of 1 if the chair of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. 
CEONUM is the total number of cartel cases the CEO is involved in. CEOCASE dummy variable shows the total number of cartel cases the CEO was involved in before a-particular cartel 
case. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. DoJ is a dummy variable with value of 1 is assigned when the firm is found to have committed a cartel criminal infringement in the jurisdiction. 
Saleb is the average sales pre-cartel formation. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is 
the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. UK is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. The variables on CEO 
characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested using a standard t-test and the equality 
of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Dependent variable: Cartel formation and discovery(CONV) Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent Variable Expected Sign Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z 
CEOTen (-) -0.10 -2.95** -0.07 -2.43** -0.02 -0.59 -0.01 -0.44 
CEOage (+) 0.05 3.59** 0.06 4.37** 0.06 4.26** 0.04 3.77** 
CEOgen (-)     -3.31 -2.99** -3.13 -2.83** -2.46 -2.76** 
Multidir (-) -0.14 -1.53 -0.11 -1.52 -0.10 -1.48 -0.05 -0.58 
BOSS (+) 0.79 2.59** 0.94 3.42** 1.10 3.83** 0.76 2.50** 
CEONUM (+)              2.27 4.22** 
CEOCASE (+)          1.8 5.53**     
Control Variables 
PPER   -0.00 -3.00**             
Costa   1.25 4.46** 1.36 5.06** 1.30 4.77** 1.19 4.03** 
Saleb   -0.00 -0.67 -0.00 -0.87 -0.05 -0.16 0.01 1.89 
CurrRatioB   -0.11 -1.11 -0.01 -0.16 -0.04 -0.35 -0.04 -0.39 
HHI   1.33 2.71** 1.79 2.58** 1.43 2.21** 1.42 1.91 
DoJ   1.94 4.36** 1.67 4.18** 1.56 3.02** 0.99 1.46 
UK   -0.26 -0.79 -0.41 -1.24 -0.31   -0.09 0.01 0.02 
Industry effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs   279 308 308 308 
Pseudo R2   0.233 0.230 0.395 0.525 





The multivariate test results emphasize the univariate comparisons that were presented in Table 
5.2. The ordered logit model shows that the CEO tenure coefficient, CEOTEN used in models 3 
and 4 is negative and significantly different from zero in estimating cartel formation and 
discovery (CONV), given other predictor variables in all models (β=-0.10, z=-2.95, -2.43, 
p<0.05). The results confirm the earlier pairwise univariate comparison between UK-based 
cartel firms and non-cartel firms. This finding is in consistent with P10; the results indicate that 
the number of years the CEO has served as director for cartel firms is actually less than for non-
cartel firms. It gives light to the assumption about whether CEO tenure, along with overlap of 
CEO and board chair roles (BOSS), help carry out the monitoring process of corruption 
activities for cartel firms (Mace 1986; Patton and Baker 1987; Vancil 1987).  
 
Hence, the result is in contrast with some studies investigating CEO tenure and firm fraud. 
Loebbecke et al.’s (1989) study found a positive relationship between the two variables, but the 
fraud was often very specifically in connection with ‘income smoothing’ behaviour after a 
pronounced growth period which is then followed by much poorer financial performance in a 
subsequent downturn. Longer serving CEOs wished to smooth income, and likely had the depth 
of knowledge and intra-firm connections to make this form of fraud more plausible and likely. 
The controls used in this study in fact minimise the role of poor financial performance as a 
predictor for cartel activity. Even if many aspects are similar, a direct comparison between the 
studies is not altogether appropriate for every variable. 
 
The finding is however in line with researchers who conducted another logit analysis between 
fraud and non-fraud firms, using CEO tenure as an independent variable (Beasley, 1996). The 
basis of Beasley’s study is much closer to the study conducted here, and in fact Beasley’s study 
used similar variables CEO tenure (CEOTen) and overlap of the CEO and board chair roles 
(BOSS) in the logit analysis. The variable BOSS was also found to be positively correlated with 
the likelihood of financial fraud misstatements. The finding also agrees with how long-tenured 
CEOs are less likely to have appropriate strategies (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). This is of 
interest if cartel activity is accepted as a measure of a lack of strategic change ability, i.e. opting 
for the status quo amongst cartel firms. The results are also consistent with evidence suggesting 
that firms are more likely to be involved in cartel crime when CEO tenure is low, or 
equivalently, when CEO turnover is high (Han, 2010). Hence, it is possible to say that this 
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research extends previous research on fraudulent financial misstatements and board composition, 
and finds comparable results for how board composition and CEO tenure are likely to affect the 
probability of cartel formation and discovery. 
 
Therefore, P10 is accepted: the number of years a CEO had served as a director for a cartel firm 
is less than that for non-cartel firms. If CEO entrenchment has in fact been found to have 
various negative consequences, especially in terms of excess remuneration and the stacking of 
outside directorships (Vafeas 2003), one benefit is to make cartel formation relatively less likely. 
The effect is not, however, large. Based on the figures above, the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero can be rejected at 5% level of significance. 
The effect is not large in quantity but still has a strong signature in the data.  
 
CEO Age 
Consistent with expectations, the results of all the models show a positive and significant 
relationship between CEO age (CEOAGE) and the likelihood of cartel formation in UK-based 
firms (β=0.05, z=3.62, p<0.05). The parameter is significant at 5% level of significance, 
suggesting that the null hypothesis that the factor loading on CEO age is not significantly 
different from zero can be rejected. The evidence suggests that the older the CEO, the higher is 
the incentive to engage in cartel formation. Firms engaging in strategic change often have top 
management teams (defined to include the CEO as well as second executive levels) 
characterised by a lower average age (Han, 2010). Older executive teams (on average in the first 
and sector tier management hierarchy), are in their study more conservative in terms of strategy 
development.  
 
Older CEOs are likely to be more conservative and this has a positive impact on firm 
performance, but also less likelihood of fraud (and increased CEO tenure means less fraud) 
(Stevens et al., 1978). However, fraud happens amongst single firms – it is a singular activity by 
one firm. Cartel formation on the other hand has different and more social dynamics. Older 
CEOs may have strong established social networks that enable the communication necessary to 
cartel formation. Older CEOs may have worked for many organisations and established a 
number of strong networks. As a result, engaging in collusion with other firms will be less 
difficult (Beasley, 1996). Older CEOs established in certain industries can also understand how 
those market structures perhaps make the formation of a cartel agreement a ‘rational decision’. 
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On average, the probability that a CEO will leave the firm falls up to the age of 52 but begins to 
rise beyond that. CEO turnover therefore does increase with age. However, those CEOs that 
approach retirement age but whose firm has a superior corporate performance are less likely to 
leave the firm, than those that have nearly reached retirement age and whose firms are 
performing poorly. The latter are more likely to retire early, and thus increase CEO turnover and 
lower CEO tenure. Older CEOs may use the shorter career time remaining to at least ensure 
maintaining their personal benefits. Engaging in cartel activity could be seen as a means of 
retaining and insuring continued levels of expected remuneration (and status) before eventually 
retiring and leaving the firm (Bebchuck and Grinstein, 2005).  
 
On the contrary, younger CEOs should expect in comparison to have a longer tenure with the 
firm. Younger CEOs in the early stages of corporate careers are yet to establish strong networks, 
and may not wish to suffer the reputational consequences of discovered cartel activity so early in 
their careers. Consequently engaging in cartel activity may be more difficult and higher risk for 
younger CEOs, and so less expected of younger CEOs in the organisational culture. Younger 
CEOs may therefore be more interested in maintaining a good reputation by maximising 
shareholder wealth through competitive means and building competitive advantage. In addition 
then, younger CEOs have a longer time in their career path and thus would be more interested in 
protecting their long-term careers from reputational damage. 
 
Therefore P9 as well as P10 are accepted: the age of the CEO for cartel firms is higher than for 
non-cartel firms, but that CEO tenure has a reverse effect. One possible implication would be to 
combine the two propositions, that an older CEO with a shorter expected tenure may well use 
wide corporate social network connections, perhaps pressured by poorer corporate performance 
and the avoidance of forced early retirement, to resort to cartel formation as a pseudo-strategic 
response to market conditions. However, the relationship between CEO tenure and CEO age is 
difficult to model but generally, the risk of termination does increase for thirteen years, to only 
then decrease (Brookman and Thistle, 2009). Brookman and Thistle (2009) concluded that 
corporate governance does function as reasonably expected, and that CEO age, tenure, 
retirement and corporate performance do act in tandem, as described above. 
 
CEO Gender 
Several studies suggest that compared with men, women are less likely to participate in corrupt 
practices (Cheung and Hernandez-Julian, 1999; Swamy et al., 1999). Byrnes, et al., (1999) 
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observed that in different activities men were more willing to take risk than women. Sundén and 
Surette (1998) and Bernasek and Shwiff (2001), documented that women are considerably more 
risk averse than men. In a study on betting behaviour of men and women by Bruce and Johnson 
(1994) and Johnson and Powell (1994), it was observed that women show a lesser inclination 
towards risk-taking than men.  
Consistent with this previous research, the results here show a very significant negative 
coefficient for CEOGEN in Model 4, 5 and 6 (β=0.94, z=3.28, p<0.05). This shows that the 
CEO gender of the UK-based cartel firms has a very significant negative impact on the number 
of convictions on cartel formation. In fact, the impact of CEO gender was the highest value 
coefficient discovered in any of the regression models. Therefore, we accept P11: that there are 
less female CEOs represented in cartel firms, compared with non-cartel firms. 
 
Multiple-Directorship 
In all previous models the coefficient for multiple directorships; Multidir is found to be negative 
but statistically not significant. Therefore, we cannot accept the proposition P12: that board of 
directors of cartel firms are less likely to have directors who work on other boards, compared 
with boards of directors of non-cartel firms.  However, the results suggest that the number of 
cartel formation and discovery in UK-based firms reduces as multiple directorship increases. 
These results are consistent with prior research where illicit activity is being modelled alongside 
corporate governance variables (Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Brickley et al., 1999; 
Shivdasani, 1993; Ferris et al., 2003). The results of these authors show that boards of directors 
of firms committing fraud are less likely to have directors who work on other boards, compared 
with boards of directors amongst non-fraud firms. Although multiple directorships as a variable 
appear to reduce the formation of cartel as evidenced by its negative impact on the number of 
convictions for cartel formation, its impact appears to be only a minimal one.  
 
CEO Concentration Power 
The coefficient for the concentration power variable (BOSS) was found to be positive and 
statistically different from zero in estimating its influence on cartel formation and discovery 
(CONV), given other predictor variables in all models (β=0.83, z=2.80, p<0.05). This positive 
figure shows that concentration power increases incentives to commit cartel crime given that the 
number of cartel formation and discovery increases with an increase in power concentration. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not significantly different from 
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zero at the 5% level of significance. This is consistent with prior studies, which discuss the case 
of fraud in general (Loebbecke et al., 1989; Jensen, 1993). Hence P13 is accepted, that firms 
committing cartel are more likely to have CEOs who also have a dual role serving as board 
chairs. 
 
Both CEOCASE and CEONUM variables are significant for how they both made very 
noteworthy contributions to explaining the variability in the data. For all models without the 
inclusion of the number of cartel cases or cases of misconduct, the pseudo-R2 is under 0.3. 
Although the value of pseudo-R
2
 is not to be compared with R
2
 in ordinary logistical regression, 
the values of pseudo-R
2
 do have a comparative value used in the same data set for comparing the 
effects of individual variables on data variance. Hence, only by including CEO cases and CEO 
misconduct cases, on the part of the CEO, does the pseudo-R2 value reach towards or exceed 
0.5, and in fact, the number of cases of CEO misconduct shows more ability to describe variance 
than cartel cases. This is to be expected when generally the number of misconduct cases will be 
greater than the number of cartel cases – the average number of CEO misconduct cases was in 
fact 1.75, and for CEO cartel involvement, 0.82.  
 
Firm Sale  
Surprisingly however, the average sales of firms three years pre-cartel (SALEBA) has an 
opposite sign to previous models. The SALEBA coefficient is negative but statistically 
insignificant. The robust standard error of the parameter is 0.008 and the p-value is 0.00. The 
negative coefficient suggests that the lower the average sales figure three years prior to the cartel 
formation, the higher the incentive to engage in cartel activity. These findings suggest that UK-
based firms with healthy sales and income flow would find it less relevant to engage in collusive 
behaviour, such as price fixing and other cartel activities. However, although sale as a control 
variable appears to have a negative impact on the number of convictions for cartel crime, its 
impact appears to be negligible.  
 
5.6.4 Board Characteristics, Ownership Structure and CEO Characteristics 
Estimation Results  
The results for all the above models are used for board and CEO characteristics separately, and 




Table 5.9- Board and CEO Characteristics - Ordered Logistic Estimation Results 
The table reports the results of ordered logit regressions of a dummy variable equal to the prior incidence of cartel 
formation and discovery (CONV). Thus, the value of 0 is assigned for the benchmark comparison with firms without any 
involvement in cartel activity, referred to here as non-cartel firms. It means that the firm has not formed any cartel, nor 
had been discovered for any cartel activity, 1 if it was a first-time conviction, 2 if it represented the second conviction, and 
so on, in this cartel formation and discovery as dependent variable on a number of financial and corporate governance 
variables for the sample of mainly UK-based cartel firms and matched non-cartel firms. For every cartel firm, a control 
group of non-cartel firms was created, which share the first three digits of the SIC code and similar firm size based on net 
sale within ±25% of the cartel firm’s sales at the end of the year before the collusive agreement started. Firm-years, in 
which cartel firms, i.e., firms that at one point in time during our sample period are part of a cartel agreement, are not 
participating in a cartel, are excluded from this analysis. Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel formation. NED% is the 
percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the board before the cartel 
formation. GENBA %% is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the board 
pre-cartel formation. Remun is the board remuneration pre- cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the common stock owned by 
outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is family 
owned and controlled; 0 otherwise. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of the cartel 
formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the cartel started. 
BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the board held concentration power of 
CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of directorship assigned to the CEO on 
other boards. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. DoJ is a dummy variable with value of 1 is assigned when the firm 
is found to have committed a cartel criminal infringement in the jurisdiction. Saleb is the average sales pre-cartel 
formation. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial 
performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. UK 
is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. JOIN is the number of member joined the 
board during that period. The variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing 
dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested using a standard t-test and the 
equality of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level. 
 
Dependent variable: CONV (Formation and discovery)  Model 6 
Independent Variable Expected Sign Coeff. Z 
Board Characteristics 
Sizeba (+) 0.12 2.35** 
NED (%) (-) -2.51 -2.36** 
AGEBA (-) -0.03 -1.49 
GENBA % (%) (-) -0.96 -0.85 
DURBA (-) -0.12 -0.70 
REMUNR (+) 0.03 3.02** 
JOIN   -0.06 -1.94 
Ownership structure 
   FAMCON   (+) -1.35 -1.68 
OUTOWN (%) (-) 0.58 0.96 
CEO Characteristics 
CEOage (+) 0.05 2.88** 
CEOTen (-) -0.08 -1.51 
Multidir (-) -0.18 -1.91 
BOSS (+) 0.96 2.54** 
Control Variables 
COSTA   1.25 3.85** 




CurrRatioB  -0.36 -1.97 
HHI   1.85 2.34** 
DoJ   1.44 2.63** 
UK   -0.34 -0.89 
Industry effect   Yes 
Year effect   Yes 
Number of Obs   213 
Pseudo R2   0.258 
Source: Author’s own calculation 




Table 5.9 above illustrates the results obtained using model 7. Similar to the previous models 
after including all board and CEO characterises, the figure shows a positive and significant 
coefficient in board sized (SIZEBA), CEO age (CEOAGE) and BOSS variables, the results 
also show a negative and significant coefficient in the average age of the board (AGEBA), non-
executive directors (NED %), members joined (JOIN), CEO gender (CEOGEN), and multi-
directorship (MULTIDIR). However, remuneration (REMUNR) shows a positive coefficient, 
yet is not significant. After replicating the analysis with all the characteristics, the results prove 
to be robust, as shown by the previous models. 
 
5.6.5 Marginal Effects  
In order to measure the relative impact of the board and CEO variables on the occurrence of 
cartel formation and discovery, the marginal effect is generated for all variables from model 7. 























Table 5.10 Marginal Effects of Independent Variables Displays of Ordered Logistic Estimation 
 
The table report the effect of one standard deviation % change in the cartel formation and discovery (CONV==1). 
Marginal effect can be interpreted as the change in the probability of cartel formation (formation and discovery) for 
each unit change in the independent variables. These effects are computed based on the independent variable’s 
mean value from model 6 above. The dependent variable is the cartel formation and discovery (CONV). Thus, the 
value of 0 is assigned for the benchmark comparison with firms without any involvement in cartel activity, referred 
to here as non-cartel firms. It means that the firm has not formed any cartel, nor had been discovered for any cartel 
activity, 1 if it was a first-time conviction, 2 if it represented the second conviction, and so on, in this cartel 
formation and discovery as dependent variable on a number of financial and corporate governance variables for the 
sample of mainly UK-based cartel firms and matched non-cartel firms. Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel 
formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the 
board before the cartel formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the 
duration of the board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the board remuneration pre- cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the 
common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 
1 if the firm is family-owned and controlled; 0 otherwise. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year 
of the cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the 
cartel started. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the board held 
concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of directorship 
assigned to the CEO on other boards. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. DoJ is a dummy variable with value of 1 is 
assigned when the firm is found to have committed a cartel criminal infringement in the jurisdiction. Saleb is the average 
sales pre-cartel formation. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor 
financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public 
firms. UK is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. JOIN is the number of member 
joined the board during that period. The variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements 
with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested using a standard t-test 
and the equality of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level. 
Model 7 
Independent Variable Z Changes the pr(Conv==1) by y% 
SIZEBA 2.18** 0.024 
AGEBA -1.46 -0.006 
GENBA % (%) -0.82 0.186 
DURBA -0.70 -0.019 
NED (%) -2.75** -0.643 
REMUNR 2.67** 0.002 
JOIN -2.49** -0.150 
CEOTEN -1.45 -0.016 
CEOAGE  2.74** 0.010 
MULTIDIR -1.78 -0.036 
BOSS 2.75** 0.170 
OUTOWN (%) 0.96 0.113 
FAMCON -1.98 -0.263 
Control Variables     
COSTA 4.19** 0.231 
PPER -2.16** -0.001 
SALE 1.63 0.000 
CURRRATIOB  -1.94 -0.070 
HHI 2.28 0.358 
DoJ 3.70**  0.171 
UK -0.95 -0.064 
Industry effect Yes 
Year effect Yes 
Obs 228 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
The effect of one standard deviation change (CONV==1) is reported in the table above. 
Marginal effect can be interpreted as the change in the probability of cartel formation and 
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discovery for each unit change in the independent variables. These effects are computed based 
on the independent variable’s mean value.  
 
Model (7) shows that one unites change in the board size (Sizeba) leads to an increase in the 
probability of cartel formation by 2.4%. The percentage of non- executive director (NED %) has 
the largest marginal effect; where one unites increase in non- executive director (NED %) lead 
to a -64.3% decrease in the probability of cartel formation. Besides, one unites increase in the 
percentage of board remuneration (Remun) leads to a 0.2% increase in the probability of cartel 
formation. Moreover, one unites increase in (JOIN) the number of member joined the board lead 
to a -15% decrease in the probability of cartel formation.  
 
Furthermore, the CEO concentration power (BOSS) variable result shows that a one unit 
increase in BOSS leads to a 17% increase in the probability of cartel formation. The CEO 
gender (CEOage) in addition, shows that a one unite increase in CEOage leads to a 1% increase 
in the probability of cartel formation (CONV==1).   
 
The current ownership status of the firm (COSTA) has a positive impact on the number of 
incidences of cartel formation and discovery; one unites increase in (COSTA) leads to a 23% 
increase in the probability of cartel formation. Additionally, the poor performance of a firm 
(PPER) one unite decrease in (PPER) leads to a 1% increase in the probability of cartel 
formation (CONV==1).   
 
5.6.6 CEO Compensation Estimation Results 
Top management levels are responsible for taking the decision of forming cartel and then 
imposing this decision upon the management of the organisation who strives to hide any kind of 
collusive agreement (Harrington, 2006a). Many compensation schemes are provided to the top 
managers and it is necessary to understand if these schemes may help in facilitating the collusive 
behaviour. The above results prove that there is a strong association between CEO 
characteristics and cartel formation and discovery; therefore, the following sections examine the 
relationship between the CEO compensation package and the incidence of cartel formation and 
discovery. Due to the availability of the data the observation number shrunk to 92 firms (46 
cartel firms and 46 non-cartel firms). Therefore, Binary regression (logistic model) is used for 
CEO compensation. The dependent variable is cartel formation and discovery (Cartel), is a 
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dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm participated and discovered in cartel 











Table 5.9- CEO Compensation- Logistic Estimation Results 
The table reports the results of logit regressions of (Cartel)  dummy variable of whether a firm participates in a cartel agreement or not, in this cartel as dependent variable on a number 
of corporate governance and financial variables for the sample of mainly UK-based cartel firms and matched non-cartel firms. For every cartel firm, a control group of non-cartel firms 
was created, which share the first three digits of the SIC code and similar firm size based on net sale within ±25% of the cartel firm’s sales at the end of the year before the collusive 
agreement started. Firm-years, in which cartel firms, i.e., firms that at one point in time during our sample period are part of a cartel agreement, are not participating in a cartel, are 
excluded from this analysis. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the cartel started. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms 
created with a value of 1 if the chair of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO bonus. Share is 
calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average three years CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. UK is a dummy variable took value of 1 if the firm based in the UK, 0 otherwise. The variables on CEO 
characteristics and compensation were obtained from proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. The equality of means is tested using a standard 
t-test and the equality of medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Dependent variable: Cartel  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Independent Variable Expected Sign Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z 
CEOTEN (-) -0.28 -3.24** -0.22 -2.70* -0.26 -3.34** 
BOSS (+) 0.11 0.18 0.30 0.37 0.19 0.36 
Bonus (+) 0.07 2.28**         
Share (+)     0.14 0.91     
Tcomp (+)         0.00 2.36** 
Control Variable               
PPER   -0.23 -0.75 -1.38 -1.17 -0.89 -1.21 
CURRRATIOB    -0.13 -0.19 -0.29 -0.45 -0.23 -0.40 
HHI   3.24 1.44 2.14 0.86 2.56 1.11 
UK    0.83 1.00 0.86 0.93 
  
CONSTANT   1.73 1.18 1.89 1.66 1.40 1.18 
Number of Obs   84 84 85 
Pseudo R2   0.318 0.312 0.329 





Similar to the previous results on CEO tenure the comparison model shows that the CEO tenure 
coefficient CEOten used in models 8, 9, and 10 is negative and significantly different from zero 
in estimating cartel formation and discovery (Cartel). The results indicate that the number of 




The share variable (SHARE) indicates that the effect is not large. Based on the total 
compensation (Tcomp), the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero can be rejected. There is therefore a significant difference in the total compensation and 
bonus between the cartel and non-cartel groups. It therefore rejects P15 - that the average CEO 
share for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms and accepts P14 and P16 – that the average 
CEO bonus for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms (P14) and that the total CEO 
compensation for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel firms (P16). These are consistent with 
the literature, that the CEOs of firms with weaker governance (where cartelisation) is possible 
structures receive greater compensation (Core et al., 1999). These are also consistent with the 












5.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter reports the results of empirical findings on the association between three sets of 
variables, i.e. board composition, CEO characteristics, and CEO compensation and cartel 
formation, over the period 1990 to 2008. 
 
Two types of analysis are performed, univariate and multivariate, to analyse the sample of this 
research. The univariate test applies the T test. The multivariate analysis adopts a regression 
analysis. Overall, the estimation results show relations between CEO tenure, CEO age, CEO 
gender, the concentration power of the CEO, size of the board, the duration of the board, the 
percentage of non-executive director and CEO compensation, in respect of the likelihood of 
cartel formation and discovery amongst otherwise matched firms where market and legal 
environmental controls are also modelled. 
 
The ability to co-ordinate cartel activity would seem to be affected by past experience of the 
CEOs. Whenever, CEOCASE and CEONUM are each added to the models 6 and 7 concerned 
with CEO characteristics, both values have strong and significant positive effects on the 
likelihood of raised incidences of cartel formation and discovery. Past CEO history can be a 
guide to future proclivities to cartel formation. In other words, cartel activity, if it is not a habit, 
is an ingrained response by some CEOs to the problems of financial, market, and economic 
uncertainty, at the very least. In fact, the pseudo-R
2
 value when these two variables are added to 
the model rises considerably and doubles, approximately, compared with CEO-based models 
without board characteristics, or CEO and board characteristics together, without CEOCASE 
and CEONUM. In logistic regression there is no direct equivalent to the R-squared found in 
ordinary least squares regression but pseudo-R
2
 values can play a similar role (if technically 
there are different from OLS types, and there are various pseudo-R
2
 techniques. In this study, 
CEONUM and other CEO characteristics can themselves account for a great deal more variance 
than other models, either CEO variable without CEONUM, or combined CEO and board 
characteristics. This means that the history of the CEO can be a critical factor in determining 
future cartel activity.  
 
In the next chapter, a discussion of corporate governance and cartel is presented, alongside 
ownership concentration in cartel formation, compliance code needs vis-a-vis cartels, and 







This chapter presents and discusses the results reported in Chapter Five in an effort to provide an 
answer to the research question identified in the first chapter. Those results relating to the 
relationship between cartel and corporate governance are discussed first; followed by a 
discussion on cartel and the compliance code needs and the corporate anti-cartel programme. 
 
6.1 Corporate Governance and Cartel Formation 
This study has investigated by empirical means across a controlled and matched set of data just 
what attributes of corporate governance can significantly mitigate the likelihood of cartel 
formation. Many of those attributes in each of the models with negative co-efficient have been 
shown under their specific modelling conditions to have a significant empirically measurable 
effect on desisting from cartel formation.  
 
This study is part of the developing empirical based ‘technology’ of corporate governance, 
whereby empirical research is done precisely on soft system analyses of corporate governance. 
This study extends these kinds of research in a new direction, to the applicability of an empirical 
study of corporate governance and cartel formation, based on individual and group attributes. 
Much of the reason for these sorts of developments in corporate governance has been driven by 
the new importance of risk management in almost every sphere of corporate activity, but 
especially as risk management exists to mitigate the risks of illicit activity. This particular 
potential use of the study will be developed in the recommendations section. 
 
This research aims to find if there is a link between corporate governance characteristics and 
cartel formation in UK-based cartel firms. The cartel data set consists of 150 cartel firms, where 
114 firms are from the UK. These firms have formed cartel and discovered in 52 cartel cases that 
operated in all around the world, and were found guilty by DoJ, EC, and OFT/CC between 1990 
and 2008.  
 
A cartel in general is a management response to a challenging set of economic and technological 
circumstances. Typically in the past, the response has been described by more econometric and 
structural arguments. The cartel emerged from economic pressure. These forces are still of 
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course to be acknowledged as prime, and cannot be discounted or minimised. However, this 
study, after controlling for market and legal environment, also focuses on how human and 
organisational factors are likely to either aggravate or mitigate the formation of a cartel. Chapter 
Five describes in detail just how such factors can and do have significant influence on the 
likelihood of cartel formations and discovery.  
 
In the contemporary period, the opportunities and the potential benefits of cartel formation have 
only increased, given the modernisation processes that globalisation has introduced across the 
globe, along with vast information exchange (H schelrath and Weigand, 2010). The relationship 
between corporate governance and market competition which was discussed in Chapter Three 
confirm that market information and new opportunities for hidden communication after all are 
the basic requirements for a cartel to even become possible (e.g. Keasey et al., 2005; Van 
Frederikslust et al., 2008; du Plessis et al., 2011; McCahery, 2002; Januszweski et al., 2002). In 
any economic downturn, it is likely that the incentives for cartel formation will only increase 
(Lipczynski and Wilson, 2001). In the context of the current global competition, it is becoming 
clear that international competition has risen in complexity well beyond the degree that most 
economists can cope with in their models and, generally speaking, in their understanding 
(Grossman, 2004).  
 
The period covered by this study, 1990–2008, according to management guru Peter Drucker, 
saw the beginning of a transformation of society and business culture into an era when “people 
don’t understand the world anymore, and the past is not sufficient to explain the future” 
(Childress and Senn, 1995: 3). Change is becoming less predictable and still unremitting. Firms 
are experiencing considerable rates of failure in strategic change programmes, threatening the 
survival of many firms in the headwind of globalisation. The pressure on CEOs and boards to 
navigate firms through this period of new competitive pressure has been intense.  
 
New information technology and organisational factors including globalisation raised the 
potential and incentives for international and multiple project contacts between firms. These 
changes are still to be rationalised and described adequately in orthodox economic theory. In 
fact, Grossman (2004) argues that it is the new dynamics of strategic business management in a 
globalised market, including forms of corporate governance, that are driving these new 
economic and organisational structures, some of which may be opaque to regulators. Thus, the 
capacity of boards and CEOs to “game the system”, which includes cartel formation, has raced 







Modern cartels can indeed have remarkably sophisticated organisational structures. The purpose 
of this sophistication is so that the corporate governance of the cartel can proceed with 
monitoring and punishment of the cartel’s governance structures. How to adapt to these forces 
and new complexity in how cartels operate and disguise their activity is an increasing challenge 
to regulators, who now have to cope with the added complexity of international cartels in the 
globalised business environment. It has been emphasised that firms surviving the competition 
tend to possess optimal governance structures, and those who fail to adapt their governance 
structures to changes in the business environment are likely to lead to demise (Kole and Lehn, 
1997). This assertion is a prelude for this study to focus on CEO and board characteristics as 
factors that can enable cartel formation and detection.  
 
Certain CEO characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, remuneration, and dual executive-board 
roles exacerbate the likelihood of cartel formation. This is mirrored in the results showing that 
cartel firms characterised by having larger board size (Sizeba) compared to non-cartel firms; 
lower percentage of independent member (non-executive) (NED %); higher average board 
remuneration (Remun); less likely that cartel firm is owned and controlled by family; older 
CEOs represented on the board (FAMCON); having older CEOs represented on the board 
(CEOage); having CEO who served a less number of years as a director (CEOten); less likely 
to have a female CEO represented (CEOgen); more likely to have CEOs who’s combined CEO-
chairman position (BOSS); and a higher average of CEOs bonuses (Bonus) and compensation 
packages (Tcomp). All of these findings serve the purpose of cartel firms to persist in cartel 
formation.  
 
Successfully adapting to an increasingly complex and highly competitive global market, 
straddling national and cultural boundaries, will indeed require regulators, to pay attention to 
“diagnosing and changing organisational culture”, including corporate governance (Cameron 
and Quinn, 2006). Most of the literature argues that successful firms those that have maintained 
profitability and higher than normal financial-returns are characterised by particular clear 
defined conditions.
2
 These conditions involve obtaining (1) high barriers to entry, (2) 
Products/services which are non-substitutable, (3) large market share, (4) buyers and suppliers 
with low bargaining power, and (5) competition between competitors. (Porter, 1980) 
 
                                                 
2
 Discussed in details in Chapter Two 
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A focus on the ownership structure and composition of boards and the occupancy of the CEO, 
which are exactly the characteristics described in this study, could help identify some of the 
preliminary features of organisational structure which allow cartels to develop. The empirical 
study of cartel risk assessment is in fact growing, and this study is a step in that direction. This 
study is part of how “diagnosing and changing organisational culture” can be performed on an 
empirical basis in the direction of a growing threat of expanded international cartel operations 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2006). If board and CEOs cannot be held accountable for their own age 
and gender, it is still the case that shareholders, markets, and regulators may be interested in how 
a collective group of board members and the CEO can present a risk profile (which is high in 
terms of the formation of a cartel) or recidivist behaviour in cartel activity.  
   
The likelihood for CEOs and board of directors to thrive financially in cartel firms is seen in the 
fact that firms collude together in order to maximise profits and maintain their price, suggesting 
that they are also likely to have good financial performance (Spagnolo, 2005). Boards and CEOs 
who view cartel as a protector of firms and of sector stability, more than as a potential source of 
artificially inflated profits, may well be more the contemporary rationale for cartel formation 
(Connor and Helmers, 2007). The benefits that CEOs and boards of directors obtain from their 
positions in cartel firms are confirmed by the findings that the board remuneration (Remun) for 
these firms is higher than for non-cartel firms.  
 
The ideal step is to discover where corporate networks between CEOs and boards are actually 
fixated on the classic hard-core cartel manipulation of price, supply and market share 
(Grossman, 2004). What this study has demonstrated is that CEO and board characteristics have 
a potentially important role to play in helping identify what kinds of attributes attached to 
corporate governance can actually add to the likelihood of cartel formation and cartel activity. 
This indeed would be valuable information. Therefore, to model cartel risk assessment, which 
would generally include econometric data, the board and CEO characteristics can be 
meaningfully attached to a more expanded and still empirically driven basis.  
 
The inclusion in this study of poor financial performance (PPER) and ratio of assets to liabilities 
(CurrRatioB) has been used for control purposes to focus with empirical precision on board and 
CEO characteristics, whilst not ignoring the influence of econometric data. Thus, given how the 
data have been matched and controlled for the information on age, gender, tenure, board 





Before cartel scandals erupted, studies concluded that as expected, institutional investors and 
financial analysts did not assess firms solely on financial performance criteria. Rather, they also 
based their judgments on prognoses about the boards and CEOs on human resource management 
factors influencing the success of the firm. It is worthy of note that lack of apparent relationship 
is found between the financial performance of the firm and implementation of several 
directorships (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006).  
 
Where does the value of a board and CEO lie, and how can criteria be established for making 
such assessments in relation to cartel avoidance? What might this mean for identifying scenarios 
where boards or CEOs are more likely to commit to cartel formation as a brand of strategy, and 
of colluding with competitors against the consumer? Can the quantitative study of different 
board and CEO attributes contribute to an assessment of the latent value of a corporate 
governance structure? Would firms, noting the outcome of a study such as this, take 
responsibility and demonstrate some measures of accountability by adapting its CEO and board 
personnel to lower the risk of cartel activity? Would some compendium of all of the negative co-
efficient characteristics (e.g. CEOgen, NED% etc) finally be added to the list above? The 
prospect seems unlikely but there is after all a growing body of evidence that certain corporate 
arrangements of CEOs and boards is more likely to produce illicit activity, and the costs of illicit 
activity are growing considerably. Regulatory measures are increasing, but there are more 
intangible costs such as reputational damage. Commentators after the collapse of the case against 
BA apparently left the court with their “reputations unsullied” (Joshua, 2010). Such a situation is 
unlikely to be repeated, and the prosecution in US courts would almost certainly have led to 
considerable repercussions for all the reputations of the defendants. 
 
A great deal of the informal leadership qualities and capabilities of CEOs and board 
characteristics enabling cartel formation can hardly be modelled empirically. The study found a 
direct relationship between communication of strategy by investor relations departments, and the 
ratings of analysts. All modern firms now realise that investor relationship is an important 
criterion for investing amongst investors. Stakeholders’ relations have very much risen, and 
continue to rise in importance (Low and Siesfeld, 1998).  
 
These matters of informal influence and communication are highly complex and difficult if not 
impossible to judge with certainty on an empirical basis. In the past, the tendency has been to 
answer such questions with the analysis of econometric measures that are quantifiable and 
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impersonal. The challenge of this study is that the personal attributes of CEOs and boards can 
make a significant contribution to the risk profile of a cartel being formed. This indeed would be 
to ‘diagnose’ organisational culture in a quite radical direction.  
 
The link to economic benefits of diagnosing organisational culture with respect to cartel 
formation would be to lower the monitoring and agency costs of compliance with the law. At the 
radical end of action on cartel monitoring and investigation, firms with lower risk profile might 
be subject to less intrusive monitoring, or have taken action to lower their ‘cartel risk’ in terms 
of corporate governance, and greater leniency. Many types of experiments in cartel monitoring 
and investigation are being tried and have been discussed in this study. The fact that cartels are 
ongoing and maybe in fact increasing in number will itself spur new experiment in terms of 
corporate regulation. The US, UK and EU have all made considerable revisions to competition 
law in the past decade. Empirical research is the order of the day, and applying empirical 
research to cartels and corporate governance, even if the results may be difficult to interpret or 
implement in regulation, can hardly be ignored.  
 
The rising tide of anti-cartel legislation across the globe has been consistently noted in this 
study. Any and all instruments for helping identify the likelihood of cartel activity will be 
welcome in an atmosphere where cartel prosecutions are becoming far more important. More 
resources are being dedicated to investigations, alongside some very public actions against 
cartels, including fines that have risen exponentially in value. The 10% of global turnover in 
fines must be a very considerable and galvanising threat for management against cartel 
formation (Alderman, 2009; Andreas, 2008). The US has certainly led the way in adding to the 
criminal basis and criminal sanctions against cartel participants, and the UK and EU have 
followed. Yet it is still the case, amidst all of these regulatory activities and new threats of fines 
and criminal punishment, that cartel activity is likely to have increased. As before, any and all 
means of analysing and explaining cartel formation could be a valuable regulatory and 
management tool. The rise in cartel activity and punishments cannot finally be good for the long-
term economic welfare of the global economy. 
 
However, in Norway for example, a new rule has been introduced into the corporate governance 
structure of every firm by national regulators. Corporate boards will have to have 40% female 
representation by force of law. According to the results of this study, this is bound to have an 
effect on cartel activity. Norway has experienced cartel activity (e.g. the cement cartel), and the 
new rule was not put in place as an anti-cartel measure, but as a social justice measure and a 
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commitment to the rights of women. However, this kind of radical action is expected to have 
significant benefits in terms of risk management since female participation at board level and 
senior management level has been found to inhibit illicit and fraudulent activity. In other words, 
a commitment to social justice via gender politics that also has risk management benefits may 
also add an anti-cartel effect to Norwegian corporate culture. The outcome remains to be seen, 
but the fact is that risk management and CEO and board attributes have become a normative 
mode of analysis of corporate governance.  
 
It must be noted that the board characteristics that are linked to cartel formation and detection 
also necessitate the consideration of factors leading to how cartel have been formed in the first 
place. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Five, the dependent variable (CONV) distinguishes those 
firms that formed cartel (which are however detected) from all others firms; some of which are 
not in cartel, and others of which are in undetected cartel. The dependent variable in this case 
might decrease given the increased likelihood/attractiveness of cartel formation, which likewise 
makes cartel formation less attractive and hence making detection easier.  
 
Despite the establishment of board characteristics in the study where some have been linked to 
firms that have been detected of cartel, the dependent variable is said to increase with the 
likelihood/attractiveness of cartel as indicated by the factors that lead to cartel formation. Factors 
that are likely to establish cartel are high seller market concentration, which is ushered by 
presence of entry barriers, number of firms, quality differences/ product differentiation, seller 
concentration, buyer power, and demand elasticity (Connor, 2008). In firms thus examined for 
the formation/existence of cartel, high seller concentration (HHI) appears to be a prevailing 
condition along with (product) homogeneity, which is usually considered an important condition 
for effective collusion. These factors are undoubtedly present within the market environment 
where both cartel and non-cartel firms operate in a high seller market concentration and the 
advantages that cartelisation provides might enable even non-cartel firms to commit cartel due to 
these. Both cartel and non-cartel firms operate in such environment, which would lead us to ask 
why non-cartel firms are not committing cartel despite the attractiveness posed by these factors. 
The assumption that might take place therefore is that these firms might in fact be committing 
cartel also but are not yet caught doing so; or that they might not be committing cartel at all. The 
only certain thing here is that cartel firms are committing cartel as shown by the evidence of 




If non-cartel firms that have not been detected of cartelisation happen to commit cartel, an 
insightful position would be to look at the characteristics of the board that serve as the 
independent variable for this study; as there are findings establishing some board characteristics 
in cartel firms, which are not present in non-cartel firms (e.g., larger size of the board of 
directors; lower percentage of independent (non-executive) members; lower average age of 
board directors; higher board remuneration; higher CEO age; etc.).  
 
Quantitative research has already shown that even for highly efficient firms, in industries where 
the concentration index HHI is high, a stable cartel is even likely (Prokop, 1999). The 
concentration index HHI with its positive correlation with CONV indicates how, as might be 
expected, with more concentration there are often fewer firms, and hence decision-makers 
involved in a cartel, making it easier for a cartel to form (Grossman, 2004). This expectation was 
also found to be correct in this study, with a considerable strength of effect. In all of the models, 
the HHI index had a strong aggravating influence on the likelihood of cartel formation. This 
result in all of the models also acts as a gratifying quality check for the data collection and model 
design processes. 
 
Thus, good financial performance and apparently good corporate governance do not diminish the 
likelihood of cartel formation. Structural factors in the market are important, and these cannot be 
discounted (Aubert, 2007). However, this study has shown that board and CEO characteristics 
can and should also be added to the analyses of cartel formation, in both qualitative and 
quantitative fashions. These are matters of organisational culture and decision making, and the 
factors identified here certainly do not imply that the decision, or action, to implement a cartel 
arrangement is even rational or personal. The effect is still generic but cannot be ignored. For 
instance, the financial crisis may have a rationale in profit-making, but the group effect was 
highly irrational. Are cartels in fact always rational? Research by Asch and Seneca (1976) 
suggested that cartels based on seemingly simple profit motives may even defy their own aims, 
and in fact harbour an irrational strategy (Asch and Seneca, 1976). Other strategies, such as 
innovation, or bringing in new personnel, may have been superior. A cartel after all is a 
conservative response to a dynamic market environment.  
 
Therefore, if it seems far-fetched to invoke CEO and board characteristics as the absolute focus 
of an anti-cartel compliance code, or of regulatory monitoring, the new and increasingly 
universal devotion to the arts of risk management is in effect only a major umbrella for the kind 
of analysis conducted here. Tenure has been studied a great deal, as discussed, and gender is 
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increasingly of interest. However, the co-efficient for CEO characteristics, gender (CEOgen) by 
far has the greatest inhibitory effect on cartel formation (-2.96, in model 4), and in terms of 
board characteristics, the percentage of non-executive directors (NED %) also had a very 
sizeable inhibitory effect (-3.40, see model 1). It is said that gender differences may not exist 
when seen in the context of corporate decision-making, and the reason is either the women 
would try to outdo men in terms of taking risk or since the decision would be made together by 
men and women, there could not really be gender difference in the decision made (Zahid et al., 
2006). 
 
In an experiment conducted by Hamaguchi et al. (2009), gender was included as an individual or 
social background variable, in an experiment mostly designed to look for group size effects on 
cartel dissolution, along with leniency programme characteristics. The design of the research 
(which also proceeds by logistic regression), is very much alike the research pursued here in this 
study. There is certainly more attention being given to individual characteristics than ever before 
in the non-econometric analyses. Once more, the coefficient for gender in the logistic regression 
was significantly negative in showing that as well as women have a negative impact on cartel 
formation, women also have a positive impact on cartel dissolution (p<0.05), since “fewer men 
dissolved their cartels than women” (Hamaguchi, Kawagoe and Shibata, 2009). The fact of the 
matter is that gender can have as powerful an effect on cartel formation likelihood as the HHI 
concentration index, which seems a remarkable feature of the sensitivity of organisational 
culture to being diluted away from an ‘old-boy’ network characterisation. This may not be a 
quantifiable statement on ‘old-boy’ networks, but the evidence is still there in the regression 
analysis of data on gender influences controlled for market environment. ). Another study by 
Byrnes et al. (1999) found that men are more willing to take risk than women, and this gender 
difference in risk taking decreases as age increases. However, no indication of difference in 
performance was noted despite the presence of risk-related behaviour difference between male 
and female fund managers in a study conducted by Niessen and Ruenzi (2006). 
 
Moreover, the classic problems of principal-agent divisions of managerial responsibility, typified 
by aims and objectives dominated by personal gain, as well as profit maximisation, are in many 
ways inherited by the problem of a cartel. How a CEO and board (with certain characteristics) 
are more likely to assure their own personal gain and profit maximisation (including firm 
stability in difficult market conditions), through a cartel arrangement, can now be said to take 
place with some empirical precision, even if little is being said of the psychological and 
economic reasons for the cartel’s formation. This research is neither economic (if it controls for 
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market conditions), nor psychological (which of course is unexamined) but certain definite 
attributes have been discovered which would be of some importance for the internal and external 
regulatory monitoring of cartel.  
 
Tacit collusion between oligopolistic firms has been fairly well understood after decades of 
research on games theory (Friedman, 1971; Green and Porter, 1984). These analyses work with 
the ‘standard’ assumption that firms maximise discounted expected profits. The effects of 
observed managerial incentives on long-term (oligopolistic) competition, and how managers 
with a preference for “smooth time-paths of profits” [also noted in the literature as “income 
smoothing” (Loebbecke et al., 1989)] can sustain cartels at lower discount factors, make the 
presence of a cartel arrangement less observable, and allow a cartel seem less of a criminal 
offence (Spagnolo, 2004 and 2005). The economic cycle can have a considerable effect 
alongside managerial incentives, together with the threat of being forcibly retired (discussed in 
Chapter Five). In the study of Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), the authors mentioned that a 
critical role is played by factors of corporate governance in determining a firm’s behaviour 
towards competition as well as in identifying the key players in ascertaining anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
 
The tied nature of an array of economic factors and CEO and board incentives cannot be 
ignored. There is no claim for isolating CEO and board characteristics as inherently influential 
on their own, but only those that can be distinguished in controlled circumstances. These 
characteristics can and will play a part in real world scenarios where cartel formation is likely.  
 
In the real world, where strategic management and economic forces as part of globalisation are 
linked more than ever, it is the case that other organisational factors still influence a firm’s 
objective function to generate a profit on behalf of its shareholders. Understanding the soft-
system complexity is important to help understand how factors such as CEO characteristics, 
board characteristics and ownership structure can affect market behaviour, as well as how 
economic behaviour affects corporate governance. Corporate governance is said to comprise 
market competitiveness as an external mechanism, as pointed out by Lin (2001) in the literature 
review. The systems of corporate control and corporate activity under observation in this study 
are highly dynamic between market conditions and corporate volition. This is especially true 
given the prevalence of control and agency problems, when firms may follow objectives that are 





Some portions of the control and agency problems of firms when they embark on cartel 
formation and take risk (such as a growing risk in the contemporary anti-cartel vendetta of the 
U.S DoJ, for instance) can now be explained by the distribution of CEO and board attributes 
analysed in the study. However, these characteristics are only generic and not liable so far to be 
part of any individual hiring practice assessment mechanism. Yet, like much of social change 
and corporate culture in general, such as the diversity management concept, matters that before 
were seen as irrelevant to corporate success, and merely the presence of liberal anguish, now 
appear as crucial elements of strategy in a globalised economy. What a CEO is, or what a board 
is, in terms of age, tenure and gender may be seen to be static and immaterial to future success 
compared with the incipient knowledge and experience held by CEOs and the board. However, 
what those characteristics also veil are tendencies, for and against, the formation of a cartel. 
 
A cartel however cannot be communicated to investors or be broadcast as part of a strategy, as it 
is an illegitimate form of strategising, when stakeholders in corporate activities begin to include 
other competitors acting illegally as conspirators. Therefore, a cartel is an organisational culture 
in direct opposition, or standing in contradiction, to what most business commentators and 
analysts today identify as best corporate governance and strategic practice - meaning 
transparency and accountability. Transparency and accountability are what enable the underlying 
reasons for corporate strategy, and help their enactment, thus enhancing CEO and board 
credibility. The quality of corporate strategy must be tied to communication - strategy is 
basically an outline of how a business will achieve its goals, usually by innovation and talented 
employees – but a cartel cannot be communicated. This must be why, at least partly, non-
executive directorships inhibit cartel formation, since such directors are intrinsically more biased 
towards transparency and accountability, without heed to long-standing, more entrenched 
relationships in a firm. Hence, the percentage of non-executive directors (NED %), and the 
avoidance of concentrated power in organisational authority (BOSS), appear as distinctive 
inhibitors and aggravators of the likelihood for cartel formation.  
 
It may be examined that the easiest and most visible characteristic of a board is its size. The 
board is supposed to summon experience and good judgement to all decision-making and 
supervisory functions at the highest level of strategic thinking in the firm. How can the larger 
board take a decision, or follow an action or strategy that is more likely to lead to cartelisation as 
is the case of the analysis here? Clearly, it is likely that cartel formation will be connected in 
some way to an intermediate term strategy. It is true that boards are being asked to perform more 
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functions and assume more responsibility. One empirically-based micro-perspective study on 
how boards actually ‘do’ strategy showed how boards may have very little interaction with daily 
organisational practices (Hendry, 2010). Boards often conduct only a reactive or procedural 
supervision around strategy (oversight and auditing functions). This is board management as 
‘board management by exception’, that is, boards only act in exceptional circumstances. 
Otherwise, the board is merely a compliance overseer without much actual insight into the 
business and its detailed functioning. However, raising the profile and importance of this 
activity, particularly with regard to risk management, does today have a greater strategic 
importance, specifically in light of corporate governance scandals. There are only increasing 
demands on boards for oversight functions and board controls to have a strategic importance, 
and not to be mere passive vehicles of thin compliance checking (Hendry, 2010).Yet, enlarged 
boards may not be the answer.  
 
The literature review emphasised that if cartel agreement can be considered a failure of corporate 
control, i.e. a failure of the board to control (e.g., CEO, individual directors), then it may be 
furthered that the likelihood of a firm to get into the cartel agreement is positively related with 
the size of the board (Gonzalez and Schmid, 2012). Board size (SIZEBA) used as a variable in 
two of the regression models both showed that significant differences existed between cartel and 
non-cartel firms, with the board size of cartel firms averaging around two more board directors 
than non-cartel firms, rather it is board quality, and especially the presence of engaged non-
executive directors (NED%) which has the desired effect of determining cartel formation. OFT 
(2011) stated that directors in smaller firms might become more involved in day-to-day business 
practices of their firm, and might therefore be more knowledgeable of any actual or potential 
breach of competition law. In contrast, directors in larger firms might not be as involved as the 
directors in smaller firms. In a logit regression analysis of 75 matched firms characterised by 
fraud and no-fraud histories,  
 
“no-fraud firms have boards with significantly higher percentages of outside members than 
fraud firms” and, “as outside director ownership in the firm and outside director tenure on the 
board increase, and as the number of outside directorships in other firms held by outside 
directors decreases, the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases” (Beasley, 1996: 459). 
 
Non-executive directors (NED %) maintain the integrity of their erstwhile contracts to perform 
monitoring function as part of corporate governance, and the concentration of CEO and board 
chairman roles (BOSS) exactly opposes the contractual independence proven to be necessary for 
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capable corporate governance in virtually all studies of the subject. In the literature, it is 
recognised that contracts with third parties may have important strategic effects on the quality of 
corporate governance. Many of the corporate governance variables discussed in this study, such 
as board remuneration (Remun) and CEO compensation (Tcomp), can be viewed as “contracts 
with third parties from the point of view of competitors” (Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2007). In this 
regard, CEOs and boards are all third parties to be engaged variously by firms competing for the 
services of board members and experienced CEOs. This is part of the market in corporate 
governance, in terms of human resources.  
 
A cartel exists to defeat or at least negate this form of contract that should exist within firms. 
Contracts with CEOs and board members should require these actors, in fulfilment of their 
corporate leadership roles, to usher the interests of one firm and compete with all other firms. 
The rational self-interest of economic activity should extend to governance and leadership. This 
is why the DoJ, EC, and CC/OFT all have strict rules about joint ventures and mergers, which 
may interfere with the self-interested structuring of market forces, from consumers to corporate 
entities. The doctrine of the corporate veil and that legal function assumes that the corporate 
form is acting as a single corporate entity. A cartel defeats or negates the doctrine of the 
corporate veil by veiling many corporate entities within a collective corporate entity that has in 
fact no legal status in corporate law.  
 
The characteristics of the board and CEO which might function as markers for cartel formation 
would be white-collar criminals capable of expert networking at very high levels of corporate 
activity, and who are willing to become an offender, and often a re-offender, with the aim and 
objective of securing corporate gains that ultimately should benefit the said offender(s), but 
however, are deferred gains in terms of their own wealth and remuneration. This is the behaviour 
of a personality and group of people who appreciate the organisational culture of at least one 
industrial sector, and who are heavily invested personally, and even idealise, the status of their 
own firm amongst other firms within that sector.  
 
Cartel is a defence of an industry as well as of a firm, against the interests of the consumer in 
general. In fact, cartel participants even over-identify with corporate culture and dis-identify 
with consumer culture. This may even help explain why aged CEOs (CEOage) with shorter 
tenure (CEOten) expectations may be more responsible for cartel formation than other older 
CEOs, since such CEOs may be about to depart from corporate culture after a long association. 
In the threat of departure, the potential comfort of a cartel as a point of identification with a 
225 
 
shared corporate culture amongst multiple firms may be more appealing. This of course is to 
verge on a psychological explanation of CEO characteristics. In this group of people, it makes 
more sense that corporate fines, and any other corporate sanction, will have less impact since 
these individuals are already identifying with corporate cartel culture, and these forms of 
punishment are an ordinary risk, rather than a critical risk, of corporate activity. This must help 
explain the difference in recidivism in the UK and U.S jurisdictions. In the UK, to abandon 
competition in favour of a cartel, on a number of occasions, already indicates the more 
normative identification of CEOs and boards with corporate versus consumer culture. This is 
clearly not the case with the aggressive and hostile pursuit of cartel activity by US authorities, 
where the corporate contract with the consumer, and never with other corporations, remains 
moral and ethical as well as economic virtue par excellence.  
 
In fact, the negation of the erstwhile capitalist and free market contract with the consumer will 
thereby homogenise corporate governance around a hidden corporate ‘cartel’ structure. This is a 
strategy to defeat the conflict between firms by substituting the cartel agreement as the principal 
agent of agents. A cartel negates the point of view of other firms acting as competitors looking 
on at CEO and board contracts. In other words, the cartel defeats the market in corporate 
governance, or at least suspends the market in corporate governance for the duration of the 
cartel. Why should a market in corporate governance exist when it is understood that profits and 
market shares are already pre-determined in advance? Any movement at C-suite level between 
erstwhile ‘competitor’ firms during the operation of a cartel would seem an ineffective and even 
disruptive manoeuvre.  
 
A cartel is a strategy that seeks to nullify strategy – this also helps explain why older and not 
younger CEOs seem to be more palatable to cartel formation, if older CEOs are strategically 
exhausted, and only have a network of contacts, an address book to put it crudely, as a strategy 
in difficult conditions. This research has indicated that C-suite transfers between firms are 
generally an inhibition on cartel formation (JOIN). A cartel is a stasis of strategy that is partly 
reflected in the individual characteristics of older CEOs with shorter tenure, and a lesser traffic 
in the market for corporate governance within a firm. The results from previous research on the 
role of outside directors in monitoring management and controlling agency problems suggest 
that a relatively large percentage of independent directors serve as a substitute for other types of 
monitoring mechanisms (Booth et al., 2002). In the literature review, Rajagopalan and Datta 
(1996) examined any possible association between CEO characteristics and comprehensive 
industry conditions and found out that a limited role is played by industry conditions in tackling 
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differences in CEO tenure, educational background, and functional heterogeneity. Moreover, 
Booth et al. (2002) found that agency problems between management and shareholders played a 
role in motivations to add outside directors, or as this study agrees, JOIN had a negative co-
efficient compared to raised cartel formation and discovery (CONV).  
 
In a scenario of denied contractual obligations to compete, the only strategic competitor to a 
cartel – since the consumer is now the enemy - becomes the regulatory bodies with direct 
supervisory powers of investigation, both commercial and criminal. Related to the question if C-
suite movement between cartel members has any significance could be the question if movement 
between public and private entity personnel could have any influence on cartel formation. Thus, 
many of the recommendations of this study, as well as focussing on risk assessments as a new 
avenue of anti-cartel activity, will focus on regulation becoming more proactive. In this regard, 
the US DoJ has been and continues to be in the vanguard of anti-cartel criminal and civil 
procedures. However, there does remain room for more research in how to identify preliminaries 
that help the formation of cartels. The figures for cartel discovery suggest that there is still a 
great deal of room for improvement in detection rates. 
 
In many ways, this study has complemented the work of Grillo (2002). Instead of focus on 
competition law and how market strategies are nullified by the “straightforward co-ordination on 
market strategies”, the focus of this research describes how multiple firms design and practice an 
organisational culture in a cartel arrangement, or what Grillo calls “an anticompetitive object”. 
This anticompetitive object can more easily be reproduced amongst certain kinds of boards and 
with certain types of CEO – this is the conclusion of this research. In many ways, the obvious 
object is obtained and arranged by recruiting a CEO with a previous history of cartel formation 
and involvement. In fact, CEOCASE was more significant than CEONUM as seen by the 
difference in the coefficients in Models 5 and 6. In these models, CEO tenure, age, managerial 
position in respect of the chairman of the board being the CEO, and multiple directorships, are 
all the same, as well as the control variables. The difference is the addition of either the CEO’s 
total number of cartel cases the CEO was involved in (CEONUM); versus the CEO involvement 
in another cartel at the same time (CEOCASE). By the lower coefficient for the number of 
cartel cases, cartel cases have a raised effect compared to the number of cases per se. Past 
history is a guide to the future, and that previous involvement in cartel activity may well be an 




The research in part constitutes a profiling exercise. However, in criminal justice studies in 
general, the more focused the profiling technique is on individual offenders (including CEOs); 
the more controversial becomes the use of profiling. For instance, in light of recent events in the 
UK after the collapse of the cartel trial against British Airways (BA) for fuel surcharges, lawyers 
argued that “criminal cases should be selected based on the strength of evidence and not on the 
profile of the defendants” (Beaton-Wells and Exrachi, 2010).  
 
Any use of quantitative (general spreadsheet, actuarial, or machine learning) techniques in 
gauging and understanding the behaviour of individuals is controversial. However, business 
culture is becoming more data-centric and analytical in its use of insights derived from the 
analysis of datasets. Best practice is increasingly focused on such insights often with more 
centralised control over decision-making. Boards and senior management would be the prime 
users of risk tools that invoke actuarial practices.  
 
However, the conversion of data to the management of individual persons and contexts is 
contestable (Aitken et al., 1996). Assembled data cannot and should not determine decisions on 
individuals, even in principle. The necessary appreciation of the dynamism of individuals 
supposedly cannot be recreated from collected data, no matter if the analysis is expert and adroit. 
Others argue that the level of accuracy of actuarial tools is too uncertain for estimating any 
individual’s risk, especially in terms of offending rates (Hart, Michie and Cooke, 2007). This 
would include rates of cartel offences and the associated risks of cartel formation by certain 
CEOs.  
 
The subject of this research thus will attract criticism as an inappropriate method for identifying 
the raised likelihood of cartel activity. Newer methods and uses of profiling may be ‘interesting’, 
but any method should be used according to its suitability for specific applications (Sampson and 
Laub, 2005). However, in the criminological literature, it has been more and more accepted, with 
more and more proof having been accumulated, that actuarial methods of offender profiling have 
greater accuracy than clinical (versus personal, and intuitive professional assessments done face-
to-face). Statistical means can predict the likelihood of recidivism better than clinical 
assessments made by professionals (Veljanovski, 2011). 
 
The fact that many UK firms are recidivist, and take part in multiple cartel arrangements at 
multiple times, might also suggest that some ‘objective’ quality of the corporate governance and 
organisational culture is persistent, and given over to abetting the formation of cartels. This may 
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of course be partly dependent on the market environment (the HHI index in particular), as well 
as the legal environment (the latter as a deterrent to recidivism, such as in the US), but the 
organisational culture and human resource selections of an organisation may be given to 
accommodate the possibility of engaging in cartel arrangements. Firms with given board and 
CEO characteristics in certain industries and market conditions have a latent tendency to 
cartelise competition. This reproduction of an anticompetitive object must indeed be facilitated 
by the human resource management of cartel firms, whether or not boards and CEO positions are 
publicly advertised, or whether the positions are filled with private sponsorship of known 
individuals (the old-boy network in classic terminology). 
 
A truer measure of the ability of a board to get involved in a cartel arrangement, and access or 
consolidate market power, is the board’s bargaining power, or the power of a board to bargain 
with others and demonstrate, and remonstrate, that a cartel is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the economic welfare of all parties to the cartel (and even the consumer in the 
cartel of the crisis situation). The reason most cartel fail is due to new entrants outside of the 
cartel entering a market, and thereby disrupting the cartel to the point of breakdown (Grossman, 
2004). Often, entry will be followed by an invitation to join a cartel, and without a successful 
conclusion to the ‘bargaining problem’ of new quotas, failure is more likely, but this is not 
labelled an entry problem per se, and is a bargaining problem. Therefore, for a cartel to be 
expected to last, the board, and CEO, plus any other organisers, must be capable of bargaining 
for its duration. 
 
This is not to refer to the bargaining power of economic competition (with sellers and buyers 
bargaining over the best price for a product). This is instead to bargain over entry to a cartel, and 
for one firm to lever other firms into a cartel, even though other firms may judge that the 
potential ‘price’ they are paying (fines, loss of reputation, and criminal charges) is too high, 
compared to the promised benefit of raised or secured profits. Can cartels be treated as an 
investment? Schelling (1960) cites the example of an oligopolistic market whose apparent 
domination by the few using price leadership may in fact be an “unprofitable distinction evaded 
by the small firms and assumed perforce” by bigger firms. Smaller firms may well seek out 
differentiators that large firms eschew and instead opt for the supposed safety of a cartel and its 
pseudo-contractual commitment between competitors.  
 
However, like an actual contract, a cartel arrangement is usually the “assumption of a’ transfer 
cost,’ not a real cost”, and entry into a cartel by all of the interested parties does not remove the 
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“range of indeterminacy” that is the transfer cost of moving in or out of the cartel (Schelling, 
1960). This is by knowing how to judge this transfer cost, which is usually a matter of 
significant CEO, board or senior management experience, operational influence control, and 
board monitoring processes. This is why both CEOAGE and BOSS were positive influences on 
cartel formation likelihood. 
 
 6.1.1 Ownership Concentration and Cartel Formation 
Literature suggests that shareholder value is maximized through the authority and greater 
incentives of the larger shareholders. The larger owners have greater motivation as well as better 
opportunities than the smaller shareholder to exercise authority over the manager, according to 
the empirical evidence available (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Zeckhouser and Pound, 1990; 
Burkart, 1997).  
 
Further models have been created from the views of Jensen and Meckling (1976) regarding 
issues of ownership structure, and consider not just the extent of ownership of the firm insiders, 
but also the concentration of outside shareholders’ holdings (OUTOWN %). The larger 
shareholders largely internalize the costs of supervision in addition to possessing adequate 
voting power to be able to have an impact on the corporate decisions which is why management 
is supervised better through them rather than the smaller shareholders.  
 
Firm profitability is considered to be positively affected by the structure of ownership (Berle and 
Means (1932)). The expectations of the agency theory have been supported by other scholars in 
continuation of this debate (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This includes the greater managerial 
incentives to diversify when ownership and control are separated as the managers are able to 
gain personal benefits due to risk diversification and reduction. This follows from the fact that 
managerial performance cannot be supervised by the greater number of shareholders. If the 
ownership was more concentrated (family firms) or if there was a single shareholder, managers 
would not have enough freedom to utilize firm resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
 
Diversification studies have shown that in product or market diversification, greater personal 
benefits including financial and reputational are acquired by the managers during product or 
market diversification due to risk aversion, empire building and expense preference (Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000). Greater shareholder value is created through ownership concentration which 
also offsets corporate diversification. The managers’ tendency to increase their monetary status 
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and reputation through diversification and rapid development does not maximize the firm’s 
market value, as the agency theory states (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When the managers are 
not forced by the owners or external investors to meet the interest of the owners which is to 
enhance the firm’s market value, they are not inclined to downsize or diversify in the reverse 
manner. According to the agency theory, the ownership structure hence determines the 
managers’ tendency to increase firm value. Further examination of this theory was carried out by 
Amihud and Lev (1981), with the results confirming the view that investments in unrelated 
mergers and acquisitions were less likely to be made by the managers employed in firms that had 
large shareholders.  
 
The systems of control that bring about an alignment of the managers’ interests with that of the 
shareholders’ is another aspect of corporate governance that is being studied. Ownership 
concentration (family firms for example) which includes risk and incentive efficiency trade-off 
is an example of such a control mechanism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986). A greater motivation to supervise is possessed by the larger shareholders, 
which is why they need to compel the managers to bring their goals in line with their interests of 
enhancing the share value. However, when ownership concentration exceeds a certain degree, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that managers get a chance to become entrenched and confiscate 
the minority shareholders’ assets. The possibility of a non-linear association between firm 
performance and ownership concentration is hence being argued over by the scholars now.  
 
Ownership concentration in firms does not necessarily lead to greater disclosure; however a 
positive and vital impact comes about through the composition of the board. There is a strong 
association between ownership concentration and quality of corporate governance in legal 
regimes that are weak, as has been suggested through the negative coefficient of law variable 
with the index of corporate governance. Ownership concentration hence becomes the method of 
resolution of agency conflict between the shareholders that are in control and the ones in 
minority when the investors are not given ample legal protection. Poor legal security then leads 
to ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1999; Durnev and Kim, 2006). 
 
Additionally, agency problems between the families in control and other shareholders may either 
aggravate or alleviate due to family control, which plays a significant role in addition to 
ownership concentration. Steijvers et al. (2010) puts forward the view that family-controlled 
firms are more likely to encounter agency problems. In such firms, the controlling family has the 
complete authority to appoint the members of its family to the board or management team 
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because of which it is able to attain maximum benefits for itself and have a low level of 
corporate transparency. In such situations, external monitoring is not favoured by the family-
controlled firms so that the private interests of the family are protected, which is why low-
quality auditors are hired (Niskanen et al., 2011a). 
 
The results revealed in this study exhibits the concept of ownership concentration prevailing in 
cartel firms. This ownership concentration is understood within the context of a prevailing global 
competition where firms collude in order to increase their profitability and stability. Laiho 
(2011) has emphasised that the firm’s resources might be extracted by dominant owners due to 
high ownership concentration. The firm’s ownership structure may be taken into account with 
regard to this; as such structure enables ease of ownership concentration, as shown by high-
ownership owners who use their position to obtain private benefit.  
 
However, the formation of cartel is significantly and negatively influenced by the family firm 
(FAMCON) as the results shown in Model 2. The claim that family owners create enhanced 
governance and supervisory systems has been affirmed through this result. The agency problem 
between managers and owners can be lessened through family control which is why significant 
and negative effects of family shareholdings are obtained (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The large 
shareholders are better able to monitor the management compared to small shareholders. This is 
because large shareholders (family firms) internalise larger aspects of the monitoring costs and 
possess sufficient voting power in corporate decisions. Small shareholders, on the other hand, 
are only able to influence corporate decision making at a minimum basis. Because small 
shareholders have little influence on decision making, the managers then hold the control of the 
firm, who possess both the opportunities and incentive of misusing their position. It is therefore 
concluded that corporate performance would be adversely affected by the ownership-control 
separation (Laiho, 2011; Hamdani and Yafeh, 2010; Leech, 2001). According to James (1999), 
there is greater efficiency in investments as families possess a long term perspective on 
investment. When the shareholders have a long term view, the manager’s tendency to take 
myopic investment decisions can be greatly reduced, as Stein (1989) asserts.  
 
An explanation of this result could be as demonstrated in Chapter Five that the study sample is 
dominated by UK public firms, and according to Desender (2009) and Franks and Mayer (1997) 
who have argued that shareholder structures are fairly varied across countries, where frequency 
of dispersed ownership is seen in listed firms of US and UK, which means that several small 
shareholders are associated with the phenomenon of dispersed ownership and dispersed voting 
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power. When there is a wide distribution of share ownership, for example in the UK, the owners 
do have the motivation to become active owners and as their proportion of shareholdings is quite 
small; their voting power is quite weak which means that they can cause little influence on 
decision making (cartel formation), which makes the decision on the top management hands.  
 
6.2 Cartel and Compliance Code Needs 
Cartels have never been feared and loathed as they are often today. Before WWII and the height 
of cartel dominance, cartel governed roughly 40% of world trade (UN Department of Economic 
Affairs, 1947). Only since the post-WWII settlement, and especially with US economic 
dominance, have cartel been treated as more or less abhorrence to economic welfare. In Europe, 
Japan and Korea, cartel instead received a much more tolerant dispensation. Yet today, there is 
without question a “hardening of attitude of competition authorities worldwide towards cartel” 
(Whish, 2009). The US has always been uncompromising, the OECD has made major 
interventions in denouncing especially hard-core cartel. In Chapter Two, it has been shown that 
the number of cartel cases filed by the antitrust fell by 49% from 1990 to 2007, alongside the 
number of firms charged annually, which decreased continuously. The penalties imposed on 
convicted firms have increased however (Connor, 2008). In 2005, the EC set up its own 
dedicated Cartel Directorate and the UK has very recently loosened the criminal elements of its 
cartel offence to make prosecution easier. Furse (2004) for instance, contested the equivalence of 
cartel activity with theft, pointing to the voluntary participation of the customer, albeit on false 
information. However, the UK Enterprise Act’s own intention was to make the analogy more 
accessible. The history of antitrust legislation in Europe itself has been “very much one of 
American influence” (Wils, 2005 and 2006).  
 
The US value system around competition is that a “working competitive process is a precious 
public benefit that should be safeguarded” (Cseres, Schinkel, and Vogelaar, 2006). This is 
becoming more of a new norm, in the UK and EU jurisdictions, although resistance in the UK 
remains perplexingly strong. In a 2007 public survey, only a quarter of respondents ‘strongly 
agreed’ price fixing was even dishonest, and fewer than ten percent felt criminal prosecution and 
imprisonment was then an appropriate punishment (Stephan, 2008a). Another problem is how 
the EC still remains inconsistent and excessively secret as to how fines and penalties, especially 
in regard of leniency measures, finally affect outcomes (Veljanovsk, 2011). For instance, one of 
the worst recidivists, Akzo Nobel, received complete immunity in the Calcium Carbide cartel 
despite involvement in four previous cartels. Akzo similarly received full immunity in the 
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Sodium Chlorate cartel discovery but once more, past cartel infringements were not presented as 
aggravating circumstances deserving of exemplary punishment. Vafeas (2003) also worryingly 
found that “the audit committee is mostly regarded as a compliance committee”. Where the 
number of outside directors is limited (NED% is low), new directors are likely to go on the audit 
committee and remain in the committee for an extended period of time. This expectation and 
restriction of choice may well lower the quality of monitoring independence so that a more 
passive compliance, rather than proactive auditing, may be the norm (Vafeas, 2003).  
 
This finding in fact may have implications for the monitoring of a compliance code for cartel 
activity. The audit function of the initial risk assessment and identification process might 
experience the same problems as other auditing bodies when committee membership defaults to 
longer tenures. The committee should have as wide a body of participants as possible, including 
outside directors, with change on a regular basis. The tenure of the audit committee thus shares 
some aspects of the result for CEO tenure, and this change guards against cartel formation.  
 
Being proactive in anti-cartel is first of all being aware of either regulators or board members. 
The “paramount problem” around optimising an oligopolistic market structure is “to devise and 
maintain communication systems that permit behaviour to be co-ordinated in the common 
interest” (Scherer and Ross, 1990). This communication will solve the two working problems of 
co-ordination on price, and enforceability of arrangements in order to stop cheating and 
‘chiselling’ (Symeonidis, 2002). Social ties and a ‘homogeneity of values’ can foment collusion 
and make design, co-ordination, and cartel agency problems more easily solved (Symeonidis, 
2002). An infamous example of board level conviviality producing a cartel was the Gary 
Dinners that made for an American steel cartel in the early 20
th
 century, which made cooperation 
between affectionately known competitors “more binding… than any written or verbal 
contract” (Scherer and Ross, 1990).  
 
As noted in §2.10, the forces and motivations between internal corporate incentives and market 
conduct are very complex. Yet, displaying and communicating control over corporate 
governance and internal controls is now a very desirable and incentivised corporate goal. These 
forces and motivations have been particularly studied in the context of strategic delegation, but 
much less with respect to cartel practices. In particular, if shareholders also may benefit from 
collusion, the question of shareholder responsibility in inducing collusive agreement arises. This 




The literature on cartel formation and collusion more generally has consistently underestimated 
the importance of channels and skills in communication that assist the formation and 
sustainability of cartel. Economics is mostly concerned with equilibrium outcomes, and not the 
dynamic organisational structures and paths of communication by which equilibrium becomes 
more likely through exchanges of information. By contrast, this is exactly the type of analysis 
called for in legal proceedings investigating collusion. There is a pronounced gap between the 
theoretical quality of economics and the practical matter of establishing accountability and 
attributing responsibility (Grout and Sonderegger, 2005). This gap may well be one reason why 
the frequency of prosecution in some jurisdictions, such as the UK, has been lamentably low.  
 
The fact that the authorities are now more willing to pierce the corporate veil in pursuit of 
executive connected to cartel operation is a significant step that firms and executives must bear 
in mind with care. The new willingness to pierce the veil is most noticeable around bribery and 
fraud activities. For instance, consultancies are not establishing more and more supervisory and 
internal audit controls to help with information accuracy, comprehensiveness, and currency, and 
hence with regulatory compliance.  
 
Ernst and Young’s (2012) report, Global bribery and corruption fraud risks, describe how the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently settled a civil action against a retailer after 
two executives were charged in connection with bribery at Brazilian subsidiary, when customs 
officials were bribed. While the two executives had no direct supervisory role and absolutely no 
operational connection to the subsidiary, and hence had no connection to the improper payments, 
the SEC argued that both executives failed to comply with the rigorous terms of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), simply by failing to ensure a sufficient level of internal control 
(Young, 2012). Could there be a system of internal control that may be expected to police and 
act as a deterrent against the risk of cartel formation? This study has made a contribution to 
understanding how, and in what comparative measure, CEO and board characteristics do 
contribute to cartel formation likelihood.  
 
Research such as this is also being pursued in a wider geographic frame. In China, where 
corruption and poor corporate governance have been increasingly recognised, new studies have 
shown that board characteristics play a vital role in assuring good corporate governance (Gulzar 
and Wang, 2011). Studies have found, as here, that there are significant and positive correlations 
between management earnings and CEO / chair concentration power (BOSS in this study), board 
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meetings, female directorships (GENBA % in this study) and concentrated ownership 
(FAMCON in this study) (Young, 2012). 
 
Fama’s (1980) well-known analysis of the principal-agent problem dispensed with the 
presumption that a firm has a distinctive set of owners, in any definitive sense. The legendary 
roles of the ‘entrepreneur’ and of the strong guidance of an owner-leader should also be 
contained for the purpose of analysing modern corporate entities of considerable size and 
complexity. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur - management and risk 
bearing - are taken as naturally separate factors “within the set of contracts a firm is called” 
(Fama, 1980). The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, and this competition 
spurs the evolution of management devices (and risk tools) for efficiently monitoring the 
performance of the corporate board as well as the CEO. Individual participants including the 
CEOs and outside directors, as well as managers, are presented with both disciplinary measures 
and opportunities by markets vying for their services, and this form of competition is transmitted 
into the firm from without, to operate within the firm (intra-firm competition) as well as outside 
it (inter-firm competition) (Fama, 1980).  
 
This is apparently critical since cartel competition exists to nullify first of all, by definition, 
inter-firm competition. However, this research has shown that inter-firm competition may be 
highly significant in protecting against the risk of cartel formation. That is, female CEO 
(CEOgen) and a higher percentage of non-executive directors (NED%) can present an anti-
cartel, competitive effect, in terms of corporate governance, against the constellation of an aged 
CEO (CEOage) with not a great deal of tenure (CEOten) left, in all likelihood, who is capable 
and prepared to organise a cartel. This study would support the notion that internal competition 
over corporate governance, through stable boards with female representation and outside 
directors, can balance the risk of cartel formation. 
 
Yet, cartel remains complex and dynamic objects. There may be an apparent explication of why 
CEOs and boards might choose to form a cartel, but price dynamics alone are not altogether 
sufficient to explain any given cartel in its specific political and social context, as well as in 
economic context. The weight of research so far has more or less emphasised how cartels fail, 
rather than why they arise (except as price mechanism for market power by oligopolistic forces). 
This research has instead contributed to an effort to describe both qualitatively and quantitatively 
some of the factors that might precipitate cartel formation, by researching the data and 
developing a model of matched cartel and non-cartel firms, and then comparing cartel and non-
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cartel attributes as to CEO and corporate governance characteristics. As Fear (2007) comments, 
the “internal organisational dynamics of cartels needs more research, embedding it in economic, 
organisational, and political theory”.  
 
Internal controls comprise a great many delegated and now often automated functions of 
corporate governance. Sarbanes-Oxley changed the landscape of corporate governance by 
nominating corporate boards as responsible for highly detailed auditing and internal control 
processes that must be monitored and assured by the board. Risk management, which used 
perhaps to be an arcane mandate of mathematical and economic exactitude, now assumes a far 
more system-wide and holistic role, including overall IT and information resources. If boards 
make decisions on internal control and auditing, and this responsibility assumes a greater profile 
today, as in SOX – how this responsibility could be denominated in respect of internal controls 
over cartel formation - remains a subject for more research.  
 
The fundamental question has been who will police the policy in respect of the corporate board 
and CEOs of major corporations? There are two paths to supervision. The internal supervisory is 
a function of the board, which is supposed to fulfil the remit of policing. The second is of course 
external supervision and engagement with public regulators (which also leaves open the question 
of who can regulate public entities with equal integrity). 
 
The answer in the past would have been to rely on the integrity of the board, in a passive 
manner, and especially a manner that rested on the social and intellectual distinction of the board 
and its inferred status, as well as the board’s presumed integrity. There are two problems with 
this perspective. Recent history has shown that boards are either corruptible (the old boys’ 
network adage), or not engaged enough. The frequency of board meetings in some firms can 
even be very low. It will be regulators, partly as third parties overseeing contracts that will have 
to bear the extra burdens of time and other resources.  
 
Therefore, it is appreciated how the US DoJ has set a highly sophisticated example of how to 
disrupt cartel activity using its carrot-and-stick techniques. In tandem with individual sanctions, 
amnesty programmes have been developed for individual executives, often to find if multiple 
cartel arrangements are in progress. When a firm fixes prices in one market, cartel arrangements 
in other markets may well be likely, in the experience of DoJ investigators (LeClair, 2011). The 
latest version of DoJ amnesty dispensation, Amnesty Plus, invites executives to disclose all past 
and current involvement in collusive agreements, but with increased individual penalties for 
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obstructing justice in a cartel case. The DoJ has embarked on extensive publicity exercises to 
broadcast as widely as possible the new risks attached to remaining silent in a cartel case. The 
whole culture of cartel disruption by investigatory bodies, if the US lead is taken (and the OECD 
is a strong supporter of such a lead) will be to exercise increased pressure on individuals at all 
levels, but especially at board and C-suite level. Executive obstruction of justice will be treated 
by DoJ investigations as aggravated offences if discovered (LeClair, 2011). Sentences in the US 
are of increasing severity, so much so that the average sentence for antitrust offences between 
2000–2005 was double that of the 1990s (Cseres, Schinkel, and Vogelaar, 2006). Directors have 
been known to lie to firm lawyers for many years as to meetings with competitors (Jephcott and 
Lübbig, 2003). This kind of behaviour should become unacceptable. 
 
Studies have now investigated the career path of individual managers who have been involved in 
cartel activity. Rosenboom’s (2012) research for instance focussed on Holland, where the usual 
EC penalties (10 percent of overall global revenue) and personal fines up to € 450,000 are turned 
into public information. The effect is to exert reputational damage and a strong negative effect in 
career progression. The study uses binary and multinomial logit modelling techniques similar to 
those used in this study. Rosenboom showed that reputational damage is in fact linked to 
subsequent career damage, and that by extension, more grievous reputational damage will have a 
greater deterrent effect on individual managers who may be tempted to engage in cartel activity. 
Since cartel activity is increasingly a strategic management choice in a globalised environment, 
where the temptations may be considerable and the cloaking and difficulty of investigation 
effects of international collusion may be great, Rosenboom’s findings are also significant for 
CEO and management deterrent.  
 
Increasing the individual punishment factor to include jail sentence would be expected to have a 
large effect. Since this study has found that individual CEO characteristics have a large effect on 
the likelihood of cartel formation, responding with individual sanctions that deliberately 
undermine the reputation of individuals, meaning jail sentences even of minimal length, could 
have significant deterrent effects. Further research is called for to help quantify and qualify just 
how jail sentences have career effects, but of course, research in the US where sentencing is 
more routine, does show that recidivism is a very rare event. Europe thus has much to learn in 
developing a comparable punishment regime to match that of American experience (as well as 




Corporate governance is an effective tool for maintaining performance and safeguarding the 
corporate financial security of firms, and this is especially critical in emerging and privatising 
economies. These kinds of economies (including those in China) are generally exposed to higher 
external risks, operational transitions, and diversification (Dharwardkar, George, and Brandes, 
2000). The proper scope of corporate governance in agency theory is limited to the relationship 
between managers and owners of the firm. Agency costs include those involved in shareholders 
monitoring the performance of managers. Yet, designing a contract to eliminate all possible 
sources of agency risk is impossible (Jensen and Murphy, 2004). There will always be agency 
risks involved in the limited firm form of organisation. Agency theory requires good corporate 
governance tools, techniques, policies and procedures to minimise agency costs. This study, by 
providing a new empirical tool, could contribute to monitoring the risks of collusion, especially 
in developing countries, and help investors or other firms with decisions around investment, 
whether capital or foreign direct investment. 
 
Firms will also do well to examine the risk of inadvertent cartel activity. A leading UK antitrust 
lawyer, Luke Tolaini, advised that the new UK measures mean employees might go to jail for 
inadvertent behaviour. Deliberate price fixing may offer a clear example, but more subtle and 
less blatant cases might arise, and hence “employees at risk really need to be trained in what 
they can and can’t do when it comes to communications with competitors” (Chadderton, 2012). 
Training around cartel provision will need to be increased amongst firms. Boards should also be 
aware that sudden price changes and employee familiarity with competitors’ strategies, or 
meetings with competitors, need to be investigated (OFT, 2010). It is also worth noting that 
compliance programme may well act as an aggravating factor in the imposition of any fine 
(Jephcott and Lübbig, 2003).  
 
Moreover, a firm facing cartel-related exposure must navigate a path laden with pitfalls: varying 
obligations and exposure across jurisdictions; risk of cross-jurisdictional disclosure even without 
a waiver; and the fact that amnesty or leniency in one jurisdiction does not ensure amnesty or 
leniency in another. Firms must carefully evaluate the conflicting incentives and complications 
around cartels, and develop a sophisticated global approach to mitigate cartel-related exposure 
with a comprehensive compliance programme (Fishbein, Kafele and O’Neill, 2012). Given that 
fines are likely to rise, as evidence mounts that the deterrent effect is wholly sub-optimal, the 
implementation and adaptation of a compliance code will only become more pressing (Lande 




6.3 Corporate Anti-Cartel Compliance Programme 
There are five basic elements that have been identified as pivotal to a comprehensive compliance 
code program (Furse and Nash, 2004): 
 
i. Audit function – This is a broad based assessment of what firm activities might actually 
be subject to competition law. As such, the audit is a risk identification procedure. 
The audit is to be conducted by either firm or external lawyers with advanced 
knowledge and experience of competition law. An audit can identify prospective 
problems that could potentially be of significance in relation to competition law. The 
audit should cover both the civil/ administrative and criminal law elements of the 
appropriate legislation. Separating out civil from criminal codes and sanctions is not 
advised, and sends the wrong signal that there are lesser penalties for some forms of 
cartel activity. Familiarity with the firm, the market, and market dynamics would be 
essential to establish a baseline standard of transparency that should grow in time. 
Questionnaires directed to senior management and board personnel, as well as the 
CEO, shall seek out relevant financial and corporate information, plus the internal 
perceptions of firm activity. An acfirming document should provide a description of 
competition law and typical cartel terminology, including typical cover phrases that 
disguise cartel operations. As a distinct form of audit practice, there should be special 
focus on the sales and marketing departments, since these employees have the 
greatest volume of communication exchanges with other firms and competitors. 
Private contracts over intermediate products (such as the lysine cartel) present 
especially higher (structural) risks of cartel formation. Past problems and personnel 
likely to be involved should be focus points. Areas of high, medium, and low risk 
activity can be identified and placed in a special risk register, using “examples of 
activities that raise competition law risk” (OFT, 2010). 
 
ii. Risk assessment – The risk assessment draws on the audit to measure and balance out 
the potential consequences of those activities affected by competition and cartel 
offences in the civil and criminal spheres. Jurisdictional differences such as the de 
minimis condition of EU legislation (not applicable in the US) should be made clear. 
A cost benefit analysis in the EU might persuade a firm that a risk is acceptable since 
the threat of detection and penalties may be lesser than abandoning a specific activity. 
However, criminal sanction will have to be assessed on different as well as more 
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intangible merits. The reputational costs to senior management and the firm, and 
incarceration for senior management, may be too imperative in certain jurisdictions to 
allow any, even minor dispensation, towards cartel activity. Either the activity 
triggering cartel offence sanctions is terminated or notification given to the relevant 
authority of the arrangement with an application for exemption from e.g. EU Article 
81. The risks associated with continuation of the activity, and concealment, including 
the destruction of evidence, should be made clear, including terms of imprisonment 
and personal fines. 
 
iii. Modifications in organisational behaviour and responses to competition law using the 
findings of the audit and risk assessment. The design and implementation of any 
compliance programme depends heavily on proper sponsorship by C-suite executives 
and senior management through mission statements including norms and values 
expected of the organisational culture of the firm. A code of ethics can be used to 
achieve a similar effect of high expectations in regard of organisational behaviour. 
The expectations must be placed upon all relevant employees and directors. The 
expectations of full compliance with the law might also be contained in written 
undertakings in employment contracts which allow for disciplinary proceedings 
should an employee be found to have engaged in cartel activity. Specific conduct 
modifications after the fact of the initial setting of policy must also be formalised and 
written down in redesigned policies. The board and ethics committee should maintain 
sufficient autonomy from the CEO and senior management in respect of 
independently monitoring code compliance, and be offered sufficient resources and 
authority to implement that monitoring role with exactitude and authority. 
 
iv. Training. Once suitable policies are in place, training must be at the heart of the risk 
mitigation process. The risk assessment of the firm’s activities must be fully 
understood by all employees, and that either intentional or negligent breaches of 
cartel law can command an assortment of disciplinary, civil and potentially criminal 
sanctions. Training, as well as notifying employees of the adverse effects of cartel 
infringements, should also stress building employee confidence over ‘the rules of the 
game,’ and stimulate an ethical business culture with reputational advantages to the 
firm. The same training can include and augment many other forms of compliance, 
over anti-bribery, corruption, internal fraud, or health and safety and environmental 
issues. All new employees should be trained in the code. More generally, the details 
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of the law itself should be available for further inspection. The firm’s attitude should 
be proactive and reinforced by follow-on training sessions for all staff. The firm shall 
take account all relevant legal and market developments as well as evolving global 
and industry standards to update and adopt the compliance code as necessary to 
ensure its continued effectiveness. In particular, all members of the board should be 
completely familiar with current requirements for code compliance. Periodic testing 
of employees’ knowledge of competition law should be undertaken. In particular, 
testing can focus on the particular risks on non-compliance with certain firms in 
certain market positions. For instance, the risks of cartel involvement are different for 
small player in very large markets compared to dominant firms (OFT, 2010). Joint 
ventures and co-operative arrangements may need special diligence and training. 
Training by ‘box-ticking’ for all employees without distinction of roles and risk 
exposure, or a ‘one size fits all’ approach to compliance can in fact be 
counterproductive (OFT, 2010: 28). Complex matters of competition law, including 
intellectual property and patent abuse, should be covered as appropriate. 
 
v. Cultural change if necessary, along with proper evaluation of current behaviour and the 
identification of improvements and gaps, with an action plan to remedy current or 
potential shortcomings. The issue of cartel code compliance should be a regular point 
of discussion at board and senior management meetings. An ethics committee may 
encourage and support anti-cartel policies at every level of firm activity, including 
subsidiaries. Compliance and reporting potential violations of compliance should 
become the duty of employees at every level of the firm. Confidential reporting 
channels and amnesty programmes should be developed. The OFT recommends 
appointing a ‘compliance champion’ so that responsibility and accountability is 
further personalised and has a focus point in the organisation, at the same time as 
code compliance develops as a general norm (OFT, 2010: 18). Violations of 
competition law at any level should be immediately reported to the authorities. The 
allowable scope of communications and relations with competitors, and within trade 
associations, should be understood. Communication records should be treated on a 
potential evidentiary basis, and procedures for handling ‘smoking guns’ must be 
formalised. Ultimately, management by exception (C-suite takes over from senior 






6.4 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter highlights the results laid down in Chapter Five to offer specific answers to the 
research questions. A cartel is a response of the firm to the increasingly competitive and 
challenging environment. This study tackles how human and organisational factors can 
potentially exacerbate or reduce the formation of cartel. Globalisation, modernisation processes, 
and technological advancement increased the opportunities and potential benefits of cartel 
formation. The link between corporate governance and market competition demonstrates the rise 
of complex international competition prevailing in the current global environment, which 
therefore ushers the formation of cartels. Contacts amongst firms have been raised by new 
information technology and the rise of globalisation, which characterise the new dynamics of 
strategic business management in a globalised system. Optimal governance structures are likely 
to characterise firms surviving the competition, whilst failure and demise are the potential 
outcomes for those who fail to adapt their corporate governance structures to the rapidly 
changing business environment.  
 
Before the upsurge of cartel scandals, firms were not assessed solely on financial performance 
criteria but also on analysis of boards and CEOs. The study has focused not on competition law 
or the nullification of market strategies, but on how organisational culture in a cartel 
arrangement is created and practiced by multiple firms.  
 
The persistence of some objective quality of corporate governance is seen in the recidivism of 
several firms participating in multiple cartel arrangements, which is in part dependent on the 
market environment, as shown by the HHI index. Amongst firms with given board and CEO 
characteristics, a hidden tendency to cartelise competition is indicated. In order for a cartel to 
persist, it is important for the board, the CEO, and other organisers to bargain for its duration.  
 
This study identifies the dependent variable as detected and non-detected cartel firms and those 
not in cartels at all. However, firms not committing cartels cannot be absolutely discounted of 
the possibility of cartel commission just because no detection had taken place, but it is also 
possible that they too are into cartels but have not been detected. The concept of ownership 
concentration amongst cartel firms is demonstrated in this report. Such ownership concentration 




In terms of cartels and compliance code needs, there exists corporate anti-cartel compliance 
programme, which includes audit function, risk assessment, training, organisational behaviour 
modifications and responses to competition law, as well as cultural change and proper evaluation 
of current behaviour.  
 
The next chapter provides a summary of research results, recommendations, limitations of the 
research, suggestions for future research, and conclusion, finalising the findings and insights for 

























Chapter Seven  
Summary and Conclusion  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises this research study and its key findings. It will be structured as below: 
1. Summary of the research results 
2. Research recommendations 
3. Limitations of the research  
4. Suggestions for future research  
5. Conclusion  
 
7.2 Summary of Research Results 
Fifteen propositions and main findings of their tests are summarised in Table 7.1. The results 





















Table 7.1 Summary of Research Results 
  Proposition Findings Models 
Board Characteristics 
P1: 
The size of board of directors is larger for firms committing 
cartel than for a matched sample of non-cartel firms. 




The percentage of independent (non-executive) members on the 
board of director is lower for firms committed cartel crime than 
for non-cartel firms. 




The average age of board directors for cartel firms is lower than 
non-cartel firms. 
Not supported   
P4:  
There are less female directors on the board of cartel firms than 
the non-cartel firms. 
Not supported   
P5:  
The average duration of the cartel board is less than the non-
cartel firms 
Not supported   
P6: 
 Board remuneration for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel 
firms. 





The percentage of outside directors’ stock ownership is lower 
for cartel firms than for a matched sample of firms not convicted 
of the cartel 
Not supported   
P8:  Cartel likely to be formed by family-owned and controlled firms Not supported   
CEO Characteristics 
P9:  
The age of the CEO for cartel firms is higher than non-cartel 
firms 




The number of years a CEO had served as a director for a cartel 
firm is less than that for non-cartel firms. 




Female CEOs are less represented in cartel firms than in non-
cartel firms. 




Boards of directors of a firm committing cartel crime are less 
likely to have directors who work on other boards, compared 
with boards of directors of non-cartel firms. 
Not supported   
P13:  
Firms that commit cartel crimes are more likely to have CEOs 
serving as board chairs compared to non-cartel firms. 
Supported and significant 
at p<0.05 
2,3,4,5,6,7 
CEO Compensation Scheme 
P14:  
 The average CEO bonus for cartel firms is higher than non-
cartel firms 




 The average CEO share for cartel firms is higher than non-
cartel firms 
Not supported   
P16: 
Total CEO Compensation for cartel firms is higher than non-
cartel firms. 




In addition the study also found that The CEO tenure in models 7, 8, and 9 is negative and 
significantly different from zero in estimating cartel formation and discovery (CONV).  BOSS 





Moreover, Board size (Sizeba), board duration (DURBA) and non-executive directors 
(NED(%)) have a significant difference between UK cartel firm-home and UK cartel firm-
abroad in terms of board characteristics. Board age (AGEBA), gender of the board (GENBA 
(%)) and outside ownership (OUTOWN (%)) have no significant difference based on p-value of 
0.05. 
 
CEO Characteristics, CEO tenure (CEOten) and CEO age (CEOage) demonstrate a significant 
difference along with CEO compensation. The size of the board (SIZEBA) and board duration 
(DURBA) indicate a significant difference at p<0.05, along with the age of the board at p<0.01.  
 
7.3 Research Recommendations  
Recommendation 1: All firms should maintain a compliance code in respect of anti-cartel 
expectations. 
Internal management controls must both incentivise and constrain managers to remain within the 
limits set in firm law, but if these controls are not in place, identifying accountability becomes 
far more difficult. Accountability is obfuscated by having poor internal controls, and these 
controls may be left deliberately diffuse at senior levels of management. Other “professional 
hiding techniques” and “indemnification methods” would include finding low-level scapegoats, 
and contractual insurance as a bonus or benefit that contains a clause to leave the firm with 
immediate effect if antitrust proceedings could have any ultimate personal consequences (Cseres 
et al., 2006). These types of omissions and escapes must be avoided, and a compliance code will 
go some way to eradicating lapses and corrupt practices such as these types of arrangements. 
 
In the Hampton Review in the UK, it was found out that too many forms and duplication of 
regulatory activities placed a significant burden not only on the regulated third party, but also on 
the regulator, and degraded the efficiency of regulation. The development of a risk register on 
potential cartel activity could alleviate some of these burdens on regulators, who often, are 
woefully under-resourced, especially in regard to investigating complex and international 
arrangements of hidden collusions.  
 
Recommendation 2: Data related to potential cartel arrangements should be proffered by firms 
and made obligatory by regulators in order to alleviate the burdens of sector inspections in 




Firms that have no history of cartel activity and which have developed anti-cartel compliance 
codes would obviously benefit from lighter touch inspections. The carrot and stick approach 
should also include how data is collected. The research conducted in this study encountered a 
range of difficulties assembling a comprehensive set of data on cartel activity alongside CEO 
and board characteristics. Any accurate risk assessment process automatically requires 
comprehensive and current data to be effective. Knowing that regulatory data now include CEO 
and board characteristics would place more effective supervisory pressures on CEOs and boards 
to not engage with cartel activity. Accountability will be enhanced by improved and 
comprehensive data collection.  
 
Studies have detected tacit or secret collusion using econometric techniques that only require 
average price data and a minimal amount of other data (Ganslandt, et al., 2007).This study 
performs a similar function in respect of organisational data, but the assembly of such data 
remains a substantial opportunity cost for researchers. Hence one of the recommendations of the 
study will be not only around co-operation of leniency or sanctions, or other matters of 
disciplinary policy, but also around information, and the kinds of information strategies that 
national and international authorities will require to publish as regular schedules, if anything like 
real time risk assessment, or detection of collusion is to become more likely.  
 
Recommendation 3: Cartel should be distinguished between hard-core and crisis cartel. 
Leniency programmes should reflect the distinction. A categorisation procedure for labelling 
cartel as ‘hard-core’ should be followed and extra remedies applied in the aftermath in terms of 
transparency, this would include board and CEO characteristics. A board that has previous cartel 
experience and goes on to commit further recidivist acts of cartel activity should be punished 
with extra and punitive sanctions.  
 
Recommendation 4: Sanctions should be capable of deterring firms, including board members 
and CEOs, from cartel participation; lifetime bans on board participation or CEO responsibilities 
should be considered for the most egregious hard-core cartel arrangements.  
 
The cartel offence in the UK set out within Part VI of the Enterprise Act of 2002 remains the 
single piece of UK competition law to be criminal in nature, with breaches facing prison terms 
of up to five years (and unlimited fines). The act is stand-alone, and not connected to other 
competition laws, and is directed at individuals, not corporate entities. The same board directors 
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in breach of the Act may also be disqualified, and it is this latter punishment that is reckoned to 
have the maximum impact on rates of compliance. The cartel offence is sufficient grounds alone 
for disqualification, although this is a recent phenomenon (Furse, 2004). The director of a firm 
found to have breached the law may also be found “unfit to be concerned in the management of 
a firm” (Furse, 2004). This is upheld even if only the omission of action against the breach is 
found, where reasonable grounds would have suspected the matter of the breach, or the director 
had direct responsibility and should have known the breach. Competition disqualification orders 
or undertakings (CDO / CDU) can follow, with the disqualification period potentially reaching 
15 years. There is a great deal of discretion in such arrangements, perhaps too much for the 
maximal deterrent effect on individual CEOs and board members. 
 
To separate hard-core from other forms of cartel, and especially the so-called ‘crisis cartel’ is 
one recommended distinction of contemporary thinking on the subject of cartel. Cartel do not 
always have a uniformly destructive intent or purpose. In economic crises, the national and 
international competition authorities maintains an advocacy role for enhancing competition but 
when price and market volatility, (and the consequences of that volatility), become severe 
(especially for poorer producers), then ‘crisis cartel’ may be accepted as a viable practical 
alternative that may have some merit as a temporary remedy to market volatility. Other 
intervention measures should be considered, amongst them financial market and credit 
alternatives (OECD, 2004). However, the results of this study show that a focus, like U.S. DoJ 
practice, should be maintained on individual CEO and board responsibility. 
 
The outcome or ‘Response’ by the UK Government’s Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) to its own competition review created much controversy with lowering the criminal 
standard for the UK cartel offence. Critics have recently berated the dangers of lowering the 
standard since expanding the scope of criminal behaviour is dangerous, merely to expedite 
prosecutions. Patel and Gottlieb (2012) point to the injustice of prosecuting “mid-level 
executives who may not be privy to the full commercial impact of their actions”. Therefore, the 
legal fraternity and government are expanding the organisational scope of cartel offences to sub-
CEO and sub-board levels of management. This in fact should be encouraged. 
 
The OECD’s (2002) new lead on this change – “individual sanctions can strengthen the 
incentive of directors and employees to resist corporate pressure to engage in unlawful activity, 
and thus enhance the level of deterrence”– is partly spurred by how individuals in the US went 




Recommendation 5: Co-operation and policy formation amongst countries should be 
considerably expanded so as to facilitate the detection of international cartel activities. 
 
By necessity, with the GATT and WTO reduction and dismantling of tariff barriers, competition 
is seen by CEOs and directors through a thorough “international lens” (LeClair, 2011). This 
internationalisation process has indeed changed the way cartels co-operate and how competition 
laws must be regulated and enforced. First, regulation and investigation will often involve 
domestic and foreign firms. Disclosing and sharing confidential commercial information, as part 
of a prosecution, must be done with utmost care, in consideration of foreign legislation 
negotiated in parallel between foreign regulators (LeClair, 2011). This may lead to inefficiencies 
as well as unfamiliar complexity. Different sanctions in different jurisdictions also raise 
questions of justice. The OECD has strongly supported harmonisation of domestic privacy laws 
in connection with antitrust investigations (LeClair, 2011: 107).  
 
Recommendation 6: The group total turnover rule should be applied with greater consistency 
and frequency. 
 
Attributing liability to a parent firm has potentially significant consequences for all firms with 
economic activity in the EU (Atlee, Botteman and Joshua, 2012): 
i. The maximum fine limit of 10% of global turnover now applies to aggregate group sales 
on a global basis as a single economic unit, which means subsidiaries can be jointly 
and severally liable for fines, which would finally become times the limit that would 
have applied to them as separate economic units. 
ii. The risk of discovering recidivism, i.e. CONV>1 - which can attract more punitive levels 
of fines – will now automatically increase if any previous cartel activity amongst 
subsidiaries could potentially be taken into account (Atlee et al., 2012). 
 
The expectation is that deterrence effects will be raised. The deterrence signal and threat of 
sanctions applied to large firms and especially multinationals will be watched and incorporated 
into an organisational culture when in fact “total group turnover is taken as the yardstick” (Atlee 
et al., 2012). The actions of subsidiaries would be accountable, and then court decisions taken 
against parent firms could make filing civil damages more plausible and financially viable. In 
such a regulatory and legal environment, the imperative to recreate an anti-cartel culture across a 
whole organisation, with all that implies for C-suite sponsorship, resource commitment and new 
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norms and values, will be much more easily promulgated. This approach to deterrence and 
prosecution has been lacking in the UK.  
 
Recommendation 7: As the UK authorities acknowledge, there should be greater sharing of 
expertise or secondments in order to improve case management”, precisely in order to bring a 
proactive competition perspective to sectoral regulation, instead of only more passive 
administrative regulation (such as monitoring mergers and acquisitions, and concentration 
indices, as the main pro-competition features of any sector) (Business Innovation and Skills, 
2012). The expansion of these exchanges on an international front should be sponsored by 
governments, but there is much to be done at national levels. 
 
Recommendation 8: Sspecialist risk assessment tools should be used and shared between 
countries in order to make regulation and investigation more efficient and less costly to firms 
and regulators. Bilateral and multilateral consultations over risk assessment procedures should 
be formalised and established on a regular cycle. 
 
For instance, in this study, a risk assessment procedure could have been developed from 
grouping CEO and board characteristic risk factors, and plotting the two aggregates on a graph 
with a 2x2 matrix overlay. An example template is given in Appendix 9. 
 
Recommendation 9: Records of cartel activity and sanctions against any single firm should be 
placed in the international domain, in a specialist register for access by sanctioned public bodies 
and researchers. 
 
The difficulty in espousing transparency in corporate governance, partly for mitigating the 
agency problem by information symmetries between principals and agents, is that the business 
and managerial world is tirelessly inventive and improvisational. In oligopolistic markets, some 
incentives induce income smoothing that allows shareholders to enjoy high collusive profits, and 
the low-powered managerial incentives are “optimal” in how they induce behaviour that 
ultimately maximises firm profits. Increased transparency through Corporate Governance “codes 
of best practice” may then have negative consequences, if those measures reinforce the pro-
collusive effect of increasing the cost – or prevent entirely – a secret renegotiation of top 
managers’ compensation. Like all monitoring regimes, with too great an intensity of 
surveillance, all kinds of behaviour are driven ‘underground’, and these can even exacerbate 
milder forms of corporate abuse, including less hard-core cartel formation. Therefore, one of the 
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messages of the empirical research could be that only very high risks of the more egregious 
collusive behaviour should be recorded and policed, at least to begin with.  
 
Recommendation 10: More specialist risk assessment research should be funded into the 
organisational cultures and structures that facilitate cartel formation. Recognition should be 
made that the regulative, normative and cognitive-cultural aspects of cartel activity must be 
investigated along with traditional economic activities.  
 
Recommendation 11: In relation to Recommendation 10, cartel culture can be reproduced, like 
any other form of corporate culture, by hiring practices. The power of CEOCASE and 
CEONUM to basically predict recidivist behaviour is striking. There should be research in 
human resource management studies as to how those CEOs and board members who have 
participated and facilitated cartel activity, were actually recruited. How corporate action is 
embedded within social networks assumed almost the status of conventional wisdom in 
organisation theory throughout the 1980s, with the rise of ‘economic sociology’ that criticised 
the ‘under socialised’ quality of economics in general (Granovetter, 1985). Inter-corporation 
links between directors have since then attracted a significant amount of attention (Davis and 
Robbins, 2004). Examining such links around cartels from a human resource management 
perspective may be instructive. Remuneration and rewards have been studied in depth in the 
research, and this research has also included remuneration (REMUN) as a factor in cartel 
formation. Empirically speaking, the size of remuneration effects (around -0.03) was much 
lower than many of the other effects such as gender. The investigation of cartels could and 
should also be extended further back in time to the recruitment processes of cartel firms, and 
whether or not boards and CEO positions are publicly advertised, or whether the positions are 
filled with private sponsorship of known individuals. The successes of “carrot-and-stick” 
policies – invoking harsher penalties for cartel ringleaders and instigators, but improving 
programmes designed to reward defecting cartel members who then co-operate with competition 
authorities, should be extended. Data collection should follow through on how changes in CEO 






7.4 Limitations of the Research  
Corporate governance is certainly rising in interest with “truly interdisciplinary” research 
undertaken by researchers not only in the fields of economics and finance, but also in law, 
management, and accounting (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). The relationship between 
corporate governance practice and cartel, in a time of rising cartel activity, deserves more 
research, which must be of an interdisciplinary kind. 
 
In this study, the internal control environment is focussed on board characteristics and not on 
board decisions or activities. The model is a static model of board and CEO characteristics. 
Empirical studies, such as this one, are insufficient to extract the dynamic measures of personal 
force that all cartel, and especially sophisticated cartel, must muster in their lead organisers. 
Chen (2008) revealed how a CEO’s delegation of authority over collusion, and the decision-
making in connivance of collusion, can actually mitigate the temptation of a subordinate to 
renege or whistle blow on the cartel. Thus, CEOs and board members may use their personal 
influence, and charisma, to trap others in a cartel and its maintenance, by effectively ‘framing’ 
the subordinate as an active participant in the cartel. This is added to the research indicating that 
minimising the maximum temptation to renege on assumed active participation, or a relational 
contract, is the best strategy for cartel longevity (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002). The 
CEO’s personal charisma and influence is critical in these matters, and of course will remain an 
elusive characteristic to model. 
 
Also, in hierarchical but decentralised firms, the exposure of top executives, such as CEOs and 
board members, is often minimal compared to that of senior managers (Chen, 2008). However, 
there is little data as yet on individuals in cracked cartel. This study is one effort to supplant that 
lack. One study found only two firms from nine where top executives had decision-making roles 
in collusion, within a study of decentralised firms (Harrington, 2006a). Therefore, the data here 
could be further checked whether or not this feature of collusion exists in the data set.  
 
In common with most empirical studies, this research considers known cartels as well as those 
not detected but might also be involved in cartelisation. The dependent variable (CONV) which 
separates those firms that formed cartels that were detected from all other firms some of which 
were not in cartels and other which were in cartel but were not detected/ discovered. The non-
cartel firms however, might also be in cartel but have not been discovered/ detected, which 
cannot qualify them to be called "cartel firms" in this study. Therefore, there is a possibility that 
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some of the non-cartel firms in this study are already in undetected/ undiscovered cartel. Most 
cartels then are clandestine in their co-ordination and organisation of cartel activities, as would 
be expected. Cartel members typically attempt to cover up or destroy evidence of their meetings 
and communications. Suggestions in the cartel literature are that only about 10% to 30% of all 
such conspiracies are discovered and punished (Connor, 2008).  
 
Undiscovered cartels may be more durable or may differ in some other economic characteristics, 
but it is also possible that discovery is tied only to managerial personality characteristics (e.g., 
the tendency to become a whistle-blower), which are distributed disproportionately to discovered 
cartels. If the latter is true, then the discovered cartels in this report may be representative of the 
majority of cartels that are hidden. However, much more research will be needed into how cartel 
duration is helped by CEO and board characteristics. The bargaining power of CEOs and boards 
to effect a working cartel arrangement would need studies in greater depth, but of course this 
will be a difficult study to engage with for any CEO or board member who wishes to continue 
with a corporate career.  
 
Firms right now resort to codes to dissemble over firm names, plus encryption software, 
anonymous mailboxes including email, and select use of memory sticks instead of desktops, and 
encrypted mobile communications, all to secure secret co-ordination of the cartel (Whish, 2009). 
This research has contributed to the organisational dynamics of firms, but some of these 
technical issues need more research as part of organisational culture that rely on technology for 
illicit activity.  
 
The study is also dominated by UK firms. There can be little doubt that the profile of CEO and 
board characteristics as well as ownership structure would shift for a study dominated by 
Chinese firms for example, where it is well known collusion and secret networks of influence 
have led to expropriation and price fixing schemes. The field of research remains to be opened 
onto the Asian experience of cartel operation, and with the rise of the BRIC economies (Brazil, 





7.5 Suggestions for Future Research  
Even though the results of this research provide evidence that a number of corporate governance 
attributes are significantly related to cartel formation, there are several areas that are not covered, 
although that might be relevant to corporate governance and the formation of cartel. 
 
One of the possible avenues for future study is testing other corporate governance attributes that 
might aid the cartel formation, such as the audit committee and institutional investor. 
 
An additional avenue for future research is to test the period post cartel (after) conviction and 
compare it with the period pre-cartel formation (before). In this study, the focus was only on 
period pre-cartel formation. However, it will be beneficial to compare the corporate structure for 
firms’ post cartel convictions to see if there are any corporate governance changes.  
 
Another possibility for future research is to test the corporate governance structure for multiple 
abusers (recidivism) and single abusers, to find out whether or not there is a visible difference 
between their corporate governance structures.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a summary and conclusion of this study. The results are summarised and 
their recommendations are discussed. The potential limitations then are presented before the 
avenues for future research are highlighted. 
 
This study utilises cartel firms from an original data set of 1,901, with highest representation 
from UK firms, thereby supporting the decision to use UK firms as the focus of the study. 
There are a total number of 150 cartel firms involved, of which 114 are from the UK. The 
study purports to determine which characteristics of the participating firms’ boards of 
directors are associated with cartel formation and discovery. The results confirm that there is 
likelihood amongst public firms to engage in cartel agreements than private firms. This study 
identifies the attributes of corporate governance, which are grouped in four types as the 
following: board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics, and 




The challenge of this study is that the personal attributes of CEOs and boards can make a 
significant contribution to the risk profile of a cartel being formed. This indeed would be to 
‘diagnose’ organisational culture in a quite radical direction. The study suggests and finds that 
some corporate governance attributes are associated with cartel formation. The results reveal 
consistency with prior researches, that cartel firms have different corporate governance 
relative to a control sample in the three years prior to cartel formation. Specifically, the study 
concludes that cartel firms characterised by having larger board size compared to non-cartel 
firms; lower percentage of independent member (non-executive); higher average of board 
remuneration; less likely that cartel firm is owned and controlled by family; older CEOs 
represented on the board; having CEO who served a less number of years as a director; less 
likely to have a female CEO represented; more likely to have CEOs who’s combined CEO-
chairman position; and a higher average of CEOs bonuses and compensation packages. 
 
The main contribution of this research is to fill-in the existing gap in the literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance attributes and cartel formation. This study provides a 
contribution to understand how, and in what comparative measure, board characteristics, CEO 
characteristics and ownership structure do contribute to cartel formation likelihood. By 
providing an empirical instrument, this study may also contribute to monitoring the risks of 
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Appendix 1: Final Cartel Sample: 
Case Comp Nation Start End Conv DOJ EC CC Others 
Copper plumbing fittings Aalberts NL 1998 2001 1 0 0 1 0 
Steel, Flat Stainless Acerinox SA ES 1993 1996 1 0 1 0 0 
Copper plumbing fittings Advanced fluid Connections US 1998 2001 1 0 0 1 0 
Gasoline, Retail, Czech Republic AGIP US 2000 2001 1 0 1 0 0 
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge AIR ATLAS LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 1 0 0 
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge Air Canada CA 2000 2005 1 0 1 0 0 
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge Air France-KLM FR 2000 2005 22 0 1 0 0 
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge Air France-KLM FR 2004 2007 2 0 1 0 0 
Compressed industrial and medical gases 
in NL 
Air Liquide FR 1993 1997 1 0 1 0 0 
Gases, medical oxygen, AR Air Liquide FR 1997 2004 2 0 0 0 1 
Gases, medical oxygen, one rigged bid, 
CL 
Air Liquide FR 2004 2007 3 1 1 0 0 
Compressed industrial & medical gases in 
NL 
Air Products UK 1993 1997 1 0 1 0 0 
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge Air Canada CA 2004 2007 2 0 1 0 0 
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil Akzo Nobel NV NL 2001 2005 13 0 0 0 1 
Supermarkets Aldi DE 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Thread, automotive, EU AMANN UK LIMITED UK 1990 1996 1 0 0 1 0 
Construction, air conditioning systems, 
AU 
AMEC P L C UK 1991 2004 1 1 1 0 0 
Music downloading services, US APPLE OPERATIONS INTERNATIONAL US 2004 2008 1 1 0 0 0 
Toys & Games. UK ARGOS LIMITED UK 1999 2001 1 0 0 1 0 
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), ARLA FOODS LIMITED UK 2002 2003 1 0 0 1 0 
Supermarkets ASDA STORES LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
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Case Comp Nation Start End Conv DOJ EC CC Others 
Insurance premiums, non-life, Italy ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI-SOCIETA PER 
AZIONI 
IT 1993 1996 1 0 1 0 0 
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT AstraZeneca PLC UK 1995 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil AstraZeneca PLC UK 2001 2005 2 0 0 0 1 
New cars BMW (UK) LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Distribution, pharmaceuticals, CZ BOOTS (ALLIANCE BOOTS HOLDINGS LTD) UK 2006 2006 1 0 1 0 0 
Gasoline, Retail, Motorway Stations, 
France 
BP (UK) UK 1999 2002 1 0 1 0 0 
Gasoline, Retail, Spain BP (UK) UK 1998 2001 2 0 1 0 0 
Plasterboard BPB LIMITED UK 1992 1998 1 0 0 1 0 
Radiological Contrast Media, Non-Ionic, 
IT 
BRACCO UK LIMITED UK 1995 1999 1 0 1 0 0 
Marine hose (bid rigging vs. petrol. Cos) BRIDGESTONE COP UK 1999 2007 1 1 0 0 0 
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil BRISTOL - MYERS SQUIBB 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
UK 2001 2005 1 0 0 0 1 
Zinc phosphate BRITANNIA ALLOYS & CHEMICALS 
LIMITED 
UK 1994 1998 1 0 0 1 0 
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC UK 2000 2005 1 0 1 0 0 
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC UK 2004 2007 2 0 1 0 0 
Carbonated Drinks BRITVIC HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 1991 1998 1 1 0 0 0 
Supermarkets BUDGENS STORES LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Carbonated Drinks CADBURY SCHWEPPES P.L.C. UK 1991 1998 3 1 0 0 0 
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 1 0 0 
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED SG 2004 2007 2 0 1 0 0 
Oxo-Alcohols CELANESE CHEMICALS UK LIMITED UK 2003 2007 1 0 1 0 0 
New cars CITROEN U.K. LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Construction, air conditioning systems 
AU 
CMS ENERGY UK LTD UK 1991 2004 1 1 1 0 0 
Carbonated Drinks Coca-Cola & Schweppes UK 1991 1998 1 1 0 0 0 
Gasoline, Retail, Czech Republic CONOCOPHILLIPS PETROLEUM FIRM U.K.  UK 2000 2001 1 0 1 0 0 
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Case Comp Nation Start End Conv DOJ EC CC Others 
New cars DAIMLER UK PUBLIC LIMITED FIRM UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), 
UK 
DAIRY CREST FOODS LIMITED UK 2002 2003 1 0 0 1 0 
Auditing Services, IT DELOITTE MCS LIMITED UK 1991 1998 1 0 1 0 0 
Copper plumbing fittings DELTA PUBLIC LIMITED FIRM UK 1998 2001 1 0 0 1 0 
Marine hose (bid rigging vs. petrol. cos.& 
Navy) 
DUNLOP OIL & MARINE LIMITED UK 1999 2007 1 1 0 0 0 
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil Eli Lilly & Co. US 2001 2005 1 0 0 0 1 
Music downloading services, US EMI GROUP (S&E) LIMITED UK 2004 2008 2 1 0 0 0 
Recorded Music, IT EMI GROUP (S&E) LIMITED UK 1991 1997 1 0 1 0 0 
Construction, air conditioning systems, 
AU 
ENVAR LIMITED UK 1991 2004 1 1 1 0 0 
Auditing Services, IT ERNST & YOUNG LIMITED US 1991 1998 1 0 1 0 0 
Fuel, Aviation, IT EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL LIMITED UK 1991 2000 1 0 1 0 0 
Gasoline, Retail, Motorway Stations, 
France 
EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL LIMITED UK 1999 2002 2 0 1 0 0 
New cars FIAT GROUP AUTOMOBILES UK LTD UK 2000 2005 2 0 0 1 0 
Insurance premiums, non-life, Italy FONDIARIA (UK) HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 1993 1996 1 0 1 0 0 
New cars FORD MOTOR FIRM LIMITED UK 2000 2005 2 0 0 1 0 
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL FRANCE TELECOM UK UK 1997 2003 1 0 1 0 0 
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and 
anti-ulcer medicines), UK 
Gold shield Group Limited UK 1996 2000 1 0 0 1 0 
Toys & Games. UK HASBRO'S BIG PLAY LIMITED UK 1999 2001 1 0 0 1 0 
New cars HEIDI CAR (UK) LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Carbon Fiber HERCULES GROUP PLC UK 1992 1999 1 1 0 0 0 
Carbon Fiber HEXCEL (U.K.) LIMITED UK 1992 1999 1 1 0 0 0 
Thread, industrial in UK HICKING PENTECOST PLC UK 1998 2000 1 0 0 1 0 
New cars HONDA MOTOR EUROPE LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
IT services tenders, Episode 1, HU IBM IRELAND INFORMATION SERVICES 
LIMITED 
IE 2003 2003 1 0 1 0 0 
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Case Comp Nation Start End Conv DOJ EC CC Others 
Supermarkets ICELAND FOODS LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Copper plumbing fittings IMI GROUP LIMITED UK 1998 2001 2 0 0 1 0 
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES  UK 1995 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT INTERNATIONAL PA FIRM LIMITED US 1995 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and 
anti-ulcer medicines), UK 
IVAX PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED UK 1996 2000 1 0 0 1 0 
Auditing Services, IT KPMG AUDIT PLC    IE 1991 1998 1 0 1 0 0 
Plasterboard LAFARGE PLASTERBOARD HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 
UK 1992 1998 1 0 0 1 0 
Butyl & polybutadiene synthetic rubber, 
EU 
LANXESS LIMITED UK 1996 2002 1 0 1 0 0 
Toys & Games. UK LITTLEWOODS GAMING LIMITED UK 1999 2001 1 0 0 1 0 
Insurance premiums, non-life, Italy LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC UK 1993 1996 1 0 1 0 0 
Plastic bags/sacks, industrial LOW & BONAR PUBLIC LIMITED FIRM UK 1991 1997 1 0 1 0 0 
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT MEDA PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED UK 1995 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
Copper Concentrates MIM HOLDINGS LIMITED AU 2003 2005 1 1 1 0 0 
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL mm02 PLC JP 1997 2003 1 0 1 0 0 
Mobile phone roaming fees, UK & DE mm02 PLC UK 2001 2005 2 0 1 1 0 
Carbon and Graphite Electrical and 
Mechanical Products 
MORGANITE CRUCIBLE LIMITED FR 2002 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), 
UK 
MORRISON FOODS LIMITED UK 2002 2003 1 0 0 1 0 
Supermarkets NETTO FOODSTORES LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
New cars NISSAN MOTOR (GB) LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Steel Tubes, Seamless ("Line Pipe" or 
"Oil-Country Tubular Goods") 
NKK BUILDING SERVICES LIMITED UK 1991 1995 1 1 1 0 0 
Blood products, Brazil OCTAPHARMA LIMITED NZ 2003 2003 1 0 0 0 1 
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT OMEGA PHARMA UK UK 1995 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and 
anti-ulcer medicines), UK 
OPD CARTONS LIMITED UK 1996 2000 1 0 0 1 0 
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Case Comp Nation Start End Conv DOJ EC CC Others 
Mobile Phone roaming fees, UK ORANGE RETAIL LIMITED UK 2001 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Mobile phone roaming fees, UK & DE ORANGE RETAIL LIMITED UK 2001 2005 2 0 1 1 0 
New cars PEUGEOT MOTOR FIRM PLC UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT PLASMASELECT UK LIMITED UK 1995 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
Auditing Services, IT PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS AUDIT FIRM 
LIMITED 
UK 1991 1998 1 0 1 0 0 
Animal Waste PROSPER DE MULDER LIMITED UK 1990 1990 1 0 0 1 0 
Sewing needles, pins, zippers, fasteners, 
and other hard tailoring supplies 
Prym Group DE 1994 1999 3 0 0 1 0 
Snap buttons, rivets, and other  non-zipper 
fasteners 1 
Prym Group DE 1991 2000 4 1 1 0 0 
Snap buttons, rivets, and other  non-zipper 
fasteners 2 
Prym Group DE 1998 1998 2 1 1 0 0 
Zippers Prym Group DE 1998 1998 1 1 0 1 0 
New cars PSA Peugeot Citroen UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Marine hose (bid rigging vs. petrol. cos.& 
Navy) 
PW CONSULTING (UK) LIMITED UK 1999 2007 1 1 0 0 0 
Sewing needles, pins, zippers, fasteners, 
and other hard tailoring supplies 
QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED UK 1994 1999 4 0 0 1 0 
Thread, automotive, EU QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED UK 1990 1996 1 0 1 0 0 
Thread, industrial in UK QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED UK 1998 2000 5 0 0 1 0 
Thread, industrial, Benelux in UK & 
Nordic countries 
QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED UK 1991 2001 2 0 1 1 0 
Zippers QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED UK 1998 1998 3 1 0 1 0 
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and 
anti-ulcer medicines), UK 
RANBAXY (U.K.) LIMITED UK 1996 2000 1 0 0 1 0 
New cars RENAULT GROUP U.K. LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Copper Concentrates RIO TINTO PLC UK/AU 2003 2005 1 1 1 0 0 
Hotels, luxury, central Paris, FR RITZ HOTEL (LONDON) LIMITED(THE) UK 2001 2005 1 0 1 0 0 
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese),  SAFEWAY FOOD STORES LIMITED UK 2002 2003 1 0 0 1 0 
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Case Comp Nation Start End Conv DOJ EC CC Others 
Supermarkets SAFEWAY FOOD STORES LIMITED UK 2002 2005 2 0 0 1 0 
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese) SAINSBURY'S SUPERMARKETS LTD UK 2002 2003 1 0 0 1 0 
Supermarkets SAINSBURY'S SUPERMARKETS LTD UK 2002 2005 2 0 0 1 0 
Butyl & polybutadiene synthetic rubber, 
EU 
SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 1996 2002 2 0 1 0 0 
Fuel, Aviation, IT SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 1991 2000 1 0 1 0 0 
Gasoline, Retail, Czech Republic SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 2000 2001 4 0 1 0 0 
Gasoline, Retail, Motorway Stations, 
France 
SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 1999 2002 3 0 1 0 0 
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 2001 2005 3 0 0 0 1 
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge SINGAPORE AIRLINES SG 2000 2005 1 0 1 0 0 
Compressed industrial and medical gases 
in NL 
SOL SPAS LIMITED JP 1993 1997 1 0 1 0 0 
Oxo-Alcohols SOLVAY INTEROX UK 2003 2007 1 0 1 0 0 
Recorded Music, IT SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT UK LIMITED UK 1991 1997 1 0 1 0 0 
Bus in NE England STAGECOACH (SOUTH) LIMITED UK 1994 1995 1 0 0 1 0 
New cars SUZUKI GB PLC UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Supermarkets TESCO HOLDINGS LIMITED UK 2002 2005 0 0 0 1 0 
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), 
UK 
THE CHEESE FIRM LIMITED UK 2002 2003 1 0 0 1 0 
Steel, Flat Stainless THYSSENKRUPP STAINLESS UK LIMITED US 1993 1996 1 0 1 0 0 
Music downloading services, US TIME WARNER LIMITED US 2004 2008 1 1 0 0 0 
Recorded Music, IT TIME WARNER LIMITED JP 1991 1997 2 0 1 0 0 
Carbon Fibber TORAY INDUSTRIES INC. UK 1992 1999 1 1 0 0 0 
Zinc phosphate TRIDENT ALLOYS LIMITED UK 1994 1998 1 0 0 1 0 
Plastic bags/sacks, industrial UPM-KYMMENE (UK) HOLDINGS PLC UK 1991 1997 1 0 1 0 0 
Steel Tubes, Seamless ("Line Pipe" or 
"Oil-Country Tubular Goods") 
VALLOUREC MANNESMANN OIL & GAS UK 
LTD. 
UK 1991 1995 1 1 1 0 0 
New cars VAUXHALL MOTORS UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Mobile Phone roaming fees, UK VIRGIN MOBILE GROUP (UK) LIMITED UK 2001 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
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Case Comp Nation Start End Conv DOJ EC CC Others 
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL VIVENDI SA FR 1997 2003 1 0 1 0 0 
Music downloading services, US VIVENDI SA FR 2004 2008 2 1 0 0 0 
Cell Phone Rates, IT VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED UK 1998 1999 1 0 1 0 0 
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED UK 1997 2003 2 0 1 0 0 
Mobile Phone roaming fees, UK VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED UK 2001 2005 3 0 0 1 0 
Mobile phone roaming fees, UK & DE VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED UK 2001 2005 4 0 1 1 0 
New cars Volkswagen AG UK 2000 2005 0 0 0 1 0 
Supermarkets WAITROSE LIMITED UK 2000 2005 1 0 0 1 0 
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), 
UK 
WAL-MART LN (UK) LIMITED UK 2002 2003 1 0 0 1 0 
Snap buttons, rivets, and other  non-zipper 
fasteners 1 
YKK EUROPE LIMITED UK 1991 2000 2 1 1 0 0 
Snap buttons, rivets, and other  non-zipper 
fasteners 2 
YKK EUROPE LIMITED UK 1998 1998 1 1 1 0 0 
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Appendix 2: Cartel Cases and Firms Industries classifications  
  Cartel cases Cartel firms 
SIC Industries Initial sample Cartel cases Initial sample Cartel firms 
692 Accounting, and auditing activities 1 1 4 4 
731 Advertising  1 0 11 0 
511 Air Delivery   8 2 55 10 
244 Aluminium 3 0 18 0 
477 Antiques (retail) 2 0 11 0 
641 Bank and Financial Service 9 0 44 0 
110 Beverages - Wineries & Distillers 10 0 32 0 
235 Cement 8 0 38 0 
201 Chemical 46 9 264 22 
244 Copper production 5 2 29 6 
463 Dairy Product 8 1 48 4 
262 Data Storage Devices  1 0 10 0 
321 Diamonds 3 0 6 0 
477 Drug Distribution  2 1 9 1 
211 Drug Manufacturers  22 1 118 6 
275 Electronic Equipment  9 0 37 0 
742 Film Manufacturing 2 0 22 0 
463 Food - Major Diversified  9 1 62 9 
21 Forest Enterprises 1 0 3 0 
352 Gas Distribution 12 3 72 13 
236 General Building Materials  13 2 78 5 
421 General Contractors 3 0 23 0 
464 General Entertainment  2 1 9 4 
231 Glass Manufacture 2 0 8 0 
282 Heavy Construction  11 0 62 0 
551 Hotel 1 1 6 1 
192 Independent Oil & Gas 18 3 69 4 
432 Industrial Electrical Equipment  4 1 29 3 
651 Insurance  4 1 35 3 
612 Internet Service Providers  1 0 6 0 
309 Manufacture of motorcycles 1 0 5 0 
201 Manufacture/Rubber 1 0 18 0 
466 Manufacturing Building machinery 2 0 6 0 
463 Meat Product 1 0 6 0 
279 Mechanical Products 1 1 6 1 
325 Medical Appliances & Equipment 7 2 31 2 
619 Mobile Telephone Services 7 4 22 11 
182 Multimedia & Graphics Software  3 2 20 4 
171 Paper Manufacture 8 0 63 0 
211 Pharmaceutical 3 0 9 0 
201 Plastic/ Industrial 7 1 64 2 
261 Power & Distribution 3 0 10 0 
451 Sale of new cars and light motor vehicles 7 2 49 14 
502 Shipping 12 0 110 0 
782 Staffing & Outsourcing Services  1 0 4 0 
241 Steel & Iron 6 2 62 4 
612 Telecommunication 6 0 19 0 
133 Textile Industrial 6 6 33 13 
120 Tobacco 2 0 6 0 
324 Toys & Games  3 1 13 3 
351 Transmission of electricity 6 0 52 0 
493 Transport 1 1 3 1 
360 Utility Services 2 0 12 0 
471 Wholesale Products 7 0 54 0 
162 Wood Production  1 0 6 0 
  Total 325 52 1901 150 
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Appendix 3: Matching cartel firms with non-cartel firms 
Case Comp Peer1 Peer2 Peer3
Copper plumbing fittings Aalberts SUMATRA COPPER & GOLD PLC
Steel, Flat Stainless Acerinox SA RAINHAM STEEL COMPANY LIMITED
Copper plumbing fittings Advanced fluid Connections PRIMARY RESOURCES LIMITED
Gasoline, Retail, Czech Republic AGIP VALVOLINE OIL COMPANY LIMITED
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge AIR ATLAS LIMITED RYANAIR LIMITED
FIRST CHOICE HOLIDAYS & 
FLIGHTS LIMITED
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge Air France-KLM NAVTECH (UK) LIMITED
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge Air France-KLM NAVTECH (UK) LIMITED
Compressed industrial and medical gases in NL Air Liquide INEOS FLUOR LIMITED
Gases, medical oxygen, AR Air Liquide INEOS FLUOR LIMITED
Gases, medical oxygen, one rigged bid, CL Air Liquide INEOS FLUOR LIMITED
Compressed industrial and medical gases in NL Air Products ARCH UK BIOCIDES LIMITED
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge AirCanada Delta Air Lines, Inc
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge AirCanada Delta Air Lines, Inc
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil Akzo Nobel NV GENUS PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED
Supermarkets                                        Aldi                                                                 GLANBIA INVESTMENTS LIMITED
Thread, automotive, EU AMANN UK LIMITED GUILFORD MILLS EUROPE LIMITED
Construction, air conditioning systems,AU AMEC P L C MITIE ENERGY LIMITED
Music downloading services, US APPLE OPERATIONS INTERNATIONAL ZAPF CREATION (UK) LIMITED
Toys & Games. UK ARGOS LIMITED HOME SHOPPING DIRECT LIMITED
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), UK ARLA FOODS LIMITED AN BORD BAINNE LIMITED
Supermarkets                                        ASDA STORES LIMITED MARKS AND SPENCER GROUP P.L.C.
Insurance premiums, non-life, Italy ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI-SOCIETA PER AZIONIBanco Bradesco SA
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT AstraZeneca PLC SUZUKEN CO., LTD.
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil AstraZeneca PLC SUZUKEN CO., LTD.
New cars                                            BMW (UK) LIMITED PENDRAGON PLC
Distribution, pharmaceuticals, CZ
BOOTS (ALLIANCE BOOTS HOLDINGS 
LIMITED)
AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Gasoline, Retail, Motorway Stations, France BP (UK) POWER HOLDINGS LIMITED Genzyme Corporation 
Gasoline, Retail, Spain BP (UK) POWER HOLDINGS LIMITED Genzyme Corporation 
Plasterboard BPB LIMITED AMG RESOURCES LIMITED






Case Comp Peer1 Peer2 Peer3
Marine hose (bid rigging vs. petrol. cos.& Navy)BRIDGESTONE CORPORATION Sumitomo Rubber Industries
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil
BRISTOL - MYERS SQUIBB 
PHARMACEUTICALS TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED
Zinc phosphate
BRITANNIA ALLOYS & CHEMICALS 
LIMITED
BRITANNIA ZINC LIMITED
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC RYANAIR LIMITED
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC RYANAIR LIMITED
Carbonated Drinks                                   BRITVIC HOLDINGS LIMITED BOTTLING GREAT BRITAIN LIMITED
Supermarkets                                        BUDGENS STORES LIMITED
BOTTERILLS CONVENIENCE STORES 
LIMITED
Carbonated Drinks                                   CADBURY SCHWEPPES P.L.C. BOTTLING GREAT BRITAIN LIMITED
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED NAVTECH (UK) LIMITED CHINA AIRLINES LIMITED
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED NAVTECH (UK) LIMITED CHINA AIRLINES LIMITED
Oxo-Alcohols (butanols, propyls, hexanols, 
dioctyl phthalate, phthalic anhydride)
CELANESE CHEMICALS UK LIMITED DEIF (UK) LIMITED
New cars                                            CITROEN U.K. LIMITED JARDINE MOTORS GROUP UK LIMITED
Construction, air conditioning systems,AU CMS ENERGY UK LIMITED
MINING MINERALS CORPORATION 
LIMITED
Carbonated Drinks                                   Coca-Cola & Schweppes Beverages Ltd                                  AG Barr PLC
Gasoline, Retail, Czech Republic
CONOCOPHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 
U.K. LIMITED
TOTAL E&P UK LIMITED
New cars                                            DAIMLER UK PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY IBC VEHICLES LIMITED
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), UK DAIRY CREST FOODS LIMITED PEPPERCOM UK LIMITED
Auditing Services, IT DELOITTE MCS LIMITED TECHNIFORM (ENGINEERING) LIMITED
Copper plumbing fittings DELTA PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY Resonance Health Limited
Marine hose (bid rigging vs. petrol. cos.& Navy)DUNLOP OIL & MARINE LIMITED
WEST PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES 
CORNWALL LIMITED
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil Eli Lilly & Co. SUZUKEN CO., LTD.
Music downloading services, US EMI GROUP (S&E) LIMITED MURPHY LIMITED
Recorded Music, IT EMI GROUP (S&E) LIMITED MURPHY LIMITED
Construction, air conditioning systems,AU ENVAR LIMITED PACKO - BLACKWATER LIMITED
Auditing Services, IT ERNST & YOUNG LIMITED NEW MILTON CONCRETE LIMITED
Fuel, Aviation,IT EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL LIMITED VICTREX PLC
Gasoline, Retail, Motorway Stations, France EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL LIMITED VICTREX PLC




Case Comp Peer1 Peer2 Peer3
Insurance premiums, non-life, Italy FONDIARIA (UK) HOLDINGS LIMITED METLIFE EUROPE LIMITED
New cars                                            FORD MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED STRIPESTAR LIMITED
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL FRANCE TELECOM UK TALKTALK TELECOM HOLDINGS LIMITED
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and anti-ulcer medicines), UK Goldshield Group Limited BARD PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED
Toys & Games. UK HASBRO'S BIG PLAY LIMITED Grattan Plc
New cars                                            HEIDI CAR (UK) LIMITED STRIPESTAR LIMITED
Carbon Fiber HERCULES GROUP PLC
HUNTSMAN INTERNATIONAL EUROPE 
LIMITED
Carbon Fiber HEXCEL (U.K.) LIMITED Zoltek Companies, Inc
Thread, industrial in UK HICKING PENTECOST PLC Concord Fabrics, Inc HANRO THREAD LIMITED
New cars                                            HONDA MOTOR EUROPE LIMITED STRIPESTAR LIMITED
IT services tenders, Episode 1, HU IBM IRELAND INFORMATION SERVICES LIMITEDVISION HOLDINGS LIMITED
Supermarkets                                        ICELAND FOODS LIMITED FARMFOODS LIMITED
Copper plumbing fittings IMI GROUP LIMITED Namasco Corporation 
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT 
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES 
LIMITED
THE ROSTHERNE STRATHEARN AND 
COTTESLOWE TRADING COMPANY 
LIMITED
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT INTERNATIONAL PA COMPANY LIMITED NAPP LABORATORIES LIMITED
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and anti-ulcer medicines), UK IVAX PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED BR PHARMA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Auditing Services, IT KPMG AUDIT PLC BDO LLP LIMITED
Plasterboard
LAFARGE PLASTERBOARD HOLDINGS 
LIMITED
ELECO TIMBER FRAME LIMITED
Butyl & polybutadiene synthetic rubber, EU LANXESS LIMITED APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS LIMITED ITT Industries Limited Stadium Group PLC
Toys & Games. UK LITTLEWOODS GAMING LIMITED Amazon LTD
Insurance premiums, non-life, Italy LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC METLIFE EUROPE LIMITED
Plastic bags/sacks, industrial 
LOW & BONAR PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY
PLASTIC BAGS AND PACKAGING LIMITED
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT MEDA PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED NAPP LABORATORIES LIMITED
Copper Concentrates MIM HOLDINGS LIMITED
COPPERSMITH PLUMBING SERVICES 
LIMITED
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL mm02 PLC Yes Telecom 
Mobile phone roaming fees, UK & DE mm02 PLC Yes Telecom 




Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), 
UK 
MORRISON FOODS LIMITED MARKS AND SPENCER GROUP P.L.C.
Supermarkets                                        NETTO FOODSTORES LIMITED MARKS AND SPENCER GROUP P.L.C.




Case Comp Peer1 Peer2 Peer3
Steel Tubes, Seamless ("Line Pipe" or "Oil-
Country Tubular Goods")
NKK BUILDING SERVICES LIMITED BAT METALWORK LIMITED
Blood products, Brazil OCTAPHARMA LIMITED Baker & Taylor (Uk) Ltd Forbo-Nairn Limited TRAGO MILLS LIMITED
Antiseptics & disinfectants, IT OMEGA PHARMA UK SHIONOGI IRELAND LIMITED
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and anti-ulcer medicines), UK OPD CARTONS LIMITED ABC DRUG STORES LIMITED
Mobile Phone roaming fees, UK ORANGE RETAIL LIMITED RAYTHEON SYSTEMS LIMITED
Mobile phone roaming fees, UK & DE ORANGE RETAIL LIMITED RAYTHEON SYSTEMS LIMITED
New cars                                            PEUGEOT MOTOR COMPANY PLC
BRISTOL STREET FIRST INVESTMENTS 
LIMITED





Animal Waste                                        PROSPER DE MULDER LIMITED CROWN PET FOODS LIMITED Butcher's Pet Care Limited
Sewing needles, pins, zippers, fasteners, 
and other hard tailoring supplies
Prym Group Eliza Tinsley 
Snap buttons, rivets, and other  non-zipper fasteners 1Prym Group Eliza Tinsley 
Snap buttons, rivets, and other  non-zipper fasteners 2Prym Group Eliza Tinsley 
Zippers Prym Group Eliza Tinsley 
New cars                                            PSA Peugeot Citroen SCANIA (GREAT BRITAIN) LIMITED
Marine hose (bid rigging vs. petrol. cos.& Navy)PW CONSULTING (UK) LIMITED YOKOHAMA H.P.T. LIMITED
Sewing needles, pins, zippers, fasteners, 
and other hard tailoring supplies
QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED GUILFORD MILLS EUROPE LIMITED
Thread, automotive, EU QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED GUILFORD MILLS EUROPE LIMITED
Thread, industrial in UK QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED GUILFORD MILLS EUROPE LIMITED
Thread, industrial, Benelux in UK & Nordic countriesQUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED GUILFORD MILLS EUROPE LIMITED
Zippers QUANTUM CLOTHING GROUP LIMITED GUILFORD MILLS EUROPE LIMITED
Drugs, generic (warfarin, penicillin, and anti-ulcer medicines), UK RANBAXY (U.K.) LIMITED Generics Limited
New cars                                            RENAULT GROUP U.K. LIMITED LAND ROVER IRELAND LIMITED
Copper Concentrates RIO TINTO PLC ANTOFAGASTA RAILWAY COMPANY PLC
Hotels, luxury, central Paris, FR RITZ HOTEL (LONDON) LIMITED(THE) PARK TOWER HOTEL LIMITED (THE)
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), UK SAFEWAY FOOD STORES LIMITED AN BORD BAINNE LIMITED
Supermarkets                                        SAFEWAY FOOD STORES LIMITED
GLANBIA INVESTMENTS (IRELAND) 
LIMITED
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), UK SAINSBURY'S SUPERMARKETS LTD AN BORD BAINNE LIMITED
Supermarkets                                        SAINSBURY'S SUPERMARKETS LTD





Case Comp Peer1 Peer2 Peer3
Butyl & polybutadiene synthetic rubber, EU SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED ENI S.P.A. ARKEMA LTD. Chevron Corporation 
Fuel, Aviation,IT SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED ENI  S.P.A. ARKEMA LTD. Chevron Corporation 
Gasoline, Retail, Czech Republic SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED ENI S.P.A. ARKEMA LTD. Chevron Corporation 
Gasoline, Retail, Motorway Stations, France SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED ENI  S.P.A. ARKEMA LTD. Chevron Corporation 
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil SANOFI-AVENTIS UK HOLDINGS LIMITED ENI S.P.A. ARKEMA LTD. Chevron Corporation 
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED CHINA AIRLINES LIMITED
Compressed industrial and medical gases in NL SOL SPAS LIMITED KINGSTON MEDICAL GASES LIMITED
Oxo-Alcohols (butanols, propyls, hexanols, 
dioctyl phthalate, phthalic anhydride)
SOLVAY INTEROX LIMITED EVOTEC (UK) LIMITED
Recorded Music, IT
SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT UK 
LIMITED
MURPHY LIMITED
Bus in NE england                                   STAGECOACH (SOUTH) LIMITED ARRIVA MERSEYSIDE LIMITED First Glasgow (No.1) Limited Go North East Limited
New cars                                            SUZUKI GB PLC INCHCAPE FINANCE PLC
Supermarkets                                        TESCO HOLDINGS LIMITED
GLANBIA INVESTMENTS (IRELAND) 
LIMITED
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), UK THE CHEESE COMPANY LIMITED Westbury Dairies Limited 
Steel, Flat Stainless THYSSENKRUPP STAINLESS UK LIMITED TWM METALS LIMITED
Music downloading services, US TIME WARNER LIMITED WOKING TURNSTYLE LIMITED
Recorded Music, IT TIME WARNER LIMITED WOKING TURNSTYLE LIMITED
Carbon Fiber TORAY INDUSTRIES INC. Zoltek Companies, Inc
Zinc phosphate TRIDENT ALLOYS LIMITED Waston  
Plastic bags/sacks, industrial UPM-KYMMENE (UK) HOLDINGS PLC Fiberweb Plc 
Steel Tubes, Seamless ("Line Pipe" or "Oil-
Country Tubular Goods")
VALLOUREC MANNESMANN OIL & GAS 
UK LTD.
BAT METALWORK LIMITED
New cars                                            VAUXHALL MOTORS LIMITED LAND ROVER IRELAND LIMITED
Mobile Phone roaming fees, UK VIRGIN MOBILE GROUP (UK) LIMITED Yes Telecom 
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL VIVENDI SA Yes Telecom 






Case Comp Peer1 Peer2 Peer3
Cell Phone Rates, IT VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED TALKTALK TELECOM HOLDINGS LIMITED
Mobile (Cell) Phone Operators, NL VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED TALKTALK TELECOM HOLDINGS LIMITED
Mobile Phone roaming fees, UK VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED TALKTALK TELECOM HOLDINGS LIMITED
Mobile phone roaming fees, UK & DE VODAFONE GROUP SERVICES LIMITED TALKTALK TELECOM HOLDINGS LIMITED
New cars                                            Volkswagen AG JARDINE MOTORS GROUP UK LIMITED
Supermarkets                                        WAITROSE LIMITED TATES LIMITED
Dairy products (milk, butter, UK cheese), UK WAL-MART LN (UK) LIMITED Robert Wiseman Dairies PLC
Snap buttons, rivets, and other  non-zipper fasteners 1YKK EUROPE LIMITED PEEL LAND HOLDINGS LIMITED









Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics of All Firms (Cartel and Non-cartel Firms) 
The table reports a descriptive statistics of 150 cartel firms and 178 non-cartel firms. For every cartel firm, a control 
group of non-cartel firms was created, which share the first three digits of the SIC code and similar firm size based 
on net sale within ±25% of the cartel firm’s sales at the end of the year before the collusive agreement started. Firm-
years, in which cartel firms, i.e., firms that at one point in time during our sample period are part of a cartel 
agreement, are not participating in a cartel, are excluded from this analysis. Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel 
formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of 
the board pre-cartel formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the 
duration of the board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the average board remuneration pre-cartel formation. OUTOWN 
% is the common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if the firm is family owned and controlled. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting 
year of the cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year 
when the cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if 
CEO was female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair 
of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total 
number of directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO 
bonus. Share is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average 
three years CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. CurrRatioB is the average of 
current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is 
the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. JOIN is the number of member joined the 
board during that period. The variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with 
filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started.  
 
Category Obs Mean STDV 
Independent Variable     
Boards Characteristics    
Board size  328 5.11 3.78 
Board Duration  328 2.29 1.49 
Board age  328 44.7 10.7 
Gender diversity of the board (%) 328 0.08 0.18 
Common stock own by outside directors (%) 328 0.70 0.49 
Non-Executive director (%) 328 0.07 0.14 
Remuneration 250 1.26 9.69 
Ownership Structure      
Common stock own by outside directors (%) 328 0.70 0.49 
Family-owned and controlled firms 327 0.04 0.20 
CEO Characteristics     
CEO tenure 328 10.1 4.80 
CEO age 328 47.3 9.98 
CEO gender 328 0.10 0.31 
Concentration power  328 0.32 0.47 
Multidirectorship 328 2.37 2.82 
CEO Compensation     
Bonus 92 14.0 33.1 
Share 92 4.92 14.1 
Total-Compensation 93 49.7 16.2 
Control Variables    
Firm ownership 328 0.44 0.49 
Sale 321 2.99 32.7 
Poor financial performance  295 2.52 26.7 
Current ratio pre-cartel 314 1.48 1.12 
Herfindahl index 328 0.20 0.18 
Join 327 5.67 5.68 




Appendix 5: Descriptive Statistics for Firms Convicted of Cartel once (CONV=1) 
The table reports a descriptive statistics of cartel firms which convicted once, the sample varied between 113 to 28 
cartel firms depending on availability of the data.  Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel formation. NED% is the 
percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the board pre-cartel 
formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the 
board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the average board remuneration pre-cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the 
common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 
1 if the firm is family owned and controlled. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of the 
cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the 
cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO was 
female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the 
board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of 
directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO bonus. Share 
is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average three years 
CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio 
pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s 
ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. JOIN is the number of member joined the board 
during that period. The variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing 
dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. 
 
Category Obs Mean STDV 
Independent Variable     
Boards Characteristics    
Board size  113 5.10 3.83 
Board Duration  113 2.22 1.24 
Board age  113 44.3 9.20 
Gender diversity of the board (%) 113 0.05 0.15 
Non-Executive director (%) 113 0.05 0.15 
Remuneration 87 1.49 11.1 
Ownership Structure      
Common stock own by outside directors Outown (%) 113 0.73 0.4 
Family-owned and controlled firms 112 0.00 0.09 
CEO Characteristics    
CEO tenure 113 9.62 4.51 
CEO age 113 50.8 8.90 
CEO gender 113 0.00 0.09 
Concentration power  113 0.50 0.50 
Multidirectorship 113 1.58 2.34 
CEO Compensation     
Bonus 28 22.1 55.5 
Share 28 6.93 19.3 
Total-Compensation 29 9.5 28.3 
Control Variables    
Firm ownership 113 0.53 0.5 
Sale 113 6.01 55.3 
Poor financial performance  103 -17.1 16.2 
Current ratio pre-cartel 108 1.45 1.09 
Herfindahl index 113 0.24 0.21 
Join 113 5.33 6.23 







Appendix 6: Descriptive Statistics for Firms Convicted of Cartel Twice (CONV=2) 
The table reports a descriptive statistics of cartel firms which convicted twice, the sample varied between 23 to 12 
cartel firms depending on availability of the data.  Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel formation. NED% is the 
percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the board pre-cartel 
formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the 
board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the average board remuneration pre-cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the 
common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 
1 if the firm is family owned and controlled. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of the 
cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the 
cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO was 
female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the 
board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of 
directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO bonus. Share 
is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average three years 
CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio 
pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s 
ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. JOIN is the number of member joined the board 
during that period. The variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing 
dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. 
 
Category Obs Mean STDV 
Independent Variable     
Boards Characteristics    
Board size pre-cartel 23 7.73 3.50 
Board Duration pre-cartel  23 2.34 1.40 
Board age pre-cartel  23 44.8 8.73 
Gender diversity of the board (%) 23 0.05 0.11 
Non-Executive director (%) 23 0.10 0.19 
Remuneration 22 4.81 22.0 
Ownership Structure    
Common stock own by outside directors (%) 23 0.82 0.35 
Family-owned and controlled firms 23 0 0 
CEO Characteristics     
CEO tenure 23 8.21 4.05 
CEO age 23 52.2 9.61 
CEO gender 23 0.00 0.00 
Concentration power  23 0.34 0.48 
Multidirectorship 23 2.73 3.15 
CEO Compensation     
Bonus 12 21.7 18.6 
Share 12 9.64 16.0 
Total-Compensation 12 7.03 6.89 
Control Variables    
Firm ownership 23 0.78 0.42 
Sale 23 17.3 37.7 
Poor financial performance  22 -9.99 29.3 
Current ratio pre-cartel 23 1.43 0.85 
Herfindahl index 23 0.23 0.23 
Join 23 5.70 4.90 





Appendix 7: Descriptive Statistics for Firms Convicted of Cartel Three Times (CONV=3) 
The table reports a descriptive statistics of cartel firms which convicted three times, the sample varied between 7 to 
4cartel firms depending on availability of the data.  Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel formation. NED% is the 
percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of the board pre-cartel 
formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the duration of the 
board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the average board remuneration pre-cartel formation. OUTOWN % is the 
common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 
1 if the firm is family owned and controlled. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting year of the 
cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year when the 
cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if CEO was 
female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair of the 
board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total number of 
directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO bonus. Share 
is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average three years 
CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Saleb is the average sales pre-cartel 
formation. CurrRatioB is the average of current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial 
performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public 
firms. JOIN is the number of member joined the board during that period. The variables on board and CEO 
characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements 
started. 
Category Obs Mean STDV 
Independent Variable     
Boards Characteristics    
Board size pre-cartel 7 4.74 1.68 
Board Duration pre-cartel  7 2.13 1.67 
Board age pre-cartel  7 46.4 5.44 
Gender diversity of the board (%) 7 0.04 0.06 
Non-Executive director (%) 7 0.00 0.00 
Remuneration 7 0.09 0.72 
Ownership Structure    
Common stock own by outside directors (%) 7 0.64 0.47 
Family-owned and controlled firms 7 0.14 0.37 
CEO Characteristics     
CEO tenure 7 7.28 5.40 
CEO age 7 49.4 8.10 
CEO gender 7 0.00 0.00 
Concentration power  7 0.57 0.53 
Multidirectorship 7 2.28 2.69 
CEO Compensation     
Bonus 4 17.9 21.9 
Share 4 20.3 23.5 
Total-Compensation 4 41.7 28.4 
Control Variables    
Firm ownership 7 0.71 0.48 
Sale 7 5.60 10.4 
Poor financial performance  7 17.2 63.6 
Current ratio pre-cartel 6 1.54 0.49 
Herfindahl index 7 0.24 0.21 
Join 7 6.14 5.49 






Appendix 8: Descriptive Statistics for Firms Convicted of Cartel Four Times or More 
(CONV=4 & more) 
The table reports a descriptive statistics of cartel firms which convicted four times and more, the sample varied 
between 7 to 2 cartel firms depending on availability of the data.  Sizeba is the size of the board pre-cartel 
formation. NED% is the percentage non-executive directors on the board pre-cartel formation. Ageba is the age of 
the board pre-cartel formation. GENBA % is the average gender ratio of the board pre-cartel formation. Durba is the 
duration of the board pre-cartel formation. Remun is the average board remuneration pre-cartel formation. OUTOWN 
% is the common stock owned by outside directors on the board pre-cartel formation. FAMCON is a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if the firm is family owned and controlled. CEOAGE is computed as the age of the CEO at the starting 
year of the cartel formation. CEOTEN is computed as uninterrupted years on the board of directors up to the year 
when the cartel started. CEOGEN is a dummy variable for both cartel firms and non-cartel firms with value of 1 if 
CEO was female and 0 if otherwise. BOSS is a dummy variable for cartel firms created with a value of 1 if the chair 
of the board held concentration power of CEO or president and 0 if otherwise. Multidir is calculated as the total 
number of directorship assigned to the CEO on other boards. Bonus is calculated as the average three-year CEO 
bonus. Share is calculated as the average three-year CEO shares in the firm. Tcomp is calculated as the total average 
three years CEO compensation in the firm. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. CurrRatioB is the average of 
current ratio pre-cartel formation. PPER is the average poor financial performance pre-cartel formation. COSTA is 
the firm’s ownership status to control for private firms and public firms. JOIN is the number of member joined the 
board during that period. The variables on board and CEO characteristics were obtained from proxy statements with 
filing dates three years prior to the cartel agreements started. 
 
Category Obs Mean STDV 
Independent Variable     
Boards Characteristics    
Board size  7 7.85 3.07 
Board Duration  7 2.70 0.97 
Board age  7 45.48 5.79 
Gender diversity of the board (%) 7 0.06 0.10 
Non-Executive director (%) 7 0.03 0.08 
Remuneration 7 0.13 0.13 
Ownership Structure    
Common stock own by outside directors (%) 7 0.64 0.47 
Family-owned and controlled firms 7 0 0 
CEO Characteristics     
CEO tenure 7 7.00 3.16 
CEO age 7 50.70 6.89 
CEO gender 7 0.00 0.00 
Concentration power  7 0.28 0.48 
Multidirectorship 7 1.71 2.36 
CEO Compensation     
Bonus 2 30.43 27.67 
Share 2 20.38 28.82 
Total-Compensation 2 57.66 8.54 
Control Variables    
Firm ownership 7 0.57 0.53 
Sale 7 5.32 10.56 
Poor financial performance  7 -21.27 45.30 
Current ratio pre-cartel 7 1.46 0.58 
Herfindahl index 7 0.15 0.40 
Join 7 6.28 5.19 






Appendix 9: CEO and Board Risk Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
